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Scientific	  knowledge	  is	  often	  relied	  upon	  for	  informing	  crucial	  societal	  decisions.	  Where	  
this	  knowledge	  is	  uncertain,	  and/or	  where	  these	  decisions	  are	  made	  amidst	  a	  contested	  
political	   landscape,	  science	  tends	  to	  become	  the	  focus	  of	   intense	  scrutiny,	  as	  has	  been	  
evident	   throughout	   the	   history	   of	   climate	   change	   politics.	   One	   consequence	   is	   that	  
instead	   of	   “scientising”	   decision-­‐making,	   science	   itself	   becomes	   more	   explicitly	  
politicised.	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   in	   order	   to	   contribute	   to	   contemporary	   debates	   about	   the	  
governance	  of	   science,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	  move	  beyond	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
policy-­‐relevant	   scientific	   knowledge	   is	   credible	   and	   to	   examine	   how	   scientific	  
knowledge	   is	  made	   to	   be	   credible.	   Drawing	   upon	   the	   concept	   of	   co-­‐production	   and	  
other	  insights	  from	  Science	  &	  Technology	  Studies	  (STS),	  this	  thesis	  presents	  a	  detailed	  
examination	   of	   how	   research	   into	   the	   health	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   (infectious	  
diseases	  especially)	  gradually	  gained	  in	  prominence	   in	  both	  public	  health	  and	  climate	  
change	   circles.	   Particular	   analytical	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   an	   epistemic	   community	   of	  
climate	   change	   and	   health	   (CCH)	   researchers,	   following	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   they	  
interacted	  with	  global	  political	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  
and	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC).	  	  
	  
Based	  upon	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	  with	  actors	   intimately	   involved	   in	  CCH	  research,	   this	  
thesis	   documents	   how	   the	   rise	   of	   CCH	   research	   influenced	   and	   was	   influenced	   by	  
particular	  scientific	  and	  political	  contexts	  related	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  climate	  change	  
as	  well	  as	  emerging	  infectious	  disease.	  	  The	  examination	  of	  a	  longstanding	  controversy	  
surrounding	   CCH	   research	   reveals	   many	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   assumptions	  
embedded	   in	   it,	   further	   demonstrating	   its	   contingency.	   However,	   despite	   that	   CCH	  
research	   is	   both	   uncertain	   and	   contested,	   actors	   in	   the	   political	  world	   often	   need	   to	  
know	  what	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  the	  field	  is.	   	  To	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  this,	  the	  
CCH	  controversy	  as	  treated	  by	  the	  assessment	  reports	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  
on	   Climate	   Change	   (IPCC)	   is	   explored.	   	   Although	   IPCC	   follows	   a	   complicated	   set	   of	  
procedures	   aimed	   at	   ensuring	   scientific	   and	   political	   legitimacy,	   this	   thesis	  
demonstrates	   that	   values	   and	   normative	   judgements	   are	   important	   components	   of	  
scientific	   assessments,	   helping	   to	   co-­‐construct	   particular	   science-­‐policy	   orderings	   at	  
the	  expense	  of	  alternative	  ones.	  	  	  
	  
Amidst	  ongoing	  debates	  about	  how	  shore-­‐up	  the	  credibility	  of	  climate	  change	  science	  
and	  politics,	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	  way	   in	  which	   IPCC	  assessments	   are	   currently	  
performed,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   tendency	   to	   present	   findings	   as	   “consensus”,	   may	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  Committee	  on	  the	  Climate	  Agenda	  (UN)	  
ICD	   	   	   International	  Classification	  of	  Diseases	  
ICSU	  	   	   	   International	  Council	  of	  Scientific	  Unions	  
IHR	  	   	   	   International	  Health	  Regulations	  
IOM	   	   	   Institute	  of	  Medicine	  (USA)	  
IPCC	   	   	   Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
LSHTM	  	   	   London	  School	  of	  Hygiene	  and	  Tropical	  Medicine	   	  
MMR	   	   	   Measles,	  Mumps	  and	  Rubella	  
MRSA	   	   	   Methicillin-­‐resistant	  Staphylococcus	  aureus	  
NASA	   	   	   National	  Aeronautics	  and	  Space	  Administration	  (USA)	  
NIH	   	   	   National	  Institutes	  of	  Health	  (USA)	  
NRC	   	   	   National	  Research	  Council	  (USA)	  
PAHO	   	   	   Pan-­‐American	  Health	  Organization	  (UN)	  
SAR	   	   	   Second	  Assessment	  Report	  (IPCC)	  
SARS	   	   	   Severe	  Acute	  Respiratory	  Syndrome	  
SPM	   	   	   Summary	  for	  Policymakers	  (IPCC)	  
SRES	  	   	   	   Special	  Report	  on	  Emissions	  Scenarios	  
SSK	   	   	   Sociology	  of	  Scientific	  Knowledge	  
STS	   	   	   Science	  and	  Technology	  Studies	  
TAR	   	   	   Third	  Assessment	  Report	  (IPCC)	  
TBE	   	   	   Tick-­‐borne	  Encephalitis	  
TP	   	   	   Transmission	  Potential	  
 ix 
UN	   	   	   United	  Nations	  
UNEP	   	   	   United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  
UNFCCC	   	   United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
USDA	   	   	   United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  
VBD	  	   	   	   Vector-­‐borne	  disease	  
WG	   	   	   Working	  Group	  (IPCC)	  
WHA	   	   	   World	  Health	  Assembly	  (UN)	  
WHO	   	   	   World	  Health	  Organization	  (UN)	  




From	  October	   6-­‐8,	   2008,	   the	   Spanish	  Ministry	   for	  Health	   hosted	   a	  meeting	   in	  
Madrid	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Public	   Health	   and	   Environment	   Department	   of	   the	  
World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO).	  	  This	  meeting,	  the	  WHO	  Global	  Consultation	  
on	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Health,	   gathered	  many	  of	   the	  world’s	   leading	  scientists	  
and	  organisations	  relevant	  to	  the	  topic.	  	  Tony	  McMichael,	  intellectual	  pioneer	  of	  
climate	   change	   and	   health	   (CCH)	   research	   and	   returnee	   to	   Australia	   after	  
several	  productive	  years	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Hygiene	  and	  Tropical	  Medicine	  
(LSHTM),	  chaired	  the	  meeting.	  	  Kris	  Ebi,	  then	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  
Climate	  Change	   (IPCC),	   acted	   as	   one	  of	   the	  meeting’s	   rapporteurs.	   	  Numerous	  
other	   well-­‐known	   scientists	   attended.	   Howard	   Frumkin,	   then	   director	   of	   the	  
National	  Center	  for	  Environmental	  Health	  at	  the	  US	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control,	  
was	  there,	  alongside	  Sari	  Kovats,	  Alistair	  Woodward,	  Elisabet	  Lindgren	  and	  the	  
late	   Paul	   Epstein.	   	   Each	   had	   published	   widely-­‐cited	   studies,	   served	   on	   IPCC	  
writing	   teams,	   and	   more	   generally	   worked	   to	   raise	   awareness	   about	   the	  
neglected	  but	  important	  potential	  health	  impacts	  that	  could	  –	  would!	  –	  arise	  due	  
to	  climate	  change	  (WHO,	  2009).	  
	  
Many	  of	  the	  attendees	  had	  known	  each	  other	  for	  several	  years,	  way	  back	  in	  the	  
early	  days	  when	   the	   topic	   registered	  barely	   a	   blip	   on	   the	  WHO’s	   radar;	  when	  
funding	   was	   generally	   unavailable;	   and	   when	   “proper”	   public	   health	   or	  
epidemiologic	  journals	  were	  highly	  sceptical	  about	  publishing	  their	  speculative,	  
statistically	   uncertain	   and	   methodologically	   dubious	   early	   studies	   that	   had	  
projected	   future	   health	   outcomes	   through	   the	   use	   of	   global	   climate	   change	  
models.	  	  	  
	  
By	  Madrid,	  however,	  the	  early	  days	  were	  ancient	  history.	   	  Climate	  change	  and,	  
by	  extension,	  climate	  change	  and	  health,	  was	  on	  everyone’s	  radar.	  	  The	  IPCC	  had	  
recently	   published	   its	   Fourth	   Assessment	   Report	   and	   subsequently	   won	   the	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2007	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	   alongside	   Al	   Gore.1	  	   Meanwhile,	   the	   World	   Health	  
Assembly	  (WHA),	  the	  governing	  body	  of	  WHO,	  had	  just	  passed	  a	  resolution	  on	  
climate	   change	   and	   health,	   thereby	   creating	   a	   formal	   mandate	   for	   WHO	   to	  
further	   pursue	   CCH	   work	   and	   opening	   up	   space	   for	   further	   funding,	   further	  
research,	   further	   expert	   solicitations.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   very	   purpose	   of	   this	  
consultation	  in	  Madrid	  was	  to	  identify	  and	  highlight	  global	  research	  priorities	  in	  
CCH;	   the	   consultation	   was	   the	   first	   and	   most	   direct	   response	   the	   WHA	  
Resolution.	   	   Thus	  buoyed	  by	   such	  noteworthy	   endorsement	  of	   the	   field	   –	   and	  
through	  their	  personal	  invitations	  to	  Madrid,	  by	  such	  noteworthy	  endorsement	  
of	   their	   status	  within	   this	   field	   –	   the	   conference	   atmosphere	  was	   triumphant	  
and	  jovial.	  	  Climate	  change	  and	  health	  had	  “arrived”.	  
	  
Following	  Madrid,	  health	  seems	  to	  have	  further	  enhanced	  its	  position	  within	  the	  
climate	  change	  world.	  	  After	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  
Change	  (UNFCCC)	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  2011	  meeting	  in	  Durban,	  South	  Africa	  
(COP-­‐17),	  WHO	  boasted	  that	  the	  profile	  of	  health,	  previously	  “very	  low”	  at	  such	  
meetings,	   had	   gained	   “traction”	   within	   the	   UN	   process.	   WHO	   provides	   an	  
explanation:	  
	  
While	  negotiations	  about	  mitigation	  targets	  and	  how	  to	  achieve	  them	  remains	  
politically	  contentious,	  the	  health	  community	  is	  increasingly	  uniting	  around	  a	  
series	  of	  key	  messages:	  
• the	  necessity	  for	  broad,	  urgent	  action	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  
emissions	  and	  stop	  continued	  erosion	  of	  ecosystems	  that	  sustain	  
healthy	  environments	  and	  human	  health;	  
• the	  need	  to	  support	  more	  climate-­‐resilient	  health	  systems;	  
• and	  the	  opportunity	  for	  smarter,	  more	  sustainable	  development	  to	  
generate	  immediate	  health	  "co-­‐benefits"	  in	  a	  greener,	  low-­‐carbon	  
economy.	  2	  
	  
                                                




index.html,	  accessed	  August	  23,	  2012.	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The	  potential	  utility	  of	   such	  a	  message	  emanating	   from	   the	  health	  community	  
has	  not	  been	   lost	   on	  others	   concerned	  about	   climate	   change.	   	   It	   is	   not	   simply	  
that	   the	   health	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   can	   be	   cited	   as	   a	   good	   reason	   to	  
mitigate	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	   	  A	  group	  of	  climate	  change	  communication	  
researchers,	   for	  example,	  very	  recently	  concluded	   that	  communicating	  climate	  
change	   via	   a	   public	   health	   frame	   “was	   the	   most	   likely	   to	   elicit	   emotional	  
reactions	  consistent	  with	  support	  for	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation	  
(Myers	   et	   al.,	   2012)”.	   	   Positive	   emotional	   reactions	   could	   lead	   to	  more	   public	  
support,	   which	   in	   turn	   could	   lead	   to	   additional	   pressure	   on	   governments	   to	  
address	  the	  issue.	  
	  
There	  are,	  consequently,	  numerous	  reasons	  for	  actors	  from	  political,	  scientific,	  
and	  civil	  society	  spheres	  to	  emphasise	  the	  health	   impacts	  of	  climate	  change.	   It	  
would	  be	  valid,	  however,	  to	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  do	  
so.	  	  Could	  making	  strong	  claims	  about	  the	  health	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  turn	  
out	   to	  be	   counter-­‐productive	   should	   the	   claims	   come	   to	  be	   seen	  as	  mistaken?	  	  
The	   IPCC	   has	   assessed	   the	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   of	   CCH	   research	   just	   as	   it	   has	   of	  
atmospheric	   science,	   but	   how	   much	   credibility	   does	   this	   accrue	   in	   a	   post-­‐
Climategate3	  world?	  This	  question	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  
CCH	   research	   addresses	   the	   future	   (e.g.	   more	   deaths	  will	   occur	   due	   to	   heat	  
waves,	   or	   many	   more	   people	   will	   be	   exposed	   to	   malaria),	   even	   though	  
communication	   and	   fundraising	   strategies,	   political	   treaties,	   and	   societal	   and	  
infrastructural	   adaptations	   to	   climate	   change	   are	   all	   dependent	   on	   decisions	  
that	  must	  be	  made	  in	  the	  present.	  	  And	  for	  each	  decision,	  somebody	  will	  need	  to	  
determine:	  is	  CCH	  research	  credible	  enough	  to	  necessitate	  and	  inform	  action?	  	  	  
	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   this	   question	   –	   relevant	   for	   all	   climate	   change	   science	   (e.g.	  
Jasanoff,	  2010)	  –	  will	  be	  asked	   from	  a	  somewhat	  different	  angle.	   	  Rather	   than	  
considering	   whether	   CCH	   science	   is	   credible,	   this	   thesis	   asks:	   how	   is	   CCH	  
                                                
3	  Climategate	  refers	  to	  the	  hacking	  and	  subsequent	  publication	  of	  emails	  of	  scientists	  primarily	  
related	  to	  the	  prestigious	  Climate	  Research	  Unit	  of	  the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia.	  	  Chapter	  5	  will	  
discuss	  Climategate	  in	  much	  more	  detail.	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research	  made	  credible	  (or	  not)?	  Answers	  to	  this	  question	  will	  be	  predicated	  on	  
the	   insight,	   to	  be	  elaborated	  upon	   in	   the	  next	   two	  Chapters,	   that	  much	  can	  be	  
learned	  from	  events	  such	  as	  the	  Madrid	  Consultation,	  for	  it	  is	  precisely	  through	  
the	  interactions	  between	  CCH	  scientists	  and	  broader	  political	  contexts	  that	  the	  
very	  notion	  of	  credibility	  is	  constructed.	  	  	  
	  
This	   thesis	   is	   organised	   as	   follows.	   	   Chapter	   1	   will	   introduce	   some	   essential	  
background	   by	   explaining	   how	   this	   study	   fits	   into	   current	   discussions	  
surrounding	  “expertise”	  and	  “risk”.	  	  It	  will	  also	  provide	  some	  background	  on	  the	  
two	  underlying	  and	  interconnected	  “risks”	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  branch	  of	  CCH	  
research	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  focus	  on:	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  climate	  
change.	   	   In	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   perspectives,	  
principally	  from	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  (STS),	  upon	  which	  this	  thesis	  is	  
based	   will	   be	   discussed.	   	   In	   addition,	   it	   happens	   to	   be	   the	   case	   that	   my	  
knowledge	  of	   the	  Madrid	  Consultation	   is	  connected	  to	  my	  participation	   in	  this	  
meeting	   as	   a	   representative	   of	  my	   employer,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   this	   chapter	  will	  
also	  explore	  the	  possible	  implications	  that	  this	  may	  have	  had	  on	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
Chapters	   3,	   4	   and	   5	   consist	   of	   three	   interconnected	   case	   studies.	   	   Chapter	   3	  
focuses	  on	  the	  CCH	  research	  community	  and	  the	  factors	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  
the	  field	  that	  influenced	  the	  emergence	  of	  CCH	  research	  as	  it	  transitioned	  from	  a	  
marginal	   field	   of	   inquiry	   into	   a	   fairly	   prestigious	   one.	   	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   a	  
longstanding	   controversy	   between	   CCH	   researchers	   and	   a	   group	   of	   disease	  
ecologists	  will	  be	  introduced	  and	  analysed.	  	  Examining	  this	  controversy	  exposes	  
some	  deeply	  hidden	  value-­‐based	  assumptions	  embedded	  in	  CCH	  research,	  and	  it	  
also	  reveals	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  actors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  controversy	  
have	  attempted	  to	  assert	  the	  credibility	  of	  their	  science.	  	  Chapter	  5,	  meanwhile,	  
will	   examine	   how	   IPCC	   has	   been	   influenced	   by	   its	   role	   as	   a	   boundary	  
organisation	  mediating	  between	  science	  and	  politics.	  	  This	  context,	  in	  turn,	  will	  
be	  drawn	  upon	  in	  exploring	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  IPCC	  has	  formally	  assessed	  the	  
highly	  contested	  science	  from	  Chapter	  4.	  	  Chapter	  5	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  Concluding	  
Chapter.	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Chapter	  1.	  Expertise	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  global	  risks	  
	  
1.1	  	  Introduction	  
 
Paying	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   expert	   community	   of	   CCH	   researchers	   in	  
raising	  the	  profile	  of	  public	  health	  in	  global	  climate	  change	  scientific	  and	  policy	  
circles,	   this	   thesis	   draws	   upon	   the	   literature	   that	   has	   addressed	   the	  
interrelationships	   between	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   global	   governance.	   	   In	  
section	  1.2,	  the	  discussion	  will	   focus	  on	  “risk”	  and	  “expertise”,	  highlighting	  the	  
important	  role	  that	  expertise	  plays	  in	  framing	  initial	  conceptualisations	  of	  risk.	  
To	   elaborate	   upon	   this	   discussion	   while	   providing	   a	   few	   concrete	   examples,	  
sections	   1.3	   and	   1.4	  will	   explore	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   two	   purportedly	   “global”	  
risks,	   emerging	   infectious	  diseases	  and	  climate	  change,	  have	  been	   framed	  and	  
subsequently	  considered	  in	  international	  fora.	  	  The	  selection	  of	  these	  two	  risks	  
for	  discussion	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  accident,	  for	  the	  detailed	  case	  studies	  of	  Chapters	  
3-­‐5	  will	  primarily	  focus	  upon	  the	  CCH	  research	  that	  has	  addressed	  the	  potential	  
impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  infectious	  disease	  transmission.	  	  Thus	  sections	  1.3	  
and	   1.4	   also	   provide	   important	   context	   for	   these	   chapters.	   	   Finally	   and	  more	  
generally,	   the	   discussions	   throughout	   this	   Chapter	   will	   raise	   some	   more	  
substantive	   questions	   about	   how,	   precisely,	   the	   interrelationships	   between	  
expert	  science	  and	  governance	  can	  be	  both	  theorised	  and	  researched.	  	  This	  will	  
be	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  2.	  
	  
1.2	  	  Expertise	  and	  the	  globalisation	  of	  risk	  
	  
In	   today’s	   “age	   of	   assessment	   (Rayner,	   2003)”,	   governments	   increasingly	   rely	  
upon	  experts	  for	  input	  into	  technical	  decision-­‐making	  across	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  
topics:	  political	  experts	  for	  strategizing	  the	  next	  election;	  economic	  experts	  for	  
analysing	  sorts	  of	  possible	  causes	  and	  solutions	  to	  the	  financial	  crises	  of	  recent	  
years;	   climate	   modellers	   for	   predicting	   future	   heat	   waves,	   earthquakes,	  
tsunamis	   and	   floods;	   security	   experts	   for	   assessing	   various	   cyber-­‐	   or	  nuclear-­‐
warfare	  risks;	  food-­‐safety	  and	  genetic	  experts	  for	  weighing	  the	  potential	  health	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impacts	   from	   	   genetically-­‐modified	   (GM)	   foods;	   or	   public	   health	   experts	   for	  
tackling	  obesity	  or	  infectious	  disease.	  	  	  
	  
Although	   experts	   are	   in	   high	   demand,	   outsourcing	   a	   substantial	   volume	   of	  
policy-­‐relevant	  technical	  work	  is	  not	  without	  its	  perils.	  	  At	  the	  broadest	  level,	  an	  
emphasis	   on	   technocratic	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   highly	   specialised	  
knowledge	  throws	  into	  question	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  democracy,	  for	  it	  limits	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  what	  Habermas	  (1972)	  called	  “ideal	  speech”	  or	  Turner	  (2003)	  
somewhat	   more	   pragmatically	   labelled	   “meaningful	   discussion”,	   which	   are	  
simply	  not	  possible	  if	  a	  given	  subject	  is	  incomprehensible	  to	  all	  but	  a	  select	  few:	  
	  
One	   assumption	   of	   meaningful	   discussion	   is	   some	   degree	   of	   mutual	  
comprehension.	   	   But	   in	   the	   case	   of	   expert	   knowledge,	   there	   is	   very	   often	   no	  
such	  comprehension	  and	  no	  corresponding	  ability	   to	   judge	  what	   is	  being	  said	  
and	   who	   is	   saying	   it,	   and	   consequently	   no	   possibility	   of	   genuine	   ‘discussion’	  
(Ibid.:	  	  12).	  
	  
This	   would	   be	   true	   even	   under	   the	   ideal	   hypothetical	   circumstances	   that	   the	  
questions	   asked	   and	   the	   experts	   commissioned	   to	   answer	   them	   were	   both	  
perfectly	  objective.	  	  Yet,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  these	  circumstances	  never	  seem	  to	  hold	  
in	  practice,	  which	   raises	   several	  additional	   issues.	   	  To	  begin	  with,	   there	   is	   the	  
problem	  of	   the	   framing	  of	   the	  questions	   themselves:	  although	  often	  portrayed	  
as	   “technical”,	   they	   often	   embed	   social	   considerations	   and	   judgements.	   This	  
limits	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  both	  the	   issue	  and	  responses	  to	   it	  are	  considered.	  As	  
Jasanoff	  and	  Wynne	  (1998:	  5)	  have	  argued:	  
	  
…issue	   framings	  do	  not	   flow	  deterministically	   from	  problems	   fixed	  by	  nature,	  
but	  also	   that	  particular	   framings	  of	  …	  problems	  build	  upon	  specific	  models	  of	  
agency,	   causality,	   and	   responsibility.	   	   These	   frames	   are	   in	   turn	   intellectually	  
constraining	   in	   that	   they	   delimit	   the	   universe	   of	   further	   scientific	   inquiry,	  
political	  discourse,	  and	  possible	  policy	  options.	  
	  
Technical	   issue	   framings,	   of	   course,	   tend	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   reliance	   on	   experts,	   but	  
socio-­‐political	   circumstances	   influence	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  expertise	   is	   sourced	  
and	  mobilised	  by	  decision-­‐makers,	  as	  several	  decades	  of	  science	  and	  technology	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studies	  (henceforth	  STS)	  research	  has	  demonstrated.	  	  In	  her	  landmark	  study	  of	  
technocratic	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   USA,	   The	   Fifth	   Branch,	   Sheila	   Jasanoff	  
describes	   the	   engagement	   of	   experts	   by	   regulatory	   bodies	   as	   they	   attempt	   to	  
address	   risk-­‐related	   questions,	   which	   are	   invariably	   shrouded	   in	   uncertainty	  
and	   political	   conflict.	   	   Although	   a	   rhetorical	   boundary	   might	   exist	   between	  
experts	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  –	  or	  between	  science	  and	  policy	  –	  in	  practice	  this	  
boundary	  is	  both	  fluid	  and	  contested.	  	  As	  she	  wrote:	  
	  
…although	   the	   message	   ‘leave	   science	   to	   the	   scientists’	   was	   superficially	  
appealing,	   it	   failed	  to	  address	  the	  underlying	  problem	  of	  defining	  what	  counts	  
as	   ‘science’	   in	   areas	   of	   methodological	   uncertainty	   and	   political	   conflict	  
(Jasanoff,	  1990:	  59).	  
	  
Under	   these	   circumstances,	   different	   experts	   with	   their	   different	   branches	   of	  
science	   might	   reasonably	   have	   come	   to	   different	   conclusions,	   and	   thus	   the	  
selection	   of	   the	   experts	   themselves	   necessitates	   great	   attention:	   the	   answers	  
that	   they	   provide,	   although	   offered	   in	   technical	   language,	   tend	   to	   implicitly	  
incorporate	   “socio-­‐politically	   coloured	   judgement(s)	  about	   the	  acceptability	  of	  
risk	  (Ibid.:	  232)”.	  	  Because	  such	  judgements	  are	  not	  made	  explicit,	  expert	  advice	  
can	   be	   a	   particularly	   convenient	   ally	   for	   technocratic	   decision-­‐making	   bodies	  
like	  the	  US	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA):	  
	  
The	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  boundary	  between	  science	  and	  policy	  is	  also	  strategically	  
useful	  …	  permitting	  the	  agency	  to	  harness	  the	  authority	  of	  science	  in	  support	  of	  
its	  own	  policy	  preferences	  (Ibid.:	  178).	  
	  
Unfortunately	   for	   such	  agencies,	   the	  ambiguity	  of	   the	   science-­‐policy	  boundary	  
can	   also	   be	   disadvantageous	   in	   those	   instances	   in	   which	   their	   decisions	   are	  
contested.	  	  Coincident	  with	  the	  recognition	  that	  expertise	  is,	  like	  other	  forms	  of	  
knowledge,	  subject	  to	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  various	  social	  and	  political	  contexts,	  
many	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  has	  been	  over	  the	  past	  few	  decades	  a	  widespread	  
decline	  in	  the	  credibility	  of	  expert	  science.	  	  Incidents	  such	  as	  the	  scare	  over	  BSE	  
in	  the	  UK,	  nuclear	  reactor	  meltdowns,	  or	  the	  highly	  visible	  public	  controversies	  
surrounding	  MMR	  vaccines,	  genetically-­‐modified	  foods	  or	  climate	  change	  have	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collectively,	  it	  has	  been	  convincingly	  argued,	  contributed	  to	  publics’	  mistrust	  of	  
science	   and	   technology	   (at	   least	   in	   Western	   countries)	   	   (e.g.	   Hagendijk	   and	  
Irwin,	  2006).	  	  	  
	  
A	  useful	  way	   for	  contextualising	  this	  phenomenon	   is	   through	  the	   literature	  on	  
risk,	  such	  as	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	  Risk	  Society	  (1992),	  in	  which	  the	  limitations	  of	  “expert	  
systems”	  are	  inevitably	  exposed	  by	  their	  inability	  to	  contain	  risks	  which:	  
	  
…only	  exist	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  knowledge	  about	  them.	  They	  can	  thus	  be	  changed,	  
magnified,	   dramatized	   or	  minimized…and	   to	   that	   extent	   they	   are	   particularly	  
open	  to	  social	  definition	  and	  construction	  (Ibid.:	  23,	  emphasis	  removed).	  
 
Categorising	   something	   as	   a	   risk	   may	   be	   subjective,	   but	   it	   nonetheless	   has	  
societal	   implications	   because	   risks	   necessitate	   action.	   Collier,	   Lakoff	   and	  
Rabinow	  (2004)	  discussed	  Luhmann’s	   (1993)	  distinction	  between	  danger	  and	  
risk.	   	   Although	   both	   refer	   to	   a	   potential	   future	   harm	   or	   hazard,	   an	   important	  
difference	  is	  that	  if	  that	  harm	  is	  treated	  as	  danger,	  then	  its	  causes	  are	  thought	  to	  
be	   external	   to	   human	   control.	   	   To	   treat	   a	   harm	   as	   risk,	   however,	   is	   to	  
“technologize	  the	  threat,	  and,	  thus,	  to	  make	  our	  present	  actions	  responsible	  for	  
it	  (Collier	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  5,	  original	  emphasis)”.	  	  Consequently,	  much	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  
how	  risks	  are	  framed	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  framings	  define	  not	  only	  the	  problem	  but	  
also	   who	   has	   responsibility	   to	   manage	   it	   and	   what	   the	   range	   of	   suitable	  
solutions	  might	  be.	  	  
	  
That	   definitions	   and	   categorisations	   of	   risk	   are	   often,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	  
performed	  in	  situations	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty	  or	  even	  controversy	  increases	  
the	  chances	  that	  a	  given	  set	  of	  experts	  will	  be	  perceived	  as	  having	  been	  deficient	  
in	   defining	   and/or	   containing	   a	   given	   risk.	   	   This	   potential,	   in	   turn,	   lays	   the	  
foundation	   for	  a	  pluralisation	  of	  expertise	  –	  a	  civic	  revolt,	  of	  sorts,	  against	   the	  
technocratic	  order	  of	  things	  –	  which	  Beck	  contemplates	  through	  his	  discussions	  
on	  reflexive	  modernisation	  (cf.	  Beck	  et	  al.,	  1994)	  and	  subpolitics,	  which,	  among	  
other	  aspects,	   involves	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  alternative	  forms	  of	  expertise	  and	  a	  
related	  opening	  up	  of	  previously	  closed	  expert	  systems	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  political	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intervention.4	  	  Although	  Beck	  is	  perhaps	  over-­‐stated	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  extent	  
of	  social	  change	  that	  subpolitical	  movements	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  enact	  (e.g.	  
VanLoon,	  2002:	  38-­‐43),	  Risk	  Society	  conveniently	  draws	  attention	  to	  “expertise”	  
and	  its	  links	  to	  the	  production	  and	  management	  of	  risks,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  also	  
been	   key	   focal	   points	   in	   recent	   STS	   research.	   	   This	   theme	   is,	   naturally,	   highly	  
relevant	  to	  this	  thesis,	  given	  its	  interest	  in	  the	  role	  that	  a	  group	  of	  experts	  have	  
played	  in	  the	  re-­‐framing	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  both	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  
and	   climate	   change	   can	  be	  understood	  as	   risks.	   	  Before	  proceeding	   to	  discuss	  
the	   ways	   in	   which	   experts	   can	   be	   said	   to	   manufacture	   risk,	   however,	   it	   is	  
necessary	  to	  note	  that	  Beck’s	  treatment	  of	  “science”	  and	  “expertise”	  appears	  to	  
be	  naïve	  from	  the	  STS	  perspective.	  His	  account:	  
	  
…relies	   on	   a	   rather	   homogenized	   and	   sweeping	   generalist	   account	   of	   science	  
and	   technology	   that	   is	  more	   concerned	  with	   providing	   a	   critique	   of	   an	   image	  
that	   science	   constructs	   for	   itself,	   rather	   than	   a	   critique	   of	   scientific	   practices	  
(VanLoon,	  2002:	  46)	  
	  
Beck	  has	  furthermore	  been	  accused	  of	  not	  being	  adequately	  constructivist	  when	  
it	  comes	  to	  the	  production	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.	  	  He	  maintains	  too	  much	  of	  a	  
distinction	  between	  “nature”	  and	  “culture”.	  	  As	  Wynne	  argued:	  
	  
Once	  one	  introduces	  the	  idea	  that	  scientific	  expert	  knowledge	  itself	  embodies	  a	  
particular	   culture	   –	   that	   is,	   it	   disseminates	   and	   imposes	   particular	   and	  
problematic	  normative	  versions	  of	  the	  human	  and	  the	  social	  –	  then	  this	  divide	  
is	  no	  longer	  tenable	  (Wynne,	  1996a:	  75).	  
	  
Attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  scientific	  expert	  knowledge	  both	  produces	  and	  is	  
a	  product	  of	  a	  particular	  (epistemic	  and	  normative)	  culture	  will	  be	  an	  important	  
focal	  point	   for	  examining	  the	  activities	  of	   the	  CCH	  community	   in	  Chapters	  3,	  4	  
and	  5.	  	  The	  theoretical	  import	  of	  this	  idea	  will	  be	  further	  clarified	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  
which	  will	   explore	  how	  the	   idiom	  of	   co-­‐production	   (Jasanoff,	  2006a)	  can	  both	  
account	   for	   this	   observation	   as	   well	   as	   provide	   a	   workable	   framework	   for	  
                                                
4	  Beck	  (1992)	  also	  discusses	  the	  privatisation	  or	  individualisation	  of	  risk,	  in	  which	  individuals	  
become	  more	  accountable	  for	  the	  risk-­‐related	  issues	  that	  affect	  them	  personally.	  This,	  however,	  
is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  discussion.	  
 10 
investigating	   the	   inter-­‐relationships	   between	   the	   scientific	   and	   the	   political	  
worlds.	  	  	  
	  
For	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   current	   discussion,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   note	   that	   if	   one	  
accepts	   the	   proposition	   that	   expert	   knowledge	   is	   the	   embodiment	   of	   a	  
particular	  culture,	   then	  one	  could	  reasonably	  expect,	   in	  a	  multi-­‐cultural	  world,	  
more	  than	  one	   form	  of	  expert	  knowledge	  relevant	  to	  a	  given	  problem.	   	  Where	  
Beck	   appears	   to	   have	   assumed	   that	   alternative	   forms	   of	   expertise	   are	   also	  
“technical”	   in	   nature,	   STS	   has	   paid	   great	   attention	   the	   alternative	   forms	   of	  
expertise,	  often	  “local”	  and	  “lay”,	  that	  have	  something	  legitimate	  to	  contribute	  to	  
risk	  or	  scientific	  governance.	  	  This	  further	  challenges	  more	  conventional	  notions	  
about	  where	  the	  boundaries	  between	  science	  and	  politics	  lie	  (should	  they	  have	  
existed	  to	  begin	  with!)	  (e.g.	  Bloor,	  2000,	  Epstein,	  1998,	  Wynne,	  1996a).	  	  Work	  of	  
this	  nature	  has	  fuelled	  the	  so-­‐called	  deliberative	  turn	  in	  STS	  research,	  through	  
which	   the	   democratic	   imperative	   for	   more	   and/or	   better	   participatory	  
approaches	   to	   science	   governance	   has	   been	   made	   alongside	   critiques	   of	   the	  
successes,	   failures	  and	  implications	  of	   these	  approaches	  (Hagendijk	  and	  Irwin,	  
2006,	   Irwin,	   2006,	   Mohr,	   2011,	   Rayner,	   2003).5	  The	   upshot	   is	   that	   multiple	  
forms	  of	  expertise	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  contemporary	  science	  governance,	  even	  
if	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  how	  they	  should	  be	  more	  formally	  categorised	  and	  
incorporated	   into	   science	   governance	   processes	   has	   been	   a	   matter	   of	   quite	  
some	   contention	   (e.g.	   Collins	   and	   Evans,	   2002,	   Jasanoff,	   2003,	   Wynne,	   2003,	  
Durant,	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
More	  questionable	  than	  whether	  alternative	  forms	  of	  expertise	  have	  legitimate	  
contributions	   to	   make	   in	   science	   governance	   is	   whether	   they	   have	   much	  
influence	  in	  the	  production	  and	  framing	  of	  risks	  before	  they	  become	  a	  matter	  for	  
science	  governance.	   	  To	  begin	  with,	  as	  earlier	  argued,	  risks	  are	  very	  much	  the	  
product	   of	   “expert	   systems”.	   	   This	   is	   not	   simply	   because	   the	   applications	   of	  
                                                
5	  Some	  participatory	  approaches	  have	  at	  least	  been	  half-­‐heartedly	  incorporated	  into	  some	  
governmental	  processes	  in	  Europe,	  perhaps	  most	  famously	  the	  GM	  Nation?	  public	  debate	  in	  the	  
UK	  (e.g.	  Horlick-­‐Jones	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Rowe	  et	  al.,	  2005).	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science	   and	   technology	   often	   lead	   to	   the	   production	   of	   risks	   in	   the	   first	   place	  
(e.g.	  GM	  crops,	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change,	  nuclear	  fission),	  but	  also	  because	  
the	  initial	  identification	  of	  these	  risks	  is	  often	  –	  certainly	  not	  always	  –	  due	  to	  the	  
“sensory	  organs	  of	  science	  (Beck,	  1992:	  162)”.	  Where	  scientific	  experts	  identify	  
risks	   through	   their	   research,	   they	   consequently	   have	   significant	   sway	   in	   the	  
initial	  framings	  of	  risk	  –	  embodying	  their	  particular	  cultures	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
	  
One	  consequence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  scientific	  experts	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  risk	  may	  
be	   that	   risks	   tend	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   “global”.	   	   Beck	   even	   claimed	   that	   “risk	  
societies	   bring	   about	   ‘communities	   of	   danger’	   that	   can	   ultimately	   only	   be	  
comprised	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  (Beck,	  1992:	  47)”.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  
addressing	   risk	   is	   a	   key	   and	   often	   contentious	   activity	   at	   the	   UN	   level,	   but	   it	  
would	   be	   misleading	   to	   believe	   that	   risks	   are	   inherently	   “global”	   and	   thus	  
necessarily	   or	   even	   best	   dealt	   with	   internationally.	   	   To	   begin	   with,	   very	   few	  
risks,	   if	   any,	   are	   evenly	   distributed	   across	   the	   nations	   and	   populations	   of	   the	  
world.	  	  Furthermore,	  certain	  types	  of	  risks,	  notably	  environmental	  ones,	  tend	  to	  
have	  been	   framed	  as	   “global”	  by	  actors	  who	  have	  something	   to	  gain	   from	  this	  
framing,	  which	  also	  happens	  to	  fit	  neatly	  with	  the	  “universalising	  discourses”	  of	  
science	   and	   globalization	   (e.g.	   Yearley,	   1996:	   100-­‐141).	   	   When	   supranational	  
entities	   like	   the	   EU	   or	   UN	   initiate	   work	   on	   a	   particular	   risk,	   this	   is	   not	  
necessarily	  evidence	  that	  the	  risk	  is	  indeed	  universal	  as	  much	  as	  that	  its	  framing	  
as	   such	   has	   been	   successful.	   	   From	   an	   analytical	   perspective,	   this	  means	   that	  
problematising	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  risks	  solidify	  into	  dominant,	  global	  narratives	  
can	  be	  an	  essential	  focus	  of	  research	  into	  global	  science	  governance	  processes.	  	  
In	   turn,	   given	   that	   science	   and	   its	   practitioners	   are	   so	   instrumental	   in	   the	  
manufacturing	   as	   well	   as	   the	   management	   of	   risks,	   they	   are	   necessarily	   an	  
important	  focal	  point	  for	  investigation.	  	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  for	  these	  reasons	  that	  the	  
CCH	   community,	   many	   of	   whom	   were	   present	   at	   the	   Madrid	   Consultation	  
described	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   will	   be	   studied	   closely	   in	   this	   thesis	   (and	  
particularly	  in	  Chapter	  3).	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Studying	  the	  wider	  interactions	  between	  experts	  and	  governance	  structures	  and	  
processes	   will	   also	   be	   a	   particular	   focal	   point	   in	   this	   thesis.	   	   This	   is	   because	  
these	   interactions	  play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  determining	  how	  (and	  which)	  
expert	  knowledge	  is	  made	  credible.	  As	  Miller	  and	  Edwards	  have	  argued:	  
	  
Science’s	   place	   in	   global	   policymaking	   is	   increasingly	   formalized,	   boosting	   its	  
authority	   in	   policymaking	   processes	   but	   also	   subjecting	   it	   to	   new	   forms	   of	  
political	  and	  legal	  oversight	  and	  review.	  	  International	  expert	  institutions	  such	  
as	   the	   IPCC…increasingly	  determine	  which	  knowledge	   counts	   and	  which	  does	  
not,	  helping	  to	  shape	  crucial	  policy	  outcomes	  (Miller	  and	  Edwards,	  2001:	  29).	  
	  
Organisations	  like	  IPCC,	  which	  are	  heavily	  reliant	  upon	  expert-­‐driven	  processes,	  
are	   thus	   excellent	   sites	   for	   analysing	   how	   particular	   understandings	   of	   risk,	  
contingent	   as	   they	   are	   on	   particular	   standpoints,	   gain	   legitimacy	  where	   other	  
ones	  do	  not.	  
	  
In	   light	   of	   this	   discussion,	   the	   principal	   impetus	   behind	   this	   thesis	   should	   be	  
better	   understood.	   	   By	   following	   a	   community	   of	   researchers	   who	   became	  
instrumental	   in	   framing	   a	   particular	   risk	   –	   climate	   change	   and	   health	   –	   the	  
intention	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  political	  and	  scientific	  contexts	  have	  influenced	  
both	   the	   “arrival”	   and	   the	   “framing”	   of	   CCH.	   	   	   In	   order	   to	   provide	   some	  
background	  contextual	  detail	   relevant	   to	  CCH,	   and	   in	  order	   to	   further	   explore	  
how	  expertise	  and	  global	  governance	  processes	  interact,	   the	  next	  two	  sections	  
will	  explore	  two	  “risks”	  central	  to	  this	  thesis,	  emerging	  infectious	  disease	  (1.3)	  
and	  climate	  change	  (1.4).	   	  Section	  1.5	  will	  then	  summarise	  this	  Chapter	  before	  
moving	   on	   to	   Chapter	   2,	   which	   will	   discuss	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	  
considerations.	  
	  
1.3	  	  Emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  the	  “outbreak	  narrative”	  
 
Emerging	   infectious	  diseases	   are	  of	   great	   interest	   to	   this	   thesis	  given	   that	   the	  
CCH	  research	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  3-­‐5	  concerns	  the	  links	  
between	   climate	   change	   and	   diseases	   like	   malaria,	   dengue,	   and	   tick-­‐borne	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encephalitis.	   	   A	   discussion	   on	   EIDs	   provides	   relevant	   background	   into	   the	  
scientific	   and	   political	   dynamics	   contextualising	   CCH	   research	   as	   well	   as,	  
additionally,	  following	  1.2,	  offering	  a	  means	  of	  providing	  a	  concrete	  example	  of	  
how	  communities	  of	  experts	  are	  influential	  in	  the	  identification	  and	  framing	  of	  
“global”	   risks,	   and	   how	   interactions	   between	   experts	   and	   policy	   communities	  
are	  necessary	  for	  “stabilising”	  particular	  framings	  of	  these	  risks.	  	  	  	  
	  
Emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  (EIDs)	  have	  been	  defined	  as	  “infections	  that	  have	  
newly	  appeared	  in	  the	  population,	  or	  have	  existed	  but	  are	  rapidly	  increasing	  in	  
incidence	  or	  geographic	  range	  (Morse,	  1995:	  7)”.	  	  From	  roughly	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  
onwards,	   coinciding	  with	   the	  emergence	  of	  HIV,	  EIDs	  have	  become	  one	  of	   the	  
most	   important	  priorities	  within	  global	  public	  health	  and	  even	  global	   security	  
spheres.	   	   This	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	  mid-­‐twentieth	   century	   complacency	   that	  
existed	   in	  much	  of	   the	  West	  when	   it	  was	   assumed	   that	   infectious	  diseases	  no	  
longer	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	   humankind:	   “We	   can	   close	   the	   book	   on	   infectious	  
disease”,	  as	  the	  U.S.	  Surgeon	  General	  notoriously	  declared	  in	  1967.6	  
	  
Currently,	   according	   to	   the	   World	   Health	   Organization	   (WHO),	   four	   of	   the	  
world’s	   top	   ten	   causes	   of	   death	   are	   infectious	   diseases	   (lower	   respiratory	  
infections,	  diarrhoeal	  disease,	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  tuberculosis),	  which	  alone	  account	  
for	   over	   16%	   of	   global	   deaths.7	  	   This	   proportion	   is	   even	   higher	   in	   low-­‐	   and	  
middle-­‐income	   countries,	   and	   some	   estimates	   have	   suggested	   that	   infectious	  
diseases	  are	  responsible	  for	  nearly	  a	  quarter	  of	  all	  human	  morbidity.8	  	  WHO	  has	  
furthermore	   estimated	   that	   1500	   children	   die	   every	   hour	   due	   to	   infectious	  
diseases,	  while	   the	  World	  Bank	   estimates	   that	   infectious	   diseases	   account	   for	  
80%	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  life	  expectancy	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  countries.9	  	  	  
	  
                                                
6	  As	  cited	  in	  Kickbusch	  &	  Buse	  (2001).	  	  
7	  Based	  on	  2008	  data.	  See:	  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/index.html,	  
accessed	  May	  23,	  2012.	  
8	  Statistical	  Annex	  of	  2004	  World	  Health	  Report	  (WHO),	  
http://www.who.int/whr/2004/en/index.html,	  accessed	  May	  22,	  2012.	  
9http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040888~menuPK:3
4480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html,	  accessed	  June	  6,	  2012.	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The	   three	   EIDs	   with	   the	   highest	   profiles	   are	   arguably	   HIV,	   malaria	   and	  
tuberculosis,	  but	  there	  are	  countless	  additional	  examples,	  including	  methicillin-­‐
resistant	  staphylococcus	  aureus	  (MRSA),	  the	  Ebola	  virus,	  rotavirus,	  severe	  acute	  
respiratory	   syndrome	   (SARS),	   and	   strains	   of	   influenza	   with	   “pandemic	  
potential”,	  such	  as	  H5N1	  or	  H1N1.	  	  Yet	  even	  these	  represent	  only	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  
iceberg	  –	  hundreds	  of	  additional	  diseases	  have	  been	  categorised	  as	  EIDs.	   	  One	  
study	   identified	   177	   human	   pathogens	   as	   either	   emerging	   or	   re-­‐emerging	  
(Woolhouse	  and	  Gowtage-­‐Sequeria,	  2005)10	  and,	  similarly,	  an	  influential	  paper	  
published	   in	  Nature	   identified	   335	   emerging	   disease	   “events”	   (in	   which	   EIDs	  
originated)	  reported	  worldwide	  between	  1940	  and	  2004	  (Jones	  et	  al.,	  2008).11	  	  
	  
Each	  EID	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  not	  only	  cause	  harm	  to	  human	  health	  but	  also	  to	  
lead	  to	  widespread	  moral	  panic,	  as	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  recent	  years	  with	  the	  recent	  
H1N1	   swine	   flu	   outbreak	   of	   2009	   or	   SARS	   in	   2003	   (e.g.	   Gilman,	   2010,	   Suk,	  
2004).	   	   Particularly	   as	   concerns	   the	   latter,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   each	   disease	   is	  
understood	  is	  highly	  significant.	  	  This	  is	  because:	  
	  
The	  perspective	  from	  which	  a	  disease	  is	  understood,	  who	  is	  threatened,	  who	  is	  
blamed,	   and	   who	   is	   called	   upon	   to	   change	   their	   ways	   can	   have	   profound	  
implications	  for	  what	  is	  done,	  and	  who	  gains	  or	  loses	  (Leach	  and	  Dry,	  2010:	  5).	  
	  
Given	  that	  EIDs	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  focal	  point	  of	  attention	  for	  public	  health	  policy-­‐
makers,	   politicians	   and	  various	  publics	   it	   is,	   recalling	   the	  discussion	   from	  1.2,	  
interesting	   to	   consider	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   predominant	   framing	   of	   EIDs	   as	   an	  
important	  global	  risk.	  	  An	  excellent	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Nicholas	  B.	  King	  
(2002),	  who	  argues	  that	  contemporary	  concerns	  with	  EIDs	  have	  colonial	  roots.	  
His	  research	  follows	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  community	  of	  primarily	  American	  public	  
health	  practitioners	  and	  scientists	  who	  came	  to	  develop	  an	  “emerging	  diseases	  
worldview”.	   	   King	   traces	   the	   origins	   of	   this	   worldview	   (in	   its	   contemporary	  
                                                
10	  Although	  the	  authors	  themselves	  note	  that	  this	  number	  is	  somewhat	  problematic,	  given	  the	  
lack	  of	  a	  consistent,	  “scientific”	  definition	  for	  emerging	  and	  re-­‐emerging	  infectious	  diseases,	  the	  
trend	  is	  well	  demonstrated	  by	  such	  a	  large	  figure.	  
11	  Defining	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	  count	  as	  an	  EID	  ”event”	  is	  also,	  unsurprisingly,	  problematic	  
(e.g.	  Woolhouse,	  2008).	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formulation)	  to	  a	  conference	  jointly	  organized	  by	  Stephen	  S.	  Morse	  and	  Joshua	  
Lederberg,	   a	  Nobel	   Prize-­‐winning	  microbiologist.12	  	   This	   conference,	   arranged	  
in	   1989	   by	   the	   U.S.	   National	   Institutes	   of	   Health	   (NIH)	   and	   Rockefeller	  
University,	   was	   attended	   by	   many	   prominent	   scientists	   and	   formed	   the	  
foundation	  from	  which	  the	  emerging	  diseases	  (EID)	  worldview	  expanded:	  
	  
Over	   the	  course	  of	   the	  next	  decade,	   the	  anxieties	  expressed	  at	   this	  conference	  
would	   be	   repeated	   widely	   by	   its	   attendees,	   eventually	   hardening	   into	   an	  
orthodox	  set	  of	  predictions	  that	  would	  later	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  a	  wider	  group	  that	  
included	   other	   scientists,	   prominent	   journalists,	   local	   and	   national	   health	  
officials,	  and,	  eventually,	  national	  security	  experts	  (King,	  2002:	  767).	  
	  
In	   the	   USA,	   the	   Institute	   of	   Medicine	   (IOM)	   was	   particularly	   influential	   in	  
advocating	   this	   worldview,	   rolling	   out	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   discipline-­‐building	  
activities	  such	  as	  organising	  and	  lobbying	  for	  funding,	  holding	  conferences,	  and	  
publishing	   reports	   (King,	   2004).	   	   The	   set	   of	   anxieties	   and	   predictions	  
encapsulated	  by	  the	  EID	  worldview	  is	  very	  closely	  related	  to	  what	  Priscilla	  Wald	  
coined	  the	  “outbreak	  narrative”.	  	  This	  narrative:	  
	  
…links	   the	   idea	   of	   disease	   emergence	   to	   worldwide	   transformations;	   it	  
interweaves	   ecological	   and	   socioeconomic	   analysis	   with	   a	   mythic	   tale	   of	  
microbial	   battle	   over	   the	   fate	   of	   humanity	   …The	   outbreak	   narrative	   is	   a	  
powerful	   story	   of	   ecological	   danger	   and	   epidemiological	   belonging,	   and	   as	   it	  
entangles	   analyses	   of	   disease	   emergence	   and	   changing	   social	   and	   political	  
formations,	  it	  affects	  the	  experience	  of	  both	  (Wald,	  2008:	  33).	  
	  
Consistent	   with	   King	   (2002,	   2004),	   one	   critical	   aspect	   of	   Wald’s	  
conceptualisation	   is	   the	   central	   role	   that	   the	   experts	   have	   created	   for	  
themselves:	  
	  
The	  outbreak	  narrative	  …	  borrows,	  attests	   to	  and	  helps	   to	  construct	  expertise	  
(Ibid.:	  39).	  
	  
                                                
12	  This	  conference	  was	  called	  ‘Emerging	  Viruses:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Viruses	  and	  Viral	  Disease’.	  	  It	  
took	  place	  1	  May,	  1989	  (see	  King,	  2002,	  note	  5).	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The	   wider	   acceptance	   of	   this	   narrative	   has	   been	   accompanied	   by	   a	   wider	  
influence	   of	   disease	   experts.	   	   As	   King	   (2004:	   69)	   suggests,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
1990’s	   the	   “basic	   premises	   of	   the	   emerging	   diseases	   campaign	   had	   gained	  
acceptance	   in	  many	  American	  governmental	  agencies	  and	   international	  health	  
organizations”.	   	   This	   included	   not	   only	   the	   wider	   acceptance	   of	   their	  
recommendations	   for	  suitable	  disease	  control	  measures	  (strengthened	  disease	  
surveillance,	   better	   laboratory	   funding,	   enhanced	   professional	   training,	   etc.),	  
but	  also	  prestigious	  posts	  for	  individual	  EID	  worldview	  scientists	  (Ibid.),	  the	  re-­‐
organization	   of	   agencies,	   such	   as	   the	   WHO	   establishment	   of	   a	   Division	   of	  
Emerging	   and	   Other	   Communicable	   Diseases	   Surveillance	   and	   Control,13	  and	  
even	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   ones,	   such	   as	   the	   European	   Centre	   for	   Disease	  
Prevention	  and	  Control	  (ECDC).14	  
	  
On	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  EID	  risk	  
One	  of	   the	  reasons	  that	   the	  EID	  worldview	  was	  so	  readily	  accepted	   is	   that	   the	  
framing	  of	  the	  EID	  risk	  resonated	  with	  the	  self-­‐interests	  of	  national	  and	  supra-­‐
national	   governments.	   	   In	   dovetailing	   with	   other	   prominent	   governmental	  
concerns,	   including	   globalisation,	   security,	   and	   climate	   change,	   the	   EID	  
worldview	  was	   arguably	  more	   readily	   accepted	   and	  more	   easily	   inserted	   into	  
these	   ongoing	   processes.	   	   From	   its	   onset,	   the	   EID	   worldview	   has	   drawn	  
attention	   to	   the	   “global”	   nature	   of	   the	   risk,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   the	   role	   that	   human	  
activities	  –	   including	  ecological	  and	  environmental	   change	  –	  has	  played	   in	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  risk	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  very	  first	  papers	  in	  the	  very	  first	  issue	  of	  the	  now	  prominent	  journal	  
Emerging	   Infectious	   Diseases15	  was	   authored	   by	   Stephen	   Morse	   and	   is	   titled	  
“Factors	  in	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Infectious	  Diseases”	  (Morse,	  1995).	  	  This	  has	  been	  
                                                
13	  This	  division	  is	  now	  the	  WHO	  Global	  Alert	  and	  Response	  Unit.	  See:	  
http://www.who.int/csr/en/,	  accessed	  May	  24,	  2012.	  	  
14	  ECDC	  was	  established	  in	  2005,	  two	  years	  after	  the	  global	  outbreak	  of	  SARS.	  See:	  
www.ecdc.europa.eu,	  accessed	  September	  15,	  2012.	  
15	  The	  very	  establishment	  of	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases	  by	  the	  US	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  
and	  Prevention	  (CDC)	  in	  1995	  further	  demonstrates	  the	  greater	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  topic	  by	  
governmental	  organisations.	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followed	   by	   numerous	   other	   papers	   re-­‐citing	   similar	   constellations	   of	   EID	  
“drivers”,	   which	   typically	   include	   ecological	   changes	   due	   to	   economic	  
development	   and	   land	   use,	   changes	   in	   human	   demographics	   and	   behaviour,	  
intensified	   global	   trade	   and	   travel,	   technological	   practices	   (e.g.	   organ	  
transplants,	   over-­‐use	   of	   antibiotics),	  microbial	   adaptation	   and	   breakdowns	   in	  
public	  health	  infrastructures	  (e.g.	  King	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Lederberg	  and	  Shope,	  1992,	  
Weiss	  and	  McMichael,	  2004).	  	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  especially	  noteworthy	  that	  climate	  change	  fits	  
within	  the	  outbreak	  narrative.	  	  To	  begin	  with,	  King	  (2004:	  65)	  notes	  that	  Morse	  
had	   in	   his	   early	   essays	   acknowledged	   that	   “the	   concept	   of	   emergence	   had	   its	  
intellectual	  roots	  in	  older	  understandings	  of	  environment	  and	  disease	  ecology,”	  
a	   field	   that	  can	  also	  be	   traced	   to	  CCH	  research,	  as	  will	  be	   further	  discussed	   in	  
Chapter	  3.	   	   In	  addition,	  somewhat	  more	  concretely,	  climate	  change	   falls	  under	  
the	  heading	  “ecological	  change”	  in	  a	  table	  in	  Morse’s	  1995	  paper;	  it	  appears	  in	  
the	   “top	   ten”	   list	   of	   EID	   drivers	   in	   the	   widely	   cited	   paper	   that	   classified	   177	  
pathogens	   as	   emerging	   or	   re-­‐emerging	   (Woolhouse	   and	   Gowtage-­‐Sequeria,	  
2005)(Table	   1);	   it	   is	   a	   focal	   point	   of	   Weiss	   and	   McMichael’s	   (2004)	   Nature	  
Medicine	   essay	   on	   disease	   emergence;	   and	   one	   key	   climatic	   variable,	   rainfall,	  
was	  highlighted	  alongside	  human	  population	  density,	  agriculture	  and	  antibiotic	  
drug	   usage	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   paper	   in	   which	   335	   EID	   events	   were	  














Table	  1.	  Main	  categories	  of	  drivers	  associated	  with	  emergence	  and	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  
human	  pathogens	  16	  
Rank	  (according	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  EIDs	  
associated	  with	  them)	  
Driver	  
1	   Changes	  in	  land	  use	  or	  agricultural	  practices	  
2	   Changes	  in	  human	  demographics	  and	  society	  
3	   Poor	  population	  health	  (e.g.	  HIV,	  malnutrition)	  
4	   Hospitals	  and	  medical	  procedures	  
5	   Pathogen	  evolution	  (e.g.	  antimicrobial	  drug	  resistance,	  
increased	  virulence)	  
6	   Contamination	  of	  food	  sources	  or	  water	  supplies	  
7	   International	  travel	  
8	   Failure	  of	  public	  health	  programs	  
9	   International	  trade	  
10	   Climate	  change	  
	  
More	   broadly,	   as	   concerns	   the	   global	   framing	   of	   the	   EID	   risk,	   it	   is	  mentioned	  
above	  that	  global	   interdependence	  is	   frequently	  cited	  as	  key	  factor	  creating	  or	  
exacerbating	   EID	   risk.	   	   This	   is	   not	   particularly	   surprising	   –	   the	   great	   public	  
health	  cliché,	  after	  all,	  as	  Fidler	  (2004b:	  8)	  notes,	  is	  that	  “germs	  do	  not	  recognize	  
borders”.	   	   	  This	   is	  a	  common	  theme	  in	  the	  EID	  literature	  (and	  one	  repeated	   in	  
the	   literature	  on	  global	  health	  governance	  and	  global	  health	  security)	  and	  it	   is	  
one	   that	   has	   been	   carefully	   constructed	   by	   the	   architects	   of	   the	   outbreak	  
narrative.	  	  Again	  from	  the	  US	  perspective,	  this	  framing	  was	  helpful	  for	  grabbing	  
the	  attention	  of	  policy	  actors.	   	  As	  King	  (2004:	  69)	  observes,	  a	  series	  of	  US	  CDC	  
reports	  that	  drew	  upon	  the	  aforementioned	  IOM	  reports:	  
	  
…used	  scale	  as	  a	  resource	  for	  transforming	  Morse’s	  conceptual	  argument	  into	  a	  
pragmatic	   political	   campaign,	   providing	   American	   policy	   makers	   with	   a	  
rationale	  for	  funding	  international	  health.	  	  Ostensibly	  “global”	  causes	  produced	  
“local”	  (American)	  consequences…	  	  
	  
                                                
16 Replicated	  from	  Woolhouse	  and	  Gowtage-­‐Sequeria	  (2005). 
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In	  such	  ways,	  EIDs	  became	  understood	  as	  “global	  rather	  than	  only	  a	  national	  or	  
regional	   threat	   (Brown,	   2011:	   321)”.	   Although	   this	   framing	   tends	   to	   claim	  
universal	   vulnerability	   to	   EIDs,	   perhaps	   its	   most	   universal	   aspect	   is	   its	  
applicability	   to	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   contexts.	   	   Global	   public	   health	  
operators,	  alongside	  American	  ones,	  have	  embraced	  the	  outbreak	  narrative	  and	  
its	   associated	   anxieties	   surrounding	   globalisation.	   	   To	   wit,	   Margaret	   Chan,	  
former	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  WHO,	  wrote	  the	  following	  in	  her	  introduction	  to	  
the	  WHO	  World	  Health	  Report	  2007:	  
	  
…profound	   changes	   have	   occurred	   in	   the	   way	   humanity	   inhabits	   the	   planet.	  	  
The	  disease	  situation	  is	  anything	  but	  stable.	  ..	  New	  diseases	  are	  emerging	  at	  the	  
historically	  unprecedented	  rate	  of	  one	  per	  year.	  	  Airlines	  now	  carry	  more	  than	  2	  
billion	   passengers	   annually,	   vastly	   increasing	   opportunities	   for	   rapid	  
international	  spread	  of	  infectious	  agents	  and	  their	  vectors…	  
	  
…Traditional	  defences	  at	  national	  borders	  cannot	  protect	  against	   the	   invasion	  
of	  a	  disease	  or	  vector.	   	  Real	  time	  news	  allows	  panic	  to	  spread	  with	  equal	  ease.	  	  
Shocks	  to	  health	  reverberate	  as	  shocks	  to	  economies	  and	  business	  continuity	  in	  
areas	  well	  beyond	  the	  affected	  site.	  	  Vulnerability	  is	  universal	  (WHO,	  2007:	  2).	  
	  
The	   success	   of	   this	   “global”	   framing	   of	   the	   EID	   threat	   has,	   in	   some	   instances,	  
helped	  to	  mobilise	  attention	  and	  resources	  to	  EIDs:	  
	  
The	   fear	   of	   political	   elites	   of	   industrialized	   countries	   was	   necessary	   for	  
tuberculosis,	  a	  disease	  that	  had	  always	  been	  endemic	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  
to	  become	  a	  ‘global’	  threat	  (Shiffman	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  231).	  
	  
According	  to	  King,	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  Control	  (CDC)	  and	  
World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  emphasise	  stopping	  diseases	  at	  their	  source	  
due	  to	  a	  “postcolonial	  anxiety”	  revolving	  	  
	  
...	   around	   the	   contamination	   of	   space	   itself	   by	   mobile	   bodies	   and	   motile	  
environments.	   	  This	  is	  not	  the	  horror	  of	  matter	  (or	  bodies)	  out	  of	  place,	  which	  
presupposed	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  place	  for	  matter;	  instead,	  it	  is	  the	  horror	  of	  
places	  no	  longer	  mattering,	  of	  a	  ‘third	  worlding’	  at	  home	  (King	  2002:	  773).17	  
	  
                                                
17	  The	  outbreak	  narrative	  generally	  depicts	  developing	  areas	  or	  the	  “tropics”	  in	  a	  somewhat	  less	  
than	  flattering	  light	  (e.g.	  Brown,	  2011;	  Wald,	  2008).	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In	   such	   ways,	   the	   EID	   worldview	   has	   been	   anchored	   in	   and	   supported	   by	  
broader	   discourses	   surrounding	   climate	   change	   and	   globalisation.	   	   In	   an	  
increasingly	  globalised	  world,	  with	  high	  volumes	  of	  trade,	  travel	  and	  migration,	  
EIDs	  started	  to	  concern	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  spheres	  beyond	  public	  health.	  
	  
The	  EID	  worldview	  and	  health	  securitisation	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  communities	  to	  embrace	  the	  EID	  worldview	  has	  been	  
the	  security	  community,	  who	  has	   tended	  to	  view	  EIDs	  as	  an	   issue	   for	  national	  
security	   (e.g.	   Brown,	   2011,	   Feldbaum	  et	   al.,	   2010,	  Horton,	   2007,	  McInnes	   and	  
Lee,	   2006).	   	   This	   led	   to	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   governmental	   activity	  
addressing	   EIDs,	   which	   has	   further	   stabilised	   the	   central	   tenets	   of	   the	   EID	  
worldview.	  	  As	  Fidler	  commented	  in	  2004:	  	  
	  
The	   last	   decade	   has	   witnessed	   the	   previously	   obscure	   and	   neglected	   area	   of	  
public	   health	   shed	   obscurity	   and	   neglect	   to	   become	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	  
intense	  national	   and	  homeland	   security,	   foreign	  policy	   and	  global	   governance	  
debates	  (Fidler,	  2004c:	  45-­‐6).	  
	  
As	  concerns	  the	  increasing	  attention	  that	  security	  circles	  have	  paid	  to	  EIDs,	  part	  
of	   a	   broader	   trend	   towards	   the	   “securitisation”	   of	   global	   health18,	   there	   are	  
three	   principal	   pre-­‐occupations:	   HIV/AIDS,	   bioterrorism	   agents,	   and	   rapidly	  
spreading	  diseases	  like	  SARS	  or	  pandemic	  influenza	  (Feldbaum	  and	  Lee,	  2004).	  	  
Health	   securitisation	   has	   had	   a	   tangible	   influence	   on	   the	   political	   world.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	   famous	  example	   is	   the	  2000	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  
1308	   which	   formally	   casted	   HIV/AIDS	   as	   an	   issue	   for	   national	   and	   global	  
security. 19 	  	   Subsequently,	   numerous	   other	   international	   initiatives	   have	  
reinforced	   the	  notion	  of	  EIDs	   as	   a	   security	   threat.	   	   In	  2001,	   the	  World	  Health	  
Assembly	   (WHA),	   the	   governing	   body	   of	  WHO,	   passed	   a	   resolution	   on	   global	  
                                                
18	  Although	  recent,	  health	  securitisation	  can,	  as	  Freeman	  (2008:	  28)	  notes,	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
return	  to	  earlier	  phases	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  health,	  when	  offices	  of	  health	  were	  subordinate	  to	  
interior	  ministries	  with	  “their	  purposes	  lying	  in	  policing	  as	  much	  as	  policy	  making,	  their	  
instruments	  typically	  those	  of	  surveillance	  and	  quarantine”.	  
19	  http://daccess-­‐ods.un.org/TMP/9518286.5858078.html,	  accessed	  May	  23,	  2012.	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health	  security.20	  In	  2005,	  there	  was	  a	  substantial	  revision	  and	  strengthening	  of	  
the	  International	  Health	  Regulations,	  which	  among	  other	  things	  mandates	  WHO	  
Member	  States	  to	  strengthen	  disease	  surveillance	  activities	  (Fidler	  and	  Gostin,	  
2006,	  Suk,	  2007).	  	  At	  the	  European	  level,	  in	  late	  2011	  the	  European	  Commission	  
announced	   a	   comprehensive	   set	   of	   proposals	   to	   improve	   health	   security	   by	  
strengthening	  European	  preparedness	  to	  cross-­‐border	  health	  threats.21	  22	  	  
	  
Alongside	   such	   policy	   initiatives,	   there	   have	   been	   numerous	   high-­‐profile	  
meetings	   on	   the	   topic,	   such	   as	   those	   organised	   by	   Global	   Health	   Security	  
Initiative,	   which	   was	   initiated	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   9/11	   and	   involves	   the	  
ministers	  of	  health	  from	  several	  developed	  countries23.	  	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  
2006	   G8	   Summit	   in	   St.	   Petersburg,	   Russia,	   where	   Fighting	   Infectious	  Diseases	  
was	  one	  of	  only	  four	  topics	  on	  the	  formal	  agenda.24	  	  	  
	  
As	   the	   involvement	  of	   the	  health	   sector	   in	   these	   initiatives	  demonstrates,	   it	   is	  
not	   simply	   that	   security	   and	   foreign	   policy	   circles	   appropriated	   the	   outbreak	  
narrative	   to	   their	   own	  ends.	   Following	  9/11,	  many	  of	   the	  pioneers	  of	   the	  EID	  
worldview	   themselves	   became	   highly	   engaged	   in	   bioterrorism	   discussions	  
                                                
20	  WHA54.14.	  At:	  apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA54/ea54r14.pdf,	  accessed	  June	  5,	  
2012.	  	  This	  Resolution	  “urges”	  WHO	  Member	  States,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  begin	  to	  enhance	  
their	  infectious	  disease	  surveillance,	  to	  develop	  or	  update	  preparedness	  plans,	  to	  train	  staff	  and	  
to	  designate	  an	  IHR	  focal	  point.	  	  It	  also	  “requests”	  WHO	  to	  assist	  Member	  States	  with	  such	  
activities.	  
21	  As	  of	  June,	  2012,	  this	  proposal	  is	  under	  review	  by	  the	  European	  Council	  and	  the	  European	  
Parliament.	  See:	  http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/policy/hsi/index_en.htm,	  
accessed	  June	  14,	  2012.	  	  	  
22	  The	  language	  used	  to	  articulate	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  new	  proposals	  mirrors	  those	  used	  by	  
Margaret	  Chan	  in	  the	  WHO	  2007	  Health	  Report.	  	  As	  the	  former	  European	  Commissioner	  for	  
Health	  and	  Consumer	  Policy,	  John	  Dalli,	  stated	  in	  a	  press	  release	  announcing	  the	  proposals:	  “In	  
today's	  globalised	  society,	  people	  and	  goods	  move	  across	  borders	  and	  illnesses	  can	  spread	  
around	  Europe	  –	  and	  the	  globe	  -­‐	  within	  hours.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  
States	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  act	  together	  in	  a	  fully	  co-­‐ordinated	  manner	  to	  stop	  a	  disease	  from	  
spreading.	  The	  proposal	  we	  adopted	  today	  gives	  us	  the	  means	  and	  the	  structures	  to	  effectively	  
protect	  our	  citizens	  across	  Europe	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  health	  threats”.	  See:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1516&format=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en,	  accessed	  June	  14,	  2012.	  
23	  http://www.ghsi.ca/english/index.asp,	  accessed	  June	  8,	  2012.	  
24	  http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/10.html,	  accessed	  May	  23,	  2012.	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(King,	   2004),	   helping	   to	   further	   consolidate	   it.25	  	   Likewise,	   the	   world’s	   most	  
prominent	  health	  agency,	  WHO,	   continued	   to	  highlight	   the	   issue	   following	   the	  
2001	  WHA	  Resolution.	  	  The	  2007	  World	  Health	  Report,	  cited	  earlier,	  had	  the	  full	  
title	  A	  Safer	  Future:	  global	  public	  health	  security	   in	   the	  21st	  century,	   and	   it	  was	  
prepared	   with	   the	   explicit	   aim	   of	   drawing	   attention	   to	   “specific	   issues	   that	  
threaten	   the	   collective	   health	   of	   people	   internationally:	   infectious	   disease	  
epidemics,	  pandemics	  and	  other	  acute	  health	  events”.26	  	  This,	  too,	  can	  be	  viewed	  
as	   a	   tactical	   decision	   aimed	   at	   solidifying	   the	   outbreak	   narrative	   and	   gaining	  
further	  resources	  directed	  towards	  EID	  control.	  	  Lee	  (2010:	  8)	  noted	  the	  success	  
of	  this	  strategy	  in	  considering	  whether	  it	  might	  be	  a	  useful	  approach	  for	  other	  
issues	  such	  as	  social	  inequalities	  and	  health:	  
	  
…the	   strategy	  of	   linking	   to	  other	  agendas	   is	  one	  way	   forward.	   	  This	  approach	  
has	   been	   used,	   for	   example,	   to	   renew	   commitments	   to	   certain	   infectious	  
diseases.	  Framing	  their	  prevention,	  control	  and	  treatment	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  
and	  global	  security,	  economic	  development	  and	  growth,	  for	  example,	  has	  led	  to	  
a	   proliferation	   of	   new	   initiatives	   since	   the	   late	   1990s.	   The	   public	   health	  
effectiveness	   of	   these	   efforts	   remains	   subject	   to	   debate,	   but	   greater	   political	  
commitment	  to	  addressing	  them	  has	  been	  marked.	  
	  
Many	   scholars	  have	   contemplated	   the	   implications	  of	   the	   turn	   towards	  health	  
security,	   from	   varying	   perspectives,	   although	   these	   debates	   are	   beyond	   the	  
scope	  of	  this	  discussion	  (cf.	  Brown,	  2011,	  Elbe,	  2005,	  Feldbaum	  and	  Lee,	  2004,	  
Feldbaum	  et	   al.,	   2010,	  McInnes,	  2009,	  McInnes	  and	  Lee,	  2006,	  Rushton,	  2011,	  
Heymann,	   2003,	   Lakoff	   and	   Collier,	   2008).	   	   The	   point	   here	   is	   that	   the	  
securitisation	  of	  health	  has	  helped	   to	  solidify	   the	  wider	  acceptance	  of	   the	  EID	  
worldview.	   	   This	   has	   occurred	   not	   merely	   because	   the	   EID	   worldview	  
dovetailed	   with	   broader	   policy	   spheres	   and	   interests,	   but	   also	   because	   a	  
community	   of	   disease	   experts	   were	   quite	   calculating	   with	   regards	   to	   how	   to	  
secure	  greater	  influence	  for	  their	  ideas.	  	  	  
                                                
25	  As	  King	  (2004:	  75)	  further	  argues:	  “The	  incorporation	  of	  bioterrorism	  into	  the	  emerging	  
diseases	  campaign	  sharpened	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  campaign’s	  scalar	  narrative.	  	  It	  accentuated	  the	  
view	  that	  “global”	  causes	  begat	  “local”	  consequences	  and	  that	  international	  transportation,	  
trade,	  and	  information	  networks	  threatened	  the	  health	  and	  security	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state”.	  
26	  http://www.who.int/whr/2007/en/index.html,	  accessed	  May	  22,	  2012.	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Risk-­‐	  framing	  and	  path	  dependencies	  
As	  argued	  above,	   the	   renewed	  dedication	   that	  governments	  have	  placed	  upon	  
infectious	  diseases	   is	  partially	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  EID	  worldview	  
has	  linked	  with	  broader	  political	  agendas.	  	  Yet	  by	  connecting	  to	  these	  agendas,	  
the	  governance	  responses	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  EIDs	  are	  necessarily	  influenced	  
by	  them.	  	  Under	  the	  guise	  of	  global	  health	  security,	  for	  example,	  the	  key	  policy	  
reactions	   have	   tended	   to	   relate	   to	   a	   strengthening	   of	   “biopreparedness”	   for	  
disease	  pandemics	  (Garoon	  and	  Duggan,	  2008)	  as	  well	  as	  potential	  bioterrorism	  
attacks	  (Collier	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  Another	  key	  area	  of	  activity,	  mentioned	  earlier,	  has	  
been	   global	   disease	   surveillance,	   the	   ultimate	   objective	   being	   no	   less	   than	   an	  
efficient	   “global	   clinic	   (King,	   2002:	   776)”,	   monitoring	   EIDs	   everywhere	   and	  
always.	  	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  heightened	  interest	  
in	   strengthening	   “global	   health	   governance”	  more	   generally,	   a	   topic	  which	   be	  
further	  discussed	  in	  2.3.	  	  
	  
Thus	  particular	  framings	  of	  risk	  tend	  to	  suppress	  alternative	  ways	  of	  potentially	  
dealing	  with	  the	  issue,	  a	  point	  many	  have	  noted	  with	  regards	  to	  EIDs:	  	  
	  
Popularising	   the	   concept	   of	   “emerging	   infectious	   diseases”	   has	   helped	   to	  
marshal	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  but	   if	   certain	  populations	  have	   long	  been	  afflicted	  
by	  these	  disorders,	  why	  are	  the	  diseases	  considered	  “new”	  or	  “emerging”?	  Is	  it	  
simply	  because	  they	  have	  come	  to	  affect	  more	  visible	  –	  read,	  more	  “valuable”	  –	  
persons?	  (Farmer,	  1999:	  39)	  
	  
This	  interlinking	  of	  disease	  prevention	  with	  national	  security	  is	  crucial	  because	  
it	   often	   involves	   excluding	   people	   who	   are	   already	   socially	  marginalised	   and	  
identifying,	   cordoning	   off,	   and	   surveilling	   borders	   adjacent	   or	   otherwise	  
connected	  to	  the	  “dangerous	  places”	  they	  occupy	  (Brown,	  2011:	  323).	  
	  
	  
If	  contemporary	  responses	  to	  the	  EID	  risk	  are	  thus	  related	  to	  its	  framing,	  then	  it	  
is	  also	   important	   to	  remember	   that	  central	   to	   the	  construction	  of	   this	   framing	  
has	   been	   the	   activities	   of	   an	   expert	   community:	   very	   tangible	  
political/governance	  responses	  to	  an	  issue	  can	  be	  (at	  least	  partially)	  the	  result	  
of	   expert	   framings	   of	   risk.	   This	   reiterates	   the	   point	   that	   the	   activities	   of	   such	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expert	  communities,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  social	  and	  political	  contexts	  influencing	  these	  
activities,	  are	  important	  sites	  for	  STS	  research	  interested	  in	  science-­‐governance	  
interactions.	  	  This	  will	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  climate	  change	  (1.4).	  
	  
Before	   moving	   on	   to	   discuss	   climate	   change	   in	   greater	   detail,	   one	   minor	  
complaint	   about	   King’s	   (2002,	   2004)	   research	   concerning	   the	   scientists	  
involved	  in	  creating	  the	  EID	  worldview	  needs	  to	  be	  raised.	  	  Although	  his	  account	  
is	   self-­‐admittedly	   US-­‐centric,	   it	   nonetheless	   understates	   the	   role	   that	  
international	  actors	  may	  have	  played	  in	  helping	  to	  forge	  the	  emerging	  diseases	  
worldview.	  	  Furthermore	  and	  most	  crucially	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  thesis,	  
although	   King	   focuses	   on	   the	   role	   that	   experts	   played	   in	   constructing	   and	  
defining	  and	  advocating	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  infectious	  diseases,	  he	  does	  not	  offer	  
a	   close-­‐up	   examination	   of	   the	   interactions	   between	   the	   EID	   experts	   and	   the	  
broader	   science	   governance	   world.27	  With	   this	   in	   mind,	   it	   is	   time	   to	   briefly	  
examine	  the	  role	  of	  experts	  in	  constructing	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  surrounding	  
climate	  change.	  
	  
1.4	  	  Climate	  change:	  a	  modelled	  narrative	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  branches	  of	  CCH	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  
possible	   impacts	  of	   climate	  change	  on	   the	  spread	  of	  EIDs	  such	  as	  malaria	  and	  
dengue.	   	   It	  has	  been	  conducted	  primarily	  by	  epidemiologists	  and	  public	  health	  
experts,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  embraced	  as	  an	  important	  issue	  by	  health	  organizations	  
like	  WHO.	  	  Yet	  as	  one	  might	  expect,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  throughout	  Chapters	  3,	  4	  
and	  5,	  CCH	  necessarily	  draws	  upon	  (and	  has	  benefitted	  from)	  its	  subscription	  to	  
climate	  change	  science.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  very	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  way	  
in	  which	   climate	   change	   has	   been	   constructed	   and	   framed	   a	   “global”	   risk.	   	   A	  
more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  close	  interrelationships	  between	  
global	  climate	  change	  politics	  and	  science	  will	  occur	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
27	  This	  was	  not	  necessarily	  the	  objective	  of	  King’s	  research,	  it	  must	  be	  acknowledged.	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In	  1896,	  the	  Swedish	  scientist	  Svante	  Arrhenius	  first	  speculated	  about	  the	  links	  
between	   “carbonic	   acid”	   and	   the	   Earth’s	   surface	   temperatures,	   drawing	   upon	  
the	  work	  of	  earlier	  scientists	   including	  Fourier	  and	  Tyndall	  (Arrenhius,	  1896).	  	  
Just	  under	  one	  hundred	  years	  later,	  amidst	  growing	  concern	  about	  the	  potential	  
implications	   of	   Arrhenius’	   thesis,	   the	   UN	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	  
Change	  (UNFCCC)	  came	  into	  existence	  with	  its	  objective	  being	  the	  
	  
stabilization	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  at	  a	  level	  that	  
would	   prevent	   dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	   climate	  
system.28	  
	  
To	  support	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  
was	  formally	  established	  in	  1988	  to	  provide	  assessments	  of	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  
of	  global	  climate	  change	  science.	  	  Despite	  –	  and	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  Chapter	  5	  some	  
might	  even	  argue	  because	  of	  –	  the	  numerous	  and	  extensive	  expert	  assessments	  
that	  have	  led	  to	  “consensus	  statements”	  about	  climate	  change,	  the	  topic	  remains	  
a	   contentious	   one.	   Nearly	   25	   years	   after	   the	   establishment	   of	   IPCC,	   there	  
remains	  the	  potential	  for	  controversy	  every	  time	  a	  new	  assessment	  comes	  out.	  
The	   stances	   of	  many	   highly	   entrenched	   groups	  who	   have	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	  
either	   debunking	   or	   promoting	   climate	   change	   science	   have	   not	   dramatically	  
changed.	   	   Given	   the	   central	   role	   that	   science	   plays	   in	   the	   controversies	   that	  
surround	  climate	   change,	   it	   is	  once	  again	  useful	   to	  examine	   the	   influence	   that	  
expert	  communities	  have	  had	  in	  identifying	  and	  framing	  a	  global	  risk.	  	  	  	  
	  
Ever	  since	  its	  emergence	  in	  popular	  and	  political	  consciousness,	  climate	  change	  
has	   been	   viewed	   in	   global	   terms	   –	   which	   is	   of	   no	   surprise	   given	   that	   the	  
phenomenon	  has	  often	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  global	  warming.	  	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  
“global”	   environmental	   consciousness	   began	   in	   the	   late	   1960’s	   (e.g.	   Jasanoff,	  
2001,	   Yearley,	   1996b:	   64-­‐66),	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   climate	   change	   has	   fitted	  
within	  this	  discourse	  from	  the	  onset.	  	  This	  has	  also	  been	  the	  case	  in	  more	  official	  
circles.	   	   An	   influential	   example	   is	   the	   1987	   UN	   report	   Our	   Common	   Future	  
                                                
28	  See	  Article	  2.	  At:	  http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php,	  accessed	  
May	  27,	  2012.	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(Brundtland,	   1987),	   which	   drew	   heavily	   upon	   “One	   World”	   thinking	   to	  
emphasise	   the	   universal	   threats	   posed	   by	   a	   whole	   series	   of	   environmental	  
problems,	  including	  a	  brief	  reference	  to	  global	  warming.	  	  	  
	  
In	  more	  technical	  language,	  the	  UNFCCC	  defines	  “climate	  system”	  as	  “the	  totality	  
of	   the	   atmosphere,	   hydrosphere,	   biosphere	   and	   geosphere	   and	   their	  
interactions”.29	  	  As	  	  Miller	  and	  Edwards	  (2001)	  observe,	  this	  definition	  contrasts	  
with	  more	  traditional	  understandings	  of	  “climate”,	  which	  tended	  to	  view	  climate	  
as	  the	  average	  weather	  patterns	  that	  could	  be	  expected	  for	  a	  given	  location	  over	  
a	  given	  period	  of	  time.	  	  Although	  generally	  agreeable	  to	  many	  environmentalists	  
and	  international	  environmental	  policy	  spheres	  alike,	  the	  universalistic	  framing	  
of	  the	  risk	  of	  climate	  change	  both	  reflects	  and	  reiterates	  the	  privileged	  role	  that	  
science	  occupies	  in	  global	  climate	  change	  politics:	  
	  
…the	  problem	  of	  an	  anthropogenically	  enhanced	  greenhouse	  effect	  first	  came	  to	  
the	   attention	   of	   atmospheric	   scientists	   concerned	   with	   the	   physics	   and	  
chemistry	   of	   the	   climate	   system.	   	   From	   their	   scientific	   perspective,	   what	   is	  
interesting	   and	   important	   about	   GHGs	   are	   their	   universal	   physical	   properties	  
and	   the	   effects	   of	   increasing	   atmospheric	   concentrations	   of	   diffuse	  
anthropogenic	  GHGs	  on	   the	  planet’s	   radiation	  budget	   and	   thus	  on	   the	   climate	  
system	  of	   the	  planet	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  Accordingly,	   the	  IPCC	  and	  the	  other	  national	  
and	   international	   scientific	   bodies	   studying	   climate	   change	   have	   tended	   to	  
regard	   it	   as	   a	   universal	   and	   global-­‐scale	   problem	   of	   atmospheric	   emissions	  
(Demeritt,	  2001:	  312).	  	  	  	  
	  
In	   so	   far	   as	   it	   was	   science	   that	   was	   largely	   responsible	   for	   identifying	   the	  
problem	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   this	   should	  not	  be	   surprising.	   	   Yet,	   just	   as	  we	  have	  
seen	   for	   EIDs,	   although	   scientists	   have	   played	   an	   instrumental	   role	   in	  
identifying	  and	  framing	  the	  risk	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	   it	   is	  notable	  that	  from	  the	  
onset	  climate	  change	  science	  has	  been	  sponsored	  by	  national	  and	  international	  
organisations.	  	  This	  history	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  5.2;	  to	  provide	  a	  
brief	   example	   here,	   as	   early	   as	   1980	   the	   World	   Meteorological	   Organization	  
(WMO)	   supported	   climate	   monitoring	   research,	   such	   as	   the	   World	   Climate	  
                                                
29	  At:	  http://unfccc.int/key_documents/the_convention/items/2853.php,	  accessed	  May	  27,	  
2012.	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Programme	   in	   1980	   and	   later	   the	   Global	   Climate	   Observing	   System.	   	   	   These	  
programmes	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  much	  longer	  history	  
of	   interlinkages	   between	   global	   atmospheric	   science	   and	   international	  
organisations,	   who	   fostered	   international	   research	   which	   in	   turn	   fostered	  
global-­‐scale	   understandings	   of	   atmospheric	   dynamics	   and	   eventually	   formed	  
the	   basis	   upon	   which	   climate	   change	   came	   to	   be	   understood	   (Miller,	   2001,	  
Edwards,	   2010).	   	   Today,	   there	   exists	   a	   comprehensive	   international	  
meteorological	  and	  climate	  modelling	  infrastructure,	  and	  this	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  
a	   legacy	   of	   these	   previous	   international	   investments.	   	   Edwards	   (2010)	   has	  
described	  the	  mutually	  reinforcing	  relationship	  between	  this	  infrastructure	  and	  
climate	  science	  and	  politics	  as	  infrastructural	  globalism:	  
	  	  
…projects	   for	   permanent,	   unified,	   world-­‐scale	   institutional-­‐technological	  
complexes	  that	  generate	  globalist	  information	  not	  merely	  by	  accident	  …	  but	  by	  
design.	   	   Enduring,	   reliable	   global	   infrastructures	   build	   scientific,	   social	   and	  
political	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  globalist	  information	  they	  produce	  (Edwards,	  2010:	  
25).	  
	  
Climate	  models	  have	  a	  key	  role	  within	  this	  infrastructure	  as	  mediators	  between	  
the	   “scientific”	   and	   the	   “political”	   worlds	   (e.g.	   Demeritt,	   2001,	   Mahony	   and	  
Hulme,	   2011,	   Sundberg,	   2007).	   	   	   One	   way	   they	   do	   so	   is	   by	   simultaneously	  
validating	  and	   transforming	  climate	  data,	   contributing	   to	  a	   “global”	   framing	  of	  
the	  issue.	  	  Together,	  climatic	  data	  and	  models	  “create	  a	  picture	  –	  a	  data	  image	  of	  
the	  world	  –	   that	   is	  complete	  and	  whole,	  even	  though	  the	  observations	  are	  not	  
(Edwards,	  2010:	  283)”.30	  	  These	  pictures	  are	  used	  to	  build	  an	  understanding	  of	  
how	  climate	  change	  could	  unfold,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  highly	  influential	  in	  political	  
processes.	  	  	  
	  
The	   relationships	   between	   climate	   change	   modelling	   politics	   are,	   in	   fact,	   so	  
deeply	   entangled	   that	   they	   have	   been	   the	   focus	   of	   some	   classic	   STS	   studies	  
demonstrating	  the	  co-­‐production	  of	  science	  and	  politics	  (Chapter	  2).	  	  One	  point	  
                                                
30	  Edwards	  does	  however	  note	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  making	  global	  data	  also	  creates	  the	  
possibility	  for	  multiple	  images	  of	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  practice	  of	  creating	  model	  
“ensembles”	  that	  collectively	  account	  for	  the	  probable	  range	  of	  error	  in	  a	  given	  forecast	  period.	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of	   focus	   has	   been	  General	   Circulation	  Models	   (GCMs).	   	   STS	   research	  on	  GCMs	  
has	   demonstrated	   that	   there	   are	   numerous	   sources	   of	   contingency	   in	   their	  
production	   (Lahsen,	   2005,	   Shackley	   et	   al.,	   1999,	   Shackley	   and	   Wynne,	   1995,	  
Shackley	   and	   Wynne,	   1996).	   	   To	   give	   two	   examples	   here,	   GCMs	   rely	   upon	  
parameterization,	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  modellers	  make	   choices	  
about	   how	   to	   represent	   complex	   processes	   (like	   cloud	   movement	   or	  
evaporation)	   with	   exogenously	   specified	   and	   fixed	   variables.	   Because	   these	  
choices	   are	   based	   upon	   expert	   judgement,	   this	   practice	   tends	   to	   conceal	   the	  
“true”	  levels	  of	  variance	  and	  indeterminacy	  inherent	  to	  climate	  models	  (Jasanoff	  
and	  Wynne,	  1998).	  	  
	  
A	   second	  example	   is	   the	  practice	  of	   flux	  correction,	  which	   refers	   to	  modellers’	  
practice	  of	  overriding	  model	  calculations	  on	  energy	  fluxes	  with	  arbitrary	  values	  
that	   do	   not	   necessarily	   correspond	   to	   any	   previous	   calculated	   or	   measured	  
values,	   but	   which	   do	   enable	   model	   predictions	   to	   be	   perceived	   as	   credible.	  	  
Although	  flux	  correction	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  controversy	  within	  the	  modelling	  
community	  (Shackley,	  2001,	  Shackley	  et	  al.,	  1999),31	  Wynne	  (1996b)	  noted	  how	  
it	  eventually	  became	  a	  legitimate	  practice,	  driven	  by	  the	  political	  expediency	  of	  
being	   able	   to	   make	   long-­‐term	   predictions.	   	   The	   outcome	   is	   that	   climate	  
“scientists’	   perceptions	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   …	   play	   a	   role	   in	   shaping	   their	  
scientific	  practices	  (Shackley	  et	  al.,	  1999)”.	  	  Thus:	  
	  
…	  the	   intellectual	  order	  of	  global	  climate	  scientific	  prediction,	  and	  the	  political	  
order	  of	  global	  management	  and	  universal	  policy	  control,	  based	  as	   it	   is	  on	  the	  
promise	  of	  deterministic	  processes,	  smooth	  changes,	   long-­‐term	  prediction	  and	  
scientific	  control,	  mutually	  construct	  and	  reinforce	  one	  another	  (Wynne,	  1996b:	  
371-­‐372,	  original	  emphasis).	  
	  
Such	   influences,	   although	   mutually	   stabilising,	   can	   also	   be	   mutually	  
constraining,	   a	   point	   that	  was	   also	  made	   in	  1.3	   concerning	   the	   framing	  of	   the	  
                                                
31	  For	  example	  Shackley	  (2001)	  and	  Shackley	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  note	  the	  tensions	  between	  “purists”	  
and	  “pragmatists”	  who	  have	  different	  objectives	  for	  their	  models	  and	  also	  different	  approaches	  
to	  modelling,	  which	  to	  some	  degree	  appear	  to	  also	  relate	  to	  the	  organisation	  of	  different	  funding	  
systems.	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EID	   risk	   and	   the	   subsequent	   securitisation	   of	   health.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   climate	  
change,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   consider	   the	   example	   of	   the	   climate	   sensitivity	   range.32	  	  
This	  is	  a	  range	  of	  global	  temperature	  increases	  that	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  occur	  
given	  a	  doubling	  of	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide	  concentrations.	   	   It	   is	  obtained	  
as	  an	  output	  of	  GCMs,	  and	  has	  been	  highly	  influential	  in	  negotiations	  in	  UNFCCC	  
processes.	  	  Contrary	  to	  what	  one	  might	  expect,	  and	  despite	  decades	  of	  research,	  
the	  climate	  sensitivity	  range	  has	  remained	  surprisingly	  stable	  with	  time:	  1.5°C	  –	  
4.5°C	   from	  1979	   through	  2001,	   and	  2°C	  –	  4.5°C	   in	  2007	   (see	  Edwards,	   2010,	  
Table	  14.1).	  	  The	  explanation	  again	  relates	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  GCM	  modellers	  
are	   influenced	   by	   the	   political	   contexts	   in	   which	   GCM	   models	   are	   used.	   The	  
modellers:	  
	  
…	  have	   to	  negotiate	   support	  and	  credibility	   for	   their	   assessment	   reports	  both	  
with	   their	   scientific	   peer	   groups	   and	  with	   policy	   ‘customers’.	   	   Their	   problem	  
consists	   of	   translating	   scientific	   knowledge	   into	   a	   form	  appropriate	   for	  policy	  
actors,	  while	  keeping	   favour	  with	  the	  surrounding	  research	  communities	  (van	  
der	  Sluijs	  et	  al.,	  1998:	  311)33	  
	  
Such	   a	   dynamic	   thus	   narrows	   the	   options	   for	   the	   values	   that	   the	   climate	  
sensitivity	   range	   considers.	   	   Van	   der	   Sluijs	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   an	  
anchoring	   device:	   a	   “consensus	   knowledge	   construct,	   interfacing	   between	  
science	  and	  policy	  (Ibid.:	  312)”.	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  anchoring	  devices	  is	  
that	   they	   help	   to	   manage	   uncertainty	   because	   they	   “prevent	   the	   primary	  
scientific	   case	   from	   drifting,	   and	   this	   serves	   to	   constrain	   the	   related	   policy	  
discourse	  (Ibid.:	  316)”.	  Although	  these	  authors	  are	  careful	  to	  mention	  that	  such	  
anchoring	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   an	  unintentional	   consequence	  of	   the	  broader	  
conditions	   in	   which	   climate	   science	   occurs,	   they	   do	   suggest	   that	   because	   a	  
narrowing	  of	  uncertainty	  occurs,	  global	  policy-­‐making	  is	  facilitated:	  	  
                                                
32	  IPCC	  defines	  the	  climate	  sensitivity	  range	  (more	  formally	  known	  as	  the	  equilibrium	  climate	  
sensitivity)	  as:	  “the	  global	  annual	  mean	  surface	  air	  temperature	  change	  experienced	  by	  the	  
climate	  system	  after	  it	  has	  attained	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  in	  response	  to	  a	  doubling	  of	  atmospheric	  
CO2	  concentration”.	  See:	  http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch8s8-­‐6-­‐
2.html,	  accessed	  June	  3,	  2012.	  
33	  Wynne	  (1996b:	  373)	  further	  supports	  this	  idea,	  noting	  that	  GCM	  modellers	  were	  concerned	  
that	  predictions	  below	  1	  degree	  Centigrade	  would	  lead	  to	  funding	  cuts	  while	  predictions	  over	  6	  
degrees	  Centigrade	  would	  “unduly	  frighten	  politicians	  (Wynne	  1996b:	  373)”.	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Without	   such	   anchors	   there	   might	   be	   no	   coming	   together	   at	   all	   of	   disparate	  
parties,	  and	  thus	  disintegration	  of	  any	  incipient	  policy	  community	  (Ibid.:	  316).	  
	  
Thus	   climate	   science	   is	   influenced	   by	   (and	   influences)	   the	   broader	   global	  
political	   processes	   and	   structures	   surrounding	   climate	   change.	   	   Expert	  
judgements,	   whether	   “technical”,	   “normative”,	   or	   “political”,	   are	   embedded	   in	  
climate	   models	   as	   well	   as	   model	   outputs,	   with	   the	   consequence	   that	   certain	  
outcomes	  (scientific	  as	  well	  as	  political)	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  others.	  	  	  
	  
The	  heavy	  influence	  of	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  experts	  in	  a	  problem	  as	  vast	  as	  global	  
climate	  change	  can	  also	  restrict	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “downstream”	  research	  takes	  
place.	  	  One	  of	  the	  better	  examples	  of	  this	  has	  been	  the	  production	  and	  usage	  of	  
the	  IPCC	  emissions	  scenarios	  (e.g.	  IPCC,	  2000).34	  	  Widely	  used	  in	  climate	  change	  
“impacts”	  research	  (such	  as	  CCH),	  an	  emissions	  scenario	   is	  meant	  to	  present	  a	  
consistent	  and	  plausible	  storyline	  for	  how	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  world	  might	  look	  
in	  the	  future	  and,	  relatedly,	  how	  this	  would	  affect	  the	  volume	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  
emissions	   and	   thus	   the	   likely	   level	   of	   climate	   change.	   	   Scenarios	   necessarily	  
incorporate	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   economic,	   demographic	   and	   policy	   assumptions	  
that	  one	  would	  be	  quite	  right	  to	  assume	  is	  well	  beyond	  the	  formal	  expertise	  of	  
most	  climate	  modellers.	  	  Yet	  although	  official	  IPCC	  scenarios	  published	  in	  1990,	  
1992	   and	   2000	  were	   negotiated	   and	   approved	   intergovernmentally	   (Girod	   et	  
al.,	   2009)	  –	   adding	  a	   clear	  political	  dimension	   to	   scenario	  production35	  –	   	   it	   is	  
not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  more	  diverse	  forms	  of	  expertise	  are	  substantially	  
considered	  when	   scenarios	   are	   constructed.	   	  As	  Hulme	  and	  Dessai	   (2008:	  67)	  
commented	   regarding	   the	   production	   of	   national	   emissions	   scenarios	   for	   the	  
UK:	  
	  
                                                
34	  The	  IPCC	  emissions	  scenarios	  were	  highly	  influential	  in	  climate	  change	  research	  throughout	  
the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  	  As	  IPCC	  is	  working	  towards	  its	  5th	  Assessment	  Report,	  it	  has	  now	  
effectively	  delegated	  the	  production	  of	  scenarios	  to	  the	  research	  community—it	  is	  no	  longer	  
leading	  the	  development	  of	  these	  scenarios.	  
35	  Hulme	  and	  Dessai	  (2008:	  68)	  note:	  “Climate	  scenarios	  are	  the	  result	  of	  an	  increasingly	  
intricate	  negotiation	  between	  scientists,	  policy-­‐makers,	  communicators	  and	  numerous	  diverse	  
stakeholders	  in	  society”.	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There	   is	   a	   tendency,	   emerging	   from	   the	   epistemological	   hegemony	   of	   natural	  
science-­‐based	  climate	  models	  over	  other	  approaches	   to	  portraying	   the	   future,	  
that	   debates	   about	   scenario	   construction	   revolve	   around	   technical	   details	   –	  
spatial	   downscaling,	   construction	   of	   probabilities,	   temporal	   resolution,	   more	  
climate	  variables	  –	  rather	  than	  around	  different	  ways	  of	  seeing	  world	  futures	  or	  
of	  articulating	  the	  particular	  decision-­‐contexts	  in	  which	  scenarios	  will	  be	  used…	  
	  
Critiques	   along	   these	   lines	   have	   also	   been	   made	   about	   the	   IPCC	   process	   for	  
developing	  its	  Special	  Report	  on	  Emissions	  Scenarios	  (SRES)	  (IPCC,	  2000).	  	  Most	  
prominently	   were	   claims	   that	   value-­‐laden	   economic	   and	   demographic	  
assumptions	  informed	  the	  SRES	  process.	  	  This	  led	  to	  a	  highly	  visible	  controversy	  
on	   the	   topic	   (Castles	   and	   Henderson,	   2003b,	   Castles	   and	   Henderson,	   2003a,	  
Schenk	  and	  Lensink,	  2007),	  through	  which	  it	  was	  observed:	  
	  
…SRES	   is	   suggestive	   in	   representing	   the	  worldview	   of	   certain	   parties,	   and	   to	  
favour	  certain	  parties’	  solutions	  for	  problems	  (Schenk	  and	  Lensink,	  2007:	  298).	  
	  
One	   way	   this	   occurred	   was	   through	   a	   set	   of	   assumptions	   surrounding	  
“convergence”,	   which	   refers	   to	   a	   closure	   of	   the	   distance	   of	   the	   income	   gaps	  
between	   rich	   and	   poor	   countries.	   As	   the	   UK	   House	   of	   Lords	   concluded	   in	   its	  
review	  of	   the	  topic:	  “scenarios	   in	  which	   limited	  convergence	  took	  place	  would	  
be	   politically	   difficult	   for	   IPCC	   to	   contemplate…	   (House	   of	   Lords,	   2005:	   37)”.	  	  
The	  review	  thus	  noted:	  
	  
We	  have	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  IPCC	  process,	  with	  some	  of	  
its	  emissions	  scenarios	  and	  summary	  documentation	  apparently	  influenced	  by	  
political	  considerations	  (House	  of	  Lords,	  2005:	  6).	  
	  
A	   consequence	   of	   having	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   assumptions	   surrounding	  
“convergence”	   is	   that	   the	   range	   of	   deliberation	   was	   narrowed,	   as	   only	   some	  
potential	   futures	  are	  considered	  (Oppenheimer	  et	  al.,	  2007).	   	  This	   impacts	  not	  
only	   the	  scope	  of	  political	  negotiation	  over	  mitigating	  climate	  change,	  but	  also	  
“downstream”	  climate	  change	  impacts	  research,	  for	  in	  these	  areas,	  like	  CCH,	  the	  
outputs	   from	  GCMs	  and	  climate	  scenarios	  are	  used	  as	   inputs	  to	  their	  work.	   	  As	  
this	   occurs,	   impacts	   researchers	   necessarily	   incorporate	   the	   assumptions	   of	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these	  models	  into	  their	  own	  work	  –	  thus	  lending	  further	  credibility	  to	  them	  (e.g.	  
Demeritt,	  2001).	  	  This	  is	  can	  be	  problematic:	  
	  
The	   IPCC	   has	   not	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   SRES	   emission	   projections	   have	   a	  
sound	  economic	   foundation.	   	  Because	   these	  emissions	  projections	  are	  used	  as	  
inputs	  in	  models	  of	  temperature	  and	  climate	  impacts,	  these	  in	  turn	  do	  not	  have	  
a	  sound	  economic	  basis	  (Stegman,	  2006:	  5).	  
	  
Whether	  or	  not	  a	  “sound”	  basis	  for	  future	  scenarios	  can	  ever	  be	  determined	  is	  a	  
question	   that	  might	   also	  have	  been	   asked.	   	   The	  point	   to	  be	  made	  here	   is	   that	  
models	   of	   potential	   climate	   change	   impacts	   have	   a	   contingent	  socio-­‐economic	  
basis,	   one	   emanating	   from	   the	   dominant	   climate	   change	   narrative	   and	   its	  
related	  political	  order.	   	   Just	  as	  we	  have	  seen	   in	  1.3,	   the	  relationships	  between	  
particular	   expert	   communities	   and	   the	   broader	   political	   world	   lead	   to	   the	  
creation	   of	   “dominant”	   narratives.	   	   This	   limits	   the	   possibility	   for	   alternative	  
understandings	  of	   the	  problem.	   	   Indeed,	  many	  have	  noted	   that	   the	   framing	  of	  
climate	  change	  as	  depicted	  here	  has	  been	  at	  
	   	  
the	   expense	   of	   other	   ways	   of	   formulating	   the	   problem,	   such	   as	   the	   structural	  
imperatives	  of	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  driving	  those	  emissions,	  and	  indeed	  of	  other	  
problems,	  such	  as	  poverty	  and	  disease	  (Demeritt,	  2001:	  312).	  
	  
It	   has	   been	   famously	   argued,	   for	   example,	   that	   the	   presentation	   of	   climate	  
change	   as	   a	   “global”	   problem	   tends	   to	   gloss	   over	   important	   considerations	  
about	  the	  equity	  of	  historic	  and	  future	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  (Agrawal	  and	  
Narain,	  1991).	   	  Despite	  such	  examples,	   it	  has	  conversely	  been	  argued	   that	   the	  
social	   sciences,	   including	   science	   and	   technology	   studies,	   have	   not	   been	  
assertive	   enough	   in	   presenting	   alternative	   interpretations	   of	   climate	   change	  
science.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  could	  be	  the	  fear	  that	  deconstructivist	  accounts	  of	  
the	  politics	  and	  science	  of	  climate	  change	  could	  play	   into	   the	  hands	  of	  climate	  
skeptics	  (Grundmann	  &	  Stehr,	  2010).	   	  The	  danger	  of	  absenteeism	  is,	  however,	  
likely	   as	   problematic	   as	   engagement.	   	   Where	   important	   normative	   or	   ethical	  
issues	   find	   no	   room	   for	   discussion	   in	   the	   formal	   technical	   discourse,	  
controversies	   can	   spill	   over	   into	   the	   science:	   	   precisely	   because	   narratives	   of	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risk	   are	   so	   heavily	   built	   upon	   technical	   understandings,	   one	   of	   the	   main	  
recourses	  for	  opponents	  of	  a	  particular	  risk	  framing	  is	  to	  challenge	  the	  scientific	  
basis	  of	  that	  framing.	  	  	  
	  
Heavily	   predicated	   on	   the	   technical	   authority	   of	   “science”,	   the	   dominant	  
narratives	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  can	  be	  substantially	  undermined	  when	  
flaws	  in	  the	  science	  are	  exposed,	  which	  is	  not	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  do	  for	  such	  
highly	   complex	   and	   uncertain	   topic.	   	   This	   is	   a	   point	   that	   will	   be	   revisited	   in	  




This	  Chapter	  has	  highlighted	   the	  role	  of	  scientific	  experts	   in	   the	  identification,	  
framing	   and	   subsequent	   management	   of	   “global”	   risks.	   	   It	   was	   noted	   that	  
knowledge	  is	  heavily	  relied	  upon	  in	  global	  governance	  systems.	  	  Experts,	  as	  the	  
discussions	   on	   EIDs	   (1.3)	   and	   climate	   change	   (1.4)	   have	   demonstrated,	   are	  
highly	  influential	  in	  developing	  the	  dominant	  narratives	  surrounding	  risks,	  and	  
in	  constructing	  these	  narratives,	  their	  expertise	  is	  further	  privileged,	  potentially	  
over	  alternative	  forms	  of	  expertise.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  highly	  technical	  understandings	  
of	  risks	  emerge,	  narrowing	  the	  subsequent	  discussion	  about	  what	  a	  risk	  is,	  who	  
is	  affected	  by	  it	  and	  how	  it	  could	  be	  best	  contained.	  	  	  
	  
Meanwhile,	   social	   and	   political	   contexts	   influence	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   experts	  
identify	   and	   frame	   a	   given	   problem,	  which	   in	   turn	   influences	   the	   governance	  
responses	   developed	   to	   manage	   these	   problems.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   EIDs	   (1.3),	  
experts	   worked	   extensively	   to	   promote	   the	   “outbreak	   narrative”	   which	  
eventually	   became	   prominent	   in	   the	   highest	   echelons	   of	   domestic	   and	   global	  
health	  circles.	   	  Their	  worldview	  seems	  to	  have	  gained	  further	  traction	  when	  it	  
dovetailed	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   security	   circles,	   thereby	   leading	   to	   a	   further	  
stabilisation	  of	  the	  EID	  worldview	  and	  its	  associated	  governance	  responses	  such	  
as	  the	  revamped	  International	  Health	  Regulations	  and	  enhanced	  global	  disease	  
surveillance.	  	  As	  concerns	  climate	  change	  (1.4),	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  very	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identification	   of	   the	   issue	   was	   dependent	   on	   the	   globalist	   infrastructure	   for	  
meteorology	  already	  in	  place.	  	  This	  served	  not	  only	  to	  foster	  a	  “global”	  framing	  
of	  the	  problem	  but	  also	  to	  privilege	  very	  particular	  forms	  of	  scientific	  expertise,	  
heavily	  based	  upon	  the	  atmospheric	  sciences	  and	  the	  climate	  models	  that	  they	  
produce.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   expert	   judgements	   are	   “imported”	   into	  
climate	  change	  models,	  upon	  which	  communities	  such	  as	  CCH	  researchers	  are	  
dependent.	   	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  is	  
further	  stabilised.	  
	  
Given	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  Chapter,	  it	  should	  be	  apparent	  that	  the	  interactions	  
between	  expert	   scientists	   and	  global	   governance	   structures	   are	   an	   interesting	  
and	  important	  site	  for	  studies	  of	  global	  risk	  and	  of	  global	  governance.	  	  This	  will	  
be	   further	   explored	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   where	   it	   will	   be	   noted	   that	   much	   of	   the	  
literature	  on	  these	  topics	  have	  tended	  to	  not	  adequately	  problematise	  “science”.	  	  
STS	   research,	  meanwhile,	   offers	   a	   valuable	   suite	   of	   analytical	   perspectives	   for	  
addressing	  this	  topic,	  but	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  comparatively	  few	  empirically-­‐rich	  
analyses	  of	   international	   communities	  of	   scientists	  and	   their	   interactions	  with	  
global	  political	  structures.	  
	  
On	  the	  organisation	  of	  this	  thesis	  
Recall	   that	   the	   central	   question	   of	   this	   thesis	   is:	   how	   has	   CCH	   research	   been	  
made	   credible	   (or	   not)?	   	   As	   I	   have	   suggested,	   answering	   such	   a	   question	  
necessitates	   studying	   the	   scientists	   involved	   in	   CCH	   research	   and	   their	  
interactions	  with	  broader	  political	  structures	  and	  processes.	  	  	  
	  
Drawing	   upon	   STS	   research	   and	   the	   idiom	   of	   co-­‐production	   in	   particular,	  
Chapter	  2	  will	  outline	  an	  epistemological	  and	  practical	  framework	  for	  pursuing	  
the	  central	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  This	  Chapter	  will	  also	  explain	  how	  my	  own	  
particular	   normative	   and	   political	   commitments	   could	   have	   affected	   this	  
research.	   	  Thereafter,	  Chapters	  3,	  4,	  and	  5	  will	  present	   three	   interrelated	  case	  
studies	   related	   to	   CCH	   research	   and	   heavily	   based	   upon	   extensive	   interviews	  
with	  leading	  actors	  in	  the	  field.	  	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  CCH	  community	  described	  in	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1.1.1	   will	   be	   more	   formally	   introduced.	   The	   underlying	   motivations	   and	  
worldviews	  informing	  their	  research,	  and	  their	  discipline-­‐building	  activities	  will	  
be	   closely	   followed	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  CCH	   “arrived”	   and	  was	  
framed	  as	  a	  global	  health	  risk.	   	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  however,	  the	  framings	  of	  
risk	   inevitably	   mean	   that	   alternative	   ones	   are	   neglected.	   	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   the	  
implications	  of	  this	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  quite	  some	  detail	  through	  a	  longstanding	  
controversy	  between	  the	  CCH	  community	  and	  a	  group	  of	  ecologists	  who	  fiercely	  
resisted	  the	  findings	  and	  implications	  of	  CCH	  research.	  	  A	  careful	  examination	  of	  
this	  controversy	  reveals	  the	  tacit	  and	  normative	  assumptions	  embedded	  within	  
CCH	   research,	   thereby	   demonstrating	   the	   contingency	   of	   the	   findings	   in	   the	  
field.	   	   In	   addition,	   this	   Chapter	   argues	   that	   subscribing	   to	   the	   pre-­‐existing	  
climate	  change	  narrative	  depicted	  in	  1.4,	  while	  broadly	  convenient	  for	  the	  CCH	  
community,	  was	  not	  without	  its	  perils.	  	  	  
	  
In	  contrast	  with	  the	  controversy	  depicted	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  CCH	  is,	  as	  per	  Chapter	  3,	  
relatively	  more	  “stable”	  in	  the	  global	  governance	  world.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  
how	  this	  is	  so,	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  focus	  upon	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  CCH	  knowledge	  
has	   been	   “warranted”	   in	   official	   channels.	   	   Thus,	   Chapter	   5	   revisits	   the	  
controversies	  from	  Chapter	  4	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  IPCC	  has	  treated	  them	  in	  its	  
previous	  four	  assessment	  reports.	  	  Although	  many	  of	  the	  same	  protagonists	  and	  
antagonists	  from	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  reappear	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  IPCC	  portrayal	  of	  
these	   controversies	   reveals	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   IPCC’s	   complicated	   history	  
and	  procedures	  affect	  the	  contents	  of	  its	  assessments.	  	  Following	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  
concluding	  Chapter	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  insights	  




Chapter	  2.	  Science	  and	  its	  governance:	  theoretical	  and	  
methodological	  considerations	  
 




Having	   introduced	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   and	   discussed	   the	   way	   experts	  
influence	  the	  identification,	  framing	  and	  management	  of	  risks,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
further	   articulate	   the	   analytical	   perspectives	   through	   which	   the	   relationship	  
between	   science	   and	   its	   governance	   can	   be	   understood.	   	   This	   necessitates	  
elaborating	  upon	  three	  items	  in	  particular:	  what	  is	  implied	  by	  the	  literature	  on	  
governance	   and	   its	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   role	   of	   expertise	   (2.2);	   how	  
contemporary	   accounts	   describe	   the	   current	   global	   health	   governance	  
landscape	   (2.3);	   and	   how	   mutually	   constitutive	   interactions	   between	   science	  
and	   global	   governance	   can	   be	   theorised	   and	   studied	   from	   an	   STS	   perspective	  
(2.4).	   	   Following	   these	   discussions,	   2.5	   will	   discuss	   the	   epistemological	   and	  
reflexive	   considerations	   related	   to	   these	   analytic	   perspectives,	   and	   2.6	   will	  
describe	  the	  research	  strategy	  employed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
2.2	  Global	  governance,	  epistemic	  communities	  and	  science	  studies	  
	  
Governance,	   a	   “rather	   promiscuous	   concept	   (Newman,	   2001:	   12)”,	   sometimes	  
appears	  to	  as	  many	  definitions	  as	  it	  does	  analysts.	  	  Kooiman	  (2003:	  4)	  defined	  it	  
as	   the	   “totality	   of	   theoretical	   conceptions	   on	   governing”;	   Rhodes	   (1997:	   46)	  
defined	   it	   as	   “the	   new	   method	   by	   which	   society	   is	   governed”;	   and	   Rosenau	  
(1992:	  4)	  defined	  it	  as	  “activities	  based	  on	  shared	  goals”.	  	  These	  definitions	  are,	  
of	   course,	  not	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive.	   	  Perhaps	   the	   largest	   consistency	  
within	   the	   literature	   is	   that	   governance	   emphasises	   a	   transition	   away	   from	  
government.	   	   A	  wider	   constellation	   of	   actors	   and	   influences	   are	   involved	   and,	  
consequently,	   the	   act	   of	   governing	   has	   become	   decentralised.	   	   Governments	  
attempt	   to	   steer	   policy	   processes	   and	   outcomes	   but	   they	   must	   do	   so	   within	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decentralised	  networks	  and	  amidst	  changing	  constellations	  of	  power	  (e.g.	  Irwin,	  
2008,	  Kooiman,	  2003).	  	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   governance	   is	   particularly	   suitable	   for	   the	   “global”	   level;	   the	  
literature	  on	  global	  governance	  tends	  to	  highlight	  a	  relocation	  of	  authority	  from	  
a	  state-­‐centric	  to	  a	  more	  complex	  political	  system,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  years	  of	  neo-­‐
liberal	   reform	   (Held	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   	   	   This	   transition	   is	   chaotic,	   disaggregated,	  
unevenly	   spread,	   and	   constantly	   shifting.	   Power	   has	   dispersed	   upwards	   to	  
supra-­‐national	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  
or	   European	   Union,	   downwards	   to	   sub-­‐national	   levels,	   and	   sideways	   to	   non-­‐
governmental	  actors.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	  helpful	   to	   follow	  Freeman’s	   (2008)	  differentiation	  between	   the	  empirical,	  
normative,	   and	   analytical	   dimensions	   of	   governance.	   	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	  
section	   will	   address	   the	   normative	   and	   analytical	   dimensions,	   whereas	   an	  
empirical	  dimension	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  2.3.	   	  To	  start	  with	  the	  normative,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  there	   is	  a	  need	  for	  caution	  for	  avoiding	  the	  “ideological	  
baggage	  (Irwin,	  2008:	  585)”	  surrounding	  governance.	  	  It	  has	  been	  pointed	  out,	  
for	   example,	   that	   governance	   has	   been	   not	   unproblematically	   linked	   to	  
discourses	  surrounding	  globalization1;	  that	  it	  has,	  in	  some	  applications,	  certain	  
embedded	   meanings	   with	   regards	   to	   what	   the	   role	   (or	   size)	   of	   government	  
should	  be;	  and	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  depoliticise	  the	  nature	  of	  government	  through	  its	  
rather	  managerial	  and	  technical	  discourse	  (Irwin,	  2008;	  Freeman,	  2008).	  	  	  
	  
For	   these	   reasons,	   it	   is	   preferable,	   from	   an	   STS	   perspective,	   to	   be	   somewhat	  
critical	   about	   the	   literature	   on	   governance,	   a	   point	   best	   elaborated	   upon	   by	  
                                                
1	  Globalization	  is	  a	  variable	  and	  contested	  term.	  Some	  have	  stressed	  that	  globalisation	  leads	  to	  a	  
blurred	  distinction	  between	  global	  and	  local,	  and	  it	  occurs	  not	  only	  between	  but	  also	  within	  
nation-­‐states.	  	  It	  is	  also	  an	  uneven	  process	  -­‐	  its	  positive	  and	  negative	  consequences	  are	  not	  
evenly	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  world	  and,	  moreover,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  regions	  of	  the	  






turning	   to	   its	   analytical	   dimension.	   	   Particularly	   relevant	   for	   STS	   is	   the	   way	  
governance	  theory	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  actors	  and	  their	  knowledge.	  	  It	  
tends	   to	   suggest	   that	   information	   has	   dispersed	   alongside	   power,	   making	  
knowledge	  an	  essential	  resource:	  
	  
No	  single	  actor,	  public	  or	  private,	  has	   the	  knowledge	  and	   information	  required	   to	  
solve	  complex,	  dynamic	  and	  diversified	  societal	  challenges;	  no	  governing	  actor	  has	  
an	  overview	  sufficient	  to	  make	  the	  necessary	  instruments	  effective;	  no	  single	  actor	  
has	  sufficient	  action	  potential	  to	  dominate	  unilaterally	  (Kooiman,	  2003:	  11).	  
	  
In	   this	   situation,	   institutions	  must	   turn	   somewhere	   to	   source	   the	   information	  
relevant	  to	  the	  problems	  that	  concern	  them.	  	  Thus	  cooperation	  amongst	  actors	  
is	   required,	   but	   for	   that	   to	   happen	   actors	  must	   have	   at	   least	   some	  agreement	  
concerning	  what	  the	  issues	  are	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  addressed.	  As	  Freeman	  
(2008:	  32)	  has	  noted:	  
	  
A	  precondition	  for	  the	  concept	  and	  practice	  of	  governance	  is	  that	  an	  issue	  must	  
be	   of	   concern	   to	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   whose	   interests	   and	   objectives	   must	  
sufficiently	  converge	  to	  enable	  cooperation.	  
	  
A	   central	   question	   that	   this	   raises	   is	   how	   to	   understand	   and	   analyse	   such	  
“convergence”.	   	   Recalling	   the	   discussion	   from	   1.2-­‐1.4,	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	  
studying	   “convergence”	   requires	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   common	   narratives	  
that	  actors	  subscribe	  to,	  which	  in	  turn	  requires	  an	  examination	  of	  experts,	  their	  
interests,	   and	   their	   role	   in	   creating	   such	  narratives.	   	  Although	   the	  governance	  
literature	   has	   paid	   great	   attention	   to	   this,	   its	   accounts	   tend	   to	   neglect	   the	  
findings	   from	   STS.	   	   Numerous	   political	   scientists,	   from	   various	   perspectives,	  
have	   attempted	   to	   conceptualise	   the	   formative	   role	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	  
and	  expertise	  play	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  	  This	  has	  principally	  come	  out	  of	  studies	  of	  
environmental	   politics.	   	   Prominent	   work	   includes	   research	   into	   epistemic	  
communities	   (Haas,	   1992),	   advocacy	   coalitions	   (Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	  
1993)	  and	  discourse	  coalitions	  (Hajer,	  1995).	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It	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   this	   thesis	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   epistemic	  
communities,	   which	   simultaneously	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   experts	  
within	   governance	   structures	  while	   also	   serving	   to	   demonstrate	   how	  STS	   can	  
contribute	  analytically	  to	  this	  literature.	  
	  
Haas	   (1992)	   described	   epistemic	   communities	   as	   networks	   of	   professionals	  
with	   expertise	   in	   a	   specific	   area,	   sharing	   similar	   normative	   and	   causal	   beliefs	  
and	  a	  common	  policy	  enterprise.	  	  The	  influence	  an	  epidemic	  community	  has	  and	  
the	  ideas	  it	  develops,	  Haas	  suggests,	  can	  be	  mutually	  reinforcing.	  Power	  lies	  in	  
knowledge,	  and	  knowledge	  is	  stabilised	  by	  political	  acceptance:	  
	  
It	   is	   the	   political	   infiltration	   of	   an	   epistemic	   community	   into	   governing	  
institutions	   which	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   for	   a	   broader	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
community’s	   beliefs	   and	   ideas	   about	   the	   proper	   construction	   of	   social	   reality	  
(Haas,	  1992:	  27).	  
	  
The	   epistemic	   community	   concept	   is	   a	   useful	   analytical	   tool,	   as	   it	   draws	  
attention	  to	  the	  influence	  that	  scientifically-­‐orientated	  communities	  can	  have	  on	  
policy-­‐making.	   Nonetheless,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   adequately	   address	   the	   question	   of	  
how	   science	   acquires	   authority	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   the	   concept	   requires	   some	  
tweaking.	   	  Most	  problematic	   is	   that	  Haas’	   reading	   tends	   to	  under-­‐estimate	   the	  
influence	  of	  governing	  institutions	  on	  the	  production	  of	  the	  knowledge	  wielded	  
by	   epistemic	   communities.	   	   Rather	   than	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   creation	   of	  
knowledge	  or	  consensus,	  epistemic	  theory	  veers	  towards	  treating	  knowledge	  as	  
“objective”.	   	  It	  too	  narrowly	  focuses	  on	  the	  influence	  knowledge	  has	  on	  policy-­‐
making	   (e.g.	   Demeritt,	   2001,	   Miller,	   2004),	   neglecting	   more	   salient	   questions	  
such	  as	  how	  and	  why	  epistemic	  communities	  coalesce	  and	  how	  these	  groupings	  
achieve	   their	   “cognitive	   authority	   in	   the	   political	   domain	   (Jasanoff,	   1996b:	  
187)”.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result,	   “traditional”	   epistemic	   communities	   research	   has	   been	   hindered,	  
Jasanoff	  (1996b)	  argues,	  by	  seven	  ambiguities	  relating	  to	  both	  the	  treatment	  of	  
the	  term	  “epistemic”	  by	  political	  scientists	  and	  by	  theoretical	  concerns	  raised	  by	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science	   studies.	   	   Significantly,	   these	   ambiguities	   consist	   of	   factors	   both	  
“internal”	   and	   “external”	   to	   the	   communities	   themselves.	   	   Addressing	   these	  
ambiguities,	  she	  suggests,	  helps	  to	  overcome	  the	  “analytical	  deficiencies	  (Ibid.:	  
186)”	   inherent	   in	   epistemic	   communities	   theory.	   	   To	   begin	   with	   “internal”	  
factors,2 	  Jasanoff	   points	   out	   the	   need	   to	   problematise	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  
scientific	  discoveries	  happen,	  instead	  of	  simply	  taking	  this	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  
analysis.	  	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  “shared	  factual	  framework	  (Ibid.:	  188)”	  come	  into	  
being	   thus	   need	   to	   be	   interrogated.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   shared	  
worldviews	   that	   are	   said	   to	   be	   held	   by	   epistemic	   communities	   are,	   Jasanoff	  
argues,	  best	  understood	  as	  the	  result	  of	  social	  processes.	  	  Disciplinary	  interests,	  
in	  particular,	  may	  be	   influential.	   	   She	  urges	  analysts	   to	   shift	   their	   attention	   to	  
the	   underlying	   factors	   driving	   the	   formation	   and	   stabilisation	   of	   epistemic	  
communities,	   such	   as	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   disciplinary	   training	   as	   well	   as	  
professional	   interests	  can	   lead	  to	  a	  shared	  policy	  project	  which	  “furthers	  their	  
disciplinary	  standing	  and	  identity	  (Ibid.:	  189-­‐90)”.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  
1,	   where	   influential	   epistemic	   communities	   consist	   of	   scientists,	   scientific	  
knowledge	  is	  privileged	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  relevant	  types	  of	  knowledge.	  	  It	  
is	  possible,	   then,	   to	  view	  an	  epistemic	   community’s	   shared	  values	  as	   “nothing	  
more	   than	   the	   overriding	   interest	   of	   scientists	   in	   enlarging	   the	   influence	   of	  
science	   (Ibid.:	   191)”.	   	  Analysts	   that	  do	  not	  problematise	   the	  notion	  of	   “shared	  
values”	  may	  be	  missing	  important	  insights.	  
	  
Consistent	   with	   the	   emphasis	   that	   Chapter	   1	   placed	   on	   interactions	   between	  
scientists	   and	   wider	   political	   contexts	   (and	   foreshadowing	   the	   upcoming	  
discussion	   on	   co-­‐production	   (2.4)),	   Jasanoff	   notes	   three	   ambiguities	  
surrounding	  epistemic	  communities	  theory	  related	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “such	  
communities	   might	   be	   constituted	   or	   empowered	   through	   the	   action	   (or	  
inaction)	   of	   the	   state…	   (Ibid.:	   191)”.3	  Jasanoff	   argues	   for	   the	   need	   to	   pay	  
                                                
2	  Jasanoff	  labels	  the	  four	  ambiguities	  related	  to	  internal	  factors	  as:	  shared	  factual	  knowledge	  
about	  nature;	  shared	  causal	  framework	  (or	  paradigm);	  shared	  disciplinary	  interests;	  shared	  
commitment	  to	  science.	  
3	  These	  are	  labelled:	  convergent	  economic	  interests	  of	  business	  and	  government;	  convergent	  
domestic	  policy	  agendas:	  shared	  hegemonic	  discourse.	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attention	   to	   the	  possibility	   of	   convergence	  of	   economic	   interests	  between	  key	  
stakeholders	  in	  a	  policy	  process.	  	  As	  she	  argues:	  
	  
Instead	  of	   arising	   independently	  of	  …	   the	  emergence	  of	   international	   accords,	  
epistemic	   communities	  may	  develop	  out	  of	   the	   same	  complex	   constellation	  of	  
forces	   that	  propel	  different	  state	  actors	   to	  adopt	  similar	  policy	  agendas	  (Ibid.:	  
192).	  
	  
If	   epistemic	   communities	   exist	   not	   simply	  within	   the	   protected	   boundaries	   of	  
science	   but	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   broader	   socio-­‐economic	   forces,	   then	   the	  
possibility	  should	  not	  be	  discounted	   that	  certain	  epistemic	  communities	  could	  
be	  “merely	   the	   instruments	  of	  a	   technological	  culture	   through	  which	  powerful	  
industrial	   states	   impose	   a	   particular	   vision	  …	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world	   (Ibid.:	  
194)”.	  	  After	  all:	  
	  
Sharers	   in	   a	   common	   scientific	  worldview	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   perpetuate	   than	  
deeply	   challenge	   the	   political	   structures	   to	   which	   they	   are	   tied	   by	   bonds	   of	  
reciprocal	  legitimation	  (Ibid.).	  
	  
The	   key	   point	   in	   Jasanoff’s	   analysis	   is	   that	   neither	   “science”	   nor	   “epistemic	  
communities”	   exist	   “naturally”.	   Both	   are	   the	   product	   of	   social	   negotiations	   –	  
internally	  as	  well	  as	  across	  broader	  spheres	  of	  influence	  –	  and	  much	  analytical	  
power	  is	  gained	  by	  acknowledging	  this.	  	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  one	  implication	  is	  
that	  considering	  the	  science	  and	  politics	  embedded	  in	  (and	  represented	  by)	  an	  
epistemic	   community	   means	   treating	   “science-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making”	   (Latour,	   1987),	  
“community-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making”	   and	   “policy-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making”	   as	   though	   they	   are	  
effectively	   inseparable.	   	   The	   epistemic	   community	   concept,	   perceived	   in	   this	  
way,	  offers	  a	  useful	  analytical	  focus	  for	  studying	  the	  community	  of	  experts	  that	  
populate	   the	   climate	   change	   and	   health	   (CCH)	   domain.	   	   It	   points	   to	   the	  
questions	  that	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  3:	  how	  was	  the	  knowledge	  sustaining	  
the	   CCH	   community	   produced,	   and	   how	   did	   the	   community’s	   normative	  
commitments	   influence	   the	   production	   of	   this	   knowledge?	   How	   did	   the	   CCH	  
community	   manage	   its	   political	   infiltration	   into	   governing	   institutions,	   and	  
which	  “external”	  factors	  were	  necessary	  for	  this	  to	  happen?	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To	  summarise	  this	  discussion,	  the	  literature	  on	  governance	  is	  important	  to	  this	  
thesis	   but	   its	   treatment	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   is	   somewhat	   lacking,	   at	   least	  
from	  an	  STS	  perspective.	   	  As	   Irwin	  (2008:	  584)	  has	  argued:	   “STS	  perspectives	  
on	   scientific	   governance	   open	   up	   the	   very	   definition	   of	   such	   categories	   as	  
‘science’	   and	   ‘policy’	   to	   critical	   reflection	   and	   empirical	   reflection”.	   	   Perhaps	  
none	  have	  done	  this	  more	  so	  than	  the	  concept	  of	  co-­‐production,	  which	  will	  be	  
more	  formally	  introduced	  in	  2.4.	  	  Beforehand,	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  briefly	  explore	  
contemporary	  accounts	  of	  the	  global	  health	  governance	  landscape,	  an	  important	  
“external”	  factor	  influencing	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  CCH	  community.	  
	  
2.3	  Global	  health	  governance	  
	   	  
In	   the	   previous	   section	   the	   normative	   and	   especially	   analytical	   dimensions	   of	  
governance	  were	  discussed.	  Here,	   the	   intention	   is	   to	  describe	   the	  rather	  more	  
empirical	  accounts	  that	  have	  surrounded	  global	  health	  governance	   (henceforth	  
GHG).	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  1.3,	  there	  has	  been	  the	  tendency	  to	  view	  EIDs	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  rationale	  behind	  strengthening	  global	  health	  security.	  	  This	  has	  influenced	  
the	   range	   of	   governance	   options	   pursued,	   such	   as	   the	   2005	   revision	   of	   the	  
International	  Health	  Regulations	  (IHR),	  which	  mandates	  WHO	  Member	  States	  to	  
strengthen	  disease	  surveillance	  and	  also	  gives	  WHO	  powers	   to	  determine	  and	  
declare	   when	   an	   EID	   event	   constitutes	   a	   Public	   Health	   Emergency	   of	  
International	  Concern.4	  	  The	  significance	  of	   the	   revised	   IHRs	   is	   such	   that	   some	  
have	   claimed	   them	   to	   be	   “unprecedented	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	   international	   law	   and	   public	   health	   (Fidler	   and	   Gostin,	   2006:	   93)”.	  	  
Others	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  IHR	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	  higher	  profile	  that	  health	  
had	  achieved	  in	  global	  politics	  and	  diplomacy	  (Horton,	  2007).	  	  
	  
                                                
4	  Such	  determinations	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  evidence-­‐based	  but	  also	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  occur	  under	  
situations	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty	  and	  high	  political	  stakes,	  raising	  numerous	  questions	  from	  an	  
STS	  perspective	  (e.g.	  Suk,	  2007).	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Regardless	  of	  the	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  increased	  status	  of	  EIDs	  has	  
influenced	  the	  global	  public	  health	  landscape.	  	  As	  it	  has	  been	  argued:	  
	  
broader	  human	  security	  concerns	  about	  global	  health	  …	  prompted	  an	  explosion	  
in	   the	   number	   of	   new	   actors,	   initiatives	   and	   funders	   involved	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
global	  health	  (Elbe,	  2010:	  115).	  
	  
One	   consequence	   has	   been	   a	   further	   fracturing	   of	   a	   global	   health	   governance	  
landscape	   that	   had	   already	   changed	   dramatically	   over	   the	   past	   few	   decades.	  	  
The	  WHO	  had	  held	  a	  key	   leadership	  position	   in	  world	  health	  until	  around	   the	  
1980’s,	  when	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  geopolitical	  trends	  influenced	  its	  role:	  	  	  
	  
…the	  UN	  [health]	  system	  seemed	  to	  be	  eroding	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  neoliberal	  
ideologies,	   an	   expanding	   and	   increasingly	   concentrated	   global	   economy,	   the	  
growing	   influence	   of	   NGOs,	   global	   corporations,	   new	   philanthropists,	   and	   the	  
noncooperation	   of	   the	   one	   remaining	   hegemonic	   power,	   the	   United	   States	  
(Kickbusch	  and	  Buse,	  2001:	  715).	  
	  
In	  addition,	  globalization	   is	  often	  cited	   in	  as	  having	  had	  a	   formative	  role.	   	  The	  
increased	  movement	   of	   people,	   goods,	   services	   and	   capital	   associated	  with	   it	  
has	   been	   argued	   to	   render	   “national	   borders	   irrelevant	   (Lee,	   2004:	   157)”,	  
diminishing	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  to	  govern	  events	  within	  their	  territories.	  	  
Thus,	   it	   has	   been	   suggested,	   States	   alone	   “cannot	   address	  many	   of	   the	   health	  
challenges	  arising.	  	  Infectious	  diseases	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  example	  
of	  this	  diminishing	  capacity…	  (Dodgson	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  8)”.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  global	  health	  landscape	  notable	  for	  its	  absence	  of	  any	  dominant	  actor,	  there	  
has	  been	  concern	  about	  “overlapping	  mandates,	  competition	  and	  duplication	  of	  
health	   activities,	   poor	   coordination,	   and	   more	   recently,	   about	   issues	   of	  
governance	   (Walt,	   2001:	   691)”.	   	   Partially	   for	   these	   reasons,	   specialists	  within	  
the	  fields	  of	  public	  health	  policy,	  many	  with	  ties	  with	  WHO,5	  have	  both	  observed	  
and	  called	  for	  a	  transition	  from	  international	  health	  governance	  to	  global	  health	  
                                                
5	  For	  example,	  Kelley	  Lee,	  based	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Hygiene	  and	  Tropical	  Medicine,	  is	  Chair	  
of	  the	  WHO	  Scientific	  Resource	  Group	  on	  Globalization,	  Trade	  and	  Health;	  Nick	  Drager	  is	  an	  
employee	  of	  the	  WHO;	  Ilona	  Kickbusch	  is	  a	  former	  WHO	  employee.	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governance	  (Dodgson	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  Fidler,	  2004a,	  Kickbusch	  and	  Buse,	  2001,	  Lee,	  
2009).	  	  These	  authors,	  who	  contribute	  to	  what	  I	  suggest	  is	  the	  “mainstream”	  of	  
the	  global	  health	  governance	  literature,6	  have	  sought	  to	  simultaneously	  describe	  
the	  phenomenon,	  establish	  a	  programme	  of	  research	  and	  map	  out	  an	  agenda	  for	  
improvement.	  	  As	  concerns	  the	  latter,	  challenges	  that	  GHG	  needs	  to	  overcome	  are	  
often	  put	  forward	  (e.g.	  Gostin	  and	  Mok,	  2009),	  such	  as	  establishing	  leadership,	  
attracting	  significant	   resources,	   co-­‐ordinating	  activities	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
actors,	   developing	   a	   commonly-­‐upheld	   normative	   framework	   and	   convincing	  
states	  of	  the	  need	  to	  “pool	  their	  sovereignty”	  and	  the	  need	  to	  give	  more	  “teeth”	  
to	   global	   health	   initiatives	   (Dogdson	   et	   al.	   2002:	   21)	   such	   as,	   notably,	   disease	  
surveillance	  (e.g.	  Kickbusch,	  2000).	  	  By	  2012,	  enhancing	  GHG	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  
high	  priority	  area	  within	  public	  health	  circles,	  notably	  in	  Europe,	  evidenced	  by,	  
for	  example,	  the	  WHO	  Regional	  Office	  for	  Europe	  report	  Governance	  for	  Health	  
in	  the	  21st	  Century	  (Kickbusch	  and	  Gleicher,	  2012),	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  global	  health	  
governance	  at	   the	  high-­‐level	  2012	  European	  Health	  Forum	  Gastein	  meeting	   in	  
Austria.7	  	  
	  
Despite	   such	   activity,	   in	   the	   past	   couple	   of	   years	   global	   health’s	   gain	   to	  
prominence	  has	  been	  stalled.	  	  Rather	  than	  trumpeting	  global	  public	  health’s	  rise	  
and	   “revolution”	   (Fidler,	   2009),	   the	   GHG	   literature	   has	   most	   recently	   fretted	  
about	   the	   diminished	   role	   of	   global	   health	   in	   broader	   political	   discussions.	  	  
Fidler	   (2009:	  15),	   for	   example,	  worries	   that	   if	   global	   attention	   to	   these	   issues	  
intensifies,	  it	  could	  further	  weaken	  the	  status	  of	  global	  health:	  
	  
As	  global	  health	  moves	  from	  the	  headiness	  of	  its	  political	  revolution	  to	  fighting	  
rear-­‐guard	  actions	  against	  global	  ecological	  and	  economic	  crises,	   the	  center	  of	  
gravity	  for	  political,	  diplomatic,	  and	  governance	  activity	  for	  global	  health	  shifts	  
from	   the	   health	   sector	   to	   political,	   economic,	   and	   environmental	   contexts	   in	  
which	   health	   policy’s	   voice	   remains	  weak	   because	   the	   health	   sector	   does	   not	  
necessarily	   have	   persuasive	   input	   into	   how	   climate	   change,	   energy,	   food,	   and	  
economic	  crises	  should	  be	  prevented	  in	  the	  future.	  
                                                
6	  It	  should	  be	  stated	  at	  this	  point	  that	  although	  I	  will	  henceforth	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  the	  “GHG	  
literature”,	  there	  is	  no	  definitive	  or	  clear-­‐cut	  boundary	  of	  researchers	  working	  from	  a	  GHG	  
perspective	  (e.g.	  Freeman,	  2008):	  any	  groupings	  are	  my	  own	  constructions.	  
7	  http://www.ehfg.org/home.html,	  accessed	  October	  3,	  2012.	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Such	  concerns	  have	  caused	  actors	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  to	  work	  to	  reassert	  a	  role	  
for	  health	   in	   such	  discussions.	   	  Margaret	  Chan,	   former	  WHO	  Director-­‐General,	  
noted	  the	  following	   in	  her	  remarks	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	   in	  
2008:	  
	  
We	  face	  a	  fuel	  crisis,	  a	  food	  crisis,	  a	  severe	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  a	  climate	  that	  has	  
begun	   to	   change	   in	   ominous	  ways.	   All	   of	   these	   crises	   have	   global	   causes	   and	  
global	   consequences.	  All	   have	  profound,	   and	  profoundly	   unfair,	   consequences	  
for	  health.	  Let	  me	  be	  very	  clear	  at	  the	  start.	  The	  health	  sector	  had	  no	  say	  when	  
the	  policies	  responsible	  for	  these	  crises	  were	  made.	  But	  health	  bears	  the	  brunt.8	  
	  
Similarly,	  GHG	  writers	  have	  tended	  to	  emphasise	  	  the	  need	  for	  global	  health	  to	  
better	  articulate	  and	  even	  re-­‐orientate	   current	  policy	  discussions	  surrounding	  
these	   crises	   to	   become	   more	   focused	   on	   health	   (e.g.	   Gostin	   and	   Mok,	   2009,	  
Fidler,	  2009,	  Lee,	  2010,	  Schrecker,	  2012).	  	  It	  has	  been	  earlier	  noted	  (above	  and	  
in	  1.3)	  that	  the	  global	  health	  community	  was	  generally	  successful	  in	  linking	  the	  
outbreak	  narrative	  to	  ongoing	  security	  discussions,	  thereby	  solidifying	  	  political	  
commitment	  to	  certain	  forms	  of	  EID	  control,	  and	  this	  has	  served	  as	  inspiration.	  	  
Thus,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  global	  health	  should	  learn	  from	  that	  experience	  to	  
“piggyback	   on	   other	   priority	   agendas	   (Lee,	   2010:	   8)”	   in	   order	   to	   re-­‐direct	  
resources	  and	  attention	  back	  upon	  itself.	   	  Highly	  significant	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  
thesis,	   global	   climate	   change	   is	   highlighted	   as	   one	   of	   these	   priority	   agendas.	  	  
One	  implication,	  to	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  is	  that	  global	  health	  actors,	  
notably	   WHO,	   have	   contemplated	   the	   re-­‐framing	   of	   climate	   change	   from	   the	  
tactical	   standpoint	   of	   hoping	   to	   re-­‐gain	   some	   authority	   in	   a	   fractured	   public	  
health	  landscape.	  	  
	  
Thus	   far,	   the	  discussion	  on	   the	   “mainstream”	  GHG	   literature	   reveals	   it	   to	  be	  a	  
rather	  more	  normative	  and	  empirical	  than	  analytical	  project.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  much	  
of	   the	   GHG	   literature,	   similar	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   governance	  more	   generally,	  
tends	   not	   to	   problematise	   expertise	   and	   the	   role	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   in	  
                                                
8	  Transcript	  at:	  http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2008/20081024/en/index.html,	  accessed	  
June	  8,	  2012.	  This	  quote	  is	  cited	  in	  Fidler	  (2009).	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shaping	   GHG	   priorities	   as	   well	   as	   outcomes.9	  	   To	   be	   fair,	   these	   shortcomings	  
have	  in	  some	  cases	  been	  partially	  addressed	  (e.g.	  Shiffman,	  2002),10	  and	  indeed	  
some	  prominent	  health	  governance	  scholars	  have	  conceded	  that	   the	   literature	  
tends	  to	  be	  somewhat	  naïve:	  
	  
For	   students	   of	   politics,	   the	   link	   between	   policy	   and	   power	   is	   hardly	   a	  
revelation.	   In	   international	  health,	  where	  science	  and	  evidence-­‐based	  practice	  
are	   keenly	   upheld,	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	   power	   in	   influencing	   what	   policies	  
gain	  and	  lose	  currency	  remains	  neglected	  (Buse	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  256).	  
	  
This	   is	   a	   striking	   omission	   given	   that	   their	   accounts	   suggest	   that	   power	   has	  
become	   dispersed	   in	   the	   contemporary	   global	   health	   landscape.	   	   It	   is	  
furthermore	   conspicuous	   that	   these	  authors	   tend	   to	  neglect	   that	  power	  might	  
be	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  scientific	  and	  evidence-­‐based	  practice	  that	  is	  so	  “keenly	  
upheld”.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   empirical	   and	   normative	   accounts	   of	   GHG	   provide	  
some	   important	   background	   to	   the	   dynamics	   shaping	   the	   global	   health	  
landscape,	   which	   is	   relevant	   to	   this	   thesis.	   	   From	   an	   analytical	   perspective,	  
however,	   there	   appears	   to	   be	  much	   scope	   for	   STS	   research	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	  
deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  driving	  GHG.	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  time	  
to	  discuss	  the	  theoretical	  (2.4),	  epistemological	  (2.5)	  and	  methodological	  (2.6)	  
aspects	  related	  to	  studying	  the	  co-­‐production	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  as	  a	  
global	  risk.	  
	  
2.4	  The	  co-­‐production	  of	  science	  and	  politics	  
2.4.1	  Introduction	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	  STS	   can	  and	   should	   seek	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  broader	  
political	   science	   literature	   (e.g.	   Jasanoff	   and	   Wynne,	   1998,	   Lidskog	   and	  
                                                
9	  In	  a	  recent	  example,	  one	  study	  describes	  the	  epistemic	  community	  that	  mobilised	  around	  
tobacco	  control,	  but	  it	  accepts	  the	  standard	  theorisation	  about	  epistemic	  communities	  at	  face-­‐
value	  and	  does	  not	  investigate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  earlier	  scientific	  controversies	  got	  resolved	  
and	  transformed	  into	  a	  consensual	  science	  that	  all	  members	  of	  the	  epistemic	  community	  shared	  
(Mamudu	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
10	  Additionally,	  as	  the	  discussion	  from	  1.3	  demonstrated,	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  accounts	  of	  global	  
health	  from	  outside	  the	  “mainstream”	  GHG	  literature	  that	  are	  rather	  more	  critical	  in	  nature	  (e.g.	  
King,	  2002,	  Dry,	  2010).	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Sundqvist,	  2002,	  Murphy	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  given	  that	  the	  “scientific”	  and	  “political”	  
aspects	  of	  a	  given	  topic	  tend	  to	  be	  both	  inter-­‐related	  and	  mutually	  shaping.	  	  This	  
is	  a	  message	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  gained	  traction.	   	  As	  a	  recent	  essay	  about	  the	  
debates	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  environmental	  politics	  
concluded:	   “Political	   analysis	  of	   environmental	   science	  needs	   to	   consider	  how	  
science	   and	   politics	   evolve	   together,	   rather	   than	   identify	   one	   or	   the	   other	   as	  
dysfunctional	  (Forsyth,	  2012:	  22)”.	  
	  
Thus	   far,	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  co-­‐productionist	  STS	  perspective	  can	  contribute	  
to	   examinations	   of	   how	   and	   why	   global	   risks	   are	   framed	   (1.2,	   1.3,	   1.4),	   how	  
governance	   systems	   emerge	   to	   contain	   them	   (1.3,	   1.4,	   2.3),	   and	   how	  
communities	  of	  actors	  mobilise	  within	  governance	  systems	  (2.2),	  but	  I	  have	  yet	  
to	   elaborate	   upon	   what	   co-­‐production	   means,	   from	   theoretical	   and	  
methodological	  standpoints.	  	  
	  
2.4.2	  STS	  and	  politics	  
An	  important	  preface	  to	  a	  discussion	  on	  co-­‐production	   is	  that	  there	  has	  always	  
been	   significant	   disagreement	   within	   STS	   on	   what	   the	   social-­‐political	   world	  
looks	  like,	  how	  it	  should	  be	  analysed	  and	  even	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  any	  meaningful	  
sense	   separable	   from	   the	   scientific	   world.	   	   This	   is,	   in	   turn,	   related	   to	   the	  
longstanding	  and	  widely	  discussed	   internal	  divisions	  within	  STS,	  most	  notably	  
between	   the	   sociology	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   (SSK)	   (e.g.	   Barnes	   et	   al.,	   1996,	  	  
Collins,	   1983)	   and	   actor-­‐network	   theory	   (ANT)	   (e.g.	   Callon	   and	   Law,	   1982,	  
Latour,	  1988).	   	  Despite	  such	  divisions,	  however,	  one	  thing	  that	  most	  members	  
of	  the	  STS	  community	  would	  agree	  on	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  inherently	  political	  subject	  
matter:	  	  
	  
Science	  is	  not	  politics.	  It	  is	  politics	  by	  other	  means	  (Latour,	  1988:	  229).	  
	  
In	  seeking	  to	  explicate	  the	  nature	  of	  science	  and	  the	  sources	  of	  its	  authority,	  all	  
SSK	  scholars	  are	  necessarily	  engaged	  in	  an	  enterprise	  that	  is	  as	  deeply	  political	  
as	   it	   is	   intellectual…How	   could	   a	   branch	   of	   enquiry	   that	   takes	   as	   its	   central	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preserve	   the	   making	   (and	   unmaking)	   of	   human	   knowledge	   be	   anything	   but	  
political	  to	  the	  core?	  (Jasanoff,	  1996a:	  409,	  original	  emphasis).	  
	  
There	  are,	  crudely,	  two	  important	  implications	  of	  this	  insight	  that	  relate	  to	  STS	  
accounts	  of	  politics	  and	  policy-­‐making.	   	  One	  concerns	  whether	  analysts	  should	  
adopt	  normative	  stances	  to	  take	  “sides”	  in	  the	  scientific	  controversies	  that	  they	  
are	  studying.	   	  This	  “neutrality	  versus	  commitment”	  debate,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  thesis,	   is	  as	  much	  a	  reflexive	  methodological	  question	  as	  a	  theoretical	  one	  
(even	   if	   these	   influence	   one	   another),	   and	   it	  will	   be	   dealt	  with	   in	   2.5	   and	   2.6	  
where	  I	  outline	  the	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  considerations	  related	  
to	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  other	  implication	  relates	  to	  how	  STS	  accounts	  for	  science	  in	  
governance	  and	  policy-­‐making,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  
discussion.	  	  Before	  proceeding,	  however,	  a	  further	  division	  needs	  to	  be	  made.	  	  It	  
could	  be	  said	  that	  there	  are,	  broadly,	  two	  principal	  themes	  that	  arise	  when	  STS	  
examines	   interactions	  between	  science	  and	  governance.	   	  One	  of	   these,	  already	  
discussed	  in	  1.2,	  is	  expertise	  and	  its	  pluralisation	  in	  scientific	  governance,	  which	  
has	   led	   to	   a	   vast	   amount	   of	   STS	   research	   into	   risk,	   regulation,	   the	   public	  
understanding	   of	   science	   and	   the	   role	   of	   public	   engagement	   in	   scientific	  
decision-­‐making.	   	   The	   other,	   which	   I	   suggest	   is	   comparatively	   understudied,	  
relates	   to	   how	   the	   STS	   literature	   specifically	   addresses	   and	   conceptualises	  
science	  governance	  systems,	  institutions	  and	  processes.	  	  To	  provide	  an	  example	  
of	  the	  debates	  that	  have	  occurred	  when	  STS	  has	  attempted	  to	  analyse	  this	  topic,	  
it	  is	  helpful	  to	  discuss	  one	  particular	  example	  at	  length.	  
	  
2.4.3	  The	  science	  policy	  construction	  debate	  
In	   1990,	   Cambrosio,	   Limoges	   and	   Pronovost	   (henceforth	   CLP)	   argued	   that	  
science	  policy	  analysts	  continued	  to	  treat	  science	  policy	  as	  a	  “black	  box”,	  despite	  
the	   emergence	   of	   STS.	   	   Similarly,	   sociologists	   of	   science,	   they	   claimed,	   “have	  
tended	   either	   to	   neglect	   issues	   of	   science	   policy	   when	   analyzing	   scientific	  
practice,	  or	  to	  tackle	  them	  as	  a	  separate	  domain	  (Cambrosio	  et	  al.,	  1990:	  196)”.	  	  
To	  address	  this,	  the	  authors	  drew	  upon	  ANT	  and	  Latour	  (1987)	  in	  particular	  in	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arguing	   that	   science	  policy-­‐making	   consists	   of	   representational	  practices	   such	  
as	   the	   construction	   and	   distribution	   of	   policy	   dossiers,	  which	   they	   defined	   as	  
sets	  of	  “intragovernmental	  tasks	  and	  constraints	  (Cambrosio	  et	  al.,	  1990:	  200)”.	  	  
Dossiers:	  
	  
…travel	  along	  a	  path	  that	  will	  lead	  them	  to	  become	  (or	  fail	  to	  become)	  a	  policy.	  
Along	   this	  path	   they	  undergo	  a	  series	  of	  modifications,	  which	  may	  completely	  
alter	  their	  content	  (Ibid.:	  206).	  	  
	  
In	  CLP’s	   case	  study,	  an	   important	  element	  of	   the	  dossier	  was	   the	  definition	  of	  
the	   practice	   of	   biotechnology	   and	   its	   classification	   into	   sub-­‐categories.	   	   The	  
process	   of	   establishing	   a	   matrix	   to	   represent	   the	   various	   categories	   of	  
biotechnology,	  such	  as	  dividing	  biomedical	  biotechnology	  between	  health	  care	  
and	   cancer	   research	   was	   highly	   contingent	   –	   but	   these	   categories	   gradually	  
became	   viewed	   of	   as	   accurate	   representations	   of	   the	   field.	   	   Subsequent	  
consultations	   with	   actors	   from	   within	   and	   outside	   government	   helped	   the	  
policy	  officials	  not	  only	  to	  collect	  data	  but	  also	  to	  “naturalize”	  these	  categories,	  
although	  in	  practice	  the	  range	  of	  “external”	  actors	  consulted	  was	  quite	  limited.	  	  
CLP	   suggest	   that	   the	   policy	   researchers	   selected	   a	   limited	   number	   of	  
spokespeople	   to	   serve	   as	   “typical”	   representatives	   of	   certain	   groups,	   thereby	  
reinforcing	  their	  own	  original	  classifications	  of	  these	  groups:	  “what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  
the	  definition	  of	  spokespersons	  is	  the	  construction	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  relevant	  
group	  (Ibid.:	  214)”.	  	  	  
	  
In	  CLP’s	  account,	  then,	  the	  enrolment	  of	  selected	  external	  actors	  was	  helpful	  for	  
providing	  policy-­‐makers	  with	  an	  operational	  impetus	  for	  action.	  The	  remainder	  
of	   their	   paper	  describes	   the	  means	   through	  which	  policy	   dossiers	   –	   and	   their	  
representations	   of	   nature	   –	   gained	   further	   internal	   credibility	   via	  
intertextuality,	   which	   in	   this	   study	  was	   viewed	   as	   the	   practice	   of	   referencing	  
other	  internal	  documents	  seen	  to	  have	  authority	  (e.g.	  policies,	  legislations,	  laws,	  
memoranda)	   in	  order	   to	  convey	  certain	  messages	   to	  certain	   internal	  decision-­‐
makers.	   	  Contingent	  representational	  practices	  are	  thus	   further	  stabilized,	  and	  
 50 
to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   “…decisions	   essentially	   depend	   upon	   internal	  
governmental	  representations	  (Ibid.:	  219)”.	  
	  
CLP	  (1990)	  is	  among	  the	  first	  STS	  studies	  to	  consider	  classification-­‐making	  in	  a	  
science-­‐policy	   context,	   and	   it	   led	   to	   an	   interesting	   discussion	  which	   Abraham	  
(1994)	  labelled	  the	  Science	  Policy	  Construction	  Debate.	  	  	  	  Effectively,	  this	  debate	  
demonstrates	   the	   considerable	   difficulties	   that	   STS	   practitioners	   have	   faced	  
when	   trying	   to	   account	   for	   science	   in	   policy-­‐making	   by	   using	   the	   then	  
“established”	   STS	   frameworks.	   	   As	  Wynne	   (1992:	   595)	  noted	   at	   the	   time,	   this	  
debate	  “can	  be	  seen	  as	  another	  rehash	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  discourse-­‐focused	  
and	   interests-­‐based	   explanations”.	   	   Mirroring	   the	   broader	   STS	   controversy	  
surrounding	  actor-­‐network	  theory,	  for	  example,	  CLP	  were	  accused	  by	  Kleinman	  
(1991)	   of	   offering	   an	   account	   that	   neglected	   the	   role	   of	   politics,	   power	   and	  
social	   struggle	   in	   the	   production	   of	   the	   various	   categories	   of	   biotechnology.	  	  
Kleinman	   further	   suggested	   that	  CLP	  neglected	   to	  explain	  how	  various	  actors’	  
interests	   became	   enrolled	   in	   the	   first	   place;	   that	   CLP	   neglected	   accounts	   of	  
important	  actors	  like	  the	  biotechnology	  industry;	  and	  that	  CLP	  generally	  failed	  
to	   pay	   sufficient	   attention	   to	   institutional	   contexts.	   	   In	   light	   of	   all	   this,	  
Kleinman’s	   recommendation	  was	  nothing	   less	   than	   to	  abandon	  STS	  altogether	  
(!):	  “While	  we	  owe	  a	  tremendous	  debt	  to	  recent	  work	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  science,	  
the	  shortcomings	  of	  such	  work	  make	   it	   clear	   that	   it	   is	   time	   to	  move	  beyond	   it	  
(1991:	  771)”.	  
	  
In	  reply,	  CLP	  drew	  upon	  “traditional”	  critiques	  of	   interest	  theory	  to	  argue	  that	  
Kleinman:	   took	   for	   granted	   that	   “sides”	   exist;	  would	   have	   started	   his	   analysis	  
with	  “already	  given,	  delineated	  and	  unquestioned	  macro-­‐entities	  (Cambrosio	  et	  
al.,	  1991:	  777)”;	  and,	  for	  good	  measure,	  was	  not	  even	  interested	  in	  “what	  goes	  
on	   within	   the	   black	   box	   of	   policy-­‐making	   (Ibid.:	   778)”.	   	   Played	   out	   in	   this	  
manner,	   the	   science	   policy	   construction	   debate	   seemed	   to	   point	   to	   an	  
undesirable	   end-­‐game	   for	   STS:	   would	   all	   attempts	   at	   applying	   various	   STS	  
frameworks	   to	   studies	   of	   policy-­‐making	   simply	   mirror	   the	   more	   substantial	  
theoretical	  debates	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  field?	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Fortunately,	   the	   interventions	   of	  Wynne	   (1992)	   and	   Abraham	   (1994)	   offered	  
suggestions	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reconciliatory.	  	  Abraham	  (1994)	  critiques	  CLP’s	  
(and	   also	  Woolgar’s)	   depiction	   of	   the	   interests	   approach	   as	   static,	   suggesting	  
that	  if	  applied	  flexibly	  it	  can	  accommodate	  descriptions	  of	  how	  actors’	  interests	  
are	  constructed.	  	  He	  also	  reconciled	  some	  of	  Kleinman’s	  and	  CLP’s	  arguments	  in	  
suggesting	   that	   attention	   to	   the	   representations	   of	   policies	   is	   an	   important	  
nexus	   for	   research,	   as	   are	   the	   institutional	   contexts	   that	  Kleinman	  pointed	   to.	  	  
Both	  of	  these	  approaches	  could	  facilitate	  analyses	  of	  the	  role	  of	  scientists	  in	  the	  
political	  world:	  “if	  read	  constructively,	  Kleinman’s	  proposals	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
agenda	  (albeit	  crude)	   for	  sociologists	   to	  open	  up	   the	  black	  box	  of	  government	  
science	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  science	  policy	  (Abraham,	  1994:	  130)”.	  
	  
Wynne,	   meanwhile,	   sides	   with	   CLP	   in	   stressing	   that	   the	   representations	  
approach	   is	   particularly	   useful	   for	   examining	   “the	   unspoken	   contingency	   and	  
negotiability	  behind	  the	  natural	  languages	  of	  identity	  and	  interests	  which	  actors	  
carry	  and	  deploy	  (Wynne,	  1992:	  578)”.	  	  Yet	  Wynne	  is	  somewhat	  more	  nuanced	  
in	   his	   endorsement	   of	   CLP,	   pointing	   out	   that	   CLP	   could	   have	   drawn	   more	  
attention	  to	  the	  negotiable	  interests	  of	  the	  actors	  they	  studied.	  	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  
this	  was	  perhaps	  a	  result	  of	  following	  Latour	  too	  closely:	  
	   	  
Latour’s	  work	  does	  not	  always	  fully	  recognize	  nor	  exploit	  the	  endemic	  tendency	  
to	   instability…which	   is	   introduced	   via	   the	   continually	   negotiated…	   and	  
chronically	  incomplete	  character	  of	  actor’s	  identities	  (Wynne,	  1992:	  578).	  
	  
Together,	   then,	  Wynne	   and	  Abraham’s	   contributions	   fall	   only	   slightly	   short	   of	  
suggesting	   that	   there	   is	   some	   room	   for	   reconciliation	   between	   CLP	   and	  
Kleinman	  –	  or	  between	  ANT	  and	  the	  interests	  approach	  for	  STS	  engagement	  of	  
the	  political	  world.	  	  There	  is	  also,	  it	  would	  seem,	  a	  need	  to	  transcend	  these	  two	  
approaches.	   	   Reflecting	   more	   broadly	   on	   the	   application	   of	   “traditional”	   STS	  
frameworks	  to	  study	  “politics”,	  Radder	  (1998:	  330)	  argued:	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…if	  we	  wish	  to	  …	  develop	  an	  integrated	  politics	  of	  STS,	  we	  must	  go	  beyond	  the	  
traditional	  actor-­‐network	  and	  SSK	  approaches.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  Radder	  endorsed	  the	  “critical	  and	  programmatic	  claims	  (Ibid.:	  
328)”	   of	   co-­‐production	   as	   a	   means	   for	   achieving	   this	   –	   a	   sentiment	   that,	   as	  
suggested	  earlier,	  has	  gained	  traction	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  
	  
2.4.4	  The	  idiom	  of	  co-­‐production	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  this	  thesis	  
The	  co-­‐production	  framework	  (e.g.	   Jasanoff,	  2004c,	   Jasanoff	  and	  Wynne,	  1998,	  
Wynne,	  1996b)	  is	  perhaps	  the	  only	  STS-­‐derived	  theoretical	  framework	  with	  the	  
explicit	   aim	   of	   connecting	   STS	   to	   the	   broader	   political	   science	   literature	  
concerned	  with	  the	  role	  of	  science	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  	  It	  is	  arguably	  not	  so	  much	  
a	  theory	  as	  an	  idiom	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  to	  draw	  upon	  and	  bridge	  a	  broad	  
range	  of	  STS	  findings	  (Jasanoff,	  2004a).	  	  According	  to	  Jasanoff	  &	  Wynne	  (1998:	  
16),	   an	   over-­‐arching	   finding	   of	   the	   STS	   literature	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   idea	   of	   co-­‐
production:	  
	  
Together,	   this	  body	  of	  work	   calls	   attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   social	   and	   cultural	  
commitments	   are	   built	   into	   every	   phase	   of	   knowledge	   production	   and	  
consequent	   social	   action,	   even	   though	   enormously	   effective	   steps	   are	   often	  
taken	  to	  eliminate	  the	  traces	  of	  the	  social	  from	  the	  scientific	  world.	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   main	   aspects	   of	   co-­‐production	   is	   that	   it	   strives	   to	   avoid	   giving	  
explanatory	  priority	   to	   either	   the	   “social”	   or	   the	   “natural”.	   	   Both	   are	  mutually	  
shaping	   and	   thus	   analysts	   must	   take	   care	   to	   avoid	   both	   social	   and	   natural	  
realism.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  co-­‐production	  represents	  an	  explicit	  
rhetorical	   manoeuvre	   away	   from	   social	   constructivism.	   	   As	   Jasanoff	   argues,	  
labelling	   scientific	   knowledge	   as	   socially	   constructed	   is	   somewhat	  
misrepresentative	  of	   the	  STS	   literature.	   	  Although	  constructivist	  research	  does	  
not	   in	   theory	   prioritise	   the	   social	   over	   the	   natural,	   the	   term	   “social	  
construction”	   implies	   this	   and	   consequently	   may	   “inhibit	   the	   symmetrical	  
probing	   of	   the	   constitutive	   elements	   of	   both	   society	   and	   science	   (Jasanoff,	  
2004b:	  19-­‐20)”.	  	  Thus:	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…the	  production	  of	  order	  in	  nature	  and	  society	  has	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  an	  idiom	  
that	  does	  not,	  even	  accidentally	  and	  without	  intent,	  give	  primacy	  to	  either.	  	  The	  
term	   co-­‐production	  reflects	   this	   self-­‐conscious	   desire	   to	   avoid	   both	   social	   and	  
technological	   determinism	   in	   S&TS	   accounts	   of	   the	   world	   (Ibid.:	   20,	   original	  
emphasis).	  
	  
To	   refer	   to	   ‘the	   science’	   and	   ‘the	   policy’	   as	   separate	   domains	   exchanging	  
independently	  generated	  explicit	  ideas	  and	  constraints,	  is	  to	  conceal	  the	  shared	  
commitments	   which	   define	   them	   as	   a	   single	   culture	   (Wynne,	   1996b:	   377,	  
original	  emphasis).	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  “politics”,	  co-­‐production	  seeks	  to	  analyse	  “how	  knowledge-­‐making	  
is	  incorporated	  into	  practices	  of	  state-­‐making…and,	  in	  reverse,	  how	  practices	  of	  
governance	   influence	   the	  making	   and	   use	   of	   knowledge	   (Jasanoff,	   2004a:	   3)”.	  	  	  
Additionally,	   as	   earlier	   argued,	   co-­‐production	   also	   represents	   an	   attempt	   to	  
move	   beyond	   the	   sort	   of	   STS	   in-­‐fighting	   exemplified	   by	   the	   science	   policy	  
construction	  debate	  (2.4.4).	  	  Underlying	  this	  desire	  is	  the	  conviction	  that	  STS	  has	  
something	  important	  to	  say	  about	  the	  links	  between	  knowledge	  and	  power;	  that	  
bridging	   divisions	   within	   STS	   will	   facilitate	   its	   engagement	   (and,	   perhaps,	  
uptake)	  with	  related	  literatures;	  and	  that	  such	  a	  connection	  is	  “urgently	  needed	  
(Ibid.:	  2)”	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  more	  nuanced	  understandings	  of	  how	  scientists	  
and	  policy	  actors	  collectively	  produce	  and	  mobilize	  scientific	  knowledge	  to	  both	  
inform	   and	   rationalise	   societal	   responses	   to	   important	   contemporary	   issues	  
such	  as	  global	  climate	  change,	  EIDs,	  or,	  indeed,	  CCH.	  
	  
It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   co-­‐production	   incorporates	   models	   of	   scientific	  
governance	  and	  policy-­‐making	  from	  the	  broader	  political	  science	  literature	  into	  
its	   general	   framework11 	  by	   more	   forcefully	   problematising	   the	   status	   and	  
“objectivity”	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  (recall	  the	  discussion	  from	  2.2	  on	  epistemic	  
                                                
11	  Jasanoff	  &	  Wynne	  (1998:	  7-­‐16),	   for	  example,	  developed	  their	  analysis	  with	  STS	  in	  mind,	  but	  
they	   also	   considered	   political	   scientific	   models	   of	   policy-­‐making,	   such	   as	   agenda-­‐setting;	  
knowledge	   change;	   policy	   cultures;	   and	   policy	   interests	   and	   discourses.	   	   None	   of	   these	  
frameworks,	  they	  argued,	  “fully	  accounts	  for	  all	  the	  interrelations	  in	  the	  production	  of	  scientific	  
knowledge	  (10)”,	  but	  they	  do	  help	  to	  strengthen	  “the	  view	  of	  the	  policy-­‐science	  relationship	  as	  
complex	  and	  nonlinear	  (10)”.	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communities	   theory).	   	   Employing	   co-­‐production	   to	   study	   science	   and	   its	  
governance	  implies	  treating	  both	  symmetrically:	  
	  
To	  question	  how	  science	  acquires	  meaning	  and	  stability,	  by	  exploring	  its	  social	  
commitments,	  is	  to	  question	  policy	  in	  the	  same	  way	  (Jasanoff	  &	  Wynne,	  1998:	  5;	  
original	  emphasis).12	  
	  
Beyond	   this	   general	   insight,	   the	   co-­‐production	   framework	   usefully	   draws	  
attention	   to	   particular	   sites	   for	   STS	   research	   into	   scientific	   governance.	   	   The	  
remainder	   of	   this	   discussion	   focuses	   on	   some	   of	   the	   central	   thematic	  
preoccupations	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
	  
One	   preoccupation	   of	   co-­‐production	   is	   issue	   framings,	   something	   we	   have	  
already	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	   1.3	   and	   1.4	  where	   the	   risk	   framings	   of	   climate	  
change	  and	  of	  EIDs	  were	  examined.	  	  The	  reason	  that	  issue	  framings	  are	  a	  central	  
focal	  point	   for	   co-­‐production	   research	   is	  worth	   reiterating:	   knowledge	   carries	  
with	   it	   certain	  responsibilities	  and	  mandates	   for	  social	  and/or	  political	  action,	  
and	  yet	  it	  is	  often	  also	  the	  case	  that	  knowledge	  relevant	  to	  public	  action	  can	  be	  
subject	  to	  interpretative	  flexibility.	  	  Examining	  how	  issue	  framings	  originate	  and	  
how	   they	   come	   to	   be	   stabilised	   can	   offer	  much	   insight	   into	   the	   often	   tacit	   or	  
hidden	  dynamics	  shaping	  both	  “scientific”	  and	  “political”	  worlds,	  something	  that	  
will	   become	   apparent	   in	   Chapters	   3	  &	   4	  where	   the	   origins	   and	   production	   of	  
CCH	  research	  are	  closely	  examined.	  
	  
Applying	   the	   insights	   of	   STS	   to	   studies	   of	   controversy	   is	   another	   important	  
preoccupation	   of	   co-­‐production	   (as	   it	   is	   for	   much	   STS	   research).	   	   One	   of	   the	  
reasons	   for	   this	   is	   the	   way	   that	   studies	   of	   controversies	   help	   to	   reveal	   how	  
                                                
12	  There	   is	   an	   important	   ontological	   ambiguity	   that	   should	   be	   clarified.	   	   The	   notion	   of	   co-­‐
production	   in	   STS	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   Latour	   (e.g.	   1993),	   who,	   as	   pointed	   out	   by	   Bloor	   (1991),	  
suggests	  that	  nature	  and	  society	  are	  co-­‐produced,	  rather	  than	  society	  and	  its	  accounts	  of	  nature.	  	  
From	  my	  perspective,	   it	  would	  seem	  that	  as	   Jasanoff	  and	  Wynne	  refer	   to	   the	  co-­‐production	  of	  
science	  (rather	  than	  nature),	  they	  imply	  that	  society	  and	  its	  accounts	  of	  nature	  are	  co-­‐products.	  	  
Whether	   or	   not	   this	   is	   the	   correct	   interpretation,	   it	   is	   how	   I	   will	   understand	   co-­‐production	  
throughout	  this	  thesis.	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assumptions	  and	  norms	  are	  built	   into	  scientific	   research.	   	   In	  Chapter	  4,	   an	   in-­‐
depth	  examination	  of	  a	  longstanding	  controversy	  between	  the	  CCH	  community	  
and	  a	  group	  of	  disease	  ecologists	  will	  be	  presented.	  	  Analysing	  this	  controversy,	  
it	  will	  be	  shown,	  exposes	  assumptions	  built	  into	  CCH	  research	  that	  would	  likely	  
otherwise	   remain	   hidden,	   offering	   an	   intriguing	   counter-­‐point	   to	   the	  
mainstream	  framing	  of	  CCH.	  
	  
	  Policy-­‐relevant	   scientific	   knowledge	   needs	   to	   be	   understood	   and	   transmitted	  
across	  “time,	  place	  and	  institutional	  contexts	  (Jasanoff,	  2004a:	  5)”.	  	  Focusing	  on	  
how	  science	  and	  technology	  becomes	  standardised,	  switches	  between	  local	  and	  
global	  settings,	  and	  even	  leads	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  institutional	  settings	  is	  yet	  
another	   preoccupation	   of	   co-­‐production.	   	   Here,	   the	   role	   of	   formal	   scientific	  
governance	   institutions	  can	  be	  crucial.	   	  To	  explore	   these	   themes	   in	  relation	   to	  
CCH	   science,	   Chapter	   5	   will	   examine	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   particular	  
understanding	  of	  CCH	  science	  has	  emerged	   through	   the	   IPCC,	  an	  example,	  par	  
excellence,	   of	   a	   boundary	   organisation,	   mediating	   between	   “scientific”	   and	  
“political”	  worlds	  and	  attempting	  to	  secure	  legitimacy	  in	  both.	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  then,	  the	  three	  thematic	  preoccupations	  discussed	  above	  (which	  
Jasanoff	   labels	   as	   emergence	   and	   stabilization;	   controversy;	   and	   intelligibility	  
and	   portability)13	  all	   help	   to	   orientate	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   and	   they	   all	   fit	  
under	  the	  co-­‐production	  umbrella:	  
	  
…interpretative	   analyses	   of	   the	   framing	  of	   policy	  problems,	   the	  production	  of	  
scientific	   claims,	   the	   standardization	   of	   science	   and	   technology,	   and	   the	  
international	   diffusion	   of	   facts	   and	   artefacts	   all	   focus	   attention	   on	   the	   co-­‐
production	  of	  natural	  and	  social	  order	  (Jasanoff	  &	  Wynne,	  1998:	  74).	  
	  
In	   thus	  presenting	  co-­‐production,	   it	   can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	  useful	  heuristic	   for	  
connecting	   STS	  with	   other	   literatures	   interested	   in	   policy-­‐making.	   	  Numerous	  
STS	  and	  other	  perspectives	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  applied	  to	  examinations	  of	  any	  
                                                
13	  A	  fourth	  thematic	  preoccupation	  of	  co-­‐production	  identified	  by	  Jasanoff	  is	  the	  uptake	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  its	  influences	  on	  cultural	  practices.	  	  This	  not	  a	  central	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  
however.	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of	   co-­‐production’s	   thematic	   pre-­‐occupations.	   	   What	   is	   important	   is	   that	   they	  
help	  elucidate	  how:	  
	  	  
particular	   forms	   of	   social	   order	   or	   culture,	   and	   particular	   forms	   of	   epistemic	  
order	  mutually	   reinforce,	   construct,	   and	  validate	  one	  another	  at	   levels	  deeper	  
than	  expressed	  scientific	  or	  policy	  choice	  (Jasanoff	  &	  Wynne,	  1998:	  76).	  	  
	  
With	   this	   in	   mind,	   it	   is	   time	   to	   describe	   the	   sorts	   of	   epistemological	   and	  
methodological	  considerations	  related	  to	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
2.5	  Epistemology,	  reflexivity	  and	  objectivity	  	  
 
2.5.1	  Introduction	  
Earlier	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  provided	  examples	  of	  co-­‐production	  in	  action,	  such	  
as	   the	   studies	   of	   the	   role	   of	   GCMs	   and	   anchoring	   devices	   in	   global	   climate	  
change	   politics	   (1.4).	   	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   here	   that	   Radder	   (1998)	   scrutinized	  
Wynne’s	   	  (1996b)	  analysis	  of	  global	  climate	  change.	   	  Aside	  from	  asserting	  that	  
Wynne	  provided	  a	  “weak	  and	  undogmatic	   interpretation	  (Radder,	  1998:	  329)”	  
of	  SSK,14	  he	  asked	  how	  Wynne’s	  deconstruction	  of	  climate	  change	  science	  would	  
help	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  what	  to	  do?	  If,	  for	  example,	  one	  is	  supportive	  of	  the	  
need	  to	  address	  global	  warming,	  is	  deconstructing	  the	  science	  (and	  the	  politics)	  
surrounding	  climate	  change	  a	  desirable	  outcome?	  Can	  we,	  he	  asks,	  still	  act	  upon	  
the	  knowledge	  claims	  of	  climate	  scientists?	  
	  
The	  answers	  one	  might	  provide	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  their	  epistemological	  and	  
methodological	   perspectives.	   	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   will	   address	   some	   of	   the	  
epistemological	   issues	   that	   have	   surrounded	   STS	   research	   and	   discuss	   how	  
these	  relate	  to	  the	  co-­‐production	  framework	  (2.5.2).	   	  Based	  on	  this	  discussion,	  
in	   2.5.3	   I	   will	   elaborate	   upon	   how	   my	   methodological	   choices	   may	   have	  
influenced	   this	   thesis	   while	   also	   explaining	   the	   political	   ambitions	   of	   this	  
                                                
14	  Although	  Radder	  branded	  Wynne’s	  usage	  of	  SSK	  as	  “weak	  and	  undogmatic”,	  there	  is	  little	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  strong	  and	  dogmatic	  approach	  is	  any	  better	  at	  addressing	  science	  in	  
policy.	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research.	  	  Thereafter,	  in	  2.6	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  more	  practical	  terms	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  the	  research	  underpinning	  Chapters	  3,	  4	  and	  5	  was	  carried	  out.	  
	  
2.5.2	  Reflexivity	  and	  epistemology	  in	  STS	  research	  
Reflexivity	  was	  one	  of	   the	  key	   tenets	  of	   the	  Strong	  Programme	  as	  outlined	  by	  
David	   Bloor	   (1976).	   	   This	   programme	   nonetheless	   came	   under	   attack	   for	   not	  
being	   adequately	   reflexive	   about	   its	   explanations	   for	   how	   interests	   were	  
constituted	   (e.g.	   Callon	   and	   Law,	   1982,	   Woolgar,	   1981).	   	   A	   selective	  
epistemology	  was	   argued	   to	   be	   in	   play:	   interests	   researchers	  were	   relativists	  
when	   it	   came	   to	   scientist’s	   accounts	   but	   realists	   when	   it	   came	   to	   their	   own	  
explanations	  (e.g.	  Woolgar,	  1981).	  	  Because	  so	  many	  STS	  accounts	  were	  reliant	  
upon	   scientific	   texts,	   it	   was	   said	   that	   research	   from	   places	   like	   Edinburgh	  
tended	   to	   “reproduce	   the	   language	  of	   realism	  (Lynch,	  1982:	  242)”	  rather	   than	  
paying	   adequate	   attention	   to	   the	   discursive	   strategies	   used	   by	   scientists	   to	  
produce	  “reality”.15	  	  	  
	  
To	  address	  this	  conundrum,	  an	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  texts,	  
language	  and	  practices	  all	  help	  to	  construct	  reality	  was	  proposed.	  	  This	  so-­‐called	  
linguistic	   turn	  paid	   great	   attention	   to	   the	   analyst’s	   role	   in	  producing	   “reality”,	  
arguing	   that	   STS	   research	   offers	   simply	   another	   representation	   of	   a	   given	  
phenomenon	  and	  that	  its	  authors	  should	  seek	  to	  make	  this	  explicit.	  There	  was,	  
in	   other	   words,	   the	   need	   to	   “problematize	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   analyst	  
(author,	  self)	  stands	  in	  a	  disengaged	  relationship	  to	  the	  world	  (subjects,	  objects,	  
scientists,	  things)(Woolgar,	  1992:	  334)”.	  
	  
Pursuing	  this	  direction	  did	  not,	  however,	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  productive	  
avenue	  for	  STS	  research.	  	  Although	  the	  reflexive	  turn	  did	  help	  to	  draw	  attention	  
to	  the	  performative	  aspect	  of	  texts,	  which	  are	   indeed	  often	  primary	  sources	  of	  
evidence	  (as	  they	  are	  in	  this	  thesis,	  see	  2.5.4),	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  additional	  
                                                
15	  As	  cited	  by	  Myers	  (1990:	  26).	  	  Myers	  (1990:	  25-­‐34)	  provides	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  several	  
aspects	  of	  this	  debate,	  which	  is	  only	  briefly	  summarised	  here.	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layers	  of	  irony	  that	  often	  accompanied	  the	  desire	  to	  make	  explicit	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
author	  in	  producing	  accounts	  led	  to	  any	  particularly	  useful	  insights:	  
	  
…the	   reflexivist	   proposal	   to	   turn	   literary	   has	   the	   odd	   consequence	   of	  
transforming	  all	   texts	   into	  “epistemological”	  exercises.	  What	  a	   loss	  of	  content!	  
(Knuuttila,	  2002)	  
	  
In	   addition,	   one	   important	   criticism	   of	   the	   reflexive	   turn	   came	   from	   Lynch	  
(1982),	  who	  pointed	  out	  the	  limitation	  of	  focusing	  on	  scientific	  rhetoric.	  	  Myers	  
(1990:	  31)	  summarised	  Lynch’s	  argument	  thus:	  
	  
The	   claim	   that	   scientists	   are	   using	   rhetoric	   is	   only	   interesting	   as	   an	   ironic	  
debunking	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  their	  discourse	  is	  especially	  “objective”.	  	  Once	  
one	  grants	  that	  this	  objectivity	  is	  something	  they	  create	  in	  their	  work,	  the	  claim	  
that	  everything	  is	  rhetoric	  has	  little	  meaning.	  
	  
Lynch	  (1982)	  furthermore	  argued	  that	  by	  focusing	  too	  heavily	  on	  texts,	  analysts	  
were	   becoming	   too	   distant	   from	   scientific	   practice.	   	   By	   continuing	   to	   view	  
science	   from	   “outside”	   and	   by	   reducing	   science	   to	   “inscriptions”,	   richer	  
descriptions	   of	   how	   scientists	   construct	   their	   own	   worlds,	   practices,	   and	  
knowledge	  were	  lost.	  	  Instead,	  Lynch	  argued,	  analyses	  should	  be	  situated	  within	  
scientific	  practice;	  by	  observing	  scientific	  processes	  in	  action,	  analysts	  can	  avoid	  
imposing	   any	   pre-­‐conceived	   sociological	   frameworks.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
programme	  proposed	  by	  Lynch	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  equally	  dogmatic	  as	  the	  one	  
pursued	  by	   the	  reflexivists,	   requiring	   instead	  of	   intense	  attention	   to	  discourse	  
and	   reflexivity	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   technical	   knowledge	   and	   infiltration	   into	   the	  
scientific	  world.	  	  	  
The	   reason	   for	   describing	   such	   approaches	   here	   is	   not	   to	   argue	   for	   the	  
supremacy	  of	  one	  over	  the	  other	  but	  to	  make	  a	  few	  more	  general	  points.	  	  First,	  
the	  reflexive	  turn	  drew	  greater	  attention	  to	  texts,	  which	  remains	  an	  important	  
contribution	  to	  the	  field.	  	  Second,	  reflexivity	  requires	  analysts	  to	  be	  more	  honest	  
about	   their	   findings	   and	   more	   explicit	   about	   their	   role	   in	   constructing	   a	  
particular	   “reality”	   (to	   be	   further	   discussed	   in	   2.5.4).	   	   Third,	   reflexivity,	   if	  
viewed	  more	  broadly,	   can	   in	   fact	   offer	   an	   escape	   from	   the	  potentially	   endless	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game	  of	   “epistemological	   chicken”	   (Collins	  &	  Yearley,	   1992)	   that	   the	   reflexive	  
turn	  seemed	  to	   lead	  to.	   	  Once	   it	   is	  accepted	  that	  all	  research	   is	  contingent	  and	  
situated,	   one	   can	   instead	   appreciate	   that	   all	   theories	   and	  methods	   have	   their	  
strengths	   and	   weaknesses.	   It	   makes	   more	   sense	   to	   choose	   theoretical	  
standpoints	   suitable	   to	   a	   research	   topic	   than	   it	   does	   to	  dogmatically	  pursue	   a	  
particular	   methodology	   or	   to	   argue	   that	   one	   approach	   is	   more	   reflexive	   and	  
relativistic	  than	  another	  (Ibid.).	   	  This	  can	  benefit	  the	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  David	  
(2005:	   173-­‐4)	   argued	   in	   promoting	   the	   concept	   of	   “reflexive	   epistemological	  
diversity”:	  
	  
To	   the	   extent	   that	   data	   collected	   by	   different	   means,	   and	   within	   different	  
theoretical	   frameworks,	   leads	   to	   conflicting	   representations	   of	   science	   in	  
society,	   the	   sociology	  of	   science	   field,	   as	  a	  whole,	  benefits	   in	   two	  ways.	   	   First,	  
through	   reflexivity	   comes	   the	   recognition	   that	   any	   singular	   account,	   using	   a	  
limited	  range	  of	  methods	  and	  research	  questions,	  cannot	  hope	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  
account	  of	  scientific	  knowledge….However,	  second,	   in	  additional	   to	  reflexivity,	  
multiple	  accounts	  provide	  grounds	  for	  complementarity.	  
	  
In	  practice,	  this	  implies	  acknowledging	  that	  different	  sub-­‐disciplines	  within	  STS	  
can	  offer	   interesting	   insights,	  while	  at	   the	  same	   time	  conceding	   that	   there	  are	  
limitations	   to	   any	   of	   these	   approaches.	   	   This	   is	   a	   helpful	   perspective	   on	  
reflexivity	  as	   it	   forces	   the	   acknowledgement	   that	   no	   one	   theoretical	   approach	  
should	   be	   thought	   to	   have	   authority	   over	   any	   other	   one.	   	   The	   co-­‐production	  
framework,	  functioning	  as	  a	  means	  for	  incorporating	  the	  diverse	  insights	  from	  
STS	  into	  a	  workable	  framework,	  is	  compatible	  with	  this	  perspective.	  
	  
2.5.3	  Neutrality	  and	  symmetry	  
My	  stance	  on	  reflexivity,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  does	  not	  obviate	  the	  need	  to	  come	  
clean	  on	  how	  my	  particular	  standpoints	  and	  commitments	  may	  have	  influenced	  
this	   thesis.	   	   Given	   that	   the	   myth	   of	   the	   neutral	   social	   observer	   has	   been	  
debunked	   for	   at	   least	   fifty	   years	   (e.g.	   Gouldner,	   1962),	   it	   would	   seem	  
appropriate	  to	  begin	  this	  discussion	  not	  by	  examining	  whether	  I	  have	  any	  biases	  
but	   by	   clarifying	  what	   they	   are.	   	   As	   I	  mentioned	   in	   1.2,	   I	   attended	   the	  WHO’s	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Madrid	  Consultation	  on	  behalf	  of	  my	  employer,16	  which	  is	  the	  European	  Centre	  
for	  Disease	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  (ECDC),	  a	  technical	  agency	  of	  the	  European	  
Commission	   with	   the	   mandate	   to	   “identify,	   assess,	   and	   communicate	   current	  
and	  emerging	  threats	  to	  human	  health	  posed	  by	  infectious	  diseases”.17	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  my	  employer	  has	  such	  a	  mandate	  would	  seem	  to	  imply	  that	  I	  am	  a	  
subscriber	  to	  the	  “outbreak	  narrative”	  or	  “EID	  worldview”	  that	  was	  described	  in	  
1.3.	   	  As	  much	  of	  my	  academic	  and	  professional	   life	  has	   revolved	  around	  EIDs,	  
this	   is	   an	   accusation	   that	   would	   be	   difficult	   for	   me	   to	   deny.	   	   The	   best	   I	   can	  
probably	  do	  is	  to	  put	  it	  into	  context.	  	  	  
	  
My	  undergraduate	  degree	  was	  in	  microbiology	  and	  immunology,	  and	  thereafter	  
I	  spent	  several	  years	  working	  in	  the	  biotechnology	  industry,	  primarily	  for	  a	  firm	  
focused	   on	   developing	   antibodies	   and	   vaccines	   against	   infectious	   diseases.18	  	  
This	  industry	  stands	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  EID	  worldview,	  and	  my	  role	  was	  on	  the	  
business	  side	  of	  things.	  	  However,	  for	  me	  personally,	  working	  in	  industry	  simply	  
alerted	  me	   to	   the	  many	  economic,	   technical	   and	  geopolitical	  barriers	  blocking	  
the	  achievement	  of	  “global	  health”.	  	  One	  consequence	  was	  that	  I	  later	  enrolled	  in	  
a	  MSc.	  in	  STS,	  whence	  I	  became	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  the	  links	  between	  the	  
science	   and	   politics	   of	   “global	   health”.	   	   My	   dissertation	   looked	   at	   the	   SARS	  
outbreak	   of	   2003.	   	   I	   noted	   how	   WHO	   simultaneously	   co-­‐ordinated	   scientific	  
research,	   issued	   policy	   recommendations	   and	   negotiated	   disease	   control	  
measures	   with	   national	   governments.	   	   Each	   of	   these	   activities	   influenced	   the	  
other	   (Suk,	   2004),	   reinforcing,	   in	   my	  mind,	   the	   value	   of	   viewing	   science	   and	  
politics	  as	  co-­‐products.	  
	  
                                                
16	  It	  is	  somewhat	  ironic	  that	  my	  name	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  list	  of	  participants	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
report	  summarising	  this	  Consultation	  (WHO,	  2008).	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  if	  this	  is	  a	  lucky	  turn	  of	  events	  
helping	  me	  to	  “conceal”	  my	  biases,	  a	  slight	  to	  my	  organisation	  (ECDC	  and	  WHO	  have,	  to	  some	  
degree,	  overlapping	  mandates	  in	  the	  European	  region),	  or,	  most	  likely,	  simply	  a	  last-­‐minute	  
oversight	  as	  I	  was	  attending	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  senior	  colleague	  who	  could	  not	  attend.	  
17	  http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/Mission/Pages/Mission.aspx,	  accessed	  June	  30,	  
2012.	  
18	  http://crucell.com/,	  accessed	  June	  30,	  2012.	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Just	  after	  I	  began	  working	  on	  my	  PhD,	  I	  was	  offered	  a	  job	  at	  ECDC.	  	  	  This	  position	  
has	   given	  me	   the	   opportunity	   to	   be	   actively	   involved	   in	   “global	   health”	  while	  
also	  creating	  the	  possibility	  to	  work	  alongside	  the	  types	  of	  actors	  –	  public	  health	  
professionals	   and	   scientists	   –	   that	   I	   had	   hoped	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   in	   order	   to	  
conduct	   a	   detailed	   study	   of	   the	   role	   of	   science	   and	   politics	   in	   global	   health	  
governance.	   	   Through	   this	   employment	   I	   have	   also	   been	   involved	   in	   the	  
production	  of	  knowledge	  about	  CCH,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  types	  of	  research	  that,	   it	  
could	  be	  argued,	  contribute	  to	  the	  further	  entrenchment	  of	  the	  EID	  worldview.	  	  
It	   is	   therefore	   important	   to	   describe	   how	  my	   employment	   at	   ECDC	   relates	   to	  
some	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  before	  discussing	  what	  this	  means	  for	  my	  
ability	  to	  produce	  research	  that	  is	  “neutral”	  and	  “symmetrical”.	  
	  
The	  EID	  worldview	  
One	   of	   my	   first	   projects	   at	   ECDC	   focused	   on	   identifying	   which	   infectious	  
diseases	  would	  pose	   the	  greatest	   threat	   to	   the	  EU	   in	   the	   future.	   	  This	   led	   to	  a	  
publication	   entitled	   “Future	   infectious	   disease	   threats	   to	   Europe”	   (Suk	   and	  
Semenza,	   2011),	   that	   outlines	   the	   import	   of	   various	   EID	   “drivers”	   often	  
highlighted	   in	   the	  narratives	   surrounding	  EIDs,	   such	  as	   climate	  change,	   global	  
trade	   and	   travel,	   and	   demographic	   change.	   	   Based	   on	   these,	   several	   “threat	  
scenarios”	   were	   identified,	   including,	   notably,	   shifts	   in	   the	   transmission	   of	  
vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  	  	  
	  
The	  very	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  produced	  such	  an	  article	  means	  that	  I	  have	  contributed	  
to	  the	  production	  of	  the	  EID	  worldview.	   	  Yet,	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  should	  
demonstrate,	   I	   am	   also	   interested	   in	   how	   the	   risks	   and	   policies	   related	   to	  
infectious	   disease	   are	   being	   shaped:	   	   I	   certainly	   do	   not	   subscribe	   to	   the	   EID	  
worldview	  blindly	  or	  unconditionally.	  	  I	  should	  furthermore	  note	  that	  I	  am	  not	  a	  
big	  subscriber	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  “imminent	  plague”	  and	  I	  have	  problems	  with	  the	  
dominant	  framing	  of	  the	  EID	  threat.	  	  In	  my	  work	  at	  ECDC	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  draw	  
attention	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   social	   justice	   and	   inequalities	   are	   linked	   to	  
infectious	  disease	   spread	   (Suk	   et	   al.,	   2009,	   Semenza	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   and	   I	  would	  
rather	  see	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  disease	  control	  and	  public	  health	  in	  the	  places	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that	  need	  it	  the	  most,	  rather	  than	  measures	  such	  as	  better	  surveillance	  in	  richer	  
countries	  (which	  I	  maintain,	  in	  disagreement	  with	  many	  of	  my	  colleagues,	  is	  an	  
over-­‐emphasised	  public	  health	  measure).	  	  As	  I	  concluded	  in	  the	  paper	  on	  “future	  
threats”:	  	  
	  
…	   in	   an	   increasingly	   interconnected	   world,	   it	   would	   be	   both	   ethically	  
responsible	  and	  in	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  richer	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  including	  
Europe,	  to	  improve	  health	  everywhere	  (Suk	  &	  Semenza,	  2011:	  2077).	  
	  
Thus,	  although	  I	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  outside	  of	  the	  EID	  worldview,	  my	  work	  
at	   ECDC	  has	   attempted	   to	   slightly	   re-­‐position	   its	   orientation.	   	   This	   standpoint	  
should	  lend	  some	  comfort	  to	  anybody	  doubting	  whether	  I	  am	  able	  to	  critically	  
assess	  the	  role	  of	  science	  related	  to	  EIDs	  in	  global	  health	  governance.	  	  To	  further	  
support	  this	  claim,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  I	  have	  even	  bigger	  problems	  
with	  the	  securitisation	  of	  health,	  which	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  1.3	  often	  connects	  to	  
the	   EID	   worldview.	   	   Although	   my	   work	   at	   ECDC	   has	   periodically	   focused	   on	  
“biosecurity”	   and	   “bioterrorism”,	   I	   have	   diverged	  paths	  with	  many	  who	   share	  
the	  EID	  worldview	  to	  explicitly	  argue	  that	  the	  risks	  from	  bioterrorism	  appear	  to	  
me	   to	   be	   exaggerated.	   	   In	  more	   technical	   terms,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   great	  
attention	   that	   has	   been	  placed	   on	  potentially	   “high	   tech”	   bioterrorism	   threats	  
(such	   as	   a	   pathogen	   engineered	   so	   as	   to	   be	   more	   dangerous)	   appears	   to	   be	  
misguided,	  particularly	  when	  contrasted	  with	  the	  numerous	  diseases	  that	  have	  
“naturally”	  emerged	  in	  past	  decades	  (Suk	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  any	  potential	  
threat	  (and	  threat	  mitigation	  measures)	  related	  to	  bioterrorism	  must	  be	  placed	  
in	  a	  context	  that	  also	  considers	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  impacts	  that	  infectious	  diseases	  
have	  on	  many	  populations	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
CCH	  Research	  
As	   CCH	   research	   combines	   narratives	   surrounding	   EIDs	   as	   well	   as	   climate	  
change,	   and	   as	   it	   is	   of	   central	   interest	   to	   this	   thesis,	   my	   relationship	   to	   two	  
aspects	  of	  CCH	  research	  –	  the	  content	  and	  its	  producers	  –	  needs	  to	  be	  clarified.	  	  
To	  start	  with	  the	  content,	  it	  must	  be	  said	  from	  the	  onset	  that,	  from	  my	  personal	  
as	   well	   as	   professional	   standpoint,	   I	   “believe”	   in	   climate	   change.	   I	   am	   deeply	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aware	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  inherent	  in	  this	  complicated	  field,	  but	  generally	  feel	  
that	   even	   if	   only	   some	   of	   the	   consequences	   predicted	   by	   the	   dominant	  
narratives	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  could	  materialise,	  then	  climate	  change	  is	  
well	  worth	  avoiding,	  if	  at	  all	  possible.	  	  	  
	  
With	   regards	   to	  CCH	   research	   and	   the	  potential	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	  on	  
infectious	   diseases	   in	   particular,	   I	   am	   more	   ambivalent.	   	   However,	  
governmental	   work	   in	   the	   EU	   tends	   to	   assume	   that	   climate	   change	  will	  have	  
some	  sort	  of	  impact	  on	  disease	  transmission,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  general	  spirit	  with	  
which	  my	  work	  on	  climate	  change	  at	  ECDC	  has	  been	  undertaken.	  	  For	  example,	  I	  
have	   coordinated	   a	   project	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   producing	   a	   manual	   to	   assist	   EU	  
Member	   States	   to	   assess	   their	   possible	   vulnerabilities	   and	   then	   develop	  
adaptation	  strategies	  to	  climate	  change	  (ECDC,	  2010).	  	  Similarly,	  in	  response	  to	  
a	  question	  about	  how	  current	  disease	  surveillance	  systems	  should	  be	  altered	  to	  
anticipate	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change,	  I	  ended	  up	  co-­‐authoring	  a	  short	  essay,	  
alongside	   a	   few	   prominent	   members	   of	   the	   CCH	   community,	   in	   the	   journal	  
Science.	  	  	  The	  message	  underpinning	  this	  essay	  is	  that	  climate	  change	  will	  likely	  
lead	  to	  some	  changes	  in	  the	  distribution	  patterns	  of	  infectious	  diseases,	  even	  if	  
we	  did	  concede	   that	   “the	   impacts	  of	   climate	  change	  on	   infectious	  diseases	  are	  
complex	  and	  multifaceted	  (Lindgren	  et	  al.,	  2012:	  418)”.	  	  	  
	  
Such	   complexities	   are	   difficult	   indeed	   for	   organisations	   that	   must	   decide	  
whether	  (and	  how	  much)	  attention	  should	  be	  given	  to	  CCH	  issues.	   	   In	  another	  
paper,	  we	  have	   reflected	   upon	   the	   challenges	   related	   to	   being	   a	   public	   health	  
agency	  tasked	  with	  assessing	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change:	  
	  
Attributing	   single	   infectious	   disease	   epidemics	   to	   climate	   change	   is	   not	  
possible,	  but	  longer-­‐term	  trends	  in	  disease	  outbreaks	  and	  incidence	  may	  signal	  
linkages	   to	   climate	   variations.	   The	   exact	   attribution	   of	   changes	   in	   specific	  
infectious	   disease	   risks	   to	   climate	   change	   is	   probably	   not	   attainable.	  
Nonetheless,	  public	  health	  practitioners	  are	  obliged	  to	  address	  credible	  risks—
even	  if	   that	  requires	  acting	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  conclusive	  evidence	  (Semenza	  et	  
al.,	  2011:	  391).	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This	  nicely	  alludes	  to	  some	  of	  the	  principal	  preoccupations	  of	  this	  thesis.	   	  How	  
are	  risks	  deemed	  to	  be	  credible?	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  conclusive	  evidence,	  which	  
experts	  should	  be	  listened	  to?	  	  	  
	  
That	   I	   am	   asking	   such	   questions	   should	   indicate	   that	   I	   am	   not	   completely	  
satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  particular	  visions	  of	  CCH	  research	  have	  become	  
“dominant”.	  	  And	  yet	  although	  the	  quote	  above	  should	  also	  help	  to	  exonerate	  me	  
from	  any	  claims	  that	  I	  am	  completely	  biased	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  CCH	  research,	  the	  
very	  fact	  that	  I	  have	  published	  and	  worked	  in	  this	  area	  would	  seem	  to	  indicate	  
that	  I,	  at	  least	  in	  my	  “professional”	  capacity,	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  treating	  climate	  
change	  as	  an	  important	  health	  threat.	  	  	  
	  
Here,	   I	   should	   point	   out	   that,	   perhaps	   ironically,	  my	   professional	   exposure	   to	  
CCH	  issues	  has	  in	  fact	  led	  me	  to	  be	  more	  cautious	  about	  the	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  As	  
I	   gradually	   transitioned	   from	   one	   working	   with	   CCH	   knowledge	   for	   public	  
health	   purposes	   to	   one	   more	   intimately	   involved	   in	   the	   production	   of	   this	  
knowledge,	  my	   level	   of	   uncertainty	   has	   correspondingly	   increased	   (mirroring	  
the	   path	   of	   the	   “certainty	   trough”	   (MacKenzie,	   1990)).	   	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	  
quite	  straightforward.	  	  At	  ECDC,	  rather	  than	  simply	  accepting	  the	  findings	  from	  
the	   CCH	   community	   or	   the	   IPCC,	   we	   eventually	   started	   to	   produce	   research	  
more	   directly	   aimed	   at	   clarifying	   the	   links	   between	   climatic	   variables	   and	  
infectious	  diseases	  (e.g.	  Semenza	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  This	  has	  exposed	  me	  to	  many	  of	  
the	  technicalities,	  uncertainties,	  embedded	  assumptions,	  etc.,	  (to	  be	  discussed	  at	  
length	   in	  Chapters	  3,	  4	   and	  5)	   that	   are	   inherently	   connected	   to	  CCH	   research,	  
increasing	   my	   doubts	   about	   the	   certainty	   –	   and	   in	   many	   instances	   the	  
“credibility”	  –	  of	  the	  science.	  	  	  
	  
The	  increased	  caution	  with	  which	  I	  currently	  interpret	  CCH	  research	  is	  also	  due	  
to	   the	   many	   interactions	   that	   I	   have	   had	   with	   both	   CCH	   proponents	   and	  
opponents.	  	  Although	  some	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  articles	  that	  I	  have	  published	  
at	   ECDC	   have	   been	   co-­‐authored	   with	   prominent	   members	   of	   the	   CCH	  
community	  (like	  Kris	  Ebi,	  Elisabet	  Lindgren,	  or	  a	  senior	  colleague	  at	  ECDC,	  Jan	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Semenza),	   I	   have	   also	   had	   professional	   relationships	   with	   opponents	   of	   CCH	  
research,	  most	  notably	  Paul	  Reiter,	  Sarah	  Randolph,	  and	  David	  Rogers.	   	   I	  have	  
even	   been	   the	   project	   manager	   of	   a	   project	   for	   which	   David	   Rogers	   was	  
contracted	  by	  ECDC	   to	  model	  how	  climatic	   variables	   affect	   the	   risk	   to	  Europe	  
from	  dengue	  (ECDC,	  2012).	  	  In	  other	  instances,	  I	  have	  hosted	  and	  participated	  in	  
numerous	   meetings	   at	   ECDC	   that	   became	   quite	   heated	   when	   both	   CCH	  
opponents	   and	   proponents	   debated	   over	   topics	   such	   as	   whether	   we	   should	  
expect	  more	  tick-­‐borne	  encephalitis	  (TBE)	  or	  dengue	  in	  Europe	  due	  to	  climate	  
change.	  	  	  
	  
It	   was,	   in	   fact,	   such	   interactions	   that	   raised	   my	   attention	   to	   the	   deep-­‐seated	  
nature	   of	   the	   controversies	   in	   CCH	   research	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   probing	   my	  
interest	  in	  getting	  to	  know	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  story	  –	  both	  for	  my	  work	  at	  ECDC	  as	  
well	  as	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  Thus,	  today,	  my	  “professional”	  stance	  on	  CCH	  research	  is	  
quite	  a	  bit	  more	  sophisticated	  than	  it	  was	  a	  few	  years	  ago.	  	  
	  
On	  neutrality	  and	  symmetry	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   its	   potential	   impact	   on	   this	   thesis,	   my	   employment	   at	   ECDC	   is	  
problematic.	   	   I	  am	  not	  a	  neutral	  observer	  of	  CCH	  research	  or	  of	   its	   role	   in	   the	  
broader	   global	   health	   political	   landscape.	   	   Thus	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	  
whether	   (and	  how)	   this	   loss	  of	  neutrality	  may	   impact	   this	   thesis.	   	  To	  begin	   to	  
examine	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  many	  STS	  scholars	  have	  noted	  
that	   neutrality	   is	   simply	   not	   achievable	   in	   practice	   (Martin,	   1996,	   Scott	   et	   al.,	  
1990),	  perhaps	  particularly	  when	  studying	  controversies:	  
	  
Analysts....are	   not	   ‘apart’	   from	   the	   controversy	   they	   study,	   but	   invariably	  
implicate	   themselves	   in	   it.	   	   Their	   arrival	   on	   the	   scene	   alters	   the	   discursive	  
configuration	  and	  subtly	  modifies	   the	  object	  of	   investigation	   itself.	   	  The	  effect,	  
intended	   or	   unintended,	   is	   to	   overturn	   a	   specific	   hierarchy	   of	   plausibilities	  
(Pels,	  1996:	  294).	  
	  
This	   raises	   the	   important	   question	   of	  how	   analysts	   implicate	   themselves	   in	   a	  
controversy	   –	   if	   analysts	   are	   not	   neutral,	   should	   they	   be	   openly	   partisan	   in	  
 66 
pursuing	   their	   research,	   particularly	   when	   studying	   issues	   relevant	   to	   public	  
policy?	  	  For	  an	  issue	  as	  “grand”	  as	  climate	  change	  or	  CCH,	  it	  is	  certainly	  tempting	  
to	  be	  so:	  
	  
Whether	   solar	   neutrinos	   or	   gravity	   waves	   exist	   …	   are	   questions	   of	   little	  
significance	  when	   compared	  with	   those	  which	   affect	   (or	  potentially	   affect)	   us	  
all.	   	   In	   such	   cases,	   it	   is	  much	  more	  difficult	   for	   the	   analyst	   to	  distance	  herself	  
from	  the	  debate	  (Richards,	  1996:	  339).	  
	  
There	   is,	   however,	   a	   difference	   between	   acknowledging	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
remain	   distant	   from	   a	   debate	   and	   by	   actively	   taking	   sides	   in	   one.	   	   The	   latter	  
position,	  as	  has	  been	  observed	  by	  several,	  is	  problematic	  both	  in	  practice	  and	  in	  
theory.	  	  	  Practically,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  easy	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  identify	  the	  winners,	  losers	  or	  
the	   underdogs	   in	   a	   given	   controversy.	   	   Collins	   (1996),	   Jasanoff	   (1996a)	   and	  
Richards	   (1996)	   have	   all,	   for	   example,	   suggested	   that	   their	   research	   was	  
“captured”	  unpredictably	  by	  actors	  from	  various	  sides	  of	  a	  controversial	   issue.	  	  
Somewhat	  more	   theoretically,	  Wynne	   (1996b),	  meanwhile,	   suggested	   that	   the	  
very	   discussion	   about	   choosing	   sides	   tends	   not	   to	   have	   problematised	   what	  
constitutes	  a	  “side”	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  thereby	  reproducing	  a	  “deterministic,	  one-­‐
dimensional	  implicit	  model	  of	  politics	  and	  interaction	  (362)”.	  	  
	  
To	  return	  to	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  be	  studying	  a	  controversy	  and,	  as	  earlier	  noted,	  I	  
cannot	  claim	  to	  be	  neutral.	  	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  mean	  that	  I	  will	  seek	  to	  take	  
“sides”,	  presuming	  that	  these	  are	  easily	  identified.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  arguments	  
presented	  above,	  there	  is	  a	  sound	  pragmatic	  reason	  for	  this.	   	  As	  I	  have	  already	  
mentioned,	   CCH	   research	   is	   quite	   uncertain	   and	   controversial	   –	   there	   is	   a	  
“dominant”	   but	   not	   “orthodox”	   position	  within	   the	   field	   –	   and	   even	   if	   I	   admit	  
that	  a	  goal	  in	  my	  “professional”	  life	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  best	  possible	  public	  health	  
response	   to	   climate	   change,	   it	   would	   be	   quite	   rash	   for	   me	   to	   do	   so	   by	  
unequivocally	  choosing	  to	  side	  with	  either	  CCH	  proponents	  or	  CCH	  opponents.	  	  




There	   is	   one	   further	   reason	   why	   I	   would	   not	   want	   to	   choose	   sides.	   	   This	  
research	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  achieve	  some	  kind	  of	  closure	  for	  the	  CCH	  controversy.	  	  
Rather,	  I	  hope	  to	  use	  the	  insights	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  this	  controversy	  not	  only	  
to	   better	   understand	   its	   roots	   but	   also	   to	   say	   something	   broader	   about	   how	  
(uncertain	  and	  contested)	  climate	  change	  science	  achieves	  credibility	   in	  global	  
governance	  processes.	   	  This,	   in	  turn,	  consistent	  with	  my	  self-­‐confessed	  “belief”	  
and	   in	   climate	   change,	  might	   enable	   me	   to	   contribute	   to	   current	   discussions	  
about	   what	   institutions	   like	   IPCC	   might	   do	   as	   to	   shore-­‐up	   the	   credibility	   of	  
climate	   change	   science.	   	   Thus,	   although	   I	   cannot	   deny	   that	   I	   am	   a	   committed	  
analyst,	  I	  do	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  attempt	  to	  conduct	  a	  balanced	  analysis.	  	  
	  
Some	   STS	   scholars	   have	   asserted	   that	   it	   is	   perfectly	   reasonable	   to	   “reject	  
neutrality,	   but	   still	   be	   symmetrical	   (Pinch,	   1993:	   371)”.	   Just	   as	   “neutrality”	   is	  
impossible	  to	  achieve	   in	  practice,	  neither	  can	  a	  symmetrical	  approach	  succeed	  
in	  being	  apolitical.	  	  In	  trying	  to	  conduct	  my	  research	  symmetrically,	  for	  example,	  
I	  may	  well	  end	  up	  giving	  more	  space	  to	  the	  minority	  or	   the	  marginalised	  than	  
they	  are	  accustomed	  to.	   	  This	  conundrum,	   it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out,	  even	  exists	  
for	  “neutralists”	  (e.g.	  Collins,	  1996):	  
	  
In	   a	   field	   of	   unequally	   distributed	   symbolic	   power	   or	   symbolic	   capital,	   a	  
symmetrical	  approach	  invariably	  subverts	  the	  dominant	  view,	  and	  strengthens	  
the	  side	  of	  the	  weak	  and	  the	  marginal	  (Pels,	  1996:	  282).	  
	  
Should	  this	  happen,	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  ironic,	  as	  I	  could	  end	  up	  strengthening	  
the	  voice	  of	  people	  whose	  professional	  positions	  tend	  to	  be	  somewhat	  opposite	  
to	   my	   own	   (I	   am	   referring	   here	   to	   those	   who	  might	   oppose	   not	   simply	   CCH	  
research	  but	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  change	  more	  generally).	  	  Yet	  this	  should	  not	  be	  
overly	   problematic	   for	   me,	   for,	   as	   noted	   above,	   I	   do	   not	   subscribe	  
wholeheartedly	  to	  any	  one	  “side”	  of	  the	  CCH	  controversy.	  	  Moreover,	  another	  of	  
my	   objectives	   is	   to	   use	   the	   insights	   from	   the	   controversy	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	  
credibility-­‐making	  of	  climate	  science	  more	  generally.	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No	   matter	   what	   I	   say,	   however,	   it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   all	   normative	   or	  
theoretical	  objectives	  in	  this	  research	  are	  subsidiary	  to	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  
ensuring	   that	  my	   analysis	   is	   as	   balanced	   and	   robust	   as	   possible.	   	   As	  Richards	  
(1996:	  347-­‐8)	  reminds	  us,	  STS	  researchers	  should:	  
	  
…	  try	  to	  ensure	  that	  our	  analyses	  are	  as	  comprehensive	  as	  we	  can	  make	  them,	  
and	   that	   they	   take	   account	   of	   (and	   give	   voice	   to)	   the	   marginalized	   and	  
disempowered.	  	  Our	  specificity	  as	  intellectuals	  studying	  scientific	  and	  technical	  
‘truths’	  and	  the	  systems	  of	  power	  that	  produce	  and	  sustain	  them	  …	  gives	  us	  a	  
unique	  and	  responsible	  relation	  to	  and	  knowledge	  of	  one	  of	  the	  central	  ‘regimes	  
of	  truth’	  of	  our	  society.	  	  But	  this	  knowledge	  …	  does	  not	  make	  us	  the	  bearers	  of	  
universal	  truth	  and	  justice.	  
	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  be	  providing	  my	  account	  of	  the	  topic,	  which	  I	  cannot	   	  even	  
guarantee	  will	  be	  used	  by	  others	  in	  ways	  consistent	  with	  my	  objectives,	  filtered	  
as	   it	  will	  be	   through	  multiple	   (and	  potentially	   contradictory)	  professional	  and	  
intellectual	  commitments.	  
	  
2.6	  Research	  strategy	  and	  design	  	  
 
2.6.1	  Ethics	  
Before	  discussing	   the	   research	   strategy	   and	  design,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   address	  
the	  ethics	  of	  this	  research,	  particularly	  given	  that	  I	  have	  conducted	  this	  research	  
while	  under	   full-­‐time	  employment.	   	  As	  discussed	  at-­‐length	   in	  2.5.3,	   although	   I	  
cannot	   claim	   to	   be	   “neutral”,	   neither	   can	   any	   honest	   researcher.	   	   	   As	   it	   was	  
further	  noted,	  that	  I	  am	  a	  committed	  researcher	   is	  not	  necessarily	  problematic	  
from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   STS.	   	   	   As	   concerns	   the	   ethics	   of	   conducting	   this	  
research	  while	  employed	  at	  ECDC,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  ECDC,	  was	  made	  
aware	   of	   this	   research	   during	  my	   first	   interview	   for	   this	   post,	   and	   has	   never	  
expressed	  any	  concerns	  about	  it.	  	  Indeed,	  ECDC	  has	  been	  generally	  supportive	  of	  
this	  project,	  even	  enabling	  me	  to	  take	  the	  odd	  period	  of	  unpaid	  leave	  to	  work	  on	  
this	  thesis.	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As	   relates	   to	   those	   that	   I	   have	   interviewed	   (2.6.4),	   all	   were	   aware	   that	   the	  
interviews	   were	   related	   to	   this	   PhD	   research	   and	   not	   to	   my	   employment	   at	  
ECDC.	   	   The	   objectives	   of	   this	   thesis	   were	   explained	   to	   all	   interviewees.	   	   It	   is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   although	   I	   am	   reporting	   on	   various	   scientists’	   views	  
(albeit	   anonymously)	   about	   a	   highly	   polarised	   scientific	   controversy,	   for	   the	  
most	   point	   the	   scientists	   have	   already	   openly	   published	   their	   stances	   to	   this	  
controversy	   –	   this	   research	   is	   focused	   on	   clarifying	   such	   stances,	   but	  will	   not	  
expose	  stances	  that	  the	  scientists	  have	  expressly	  desired	  to	  keep	  private.	  	  	  Quite	  
the	   contrary:	   many	   interviewees	   were	   keen	   to	   speak	   with	   me	   to	   clarify	   and	  
elaborate	  upon	   their	  perspectives.	   	  Moreover,	   all	   interviewees	  were	   given	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   apply	   Chatham	   House	   Rules	   to	   entire	   or	   portions	   of	   their	  
interviews	   (to	   be	   further	   discussed	   in	   2.6.4).	   	   No	   interviewee	   expressed	   any	  
concern	  about	  the	  open	  publication	  of	  their	  standpoints,	  and	  only	  in	  a	  very	  few	  
instances	   did	   interviewees	   ask	  me	   to	   switch	   to	   Chatham	  House	   Rules,	   and	   in	  
these	  instances	  it	  was	  only	  to	  make	  the	  odd	  statement.	  
	  
Finally,	  owing	  to	  my	  employment	  at	  ECDC,	  I	  have	  been	  privy	  to	  information	  that	  
is	   confidential	   –	   draft	   versions	   of	   reports,	   for	   example,	   and	   private	  
conversations	  with	  interviewees	  or	  other	  actors	  with	  something	  interesting	  and	  
relevant	   to	   say.	   	   While	   this	   has	   inevitably	   informed	   my	   perspectives,	   no	  
confidential	  information	  is	  cited	  or	  drawn	  upon	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
 
2.6.2	  Overview	  of	  the	  research	  strategy	  
The	   research	   in	   this	   thesis	   was	   undertaken	   through	   an	   abductive	   research	  
strategy	   (Blaikie,	   2000:	   114-­‐119),	   which	   is	   most	   closely	   aligned	   with	   the	  
interpretivist	   epistemological	   orientation	   of	   STS	   and	   the	   co-­‐production	  
framework.	  	  Just	  as	  interpretivist	  research	  tends	  to	  view	  individuals	  and	  groups	  
as	   constructing	   their	   own	   versions	   of	   reality,	   an	   abductive	   research	   strategy	  
“seeks	  to	  discover	  why	  people	  do	  what	  they	  do	  by	  uncovering	  the	  largely	  tacit,	  
mutual	  knowledge,	  the	  symbolic	  meanings,	  motives	  and	  rules,	  which	  prove	  the	  
orientations	  of	  their	  actions	  (Ibid.:	  115)”.	  	  This	  approach	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  the	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more	   ethnographic	   approaches	   of	   STS.	   Drawing	   on	   some	   of	   Latour’s	   (1987)	  
arguments,	  Becker	  (1996)	  argues	  that	  an	  abductive	  strategy	  (although	  he	  does	  
not	  label	  it	  as	  such)	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  see	  beyond	  the	  formalised	  accounts	  
of	  actors:	  	  
	  
Epistemologically…qualitative	   methods	   insist	   that	   we	   should	   not	   invent	   the	  
viewpoint	  of	  the	  actor,	  and	  should	  only	  attribute	  to	  actors	  ideas	  about	  the	  world	  
they	  actually	  hold,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  their	  actions,	  reasons,	  and	  motives.	  
 
In	   the	  undertaking	  of	   this	   research,	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   obtain	   the	   viewpoints	   of	  
actors	   by	   observing	   them	   in	   action;	   seeking	   out	   the	  materials	   that	   they	   have	  
produced;	  and	  speaking	  with	  them	  directly.	  	  Analytically,	  my	  primary	  objective	  
has	   been	   to	   compare	   and	   contrast	   different	   standpoints	   between	   actors	   –	  
necessitating	   not	   “neutrality”	   but	   “symmetry”	   (2.5.3),	   through	   which	   I	   have	  
tried	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  to	  understand	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  actors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  
the	  debate	   surrounding	  CCH.	   	  A	   related	  objective	   in	   this	   research	  has	  been	   to	  
identify	   changes	   in	   the	   standpoints	   of	   actors	   and	   of	   official	   bodies:	   have	  
viewpoints	  on	  CCH	  changed	  with	  time,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  and	  why?	  
	  
I	   have	   drawn	   upon	   three	   separate	   sources	   of	   information	   in	   this	   thesis,	  
summarised	   in	   Table	   2.	   	   These	   include	   observation,	   primary	   documents,	   and	  
interviews	  with	  key	  participants.	   	  The	  selection	  of	  these	  data	  sources	  has	  been	  
designed	   such	   that	   they	   account	   not	   only	   for	   “scientific”	   practice	   but	   also	   the	  
activities	  of	   scientists	   in	  more	  policy-­‐driven	  arenas,	  most	  notably	   IPCC.	   	  Aside	  
from	  providing	  a	  richer	  range	  of	  information	  to	  analyse,	  drawing	  upon	  multiple	  
data	   sources	   has	   the	   additional	   benefit	   of	   somewhat	   enhancing	   the	   internal	  
validity	  of	  this	  research.	   	  This	  was	  another	  important	  objective	  of	  the	  research	  
strategy	  because	  of	  the	  potentially	  compromising	  influence	  of	  my	  employment	  
at	   ECDC.	   	   For	   example,	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   participant	   has	   not	   simply	   said	  
something	  to	  me	  during	  an	  interview	  to	  appeal	  to	  my	  “professional”	  role,	  it	  has	  
been	  helpful	  to	  corroborate	  their	  statements	  with	  what	  they	  have	  written	  in	  the	  
peer-­‐reviewed	  literature,	  stated	  at	  conferences,	  or	  submitted	  as	  revisions	  to	  the	  
IPCC.	  	  	  Such	  a	  strategy,	  of	  course,	  also	  contributes	  to	  a	  “thicker”	  analysis.	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Table	  2.	  Data	  Sources	  
Type	  of	  data	   Stage	  of	  
research	  
Source	  of	  data	   Treatment	  of	  data	  




Informal	  notes	  on	  meetings,	  
conferences,	  conversations	  
participated	  in	  as	  an	  
employee	  at	  ECDC.	  
	  
Contextual:	  identifying	  case	  studies,	  
gaining	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  
controversies	  surrounding	  CCH,	  
identifying	  key	  actors	  and	  publications.	  
Interviews	   2008	  -­‐	  2011	   22	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  with	  scientists,	  
policy-­‐makers	  and	  public	  
health	  actors	  holding	  
extensive	  experience	  in	  CCH	  
and/or	  at	  WHO	  and/or	  at	  
IPCC.	  
	  
Interview	  data	  represent	  the	  accounts	  
of	  actors,	  not	  absolute	  “truth”.	  	  
Interview	  data	  were	  coded	  according	  to	  
categories	  that	  were	  generated	  through	  





2008	  -­‐	  2011	   Primary	  documents	  (e.g.	  
research	  papers	  and	  
editorials	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  
and	  specialist	  journals,	  books	  
written	  by	  key	  actors	  
relevant	  to	  the	  case	  study,	  
IPCC	  assessment	  reports	  and	  
documents	  summarising	  all	  
submitted	  review	  comments).	  
	  
Secondary	  documents	  (e.g.	  
previous	  social	  scientific	  
analyses)	  
Texts	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  
performative:	  they	  are	  examples	  of	  
scientific	  “work”,	  not	  of	  scientific	  
“truths”.	  	  Primary	  sources	  are	  analysed	  
with	  the	  intention	  of	  uncovering	  hidden	  
assumptions	  and	  evidence	  of	  social	  
processes.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  differences	  
between	  texts,	  whether	  published	  
disputes	  over	  specific	  research	  papers,	  
or	  changes	  in	  the	  standpoints	  of	  authors	  






Employing	  multiple	  data	  sources	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  triangulating	  data,	  which	  
is	   generally	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   means	   of	   protecting	   against	   bias	   and	   ensuring	  
validity.	  	  Analysts	  from	  Denzin	  (1970)	  onwards	  have	  discussed	  various	  forms	  of	  
data	   triangulation,	   such	   as	  within-­‐method	   and	   between-­‐method	   triangulation.	  	  
The	   notion	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   confirm	   findings	   through	   the	   application	   of	  
varying	   vantage	   points	   is	   indeed	   attractive,	   but	   its	   relevance	   to	   abductive	  
research	  has	  been	  challenged:	  
	  
With	  an	  …	  epistemology	   that	   recognizes	   that	  accounts	  of	  any	  social	  world	  are	  
relative	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  and	  to	  the	  observer,	  the	  use	  of	  multiple	  data	  sources	  
and	  multiple	  observers	  do	  not	  do	  for	  the	  abductive	  strategy	  what	   it	   is	  claimed	  
they	  do	  for	  the	  inductive	  or	  deductive	  strategies	  …	  Triangulation,	  as	  originally	  




This,	  Blaikie	   suggests,	   is	   because	   interpretivist	   research,	   by	   its	   very	  nature,	   is	  
much	  less	  concerned	  with	  bias	  or	  validity	  as	  formally	  understood.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  
it	   is	   my	   intention	   to	   develop	   a	   robust	   and	   credible	   analysis,	   and	   as	   I	   have	  
discussed	  above,	  employing	  multiple	  data	  sources	  and	  methodologies	  is	  a	  useful	  
means	  of	   achieving	   this,	   as	   is	   the	  use	  of	  multiple	   case	   studies.19	  Bearing	   these	  
points	  in	  mind,	  below	  I	  will	  elaborate	  upon	  the	  different	  data	  sources	  that	  I	  have	  
used	  in	  this	  research.	  
	  
2.6.3	  Observational	  data	  
My	  role	  at	  ECDC	  has	  significantly	  facilitated	  this	  thesis,	  as	  it	  was	  through	  ECDC	  
that	  I	  gained	  in-­‐depth	  exposure	  to	  the	  CCH	  field	  and	  discovered	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
controversies	   surrounding	   this	   field,	   and	   it	   was	   through	   ECDC	   that	   I	   also	  
observed	   the	   increasing	  political	   importance	  of	  CCH.	   	   Strictly	   speaking,	   I	   have	  
not	  been	  an	  “external”	  observer	  of	  CCH	  activities.	  	  I	  have	  been,	  one	  could	  say,	  a	  
deeply	  entrenched	  participant	  observer.	   	   I	  have	  worked	  on	  and	  commissioned	  
CCH	   science	   and	   deliberated	   on	   how	   to	   interpret	   this	   knowledge	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  a	  public	  health	  agency.	  
	  
In	  the	  course	  of	  such	  activities,	  and	  particularly	  during	  my	  first	  couple	  of	  years	  
at	  ECDC,	  I	  developed	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  observational	  data,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
informal	   notes	   on	   meetings,	   conferences	   and	   conversations	   that	   I	   have	  
participated	  in	  at	  ECDC.	  	  I	  have	  only	  used	  this	  data	  to	  inform	  and	  help	  refine	  the	  
focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   and	   to	   identify	   interviewees	   and	   relevant	   documentary	  
materials	   to	   examine.	   	   I	   will	   not	   present	   any	   of	   this	   data	   in	   the	   following	  
chapters.	   	  The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	  both	  ethical	   and	  practical.	   	   It	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  easy	  to	  continually	  flip	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  my	  ECDC	  role	  and	  my	  PhD	  
role	  (this	  would	  have	  compromised	  both!)	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  it	  would	  not	  
be	  particularly	  ethical	  to	  present	  research	  data	  based	  upon	  my	  notes	  that	  other	  
                                                
19	  Even	  Blaikie	  (2000)	  does	  admit	  that	  triangulation	  can	  be	  compatible	  with	  some	  versions	  of	  
the	  abductive	  approach.	  	  His	  main	  concerns	  seem	  to	  be	  that	  triangulation	  is	  widely	  but	  
inconsistently	  used	  and	  that	  it	  encourages	  a	  naivety	  towards	  ontology	  and	  epistemology.	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participants	   were	   not	   aware	   I	   was	   taking,	   or	   based	   upon	   confidential	  
information	  obtained	  solely	  through	  my	  role	  as	  an	  ECDC	  employee.	  	  	  
	  
2.6.4	  	  Interview	  data	  
Intending	   as	   it	   does	   to	   identify	   the	   social	   and	   political	   factors	   related	   to	   CCH	  
science,	   this	   thesis	   is	   necessarily	   heavily	   based	   upon	   interview	   data.	   	   The	  
interviewees	   in	  this	  research	  were	  selected	  because	  they	  were	  both	  accessible	  
to	  me	  and	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  Chapters	  3,	  4,	  and	  5.	  	  It	  is	  no	  accident	  
that	  these	  case	  studies	  are	   interconnected,	  with	  the	  consequence	  that	  many	  of	  
the	   interviewees	  had	   important	  perspectives	   to	  offer	  on	  more	   than	  one	  of	   the	  
case	   studies.	   	   Especially	   with	   early	   interviewees,	   I	   employed	   the	   snowball	  
technique,	   a	   classic	   approach	   to	   gain	   hard	   to	   reach	   actors	   (e.g.	   Atkinson	   and	  
Flint,	   2002),	   which	   helped	   to	   identify	   and	   gain	   introductions	   to	   relevant	  
interviewees.	  	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  central	  SSK	  tenet	  of	  symmetry,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  consider	  as	  much	  as	  
possible	  the	  perspectives	  from	  those	  on	  both	  “sides”	  of	  debates	  (2.5.3).	  	  In	  total,	  
I	   interviewed	   22	   people,	   all	   of	  whom	  had	   intimate	   knowledge	   of	   CCH	   science	  
and	  politics,	  and/or,	   in	  some	  cases,	  of	  WHO	  or	  IPCC.	   	  Collectively,	  they	  include	  
high-­‐level	   scientists	   from	   academia,	   representatives	   of	   public	   health	   agencies	  
including	  WHO,	  Health	  Canada,	   the	  US	  CDC	  and	  ECDC,	   sister	   agencies	   like	   the	  
European	   Environment	   Agency	   (EEA),	   political	   actors	   from	   the	   European	  
Commission,	  and	  numerous	  people	  who	  had	  experience	  in	  the	  IPCC	  assessment	  
process	   as	   authors	   and	   reviewers	   (Table	   3).	   	   All	   interviews	   were	   conducted	  
privately	  and	  under	  confidentiality,	  and	  all	   interviews	  were	  recorded	  with	   the	  
permission	  of	   the	   interviewee.	   	  Where	  possible,	   interviews	  were	  conducted	   in	  
person,	   but	   in	   some	   instances	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   over	   telephone	   or	  





Table	  3.	  List	  of	  interviewees	  
 
Name	   Title	   Affiliation	  (at	  time	  of	  interview)	  
Ingvar	  Andersson	   Scientific	  Liaison	  Officer	   European	  Environment	  Agency	  
Peter	  Barry	   Senior	  Policy	  Analyst,	  
Climate	  Change	  and	  
Health	  
Health	  Canada	  
Ian	  Burton	   Professor	  Emeritus	   Department	  of	  Geography,	  University	  
of	  Toronto	  
Kristie	  L.	  Ebi	   Head,	  Working	  Group	  II	  
Technical	  Support	  Unit	  
Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  
Change	  (IPCC)	  
Duane	  Gubler	   Department	  Chair	   John	  A.	  Burns	  School	  of	  Medicine,	  
University	  of	  Hawaii	  
Simon	  Hales	   Research	  Associate	  
Professor	  
Department	  of	  Health,	  University	  of	  
Otago	  
Dorota	  Jarosinska	   Scientific	  Officer,	  
Environment	  and	  Health	  
European	  Environment	  Agency	  
Marina	  
Koussathana	  
Seconded	  National	  Expert	   DG	  SANCO,	  European	  Commission	  
Sari	  Kovats	   Senior	  Lecturer	  in	  
Environmental	  
Epidemiology	  
Faculty	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  Policy,	  




Swedish	  Focal	  Point	  for	  
IPCC	  
Swedish	  Environmental	  Protection	  
Agency	  
Elisabet	  Lindgren	   Environmental	  
Epidemiologist	  
Institute	  for	  Environmental	  Medicine,	  
Karolinska	  Institute	  
George	  Luber	   Associate	  Director	  for	  
Climate	  Change	  
National	  Center	  for	  Environmental	  
Health,	  U.S.	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  
and	  Prevention	  (CDC)	  
Celie	  Manuel	   Intern	   Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  
Environment,	  World	  Health	  
Organization	  (WHO)	  
Pim	  Martens	   Professor,	  Chair,	  Global	  
Dynamics	  and	  Sustainable	  
Development	  
International	  Centre	  for	  Integrated	  
assessment	  and	  Sustainable	  






Australian	  National	  University	  
Rainer	  Melicke	   Scientific	  Officer	   DG	  SANCO,	  European	  Commission	  
Bettina	  Menne	   Programme	  Manager,	  
Climate	  Change,	  
Sustainable	  Development	  
and	  Green	  Health	  Services	  
European	  Centre	  for	  Environment	  and	  
Health,	  WHO	  Regional	  Office	  for	  
Europe	  
Sarah	  Randolph	   Professor	  of	  Parasite	  
Ecology	  
Department	  of	  Zoology,	  University	  of	  
Oxford	  
Paul	  Reiter	   Director,	  Unit	  of	  Insects	  
and	  Infectious	  Diseases	  
Department	  of	  Infection	  and	  
Epidemiology,	  Institut	  Pasteur	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David	  Rogers	   Professor	  of	  Ecology	   Department	  of	  Zoology,	  University	  of	  
Oxford	  
Jan	  C.	  Semenza	   Senior	  Expert	   European	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  
Prevention	  and	  Control	  (ECDC)	  
Alistair	  Woodward	   Professor,	  Head	   School	  of	  Population	  Health,	  University	  
of	  Auckland	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   I	   gave	   all	   interviewees	   the	   opportunity	   to	   apply	   the	  
“Chatham	   House	   Rule”20	  when	   they	   wanted	   to	   discuss	   something	   particularly	  
sensitive.	  	  Yet	  in	  terms	  of	  writing	  the	  thesis,	  to	  further	  safeguard	  the	  privacy	  of	  
interviewees,	  I	  have	  written	  up	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  thesis	  according	  to	  the	  
Chatham	   House	   Rule.	   I	   have	   thus	   anonymised	   nearly	   all	   quotes	   from	  
interviewees	  cited	   in	   this	   thesis	  by	  allocating,	   randomly,	  a	  code	   to	  correspond	  
with	  each	  interviewee	  (from	  R1	  to	  R22).	  In	  the	  few	  instances	  where	  quotes	  are	  
not	  anonymised,	  this	  is	  because	  it	  will	  be	  almost	  certain	  to	  the	  reader	  who	  the	  
speaker	  actually	  is,	  and	  providing	  the	  anonymous	  code	  would	  have	  then	  made	  it	  
possible	  for	  a	  reader	  to	  identify	  that	  interviewee	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  	  In	  these	  
instances,	  none	  of	  the	  quotes	  I	  have	  cited	  were	  taken	  under	  the	  Chatham	  House	  
Rule.	  	  	  
	  
During	   interviews,	   semi-­‐structured	   research	   questions	   were	   tailored	   to	  
individual	  interviewees’	  backgrounds,	  roles,	  research	  interests	  and	  institutional	  
affiliations,	  in	  order	  to	  elicit	  as	  much	  relevant	  information	  as	  possible.	  	  Aware	  of	  
the	  possibility	   for	   varying	  discursive	   repertoires	   among	   interviewees,	   such	   as	  
“empiricist”	  and	  “contingent”	  ones	  (Gilbert	  and	  Mulkay,	  1984),	  I	  sought	  to	  probe	  
the	   contradictions	   and	   tensions	   inherent	   in	   such	   varying	   discourses.	   	   For	  
example,	   much	   of	   the	   interview	   content	   was	   focused	   upon	   the	   scientific	  
controversy	   surrounding	  CCH	  research	  –	  namely	   the	   controversy	   surrounding	  
whether	  or	  not	   climate	   change	   can	  be	   expected	   to	   impact	   the	   transmission	  of	  
vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	   	   This	   is	   a	   very	   visible	   controversy,	   for	  which	   actors	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  have	  very	  openly	  expressed	  their	  standpoints	  through	  
                                                
20	  “When	  a	  meeting,	  or	  part	  thereof,	  is	  held	  under	  Chatham	  House	  Rule,	  participants	  are	  free	  to	  
use	  the	  information	  received,	  but	  neither	  the	  identity	  nor	  the	  affiliation	  of	  the	  speaker(s),	  nor	  
that	  of	  any	  other	  participant,	  may	  be	  revealed”.	  	  See:	  http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-­‐
us/chathamhouserule,	  accessed	  July	  12,	  2012.	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peer-­‐review	  articles,	  editorials,	  news	  stories	  in	  the	  popular	  and	  scientific	  media,	  
and	  conferences.	   	  As	  noted	   in	  2.6.1,	   I	  will	  not	  necessarily	  reveal	  anything	  new	  
about	   which	   “side”	   of	   the	   controversy	   interviewees	   support	   –	   this	   is	   already	  
widely	  known.	  	  Instead,	  my	  analytical	  attention	  has	  been	  focused	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	   interviewees	   have	   “accounted	   for	   error”	   by	   drawing	   variously	   upon	  
empiricist	   and	   contingent	   discursive	   repertoires.	   	   As	  Gilbert	  &	  Mulkay	   (1984:	  
67)	  describe	  this:	  
	  
...	  the	  speaker	  (a)	  identifies	  the	  views	  of	  one	  or	  more	  scientists	  as	  mistaken	  and	  
(b)	   provides	   some	   kind	   of	   account	   which	   enables	   us	   to	   understand	   why	   the	  
scientist(s)	   adopted	   an	   incorrect	   theory	   or	   failed	   to	   accept	   a	   correct	   theory.	  	  
Any	  passage	  which	  displays	  these	  two	  features	  is	  an	  example	  of	  ‘accounting	  for	  
error’.	  
	  
Accounts	   of	   error	   in	   a	   scientific	   controversy	   are	   highly	   interesting	   because	  
scientists,	  who	  themselves	  tend	  to	  maintain	  the	  empiricist	  repertoire	  in	  relation	  
to	   their	   work	   and	   even	   their	   discipline,	   must	   nonetheless	   draw	   upon	   other	  
resources	  to	  explain	  away	  their	  opponents’	  errors:	  
	  
…	  each	  speaker	  who	  formulates	  his	  own	  position	  in	  empiricist	  terms	  …	  sets	  up	  
the	   following	   interpretative	   problem:	   ‘If	   the	   natural	   world	   speaks	   so	   clearly	  
through	  the	  respondent	  in	  question,	  how	  is	  it	  that	  some	  other	  scientists	  come	  to	  
represent	   the	   world	   inaccurately?’	   …	   This	   implicit	   question	   is	   resolved	   in	  
accounts	  of	   error	  by	   the	  assertion	   that	   the	  views	  of	   these	  other	   scientists	   are	  
being	  distorted	  by	  the	  intrusion	  of	  non-­‐scientific	  …	  influences	  into	  the	  research	  
domain	  (Ibid.:	  69).	  
	  
Gilbert	  &	  Mulkay	  note	   that	   accounting	   for	   error	   is	   not	   restricted	   in	   scientists’	  
oral	   discourse.	   	   It	   may	   also	   occur	   in	   the	   literature,	   notably	   editorials	   or	  
historical	   essays,	   for	   example,	   and	   it	   goes	   without	   saying	   that	   as	   I	   analyse	  
documentary	  data	  (2.6.5)	  I	  will	  be	  looking	  for	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  It	  is	  important	  
to	  note	  that	  there	  may	  have	  been	  instances	  in	  which	  interviewees’	  accounts	  may	  
not	  have	  been	   fully	   factual	  or	  even	   truthful.	   	   I	  have	   tried	   to	   corroborate	   facts,	  
and	  sometimes	  have	  left	  footnotes	  underneath	  interview	  data	  to	  clarify	  factual	  
errors,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   always	   possible	   to	   know	  where	   an	   interviewee	  may	   have	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been	  deliberately	  deceitful.	  	  I	  have	  reported	  interviewees’	  accounts	  as	  they	  said	  
them	   as	   supporting	   evidence	   of	   the	   arguments	   that	   I	   am	   making,	   which,	   it	  
should	   be	   stressed,	   is	   different	   than	   interpreting	   interviewees’	   accounts	   as	  
evidence	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  statements.	   	  Thus,	  I	  urge	  readers	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  
remember	  that	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  contingency	  in	  interviewees’	  accounts.	  	  	  
	  
I	   should	   finally	   acknowledge	   that	   I	   have	   likely	   played	   a	   role	   in	   influencing	  
interviewees’	  accounts.	   	  A	  wide	  variety	  of	  factors	  have	  been	  noted	  to	  influence	  
the	  data	  obtained	  from	  interviewees.	  	  These	  can	  range	  from	  the	  credibility	  that	  
one	   gains	   with	   interviewees	   (Rubin	   and	   Rubin,	   1995)	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  
skewing	   the	   interview	  by	   letting	  personal	   interests	   interfere	   (Seidman,	  1998).	  	  
Seemingly	   mundane	   things	   such	   as	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   tape	   recorders	  
(Arksey	  and	  Knight,	   1999)	   could	   also	   impact	   interviews.	   	   In	  order	   to	  prevent,	  
insofar	  as	  is	  possible,	  any	  undue	  bias	  in	  my	  interviews,	  all	  efforts	  were	  made	  to	  
avoid	   leading	   or	   double-­‐barrelled	   questions	   and	   to	   maintain	   a	   natural	   and	  
relaxed	   interviewing	   environment	   (Rubin	   and	   Rubin,	   1995,	   Hyman,	   2004,	  
Atkinson	   and	   Flint,	   2002).	   	   Perhaps	   because	   of	   my	   position	   at	   ECDC,	   I	   was	  
“known”	   to	   many	   interviewees,	   which	   I	   believe	   enabled	   me	   to	   obtain	  
particularly	  candid	  answers.	  Although	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  be	  sure,	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  
had	   credibility	   among	   the	   interviewees	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   informed	   observer,	   and	   I	  
also	   believe	   that	   I	   was	   trusted	   to	   be	   relatively	   “neutral”:	   many	   interviewees	  
sought	  to	  convince	  me	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  their	  particular	  standpoints	  rather	  than	  
assuming	  that	  I	  already	  had	  a	  strong	  standpoint	  from	  which	  I	  would	  not	  budge.	  	  
Finally,	   as	  mentioned	   earlier,	   all	   interviewees	   understood	   that	   the	   interviews	  
were	  not	  related	  to	  my	  role	  at	  ECDC	  but	  were	  instead	  related	  to	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
2.6.5	  	  Documentary	  data	  
Texts	   are	   among	   the	  key	   sources	  of	   evidence	   available	   to	   an	   STS	   scholar,	   and	  
many	   were	   analysed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   This	   includes	   editorials	   and	   scientific	  
commentaries,	   research	   papers,	   and	   books	   penned	   by	   relevant	   actors;	   official	  
documents	  such	  as	  those	  produced	  by	  the	  IPCC	  or	  WHO;	  and	  the	  odd	  news	  story	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in	   scientific	   journals	   that	   contain	   quotes	   from	   actors	   of	   interest.	   	   All	   of	   these	  
sorts	  of	  documents	  were	  treated	  as	  “primary”.	  	  	  
	  
Primary	  data	  was	  not	  obtained	  through	  any	  particular	  keyword	  search	  strategy.	  	  
Instead,	   I	   tended	   to	   start	  with	   research	  papers	  and	  editorials	  either	   identified	  
through	  observation	  or	  discussed	  by	  interviewees	  themselves.	  	  Particular	  focus	  
was,	  naturally	  enough,	  paid	   to	  sources	  relevant	   to	   the	  specific	  case	  studies.	   	  A	  
snowballing	  approach	  was	  also	  employed,	  whereby	  the	  bibliographies	  of	  initial	  
sources,	  alongside	  other	  publications	  that	  referenced	  them,	  were	  also	  assessed.	  	  
There	   was	   no	   specific	   date	   range	   with	   which	   I	   restricted	   the	   inclusion	   of	  
primary	  data	   sources	   into	   the	   analysis.	   	   I	   did,	   however,	   privilege	   sources	   that	  
had	  correspondence	  connected	  to	  them	  (such	  as	   letters	  refuting	  or	  supporting	  
the	   claims	   of	   a	   research	   paper)	   and	   publications	   in	   the	   more	   prominent	  
biomedical	  and	  public	  health	   journals,	  as	   judged	  by	  the	  Impact	  Factor	   score	  of	  
the	  Science	  Citation	  Index.21	  
	  
It	   is	   necessary	   to	   comment	   that,	   borrowing	   from	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   in	   STS,	   I	  
view	   texts	   as	   being	  performative	  –	   they	   are	   not	   passive	   products	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge	   but	   are	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   construction.	  	  
Documents	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  attempts	  to	  establish	  credibility	  and	  create	  scientific	  
truths:	   they	   are	   evidence	   of	   scientific	   “work”	   but	   not	   of	   scientific	   “facts”	   (e.g.	  
Myers,	  1990).	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  holds	  true	  for	  policy	  and	  “official”	  documents	  as	  
much	   as	   for	   “scientific”	   ones	   (Freeman	   and	   Maybin,	   2011).	   	   Consistent	   with	  
researchers	  interested	  in	  the	  “work”	  that	  documents	  do,	  my	  interest	  has	  been	  in	  
trying	   to	  get	  behind	   the	   texts	   to	  uncover	  hidden	  assumptions	  and	  evidence	  of	  
social	   processes,	   such	   as	   accounting	   for	   error	   (2.6.4).	   	   I	   have	   moreover	  
attempted	  to	  identify	  the	  human	  decisions	  and	  activities	  that	  are	  inevitably	  part	  
of	   the	   production	   of	   texts	   (choices	   that	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   further	   identify	   and	  
describe	   through	   interview	   data).	   I	   have	   thus	   been	   particularly	   interested	   in	  
analysing	   published	   disputes	   over	   specific	   texts	   and	   in	   identifying	   changes	   in	  
                                                
21	  See	  http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-­‐
z/science_citation_index/,	  accessed	  July	  12,	  2012.	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the	  writings	  of	  various	  authors	  with	  time.	  	  I	  have	  furthermore	  been	  interested	  in	  
juxtaposing	  the	  editorials	  that	  these	  scientists	  have	  written	  with	  their	  research	  
papers.	   	   Where	   it	   concerns	   the	   IPCC,	   I	   have	   been	   interested	   in	   the	   changes	  
between	   assessments	   and,	   for	   the	   IPCC	   4th	   Assessment	   Report,	   in	   changes	  
between	  draft	  versions	  and	  the	  final	  version	  (all	  of	  which	  are	  publicly	  available).	  	  
	  
Primary	   documents	   have	   been	   complemented	   by	   secondary	   sources,	   such	   as	  
analyses	   of	   topics	   related	   to	   this	   thesis	   from	   the	   social	   or	   political	   science	  
literature.	  
 
2.6.6	  	  Data	  analysis	  
This	  thesis	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  iterative	  process	  involving	  data	  collection	  and	  
analysis.	   	   The	   analysis	   has	   evolved	   as	  more	   data	   has	   been	   collected,	   and	   the	  
types	  of	  data	  collected	  have	  been	  informed	  by	  this	  evolving	  analysis.	   	  Even	  the	  
case	   studies	   themselves	   are	   the	   product	   of	   data	   collection,	   for	   early	  
observational	  data	  helped	  to	  refine	  their	  focus.	  	  	  
	  
As	  Blaikie	  (2000:	  31)	  has	  noted	  about	  iterative	  processes:	  
	  
…analysis	   may	   be	   integrated	   with	   data	   collection	   into	   a	   continuous	   and	  
evolving	   process	   of	   theory	   construction.	   	   This	   will	   involve	   establishing	  
categories	  and	  doing	  various	  kinds	  of	  coding.	  	  	  
	  
Coding	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  both	  a	  means	  of	  filtering	  and	  reducing	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  analysis.	   	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	   to	   the	  coding	  of	  data,	  but	  
they	   all	   tend	   to	   open	   some	   pathways	   for	   investigation	   and	   foreclose	   others	  
(Mason,	  2002).	  	  Following	  Strauss	  &	  Corbin	  (1998),	  I	  employed	  an	  open	  coding	  
approach	   in	   this	   study,	   whereby	   the	   codes	   and	   categories	   of	   codes	   directly	  
emerged	  from	  the	  research	  data,	  but	  I	  did	  not	  follow	  all	  of	  the	  systematic	  steps	  
related	  to	  grounded	  theory.	  	  Instead,	  following	  each	  “wave”	  of	  analysis,	  I	  refined	  
the	  codes	  until	  I	  ended	  up	  with	  a	  clear	  set	  of	  themes.	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It	   is	  relevant	   to	  describe	  how	  this	  was	  done	   in	  practice.	   	   Interview	  transcripts	  
and	  interesting	  excerpts	  of	  text	  from	  primary	  documentary	  sources	  were	  coded	  
using	  the	  HyperResearchTM	  software.	  	  Many	  excerpts	  of	  text	  had	  more	  than	  one	  
code	  allocated	  to	  them.	  	  Initially,	  I	  was	  focused	  on	  grouping	  the	  data	  according	  
to	  very	  broad	  “scientific”	  and	  “political”	  themes	  I	  was	  interested	  in	  (e.g.	  CCH	  at	  
WHO;	   CCH	   at	   IPCC)	   whilst	   STS-­‐related	   themes,	   such	   as	   “controversy”	   and	  
“boundary	  work”,	  were	  employed	  but	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum,	  so	  that	  I	  could	  focus	  
on	   the	   “narrative”	   structure	  of	   the	   thesis.	   	  As	  more	  data	   accumulated	   and	   the	  
demarcations	   between	   the	   different	   case	   studies	   that	   eventually	   became	  
Chapters	  3-­‐5	  became	  clearer,	  I	  started	  to	  categorise	  text	  as	  belonging	  to	  one	  or	  
more	  of	  these	  case	  studies	  (the	  “rise”	  of	  CCH;	  the	  climate-­‐vector-­‐borne	  disease	  
controversy;	   and	  CCH	   in	   the	   IPCC	  assessments).	   	  At	   this	  point,	   text	  was	  much	  
more	   heavily	   coded,	  with	   the	   same	   coding	   structure	   used	   for	   all	   case	   studies.	  	  
For	   example,	   text	   was	   coded	   according	   to	   disease	   (e.g.	   dengue	   or	   malaria),	  
according	   to	   numerous	   STS-­‐related	   themes	   (e.g.	   consensus,	   boundary	   work,	  
expertise,	   funding,	   evidence	   base,	   standards	   of	   proof,	   policy-­‐engagement,	  
interpretative	   flexibility,	   prestige),	   and	   according	   to	   its	   context	   (e.g.	  	  
controversy	   in	   the	  peer-­‐reviewed	   literature;	   specific	   IPCC	  assessment	   reports;	  
official	  WHO	  or	  other	  reports).	  	  
 
The	   analyses	   conducted	   in	   this	   research	   could	   be	   subjected	   to	   the	   sorts	   of	  
critiques	   that	   relate	   to	   validity	   of	   qualitative	   research	   more	   generally.	   	   For	  
example,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   case	   studies	   raise	   issues	   of	   internal	   and	  
external	   validity	   (Stoecker,	   1991).	   	   To	   address	   this,	   as	   already	   noted,	   I	   have	  
employed	   multiple	   data	   collection	   methods	   and	   sources	   (e.g.	   interviews,	  
document	  analysis)	  as	  a	  form	  of	  triangulation.	  	  As	  concerns	  the	  external	  validity	  
(i.e.	   generalisability)	   of	   my	   research,	   I	   follow	   those	   that	   have	   argued	   that	  
theoretical	  and	  analytical	   reasoning	  are	  more	   important	   than	  external	  validity	  
in	   case	   study	   research:	   “Generalisation	   is	   analytical	   and	   not	   statistical…the	  
extent	   that	   a	   case	   study	   illuminates	   and	   develops	   theory,	   we	  may	   treat	   it	   as	  
representative	  	  (Bechofer	  and	  Paterson,	  2000:	  49)”.	  	  Nonetheless,	  as	  we	  proceed	  
through	   the	   following	   chapters,	   it	   should	   be	   kept	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   arguments	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that	   are	   contained	   in	   this	   thesis	   must	   necessarily	   be	   understood	   as	   my	  
arguments,	  contingent	  on	  my	  professional,	  academic,	  and	  normative	  interests.	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Chapter	  3.	  Epidemic	  Communities	  
 
	  
“Medicine	  is	  a	  social	  science,	  and	  politics	  is	  nothing	  else	  but	  medicine	  on	  a	  large	  
scale”	  –	  Rudolph	  Virchow	  
 
3.1	  	  Introduction	  
 
In	   Chapter	   1,	   the	   emergence	   and	   stabilisation	   of	   two	   “global”	   risks,	   emerging	  
infectious	   diseases	   and	   climate	   change,	   was	   discussed.	   	   Alluding	   to	   the	   co-­‐
production	   framework	   described	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   both,	   it	   was	   argued,	   have	  
created,	  maintained	  and	  reinforced	  a	  particular	  conglomeration	  of	  scientific	  and	  
political	   actors	   and	   interests.	   This	   Chapter	   examines	   the	  merger	   of	   these	   two	  
risks	  by	  exploring	  the	  way	  in	  which	  climate	  change	  has	  been	  re-­‐framed	  a	  public	  
health	  risk.	  
	  
This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   understand	   the	   interrelationships	   between	   science	   and	  
global	   governance	   and,	   as	   it	   has	   been	   argued,	   one	   way	   of	   doing	   so	   is	   to	  
problematise	  expertise:	  who	  produces	  policy-­‐relevant	  knowledge,	  and	  how	  and	  
why?	   A	   community	   of	   epidemiologists	   interested	   in	   climate	   change	   and	   its	  
impacts	   on	   health	   (henceforth	   the	   CCH	   community)	   have	   been	   particularly	  
influential	   in	   raising	   and	   maintaining	   CCH	   as	   an	   issue	   for	   global	   health	  
governance.	   	   The	   CCH	   community	   pursued	   a	   branch	   of	   research	   that	   was	  
initially	   fairly	   speculative.	   	   Future	   and	   policy	   orientated,	   this	  work	   did	   not	   fit	  
well	   within	   “traditional”	   epidemiology.	   Instead,	   the	   CCH	   community	   drew	  
inspiration	   from	   a	   branch	   of	   epidemiology	   that	   had	   adopted	   an	   “ecological”	  
approach.	   	   From	   the	   onset,	   the	   CCH	   community	   embarked	   upon	   an	   active	  
programme	  of	  extra-­‐curricular	  work	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	  field:	  demarcating	  
and	   defending	   their	   work	   from	   “traditional”	   epidemiologic	   research;	   raising	  
awareness	  among	  policy	  and	  funding	  communities;	  gaining	  traction	  at	  WHO	  and	  
IPCC.	  	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  CCH	  research,	  WHO	  and	  IPCC	  did	  
not	   have	   any	   a	   priori	   structures	   in	   place	   to	   address	   the	   topic.	   By	   eventually	  
considering	   CCH,	   however,	   these	   agencies	   validated	   it	   as	   a	   worthy	   topic	   and	  
thereby	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  further	  funding,	  research	  and	  policy	  initiatives	  in	  this	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area.	  Climate	  change	  and	  its	  existing	  discourses	  and	  policy	  processes	  ultimately	  
offered	  a	  strategic	  ally	   for	  CCH	  work:	  climate	  change	  was	  a	  “convenient	  truth”	  
for	  the	  CCH	  community.1	  
	  
This	   Chapter	   begins	   by	   contextualising	   the	   broader	   relationships	   between	  
public	   health	   and	   epidemiology	   (3.2).	   	   In	   3.3,	   the	   key	   actors	   in	   the	   CCH	  
community	  are	  identified	  as	  are	  their	  attempts	  to	  define	  and	  broaden	  the	  field.	  	  
CCH	   eventually	   gained	   traction	   and	   helped	   influence	   reorganisations	   within	  
international	  agencies,	  notably	  WHO	  and	  IPCC.	  	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  3.4	  and	  
offers	   important	   insights	   into	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   CCH	   science	   and	   politics	  
have	   been	   co-­‐produced,	   with	   ramifications	   for	   how	   the	   vast	   amount	   of	  
uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   this	   research,	   exposed	   through	   a	   longstanding	  
controversy	  within	  the	  field	  (Chapter	  4),	  would	  eventually	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  
international	  community	  (Chapter	  5).	  
 
3.2	  Epidemiology	  and	  public	  health:	  political	  engagement	  and	  shifting	  paradigms	  
 
3.2.1	  Epidemiology,	  public	  health	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
The	  modern	  birth	  of	  epidemiology	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  John	  Snow’s	  famous	  
investigation	   of	   a	   cholera	   outbreak	   in	   London	  during	   the	   1850’s,	   in	  which	   he	  
identified	   the	  notorious	  Broad	  Street	  pump	  as	   the	  source	  of	   the	  outbreak	  at	  a	  
time	  when	  contagion	  theory	  was	  competitive	  with	  other	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  the	  
miasma	   theory	   of	   disease	   spread	   (Snow,	   1855,	   Snow,	   2008).	   Today,	  
epidemiology	   is	   applied	   to	   the	   study	  of	  health	  outcomes	  with	  a	  wide	   range	  of	  
time	  scales,	  from	  the	  relatively	  short-­‐term,	  such	  as	  the	  outbreak	  of	  an	  infectious	  
disease,	   to	  the	   long-­‐term,	  such	  as	  the	   influence	  of	  smoking	  on	  the	   incidence	  of	  
lung	   cancer.	   Regardless	   of	   time-­‐scale,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   objectives	   of	  
epidemiological	  research	  is	  to	  identify	  risk	  factors	  and	  assess	  their	  relationships	  
to	  various	  diseases.	   	  As	  such,	  much	  epidemiological	  research	  involves	  reaching	  
                                                
1	  Thanks	  to	  Steve	  Yearley	  for	  suggesting	  this	  pun	  on	  Al	  Gore’s	  film	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth.	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statistical	  conclusions	  attributing	  various	  disease	  or	  health	  outcomes	  to	  various	  
disease	  or	  health	  determinants	  (and	  vice-­‐versa).	  	  	  
	  
Epidemiology	   tends	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   “basic	   science”	   of	   public	   health	   (e.g.	  
Gregg,	   2002)	   and	   indeed	   the	   two	   are	   nearly	   inseparable.	   The	   WHO	   defines	  
epidemiology	   as	   “the	   study	   of	   the	   distribution	   and	   determinants	   of	   health-­‐
related	  states	  or	  events	   (including	  disease),	  and	  the	  application	  of	  this	  study	  to	  
the	  control	  of	  diseases	  and	  other	  health	  problems	   (emphasis	  added)”.2	  Similarly,	  
many	   universities	   around	   the	  world	   combine	   public	   health	   and	   epidemiology	  
into	   one	   school	   or	   department,	   and	   it	   is	   unimaginable	   that	   a	   public	   health	  
course	  would	  not	  insist	  upon	  teaching	  its	  students	  epidemiology.	  	  At	  the	  higher	  
echelons	  of	  the	  field,	  professors	  and	  other	  notable	  epidemiologists	  tend	  to	  have	  
great	   influence	   on	   the	  major	   public	   health	   agencies	   in	   the	  world,	   whether	   as	  
high-­‐level	   administrators,	   highly	   paid	   consultants,	   or	   field	   agents	   conducting	  
on-­‐the-­‐ground	  assessments.	  	  
	  
Although	  public	  health	  policy-­‐making	  may	  be	  modulated	  by	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	   circumstances,	   epidemiology	   is	   its	   privileged	   knowledge	   source.	  	  
Despite	   this	   position,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	   tacit	   understanding	  within	   the	   field	  
that	   its	   role	   should	   be	   limited:	   	   epidemiology	   collects,	   analyses	   and	   even	  
interprets	   information,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   public	   health	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   agencies	  
who	   should	  make	   the	   final	   risk	  management	   or	  policy	  decisions	   (Savitz	   et	   al.,	  
1999).	   	   	   As	   a	   group	   of	   epidemiologists	   noted	   in	   an	   editorial	   in	   the	  American	  
Journal	  of	  Public	  Health,	  “Our	  role	  is	  not	  only	  to	  collect	  and	  analyze	  data	  but	  also	  
to	  interpret	  them	  so	  that	  they	  have	  meaning	  for	  the	  public,	  for	  clinicians,	  and	  for	  
policymakers	   (Koplan	   et	   al.,	   1999)”.	   Not	   all	   epidemiologists	   agree	   with	   this	  
arrangement	  (e.g.	  Krieger,	  1999),	  but	  where	  they	  disagree	  tends	  to	  be	  centred	  
around	   whether	   –	   or	   how	   –	   epidemiologists	   should	   present	   their	   research	  
findings	  to	  the	  policy	  world.	  As	  some	  argue,	  their	  work	  has	  policy	  relevance	  as	  
well	   as	   inherent	   mathematical	   complexities	   and	   uncertainties	   and	   therefore	  
                                                
2	  http://www.who.int/topics/epidemiology/en/,	  accessed	  July	  15,	  2011.	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epidemiology’s	   terms	   of	   engagement	  with	   the	   policy	  world	  must	   be	   carefully	  
considered	   (e.g.	  Weed	   and	  Mink,	   2002,	   Samet	   and	   Lee,	   2001).	   	   Consistent	   in	  
much	  of	  this	  discourse	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  epidemiologic	  research	  is	  neutral	  
but	  its	  uptake	  is	  value-­‐laden:	  	  
	  
In	   the	   translation	   of	   scientific	   evidence,	   outcomes	   of	   the	   evaluation	   of	   data	  
should	  be	   as	  observer	  neutral	   as	  possible…By	   contrast,	   good	  policy	  outcomes	  
cannot	   be	   observer-­‐neutral,	   since	  many	   values	   other	   than	   scientific	   evidence	  
bear	  on	  the	  decisions	  (Brownson	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  410).	  
	  
Such	  an	   interpretation	  suggests	  a	   lack	  of	  reflexivity	  within	  the	   field,	  as	  well	  as	  
evidence	  of	  boundary	  work,	  through	  which	  the	  boundaries	  of	  epidemiology	  as	  a	  
“science”	   are	   actively	   managed	   and	   maintained	   by	   its	   practitioners	   (Gieryn,	  
1983). 3 	  	   At	   the	   very	   least,	   however,	   epidemiology’s	   debate	   over	   policy	  
engagement	  demonstrates	   that	   the	   field	   as	   a	  whole	   is	  quite	   aware	  of	   its	   close	  
links	   to	   and	   reliance	   on	   the	   public	   health	   domain.	   	   Epidemiologists	   may	   be	  
correct	   to	   fret	   about	   the	  mobilisation	   of	   their	   knowledge	   and	   expertise	   –	   but	  
they	   are	   naïve	   when	   they	   imply	   that	   they	   do	   not	   influence	   the	   way	   their	  
knowledge	  gets	  mobilised.	  	  	  
	  
As	   in	   other	   areas	   of	   policy-­‐relevant	   scientific	   investigation,	   the	   enrolment	   of	  
expertise	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	   extra-­‐scientific	   factors,	   a	  
phenomenon	  long-­‐since	  observed	  in	  the	  regulatory	  domain	  (e.g.	  Jasanoff,	  1990).	  	  
A	   relevant	   example	   from	   a	   public	   health	   policy-­‐related	   field	   was	   the	   long-­‐
standing	  debate	  over	  the	   links	  between	  smoking	  and	   lung-­‐cancer.	  Collingridge	  
and	   Reeve	   (1986)	   described	   the	   pattern	   observed	   in	   this	   debate	   as	   being	  
consistent	  with	  their	  “over-­‐critical	  model”,	  which	  remains	  evident	  across	  much	  
science-­‐for-­‐policy:	  
	  
                                                
3	  Such	  boundaries	  have	  in	  some	  instances	  been	  officially	  maintained	  and	  reinforced.	  	  For	  
example	  the	  European	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  (ECDC)	  is	  formally	  mandated	  
to	  assess	  but	  not	  manage	  risks.	  The	  latter	  is	  left	  instead	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  those	  within	  the	  
European	  Commission	  or	  EU	  Member	  States.	  See	  http://eur-­‐
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=387317:cs&lang=en&list=387317:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=1&pgs
=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte,	  accessed	  July	  15,	  2011.	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identification	   of	   some	   evidence	   by	   one	   side	   with	   a	   decisive	   interpretation;	   the	  
presentation	  of	  an	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  the	  same	  evidence	  by	  the	  other	  side;	  a	  
long	  debate	  on	  the	  merits	  and	  validity	  of	  each	  interpretation	  calling	  on	  extra	  evidence;	  
the	  development	  of	  new	  types	  of	  research	  to	  test	  the	  various	  interpretations	  (130-­‐1).	  
	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  differing	  interpretations	  in	  this	  example	  were	  not	  only	  
driven	   by	   disagreements	   between	   a	   “benevolent”	   medical	   community	   and	   a	  
“malevolent”	  tobacco	  lobby	  seeking	  to	  protect	  their	  corporate	  interests,	  but	  also	  
by	  different	  intellectual	  disciplines.	  	  In	  this	  debate,	  the	  more	  traditional	  medical	  
communities	   were	   quite	   comfortable	   with	   the	   view	   that	   smoking	   led	   to	   lung	  
cancer	  but	  a	  group	  of	  genetic	  determinists	  viewed	  tobacco	   intake	  rather	  more	  
as	   a	   confounding	   factor	   masking	   the	   influence	   of	   genetic	   make-­‐up	   on	   the	  
eventual	  incidence	  of	  lung	  cancer	  (Collingridge	  and	  Reeve,	  1986).	  
	  
If	   different	   sets	   of	   experts	   working	   with	   epidemiological	   data	   can	   disagree	  
about	   the	   interpretation	   of	   study	   results,	   this	   merely	   demonstrates	   that	  
epidemiology	   is	   like	   any	   other	   branch	   of	   science	   in	   not	   being	   a	   cohesive,	  
consensus-­‐filled	   domain.	   	   Different	   factions	   may	   share	   different	   vested	  
interests,	  different	   links	  to	  power-­‐brokers	  in	  policy-­‐	  or	  funding-­‐worlds,	  and	  so	  
on.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   field	   in	   past	   decades	   means	   that	   the	  
commitments	  of	  various	  sub-­‐disciplines	  may	  differ	  so	  much	  to	  be	  preventative	  
not	  of	  disease	  but	  consensus.	   	  Molecular	  and	  environmental	  epidemiology,	   for	  
example,	   work	   with	   different	   models	   of	   causation,	   different	   methodological	  
tools,	   and	   different	   standards	   of	   proof.	   	   They	   are	   ideally	   complementary	   but	  
potentially	  confrontational.	  
	  
It	  is,	  however,	  not	  only	  the	  uptake	  of	  epidemiological	  knowledge	  that	  is	  a	  messy	  
mélange	  of	  science	  and	  politics.	   	  The	   interrelationships	  between	  epidemiology	  
and	   public	   health	   create	   the	   context	   in	   which	   epidemiologic	   research	   is	  
conducted	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  one	  in	  which	  it	  is	  applied.	  	  The	  very	  construction	  of	  
this	   knowledge	   is	   inherently	   political	   –	   and	   only	   partially	   because	  
epidemiological	  research	  is	  so	  often	  conducted	  and	  presented	  with	  its	  potential	  
usages	  in	  mind.	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As	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  2,	   science	  and	  political	  order	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  co-­‐
produce	  one	  another	  at	  many	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  	  Liberal	  Western	  states	  
have	   tended	   to	   view	   science	   as	   a	   solution	   for	   legitimising	   political	   systems	  
(Ezrahi,	  1990)	  and,	  similarly,	  dominant	  socio-­‐political	  orderings	  have	  provided	  
solutions	   to	   the	   legitimization	   of	   scientific	   systems.	   	   This	   has	   previously	   been	  
demonstrated	   for	  epidemiologic	   research.	   	  Classifications	  of	   race,	   for	  example,	  
embed	   certain	   norms	   and	   values.	   	   Where	   these	   are	   incorporated	   into	  
epidemiological	   surveys,	   they	   inform	   particular	   epidemiological	  
understandings,	  such	  as	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  cardiovascular	  disease,	  which	  in	  turn	  
solidify	  and	  legitimate	  the	  classifications	  used	  in	  the	  survey	  –	  even	  though	  they	  
may	  gloss	  over	  more	  nuanced	  or	  even	  alternative	  understandings	  of	  race	  (Shim,	  
2005).	  	  Similarly,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  International	  Classification	  of	  Disease	  
(ICD)	   has	   emphasised	   a	   particular	   cultural	   understanding	   of	   disease	  which	   is	  
further	  stabilised	  by	  research	  using	  statistics	  extracted	  from	  ICD.	  	  Thus	  working	  
with	  ICD:	  
	  
enforces	  a	  certain	  understanding	  of	  context,	  place,	  and	  time.	  	  It	  makes	  a	  certain	  
set	  of	  discoveries,	  which	  validate	  its	  own	  framework,	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  an	  
alternative	  set	  outside	  of	  the	  framework…	  (Star	  and	  Bowker,	  1999:	  82).	  
	  
Belief	   systems	   and	   power	   structures	   shape	   categorisations,	   which	   in	   turn	  
influence	  knowledge-­‐generation	  in	  a	  mutually	  stabilising	  relationship.	  
	  
Epidemiology,	   then,	   as	  public	  health’s	  basic	   science	   is	   as	   a	   contingent	   form	  of	  
expert	   knowledge,	   influenced	   not	   only	   by	   different	   disciplinary	   perspectives	  
and	  political	  commitments	  but	  also	  broader	  socio-­‐political	  contexts.	   	  With	  this	  
in	   mind,	   the	   re-­‐framing	   of	   climate	   change	   as	   a	   health	   risk	   will	   be	   examined.	  
Notably,	   its	  re-­‐framing	  mirrors	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  EID	  worldview	  (1.3)	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  transition	  to	  global	  health	  governance	  (Chapter	  2),	  insofar	  as	  it	  was	  viewed	  
as	  a	  reorientation	  of	  the	  epidemiologic	  research	  towards	  a	  more	  holistic	  –	  more	  
global	  –	  understanding	  of	  public	  health.	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3.2.2	  Escaping	  the	  proximate	  prison	  
Tony	  McMichael	  has	  almost	  certainly	  been	  the	  most	  influential	  figure	  in	  the	  CCH	  
community.	  His	   essay,	  Prisoners	  of	   the	  Proximate:	  Loosening	  the	  constraints	  on	  
epidemiology	  in	  an	  age	  of	  change	  (McMichael,	  1999),	  offers	  an	  excellent	   insight	  
into	   the	   theoretical	   and	  philosophical	   considerations	  underpinning	  much	  CCH	  
research.	   	  McMichael	   suggests	   that	   a	   “social	   and	   environmental	   holism	   (Ibid.:	  
889)”	   characterised	   public	   health	   in	   the	   1800s	   but	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  
germ	   theory	   of	   disease,	   followed	   by	   early	   ideas	   about	   genetics,	   nutrition	   and	  
cancer,	   eventually	   led	   to	   narrower	   conceptualisations	   of	   health.	   By	   the	   early	  
twentieth	   century,	   “Disease	   causation	   could	   …	   be	   interpreted	   in	   terms	   of	  
proximate	   exposures	   and	   attributes	   (Ibid.:	   889)”.	   By	   the	   mid	   20th	   century,	  
despite	   the	   efforts	   of	   a	   few	   isolated	   epidemiologists	   interested	   in	   social	  
inequalities	   in	  health,	  developed	  world	  epidemiologists	  gradually	  moved	  away	  
from	   studying	   infectious	   diseases	   to	   studying	   complex	   chronic	   diseases.	   The	  
empirical,	  statistical	  approach	  required	  to	  do	  so	  encouraged:	  
	  
a	  growing	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  role	  of	  multiple	  proximate	  risk	  factors…	  We	  
have	   been	   busy	   reacting	   to	   our	   consumer	   society’s	   procession	   of	   new,	  
potentially	  hazardous	  exposures:	  mobile	  telephones,	  vitamin	  supplements,	  mad	  
cows,	  photochemical	  smog,	  and	  endless	  new	  chemicals	  and	  drugs	  (889-­‐90).	  
	  
McMichael	   lists	   four	   key	   constraints	   hindering	   modern	   epidemiology:	   a	  
preoccupation	   with	   proximate	   risk	   factors,	   a	   focus	   on	   individual-­‐level	   rather	  
than	  population-­‐level	   influences	  on	  health,	  a	  modular	  view	  of	  how	   individuals	  
undergo	   changes	   in	   risk	   status,	   and	   a	   methodological	   inability	   to	   address	  
“unfamiliar	  global-­‐scale	  environmental	  changes	  (Ibid.:	  895)”.	  These	  constraints	  
restrict	  “the	  social	  usefulness	  of	  the	  research	  (Ibid.:	  887)”.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  
them,	  McMichael	  points	  to	  an	  emerging	  area	  within	  epidemiology	  that	  involved	  
fostering	  a	  more	   “ecologic	   (Ibid.:	  890)”	  view	  of	  how	  social	   and	  environmental	  
conditions	  influence	  population	  health.	  	  
	  
Viewing	   health	   from	   a	   socio-­‐ecologic	   systems	   perspective	   involves	  
incorporating	   proximate	   and	   distal	   risk	   factors	   into	   analyses	   that	   integrate	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“macro-­‐,	   meso-­‐	   and	   micro-­‐levels	   (Ibid.:	   890)”.	   	   As	   concerns	   the	   constraints	  
related	  to	  large-­‐scale,	  social	  and	  environmental	  changes,	  McMichael	  specifically	  
cites	  climate	  change	  and	  ozone	  depletion.	  To	  loosen	  the	  constraints	  preventing	  
analyses	  of	  these	  topics,	  he	  suggests	  two	  categories	  of	  research.	  One	  is	  empirical	  
studies	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  causal	  links	  between	  environmental	  variables	  
and	  health	  outcomes.	  The	  other	  is	  integrated	  mathematical	  modelling	  of	  future	  
health	  outcomes.	  	  	  
	  
There	   is	   an	  urgent	  pre-­‐millennial	   tone	   to	   this	   essay.	   	   Infectious	  diseases	  have	  
continued	   their	   “apparent	   reemergence	   (Ibid.:	   896)”	   and	   “burgeoning	   human	  
numbers	  and	  economic	  activity	  (Ibid.:	  896)”	  are	  placing	  pressures	  on	  the	  global	  
environment.	   Thus,	   “As	   we	   enter	   a	   new	   century,	   we	   epidemiologists	   must	  
broaden	  our	   causal	  models	   (Ibid.:	   895)”.	  Only	  by	   engaging	   in	   “future-­‐oriented	  
interdisciplinary	   research	   (Ibid.:	   895)”	   can	   epidemiologists	   “guide	   the	  
development	  of	  proactive	  policies	  to	  constrain	  these	  large-­‐scale	  environmental	  
challenges	   (Ibid.:	   895)”.	   	  Prisoners	  can	   also	   be	   read	   as	   a	   subtle	   attack	   on	   the	  
dominant	   economic	   order	   just	   as	   it	  was	   observed	   that	   the	   emerging	   diseases	  
worldview	   (1.3)	   was	   “in	   many	   ways	   a	   wholesale	   condemnation	   of	   the	  
consequences	   of	   modernity	   (King,	   2002:	   768)”.	   	   McMichael	   argues	   that	   the	  
contemporary	   Western	   consumer	   society	   has	   diverted	   the	   focus	   of	   modern	  
epidemiology	   while	   also	   creating	   large-­‐scale	   environmental	   pressures.	   It	   is	   a	  
recurring	  theme	  in	  his	  work	  in	  this	  field,	  mirrored	  by	  the	  title	  of	  his	  1993	  book,	  
Planetary	   overload:	   global	   environmental	   change	   and	   the	   health	   of	   the	   human	  
species	  (McMichael,	  1993).4	  
	  
CCH	  and	  eco-­‐epidemiology	  
In	   believing	   that	   the	   limits	   of	   epidemiology	  must	   be	   transcended	   in	   order	   to	  
address	  climate	  change	  and	  other	  global-­‐scale	  environmental	  issues,	  McMichael	  
and	   the	   CCH	   community	   have	   pushed	   against	   the	   boundaries	   of	   “traditional”	  
                                                
4	  “I	  wrote	  it	  probably	  out	  of	  the	  sense	  that	  ‘look	  this	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  huge	  issue	  and	  none	  of	  us	  
can	  see	  it,	  so	  I	  will	  do	  my	  best	  to	  write	  something	  and	  try	  and	  then	  give	  it	  a	  bit	  of	  profile.’"	  
(McMichael	  Interview)	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epidemiology.	  This	  has	  paralleled	  a	  broader	  movement	  aimed	  at	  developing	  and	  
pursuing	  the	  so-­‐called	  eco-­‐epidemiological	  paradigm	  (Susser	  and	  Susser,	  1996).	  	  	  
This	  paradigm	  was	  in	  turn	  influenced	  by	  work	  dating	  back	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  the	  
earliest	   twentieth	  century	   focused	  on	  “disease	  ecology”.	  Major	  Greenwood,	   for	  
example,	   was	   the	   first	   professor	   of	   epidemiology	   at	   the	   London	   School	   of	  
Hygiene	   and	   Tropical	   Medicine	   (LSHTM).	   	   He	   held	   the	   chair	   that	   Tony	  
McMichael	  would	   later	  occupy	  and	  argued	  as	  early	  as	  1919	  that	  epidemiology	  
had	  become	  oversimplified	  and	  reductionist	  (Anderson,	  2004).	  A	  loose	  network	  
of	   scientists	  would	   continue	   to	   emphasize	   the	  need	   for	   “holistic”	  or	   “systems”	  
thinking	   in	   epidemiology	   throughout	   the	   20th	   century,	   including	   Macfarlane	  
Burnet,	   winner	   of	   the	   1960	   Nobel	   Prize	   for	   Medicine,5	  Theobald	   Smith,	   and	  
René	  Dubos	  (Anderson,	  2004).6	  	  Yet	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  that	  eco-­‐
epidemiological	   thinking	   began	   to	   gain	   wider	   acceptance:	   “During	   the	   1990s,	  
amplified	   concern	   about	   emerging	   infectious	   diseases,	   along	   with	   fears	   of	  
increasing	  antibiotic	  resistance	  and	  the	  health	  effects	  of	  climate	  change,	  would	  
boost	  interest	  in	  disease	  ecology	  (Anderson,	  2004:	  61)”.	  
	  
According	   to	   eco-­‐epidemiologists	   and	   CCH	   researchers,	   the	   “ecologic”	  
perspective	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   “traditional”	   epidemiology.	   It	   is	  
more	   complex	   and	   more	   interested	   in	   social	   rather	   than	   the	   individual	   risk	  
factors:	  
	  
R18:	   Taking	   into	   account	   all	   the	   environmental	   and	   social	   and	   personal	   risk	  
factors	   makes	   it	   so	   much	   more	   difficult,	   and	   this	   is	   where	   the	   field	   of	  
epidemiology	  reaches	  its	  limitations,	  because…	  traditional	  epidemiology	  is	  …	  in	  
a	   way	   framed	   from	   a	   “Milton	   Friedman”	   perspective,	   where	   we	   look	   at	  
individual	   level	   risk	   factors,	   where	   you,	   as	   an	   individual,	   are	   responsible	   for	  
                                                
5	  http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1960/burnet-­‐bio.html,	  
accessed	  October	  31,	  2011.	  
6	  Anderson	  (2004)	  and	  March	  and	  Susser	  (2006)	  provide	  more	  detailed	  overviews	  of	  the	  
development	  of	  ecologic	  thinking	  in	  public	  health.	  They	  track	  the	  roots	  of	  eco-­‐epidemiological	  
thinking	  across	  numerous	  epidemiologists	  working	  in	  the	  early-­‐	  to	  mid-­‐20th	  century.	  These	  also	  
include	  John	  Gordon,	  Frank	  Fenner,	  Gunnar	  Inghe,	  Thomas	  Francis	  Jr.,	  Alexander	  Leighton,	  
Manfred	  Pflanz,	  and	  John	  Cassel.	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your	  health.	  However,	  from	  the	  ecologic	  perspective,	  you're	  trying	  to	  talk	  about	  
societal	  accountability.	  
	  
R20:	   I	   think,	  at	   least	   in	  Western	  societies,	  we	  carry	  a	   false	  model	  of	  what	   the	  
determinants	   of	   health	   are.	   It	   tends	   to	   be	   rather	   individual	   based	   and	   we've	  
never	  given	  very	  much	  attention	  to	  global	  environmental	  influences…	  
	  
…And	   that	   is	   a	   challenge	   to	   epidemiologists	   because	   most	   modern	  
epidemiologists	   have	   been	   brought	   up	  …	   studying	   smoking	   and	   drinking	   and	  
oral	  contraceptive	  use,	  wearing	  seat	  belts,	  and	  safe	  sex	  and	  things	  like	  that	  -­‐	  all	  
things	   can	   be	   measured	   in	   the	   individual	   level.	   But	   they	   have	   not	   asked	   the	  
bigger	  questions	  about	  what	  are	  the	  risks	  for	  whole	  populations.	  
	  
Indeed,	   in	   its	   iteration	   in	   the	   1990s,	   eco-­‐epidemiology	   was	   specifically	  
developed	   as	   a	   paradigmatic	   response	   to	   the	   more	   individualistic	   and	  
geneticised	  approaches	   to	  health.	   In	   their	   influential	  paper,	   Susser	   and	  Susser	  
write:	  
	  
Without	   conscious	   countervailing	   effort,	   that	   [molecular]	   paradigm	   will	   very	  
likely	   come	   to	  dominate	  epidemiology	  no	   less	   than	  did	   the	  germ	   theory	   in	   its	  
time.	   	   In	   that	   event…the	  mainstream	   of	   our	   subject	   could	   be	   lost	   to	   creative	  
science.	  A	   countervailing	   force…resides	   in	   a	  developed	  version	  of	   the	  Chinese	  
boxes	  [eco-­‐epidemiological]	  paradigm	  (Susser	  and	  Susser,	  1996:	  676).	  
	  
In	   this	   century,	   epidemiology	   and	   public	   health	   have	   often	   withered	   in	   a	  
medical	  environment	  that	  almost	  inevitably	  must	  give	  primacy	  to	  the	  individual	  
care	  of	  sick	  persons	  who	  solicit	  care	  (Susser	  and	  Susser,	  1996:	  677).	  	  
	   	  
Demarcating	   ecological	   approaches	   to	   epidemiology	   from	   “traditional”	  
epidemiology	  requires	  a	  carefully	  balanced	  stance,	  as	  it	  must	  maintain	  a	  central	  
role	  for	  epidemiology	  and	  a	  role	  for	  the	  study	  of	  proximate,	  causal	  relationships,	  
while	   simultaneously	   advocating	   increased	   multi-­‐disciplinarity	   and	  
methodological	  innovation.	  	  There	  is,	  additionally,	  a	  normative	  impetus	  behind	  
this	   movement	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   concerned	  with	   being	   socially	   useful	   research,	  
amenable	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   pro-­‐active	   policy-­‐making	   (to	   be	   further	   explored	   in	  
3.2.3).	   	   Furthermore,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   the	   eco-­‐epidemiological	   paradigm	  
offers	   resistance	   to	   reductionist,	   individualistic	   approaches	   to	   public	   health,	  
which	   in	   turn	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   the	   organisation	   of	   contemporary	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Western	  economic	  life.	   	  If	  these	  philosophical	  and	  political	  underpinnings	  have	  
informed	  and	  influenced	  CCH	  research,	  its	  emergence	  and	  stabilisation	  has	  also	  
relied	  upon	  extra-­‐curricular	  work	  on	  the	  part	  of	  its	  early	  researchers.	  	  To	  secure	  
the	  success	  of	  CCH	  research,	  they	  needed	  to	  create	  a	  community,	  gain	  credibility	  
within	  epidemiology,	  ensure	  funding,	  find	  allies	  within	  prominent	  public	  health	  
and	  climate	  change	  governance	  institutions	  and,	  all	   the	  while,	  create,	  maintain	  
and	  dismantle	  disciplinary	  boundaries.	  
	  
3.3	  A	  suitable	  niche:	  On	  the	  arrival	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  
 
3.3.1	  Epistemic	  communities	  and	  constructivism	  
As	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  2.2,	  Haas	  (1992)	  described	  epistemic	  communities	  as	  a	  
network	   of	   professionals	   with	   expertise	   in	   a	   specific	   area,	   sharing	   similar	  
normative	   and	   causal	   beliefs,	   notions	   of	   validity	   and	   a	   common	   policy	  
enterprise.	  	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  viewed	  through	  an	  STS	  perspective,	  this	  concept	  
is	  useful	  for	  this	  research,	  as	  it	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  science	  and	  
politics	   become	   embedded.	   	   Studying	   epistemic	   communities	   through	   an	   STS	  
lens	  means	  noting	  that	  “science-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making”	  (Latour,	  1987),	  “community-­‐in-­‐
the-­‐making”	   and	   “policy-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making”	   are	   so	   intertwined	   that	   they	   are	  
effectively	  inseparable.	  	  Perceived	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  epistemic	  community	  concept	  
offers	  a	  useful	  analytical	  focus	  for	  understanding	  “how	  scientific	  networks	  and	  
institutions	   form,	  how	   they	   come	   to	   speak	  with	  a	  unified	  voice,	   and	  how	   they	  
acquire	  political	   influence	  (Miller	  and	  Edwards,	  2001:	  24)”.	   	  The	  remainder	  of	  
this	   Chapter	   asks:	   how	   was	   the	   knowledge	   sustaining	   the	   CCH	   community	  
produced,	  and	  how	  did	  the	  community’s	  normative	  commitments	  influence	  the	  
production	  of	  this	  knowledge?	  How	  did	  the	  CCH	  community	  manage	  its	  political	  
infiltration	   into	   governing	   institutions?	   	   Which	   “external”	   factors	   were	  




3.3.2	  Community	  service:	  The	  motivation	  and	  composition	  of	  the	  CCH	  community	  
One	   of	   the	   first	   peer-­‐review	   publications	   linking	   climate	   change	   with	   health	  
issues	  was	  an	  essay	   in	   the	  New	  England	  Journal	  of	  Medicine	  published	   in	  1989	  
(Leaf,	  1989).7	  “At	  the	  time”,	  wrote	  the	  late	  Paul	  Epstein,	   former	  Director	  of	  the	  
Center	   for	  Health	   and	  Global	  Environment	   at	  Harvard	  Medical	   School,	   “few	   in	  
the	  health	  community,	  let	  alone	  the	  general	  public,	  were	  aware	  of	  these	  threats	  
(Epstein	   and	   Ferber,	   2011:	   34)”.	   	   Indeed,	   as	   far	   as	   climate	   change	   was	  
concerned,	  its	  health	  implications	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  throughout	  much	  
of	  the	  1990s:	  
	  
R20:	  somehow	  in	  those	  early	  days,	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  right	  through	  the	  1990s,	  
it	  really	  wasn't	  understood	  that	  if	  climate	  change	  was	  going	  to	  continue	  in	  ways	  
that	   seemed	   possible,	   it	   would	   actually	   weaken	   and	   erode	   the	   life	   support	  
systems	  the	  human	  health	  depends	  on.	  So	  it	  always	  seemed	  obvious	  to	  me	  that	  
human	  health	  was	  a	  major	  part	  of	  the	  story	  -­‐	  but	  it	  wasn't	  obvious	  to	  others.	  
	  
With	  virtually	  no	  research	  in	  this	  area,	  embarking	  upon	  it	  was	  therefore	  laden	  
with	  risk:	  
	  
R10:	  that's	  how	  it	  is	  in	  science,	  it’s	  safer	  to	  stay	  within	  a	  specific	  field	  that	  you	  
know,	  everyone	  knows	  about	  	  
	  
There	  were	  also	  opportunities.	   	  One	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  
the	  community	  was	  able	  to	  connect	  to	  each	  other	  and	  shape	  the	  field:	  	  
	  
there	   were	   only	   one	   or	   two	   names	   that	   I	   became	   aware	   of	   in	   the	   literature,	  
whom	  you	  might	  have	  then	  made	  contact	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  us	  
changed	  e-­‐mails	  and	  ideas	  about	  this	  topic	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  (R20).	  
	  
Such	   interactions	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   fairly	   tight-­‐knit	   community.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  same	  names	  are	  cited	  by	  both	  insiders	  and	  outsiders	  as	  being	  part	  
of	  a	  “core	  group”	  of	  researchers	  in	  this	  field:	  
                                                
7	  Ironically,	  this	  publication	  does	  not	  come	  up	  in	  a	  search	  of	  the	  MeSH	  terms	  “climate	  change”	  or	  
“global	  change”	  or	  “global	  warming”	  and	  “health”	  in	  the	  PubMed	  search	  engine	  




R19:	  And	  of	  course	  one	  of	  the	  major	  drivers,	  as	  you	  know,	  was	  Tony	  McMichael	  
and	  is	  Tony	  McMichael.	  
	  
R10:	   The	   core	   group,	   well	   the	   first	   person	   I	   would	   name...	   really	   one	   of	   the	  
major,	  major	  players	   there	   is	  Tony	  McMichael…	  and	  then	  you	  have	   in	  USA	   it’s	  
Paul	  Epstein	  at…Harvard	  Medical	  School…and	  then	  you	  have	  some	  that	  focus	  on	  
the	  more	  specific	  like	  Jonathan	  Patz	  has	  been	  looking	  at	  the	  infectious	  diseases	  
and	  climate	  change	  in	  US…and	  in	  Europe	  because	  of	  Tony	  McMichael,	  the	  group	  
around	  him	  at	  London	  School	  of	  Hygiene	  &	  Tropical	  Medicine,	  Sari	  Kovats	  and	  
all	   the	   people	   around,	   Andy	   Haines,	   everyone	   there	   has	   contributed	  
tremendously…	   and	  Pim	  Martens,	  was	   in	  Holland,	   a	  mathematical	   scientist	   in	  
the	  Maastricht	  University…	  
	  
R13:	   If	   you	   look	   up	   Patz,	   you	   look	   up	  McMichael,	   if	   you	   look	   up	  Woodward,	  
Hales,	  etc	  ...	  they	  are	  the	  clique.	  
	  
CCH	   research	   has	   now	   been	   around	   for	   over	   twenty	   years,	   but	   many	   of	   the	  
initial	   members	   of	   the	   community	   remain	   both	   active	   and	   influential.	   One	  
interviewee,	   who	   was	   active	   at	   the	   beginning	   but	   has	   subsequently	   altered	  
course,	  reflected	  upon	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  field:	  
	  
R15:	  It	  surprises	  me	  that	  I	  still	  see	  the	  same	  people	  in	  these	  publications	  …	  Paul	  
Epstein,	   Jonathan	   Patz,	   Tony	   McMichael,	   Elizabeth	   Lindgren,	   there	   are	   a	   few	  
younger	  people	   that	   are	  actually	  doing	   the	   research	  but	   I	   think	  not	  much	  has	  
changed	  …	  They	  all	  know	  each	  other.	  
	  
The	   CCH	   core	   group,	   or	   at	   least	   inner	   circle,	   is	   certainly	   broader	   than	   the	  
handful	  of	  names	  mentioned	  in	  this	  study.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  
however,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  introduce	  the	  names	  of	  a	  few	  of	  the	  key	  players	  (Table	  
4).	   Most	   certainly	   know	   of	   each	   other	   and,	   often,	   they	   know	   each	   other	  
personally.8	  	  Collectively,	  they	  have	  co-­‐authored	  papers,	  organised	  conferences	  
and	   workshops,	   participated	   in	  WHO	   task	   forces,	   written	   and	   reviewed	   IPCC	  
assessments,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	  
 
                                                
8	  ”We	  have	  met	  many	  times	  before...	  (R10)”.	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Table	  4.	  Selected	  CCH	  community	  members 
Name	   Affiliation	   Nationality	  
Kristie	  L.	  Ebi	   IPCC	   USA	  
Paul	  Epstein	  (deceased)	   Harvard	  University	   USA	  
Howard	  Frumkin	   University	   of	   Washington	  
(formerly	  US	  CDC)	  
USA	  
Andrew	  Githeko	   Kenya	   Medical	   Research	  
Institute	  
Kenya	  
Andy	  Haines	   LSHTM	   Britain	  
Simon	  Hales	   University	   of	  Otago	   (formerly	  
WHO)	  
New	  Zealand	  
Sari	  Kovats	   LSHTM	   Britain	  
Elisabet	  Lindgren	   Karolinska	  Institute	   Sweden	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Having	   a	   shared	   enterprise	   is	   a	   common	   characteristic	   of	   epistemic	  
communities	   and	   it	   is	   evident	  within	   the	  CCH	  community.	   	  To	  begin	  with,	   the	  
choice	  to	  work	  on	  climate	  change	  necessarily	   involves	  accepting	  the	  dominant	  
discourse	  surrounding	  global	  climate	  change	  (1.4).	  	  Many	  interviewees	  from	  the	  
CCH	  community	  explicitly	  expressed	   their	   concerns	  with	  a	  perceived	  a	   lack	  of	  
progress	   in	  establishing	  global	  targets	   for	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission	  reductions	  
(e.g.	  R1,	  R10,	  R18,	  R19,	  R20),	  while	  others	  have	  taken	  active	  stances	  in	  related	  
issues,	   such	   as	   peak	   oil	   (Frumkin	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   	   Perhaps	   more	   profoundly,	  
membership	   in	   the	   CCH	   community	   involves,	   for	   many,	   pursuing	   a	   research	  
programme	  specifically	  aimed	  to	  influence	  policy:	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Research	   into	   the	   existence,	   future	   likelihood,	   and	   magnitude	   of	   health	  
consequences	  of	  climate	  change	  represents	  an	  important	  input	  to	  international	  
and	  national	  policy	  debates….	  The	  evidence	  and	  anticipation	  of	  adverse	  health	  
effects	  will	  indicate	  priorities	  for	  planned	  adaptive	  strategies,	  and	  crucially,	  will	  
strengthen	  the	  case	  for	  pre-­‐emptive	  policies	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  2006:	  866).	  
	  
Pre-­‐emptive	  policies,	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  CCH	  community,	  might	  related	  
to	  climate	  change	  adaptation	  strategies	   for	  health,	  as	  well	  as	  policies	  aimed	  at	  
climate	  change	  mitigation	  more	  generally.	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  CCH	  
research	  has	  been	  specifically	  aimed	  at	   influencing	  climate	  change	  politics.	   	  As	  
one	  interviewee	  commented	  concerning	  studies	  modelling	  the	  impact	  of	  climate	  
change	  on	  infectious	  disease:	  
	  
R19:	   I	  guess	  my	  major	  hope	  for	  that	  kind	  of	  modelling	  was	  that	   it	  would	  be	  a	  
stimulus	  for	  governments	  especially	  to	  take	  climate	  change	  more	  seriously	  and	  
as	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  stimulus	  for	  mitigation	  action	  especially.	  
	  
This	   demonstrates	   circularity	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   climate	   change	  
politics	   and	   CCH	   research	   –	   it	   has	   been	   designed	   to	   both	   anticipate	   and	  
influence	   policy.	   	   Such	   motivations	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   have	   influenced	   how	   CCH	  
modelling	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken:	  	  
	  
R18:	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  third	  decimal	  behind	  the	  dot	  in	  terms	  of	  
my	   estimates.	   	   I	  would	   rather	   try	   to	   see	   solutions,	   benefits,	   trying	   to	   analyse	  
current	  policies	  and	  how	  robust	  they	  are	  or	  how	  flexible	  they	  are	  given	  certain	  
[climatic]	  changes.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  other	  key	  components	  to	  the	  
standard	  CCH	  work	  programme,	   at	   least	   as	   related	   to	   epidemiologic	   research,	  
that	   were	   articulated	   by	   McMichael	   in	   the	   early	   2000s.	   One	   is	   better	  
understanding	   the	   causal	   links	   between	   various	   climate	   variables	   and	   health	  
outcomes	  based	  on	  recent	  historical	  examples,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  to	  enhance	  the	  
monitoring	   of	   current	   examples	   of	   health	   outcomes	   that	   have	   already	   been	  
influenced	   by	   climate	   change	   (McMichael,	   2001a).	   Yet	   the	   intense	   data	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requirements	  and	  statistical	  complexities	  of	  isolating	  the	  influence	  of	  climate	  vis	  
à	  vis	  other	  potential	  risk	  factors	  via	  “traditional”	  epidemiologic	  methods	  means	  
that	   scenario-­‐based	   models	   have	   played	   a	   substantial	   role	   within	   the	   field	  
(3.3.4,	   Chapter	   4).	   	   Thus	   it	   is	   both	   normative	   commitment	   and	   practical	  
necessity	  that	  has	  driven	  the	  development	  of	  future-­‐orientated	  models	  for	  much	  
CCH	  research.	  
	  
Consistent	  with	  the	  community’s	  commitments,	  its	  practitioners	  have	  sought	  to	  
influence	  policy	  through	  their	  research	  choices	  and	  through	  actively	  translating	  
their	   research	  by	   engaging	   the	  media	   and	  political	   circles	  both	  nationally	   and	  
internationally.	   	   They	  have	   simultaneously	   justified	   the	   case	   for	  CCH	   research	  
through	   editorials	   and	   commentaries	   in	   scientific	   publications.	   There	   is	   both	  
idealism	  and	  opportunism	  in	  this	  field-­‐expansion	  type	  of	  work:	  
	  
R10:	  ...	  I	  think	  it’s	  important	  if	  you	  are	  a	  scientist	  and	  you	  have	  important	  things	  
to	   tell,	   you	  should	   tell	   them…	  especially	  when	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	   those	  kind	  
of…	   extremely	   important	   issues	   for	   the	   future	   of	   planet,	   you	   should	   actually	  
take	   your	   time	   and	   translate	   what	   the	   scientific	   knowledge	   into	   normal	  
language	  so	  that	  normal	  people	  and	  the	  policy	  makers	  can	  understand	  what	  you	  
are	  talking	  about…	  
	  
R20:	  Well	  I	  and	  some	  of	  my	  closest	  colleagues	  have	  taken	  a	  lot	  of	  opportunities	  
but	  in	  setting	  very	  different	  settings,	  whether	  it	  is	  writing	  pieces	  for	  broadsheet	  
newspapers,	  doing	  media	   interviews,	   speaking	  with	  politicians,	   speaking	  with	  
lots	  of	  community	  based	  organizations	  that	  want	  to	  hear	  about	  this…	  you	  take	  
opportunities	   to	   write	   books,	   write	   other	   pieces	   that	   might	   have	   a	   bit	   of	  
influence,	  and	  speak	  with	  whatever	  politicians	  and	  policy	  makers	  you	  can.	  
	  
These	  activities	  have	  involved	  a	  keen	  situational	  awareness.	   	  As	  concerns	  both	  
the	  popular	  and	  scientific	  media,	  one	  angle	  has	  been	  to	  specifically	  deploy	  the	  
“EID	  worldview”	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  risk	  factor	  for	  health:	  
	  
R20:	   ...you	  know	  we	  all	  …	  I	  suppose,	  carry	  dark	  atavistic	  fears	  about	  infectious	  
disease	   -­‐	   that	   it's	   got	   this	   sort	   of	   miasmatic	   property	   that	   is	   sweeping	   over	  
populations,	  which	  is	  why	  there's	  been	  such	  a	  panic	  about	  H1N1.	  	  So	  that's	  sort	  
of	  embedded	  in	  the	  human	  psyche,	  and	  that	  is	  a	  good	  one	  to	  appeal	  to.	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This	   appeal	   appears	   to	   have	   worked,	   even	   occasionally	   in	   the	   mainstream	  
media.	   	   McMichael,	   for	   example,	   is	   quoted	   talking	   about	   EIDs	   in	   a	   Guardian	  
article	  entitled	  “New	  threats	  to	  health	  predicted”	  from	  2004	  (Meikle,	  2004)	  and	  
in	  2001,	  under	  an	  article	  entitled	  “Melt	  down”	  (Brown,	  2001),	  McMichael’s	  book	  
Human	  Frontiers,	  Environments	  and	  Disease	  (McMichael,	  2001b)	  is	  discussed	  at	  
some	  length.9	  Others	  in	  the	  CCH	  community	  have	  been	  occasionally	  represented	  
in	  the	  media;	  as	  just	  a	  few	  additional	  examples,	  Paul	  Epstein	  is	  a	  key	  source	  in	  a	  
New	   York	   Times	   article	   entitled	   “Is	   climate	   change	   aiding	   spread	   of	   disease?	  
(Smith,	   2002)”,	   and	   Jonathan	   Patz	   and	   Paul	   Epstein	   are	   both	   cited	   in	   a	  
Washington	  Post	  article	  entitled	   “Infectious	  disease	  may	  rise	  as	   the	  world	  gets	  
warmer	  (Brown,	  1996)”.	  
	  
Applying	   more	   sophisticated	   language	   and	   subtler	   framings,	   the	   CCH	  
community	  has	  devoted	  the	  bulk	  of	   its	  energy	  to	  awareness-­‐raising	  across	   the	  
epidemiologic,	  public	  health	  and	  medical	  communities.	  	  Prominent	  journals	  are	  
full	   of	   comments,	   editorials,	   perspectives	   and	   letters	   authored	   and	   edited	   by	  
those	  within	   the	  CCH	  community.	   	  This	  has	   included	  awareness-­‐raising	  essays	  
in	  popular	  science	  journals	  such	  as	  Scientific	  American	  (Epstein,	  2000),	  calls	  for	  
additional	  funding	  (Ebi	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  and	  countless	  editorials,	  commentaries	  and	  
reviews	  aimed	  at	  informing	  the	  public	  health	  and	  medical	  community	  about	  the	  
state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  in	  CCH	  issues.	  	  These	  have	  been	  published	  in	  internationally	  and	  
nationally	   recognised	   journals	   including	   Science	   (Epstein,	   1999),	   Lancet	  
(Haines,	  1998,	  Hales,	  2003,	  Epstein,	  1998,	  McMichael,	  2000)	  the	  British	  Medical	  
Journal	   (Haines,	   1995,	   Haines	   and	   McMichael,	   1997,	   McMichael	   et	   al.,	   2008,	  
Menne	   and	   Bertollini,	   2005),	   JAMA	   (Haines	   and	   Patz,	   2004,	   Lupo	   and	   Hagan,	  
2008,	  Wiley	   and	   Gostin,	   2009),	   the	  American	   Journal	   of	   Preventative	  Medicine	  
(Bloomberg	  and	  Agarwala,	  2008,	  Ebi	  and	  Semenza,	  2008,	  Frumkin	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  
the	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1997,	  Corvalan	  and	  
                                                
9	  For	  example,	  this	  article	  states:	  “On	  the	  whole,	  the	  picture	  is	  one	  of	  increasing	  and	  more	  
uncontrollable	  disasters,	  almost	  unmitigated	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  poorest	  and	  already	  
disadvantaged	  developing	  world,	  and	  hardly	  much	  better	  for	  anyone	  else.	  In	  his	  book	  …	  Human	  
Frontiers,	  Environments	  and	  Disease,	  Tony	  McMichael,	  professor	  of	  epidemiology,	  at	  London	  
School	  of	  Hygiene	  and	  Tropical	  Medicine	  paints	  a	  dire	  picture	  of	  what	  global	  warming	  is	  letting	  
us	  in	  for”.	  
 99 
Patz,	   2004),	   the	   International	   Journal	   of	   Public	   Health	   (Kovats,	   2010),	   the	  
Canadian	  Medical	   Association	   Journal	   (Haines	   et	   al.,	   2000,	   Kovats	   and	   Haines,	  
2005),	   Läkartidningen	   (the	   Swedish	   Journal	   of	   Medicine)	   (Lindgren,	   1995,	  
Lindgren,	  2000,	  Lindgren	  et	  al.,	  2008),	   the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Journal	  
of	  Medicine	  (Woodward,	  1995)	  the	  Medical	  Journal	  of	  Australia	  (McMichael	  and	  
Butler,	  2009)	  and	  the	  Nederlands	  Tidschrift	  voor	  Geneeskunde	  (Dutch	  Journal	  of	  
Medicine)(Martens,	  2009).	  
	  
There	  is,	  as	  Brisbois	  and	  Harris	  Ali	  (2010)	  have	  observed,	  generally	  a	  high	  level	  
of	   homogeneity	   in	   the	  message	   emerging	   from	   this	   literature.	   It	   often	   begins	  
with	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  climate	  change	  and	  it	  also	  tends	  to	  call	  
for	   increased	   –	   and,	   often,	   interdisciplinary	   –	   research	   to	   further	   explore	   the	  
links	   between	   climate	   change	   and	   health.	   An	   excerpt	   from	   the	   abstract	   of	   a	  
review	  article	  published	  in	  JAMA	  in	  1996	  is	  fairly	  illustrative:	  
	  
Analyzing	  the	  role	  of	  climate	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  human	  infectious	  diseases	  will	  
require	   interdisciplinary	   cooperation	   among	   physicians,	   climatologists,	  
biologists,	   and	   social	   scientists.	   Increased	   disease	   surveillance,	   integrated	  
modeling,	   and	   use	   of	   geographically	   based	   data	   systems	   will	   afford	   more	  
anticipatory	  measures	  by	   the	  medical	   community.	  Understanding	   the	   linkages	  
between	   climatological	   and	   ecological	   change	   as	   determinants	   of	   disease	  
emergence	   and	   redistribution	   will	   ultimately	   help	   optimize	   preventive	  
strategies	  (Patz	  et	  al.,	  1996:	  217).	  
	  
If	   the	   CCH	   community’s	   active	  work	   to	   communicate	   and	   establish	   its	  modus	  
operandi	   within	   public	   health	   demonstrates	   its	   shared	   scientific	   and	   policy	  
commitment,	   then	   the	   content	   of	   this	   work	   demonstrates	   its	   influences	   and	  
priorities.	   Both	   have	   played	   a	   role	   in	   carving	   out	   a	   niche	   for	   CCH	  within	   the	  
epidemiology	  and	  public	  health	  world;	  both	  demonstrate	  a	  persistent	  effort	   to	  
draw	  boundaries	  around	  a	  new	  a	  discipline	  while	  also	  establishing	  ownership	  




3.3.3	  Building	  bridges	  
As	   discussed	   in	   3.2.2,	   eco-­‐epidemiological	   approaches	   represent	   a	   departure	  
point	   from	   “modern”	   epidemiology.	   One	   of	   the	   key	   early	   challenges	   for	   CCH	  
research	   was	   establishing	   its	   scientific	   legitimacy.	   	   Two	   sources	   of	   doubt	   in	  
particular	   needed	   to	   be	   addressed	   among	   funders	   and	   scientific	   peers.	   One	  
related	   to	   the	   seriousness	  of	   climate	   change	   itself	   as	   an	   issue;	   the	  other	   to	   its	  
relevance	  and	  amenability	  as	  a	  health	  topic:	  
	  
R20:	   It	  was...right	   through	   the	  1990s,	   it	  was	  pretty	  difficult	   to	  get	   this	   sort	  of	  
work	   funded	  because	   the	   topic	   seemed	  unfamiliar	   and	   complex,	   there	  were	   a	  
lot	  of	  people	  that	  were	  still	  saying,	  understandably	  because	  this	  was	  the	  1990s,	  
well	  we	  don't	  know	  if	  (climate	  change)	  is	  real	  and	  we	  don't	  know	  if	  it	  is	  serious	  
and	   of	   course	   there	   were	   many	   people	   out	   there	   saying,	   well,	   what	   type	   of	  
research	  is	  this?	  	  
	  
To	  some	  extent,	   the	   former	  became	   less	  of	  an	   issue	  as	  climate	  change	  became	  
more	  and	  more	  broadly	  accepted	  into	  the	  mainstream	  of	  scientific	  and	  political	  
discourse.	   Nature	   itself	   was	   occasionally	   helpful:	   many	   interviewees	   cited	  
climatic	  events	  as	  key	  strategic	  allies.	  	  Heat	  waves	  in	  Chicago	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  in	  
Europe	   in	  2003,	  an	   ice	  storm	   in	  Canada,	  a	   storm	  devastating	   trees	   in	  Sweden,	  
flooding	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Central	  Europe	  –	  all	  were,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	   linked	  to	  
popular	  and	  political	  discourses	  surrounding	  climate	  change.	  Each,	  according	  to	  
respondents,	   helped	   raise	   the	   profile	   of	   climate	   change	   generally,	   thereby	  
contributing	  to	  more	  favourable	  research	  and	  policy	  climates.10	  	  	  
	  
Overcoming	   the	   doubts	   about	   the	   relevance	   of	   CCH	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   more	  
substantial	  barrier	  to	  the	  field:	  
	  
R20:	  So	  it	  wasn’t	  easy	  to	  be	  trying	  to	  work	  on	  those	  kinds	  of	  issues	  because	  it	  
was	   kind	   of	   going	   beyond	   what	   was	   accepted	   as	   part	   of	   traditional	  
                                                
10	  This	  was	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  message	  across	  interviewees,	  even	  if	  the	  academic	  literature	  
studying	  media	  coverage	  of	  climate	  change	  tends	  to	  suggest	  that	  its	  overall	  coverage	  has	  a	  
mixed	  influence	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  popular	  belief	  about	  climate	  science.	  See,	  for	  example,	  
(Boykoff	  &	  Boykoff,	  2004,	  Carvalho,	  2007).	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epidemiology	  I	  suppose.	  So	  yes,	  convincing	  funders	  and	  scientific	  peers	  and	  so	  
on	  that	  it	  was	  a	  valid	  approach	  was	  not	  easy.	  
	  
From	  the	  onset,	  there	  were,	  broadly,	  two	  main	  focuses	  for	  research	  contributing	  
to	  the	  CCH	  evidence	  base.	  One	  was	  establishing	  the	  links	  between	  climate	  –	  or	  
weather	  –	  and	  health	  outcomes,	   to	  better	  understand	  the	   links.	  The	  other	  was	  
scenario-­‐based	  modelling:	  	  
	  
R8:	   I	  mean	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  evidence	  base	  -­‐	   it	   is	  quite	  complicated.	  	  
You've	   got...we	   know	   climate	   factors	   affect	   health	   now,	   and	   that	   sort	   of	  
evidence-­‐base	   has	   always	   been	   there,	   because	   we	   know	   about	   floods,	   a	   bit	  
about	  heat	  waves,	  and	  malaria...	  	  Everyone	  knows	  how	  climate	  affects	  malaria	  -­‐
pretty	   much…	   talking	   about	   projection	   studies,	   that	   is	   a	   different	   type	   of	  
evidence	   ...about	  sort	  of	  policy	  relevant	  evidence	  that	  people	  look	  and	  say,	   ‘Oh	  
no	  its	  is	  going	  up	  in	  my	  county’.	  
	  
One	  of	   the	   central	  purposes	  of	   the	  CCH	  research	  examining	   the	   links	  between	  
climate	  and	  health	  was	  to	  develop	  parameterisations	  which	  could	  then	  feed	  in	  
to	  models:	  
	  
R10:	  so	  at	  that	  was	  at	  that	  time	  in	  the	  1990's	  when	  we	  did	  these	  studies	  it	  was	  a	  
way	  of	  showing	  that	  there	  are	  linkages	  there	  was	  a	  showing	  that	  out	  in	  nature	  
things	  are	  happening	  …	  and	  after	  that	  	  you	  can	  find	  ways	  of	  doing	  modelling	  to	  
look	  at	  the	  future	  trends	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  many	  balancing	  acts	  that	  CCH	  has	  embarked	  upon	  was	  to	  deploy	  an	  
interpretative	  flexibility	  between	  “weather”	  and	  “climate”.	  	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  
much	  of	   the	  evidence-­‐base	  on	   linkages	  between	  climate	  and	  health	  has	   in	   fact	  
been	  based	  upon	  the	  former:	  
	  
R10:	   …	   long	   before	   climate	   change	   was	   …	   even	   a	   thought	   …	   people	   were	  
looking	  at	  which	  temperatures	  are	  essential	  for	  certain	  vectors,	  insects	  …	  what	  
parameters	  are	  important	  for	  the	  malaria	  mosquitoes	  to	  survive	  and	  so	  on…	  
	  
R18:	   It	   is	   true	   though	   that	   ...	  we	  do	   tend	   to	   look	  at	   individual	  weather	  events	  
instead	   of	   climate	   change	   because	  we	   use	   a	   reductionist	   approach	   in	   science,	  
which	  makes	  it	  much	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  come	  to	  this	  cause-­‐effect	  conclusion	  ...	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Such	   a	   reductionist	   approach,	   of	   course,	   is	   not	   how	   one	   would	   describe	   the	  
modelling	   activities,	   in	   which	   incorporation	   of	   weather	   parameters	   into	  
projections	  of	  climate	  change	  effectively	  converts	  “weather”	  into	  “climate”.	  	  Yet	  
this	   “linkage”	   research	   provided	   necessary	   inputs	   for	   modelling	   efforts	   and,	  
furthermore,	   was	   in	   practice	   reasonably	   compatible	   with	   “traditional”	  
epidemiology:	  
	  
R20:	  The	  sort	  of	  work	  that	  has	  thrived	  most	  easily,	  which	  you	  might	  think	  of	  as	  
sort	  of	  low-­‐hanging	  fruit	  work,	  has	  been	  for	  many	  of	  the	  epidemiologists	  who	  in	  
the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   were	   working	   on	   air	   pollution	   episodes	   and	   the	   acute	  
effects	   on	   health.	   They	   found	   it	   easy	   to	  move	   ...	   straight	   into	   looking	   at	   heat	  
wave	  episodes	  and	  the	  acute	  effects	  on	  mortality	  on	  health	  hospitalization	  -­‐	  the	  
same	   methods…	   dozens	   of	   environmental	   epidemiologists	   with	   air	   pollution	  
backgrounds	  have	  moved	  into	  that...	  	  
	  
Other	   examples	   include	   time	   series	   data	   in	   relation	   to	   food	   poisoning	   by	  
salmonella	  and	  campylobacter;	  temperature	  fluctuation	  and	  diarrheal	  episodes;	  
and	  the	  influence	  of	  cyclical	  climatic	  events	  like	  El	  Niño,	  for	  example,	  on	  malaria	  
outbreaks.	   Again,	   this	   sort	   of	   work	   “was	   undertaken	   reasonably	   comfortably	  
and	   it	   could	   be	   done	   within	   an	   existing	   sort	   of	   epidemiological	   methods	  
framework	  (R20)”.	  	  	  
	  
Collectively,	  such	  research	  helped	  to	  gain	  CCH	  a	  foothold	  whilst	  it	  grappled	  with	  
more	   profound	   issues	   related	   to	   modelling	   the	   future.	   	   The	   “traditional”	  
epidemiologic	   community,	   accustomed	   as	   it	   was	   to	   proximate	   risk	   factor	  
analysis,	   was	   perhaps	   neither	   willing	   nor	   able	   to	   come	   to	   grips	   with	   future-­‐
orientated	  approaches:	  
	  
R20:	  ...	  if	  you	  want	  to	  study	  future	  risks:	  no	  testable	  hypothesis	  there,	  you	  won’t	  
be	  around	   in	  2050...	  So	   there	  was	  all	  sorts	  of	  debate	  and	  resistance	   to	   it	   [CCH	  
research],	  I	  think,	  in	  the	  late	  90s.	  
	  
R6:	  The	  health	  sector	  by	  and	  large	  has	  not	  liked	  models,	  has	  been	  pretty	  much	  
against	  modelling	  and	  when	  you	  talk	  about	  modelling	  almost	  immediately	  you	  
get	  into	  a	  discussion	  and	  this	  happens	  to	  me	  all	  the	  time	  on.	  ...	  It's	  essentially	  the	  
difference	   between	  weather	   and	   climate.	   ‘Gee,	   if	   you	   can't	   tell	  me	   if	  we	   have	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malaria	   next	   week,	   how	   can	   you	   tell	   we'll	   have	   malaria	   in	   2100?’	   	   Different	  
issues,	   and	   there's	   not	   a	   clear	   understanding	   that	   these	   are	   very	   different	  
issues.	  
	  
This	  is	  exactly	  the	  sort	  of	  problem	  that	  one	  might	  expect	  given	  the	  paradigmatic	  
struggles	   within	   epidemiology	   (3.2.2).	   For	   its	   modelling	   work,	   the	   CCH	  
community	  necessarily	  borrowed	  methodological	  approaches	  and	  data,	  such	  as	  
IPCC-­‐endorsed	   climate	   models,	   from	   the	   climate	   change	   community.	   Such	  
activities,	   clearly	   multi-­‐disciplinary,	   led	   to	   the	   uncomfortable	   but	   necessary	  
situation	   in	   which	   they	   needed	   to	   translate	   their	   work	   to	   both	   health	   and	  
environment	  communities:	  
	  
R15:	   	  It	  was	  the	  very	  funny	  thing	  that	  people	  in	  the	  environment	  field,	  climate	  
change	  business	  they	  knew	  the	  value	  of	  models.	  	  They	  also	  were	  used	  to	  dealing	  
with	   models	   with	   the	   complexity,	   uncertainties,	   but	   they	   had	   hardly	   any	  
knowledge	  of	  health	  issues	  of	  course.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  health	  community	  
knew	  a	   lot	   about	  health	  but	   they	  were	  not	   that	  much	   interested	   in	   long	   term	  
perspectives	  and	  views	  on	  that	  and	  models	  as	  such.	   	  They	  didn't	  know	  how	  to	  
put	  a	  value	  on	  it.	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  not	  only	  familiarity	  with	  different	  methodological	  approaches,	  but	  also	  
different	  standards	  of	  proof	  across	  sectors	  contributed	  to	  the	  initial	  reluctance	  
of	  the	  health	  sector	  to	  accept	  such	  models:	  
	  
R8:	  we	   [epidemiologists]	   are	   drilled	   and	   drilled	   about	   evidence-­‐base	   and	   not	  
making...	   you	   know,	   unless,	   you've	   got	   a	   very	   good	   basis	   for	   doing	   your	  
modelling,	  for	  not	  doing	  it.	  And	  the	  other	  sectors	  do	  not	  apply	  those	  standards	  –	  
not	  to	  the	  same	  effect.	  	  For	  some	  of	  the	  areas	  are	  very	  weak,	  but	  yet	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  
modelling	   is	  done	  by	   economists,	   or	   just	  modellers,	  who	  don't	   have	   the	   same	  
rules	  -­‐	  they	  are	  not	  playing	  the	  same	  game	  as	  us.	  	  
	  
There	   was	   in	   fact	   a	   fear	   amongst	   the	   CCH	   community	   that	   it	   was	   being	   left	  
behind	  other	  climate	  change	   impact	  sectors,	   in	  part	  because	  public	  health	  and	  
epidemiology	   are	   more	   rigorous.	   As	   a	   result,	   some	   perceived	   that	   the	   health	  
sector	  was	  missing	  an	  opportunity	  in	  climate	  change	  policy	  discourses	  to	  obtain	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resources	   and	   to	   emerge	   as	   a	   priority	   area.11	  The	   history	   of	   health	   coverage	  
within	   IPCC	   Assessment	   Reports	   lends	   some	   credence	   to	   this	   suspicion,	  
particularly	   as	   in	   the	  1990s	  health	  was	   only	   a	   very	  marginal	   part	   of	   the	   IPCC	  
assessment	  process	  (to	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  3.3.4	  and	  Chapter	  5).	  	  	  
	  
Another	   factor	   limiting	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   CCH	   field	   related	   to	   funding	   and	  
publishing.	   	   Once	   again,	   it	   was	   a	   challenge	   to	   get	   CCH	   work	   to	   be	   seen	   as	  
acceptable:	  
	  
R6:	  The	  hard	  part	  is	  nobody	  has	  paid	  the	  money	  to	  build	  the	  model.	  	  And	  then	  
trying	  to	  get	  funders	  to	  ...	  understand	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  systems.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  not	  all	  CCH	  research	  is	  expensive	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  
branches	   of	   epidemiologic	   or	   public	   health	   research.	   CCH	   is	   not	   amenable	   to	  
long-­‐term	   cohort	   or	   case-­‐control	   studies,	   for	   example,	   which	   tend	   to	   be	   the	  
costliest	   types	  of	  epidemiologic	  research.	   	  Nonetheless	   the	  acquisition	  of	  all	  of	  
the	   data	   needed	   to	   inform	   models,	   the	   international	   collaborations	   that	   are	  
often	  part	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  assembly	  and	  training	  of	  interdisciplinary	  teams,	  
and	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   develop	   and	   run	   models	   are	   expensive	   –	   external	  
funding	  is	  needed.	  CCH	  initially	  had	  a	  hard	  time	  getting	  funded,	  and	  one	  reason	  
is	   that	   it	   fit	   uncomfortably	   within	   the	   mandates	   of	   both	   health	   and	  
environmental	  funding	  bodies:	  
	   	  
R6:	  If	  you	  look	  at	  almost	  all	  agencies,	  they	  still	  fund	  within	  stove	  pipes	  ...and	  it's	  
a	  constant	  challenge.	  	  	  
	  
R15:	   I	   also	   mentioned	   earlier	   to	   you	   that	   we	   are	   trying	   to	   get	   in	   a	   kind	   of	  
national	  funding	  programme	  at	  [the]	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  on	  Climate	  
Change	  and	  Health.	  	  But	  normally	  a	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment	  or	  a	  Ministry	  of	  
Health	  they	  should	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  persons	  to	  get	   it	  up	  and	  started	  but	  you	  are	  
being	   referred	   to	   one	   or	   the	   other	   because	   ...	   then	   they	   say,	   “Well	   it's	   about	  
                                                
11	  As	  one	  interviewee	  noted	  at	  preparatory	  meeting	  to	  COP15,	  also	  held	  in	  Copenhagen:	  “The	  
emphasis	  was	  on	  us	  to	  really	  start	  getting	  some	  work	  done	  and	  work	  out	  there	  because	  
otherwise	  you	  know	  we	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  not	  doing	  what	  we	  should	  be	  doing,	  and	  it	  sounded	  a	  
bit	  like	  the	  drive	  to	  get	  research	  done	  was	  mostly	  from	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  left	  behind	  (R3)”.	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health,	  so	  go	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health,"	  and	  they	  address	  us	  back	  to	  the	  other...	  	  
So	  it	  is	  in	  between	  …	  
	  
Perhaps	  because	  of	  its	  greater	  familiarity	  and	  acceptance	  of	  CCH	  methodologies,	  
the	  environment	  sector	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  more	  fruitful	  home	  for	  the	  initial	  
funding	   of	   CCH	   research	   than	   was	   the	   health	   sector.12 	  A	   similar	   situation	  
happened	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  early	  CCH	  research,	  particularly	  from	  scenario	  
modelling:	  
	  
R15:	   	  [we]	  mainly	  published	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  in	  environmental	  journals	  like	  
Climatic	  Change	  …	  Global	  Environmental	  Change,	   these	   kinds	   of	   journals.	   	   The	  
more	  medical	   journals,	   they	  were…	   at	   first	   quite	   sceptical	   of	   these	  modelling	  
approaches.	  	  	  
	  
Once	   again	   the	   CCH	   community	  was	   also	   pro-­‐active,	   launching	   new	   academic	  
journals,	   such	   as	   EcoHealth	   and	   EcoSystem	   Health,	   which	   were	   specifically	  
designed	  to	  “give	  more	  attention	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  platform	  for	  publishing	  work	  
on	   the	   interface	  between	  global	  environmental	  changes	  and	  population	  health	  
issues	   (R15)”.	   	   With	   a	   platform	   to	   publish	   studies,	   early	   results	   from	  
“reductionist”	   studies,	   a	   growing	   community	   and	   growing	   general	   awareness	  
about	   climate	   change,	   CCH	   began	   to	   carve	   out	   a	   comfortable,	   if	   somewhat	  
financially	   constrained,	   niche	   which	   it	   could	   use	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   further	  
expansion.	   This	   enabled	   –	   and	  was	   further	   enabled	   by	   –	   its	   infiltration	   of	   the	  
public	  health	  and	  climate	  change	  worlds.	  
	  
3.3.4	  Infiltration:	  CCH	  at	  WHO	  and	  IPCC	  
CCH	  research	  is	  hybrid	  in	  the	  Latourian	  (1993)	  sense:	  it	  simultaneously	  embeds	  
both	  “scientific”	  and	  “political”	  elements.	  	  Given	  its	  content	  and	  its	  policy-­‐focus,	  
the	   emergence	   of	   CCH	   research	   eventually	   also	   led	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   what	  
Brown	   and	   Michael	   have	   called	   “institutional	   hybrids”	   (Brown	   et	   al.,	   2006,	  
                                                
12As	  an	  interviewee	  mentioned:	  “People	  don't	  fund	  global	  model	  development.	  	  The	  health	  
funders	  don't	  fund	  it	  because	  they	  don't	  see	  the	  point,	  you	  know,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  




Brown	  and	  Michael,	  2004):	   it	  created	  a	  need	  “to	  alter	  the	  boundaries	  between	  
existing	  institutional	  arrangements	  (Brown	  and	  Michael,	  2004:	  208)”.	  	  The	  focus	  
of	   this	   and	   the	   next	   section	  will	   be	   to	   explore	   how	   these	   arrangements	  were	  
altered,	  paying	  attention	  to	   the	  role	  of	   the	  CCH	  community	  as	  well	  as	   those	  of	  
the	  broader	  global	  governance	  structures	  surrounding	  climate	  change.	  	  It	  will	  be	  
shown	   that	  both	  aligned	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  CCH	  research	  became	  entrenched	  
within	  the	  global	  governance	  landscape.	  	  	  	  
	  
CCH	  and	  the	  UN	  
With	  an	  eye	  to	  producing	  policy-­‐relevant	  knowledge,	  there	  was	  no	  better	  home	  
for	  CCH	  work	   than	  WHO.	   	  A	   foothold	   there	  would	  help	  raise	   the	  awareness	  of	  
CCH	   as	   a	   “political”	   issue	   while	   also	   contributing	   to	   its	   entrenchment	   in	   the	  
research	   world.	   	   However,	   mirroring	   the	   challenges	   CCH	   faced	   in	   gaining	  
recognition	   across	   the	   health	   sector,	   WHO	   did	   not	   initially	   embrace	   the	   CCH	  
community	  with	  open	  arms.	  Reflecting	  back	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  CCH	  topic	  
by	  WHO:	  
	  
R6:	   …	   and	   so	   it's	   been	   a	   long	   road	   to	   try	   and	   get	   people	   to	   understand,	  
particularly	   given	   all	   the	   other	   issues	  WHO	   deals	   with,	   that	   they	   should	   also	  
take	  climate	  change	  on	  board.	  
	  
In	   the	   early	  1990s,	   it	  was	  by	  no	  means	  obvious	   that	   the	  WHO	  would	  one	  day	  
embrace	   climate	   change	   forcefully.	   	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   WHO	   had	   decided	   to	  
embark	  upon	  CCH	  but	  it	  was	  still	  a	  rather	  marginal	  topic	  within	  the	  agency:	  
	  
Jonathan:	   And	   how	   was	   climate	   changed	   perceived	   then	   as	   an	   issue	   within	  
WHO?	  
	  
R2:	  An	  exotic	  subject.	  Not	  very	  robust	  science,	  not	  very	  clear	  on	  what	  could	  be	  
done	  on	  the	  subject…	  you	  know	  quite	  confusing	  on	  what	   the	  word	  adaptation	  
is…	  What	  is	  mitigation?	  
	  
Two	  factors	  relating	  to	  WHO’s	  position	  in	  the	  world	  nudged	  it	  towards	  further	  
engagement	   with	   climate	   change,	   playing	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   CCH	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community.	  One	  factor	  is	  that	  WHO,	  as	  discussed	  in	  2.3,	  has	  been	  operating	  in	  a	  
fractured	   global	   health	   governance	   landscape	   characterised	   by	   increased	  
competition	  among	  agencies,	  poor	  coordination,	  and	  overlapping	  organisational	  
mandates	   (e.g.	  Walt,	   2001).	  One	   interviewee,	   part	   of	   the	  CCH	   core	   group,	   had	  
recently	  returned	  from	  spending	  a	  year	  at	  WHO	  in	  Geneva	  when	  interviewed:	  
	  
R19:	   I	   mean	  WHO	  wants	   to	  maintain	   its	   kind	   of	   status	   as	   a	   leader	   in	   global	  
health	  and	  that's	  understandable…	  And	  there	  were	  various	  -­‐	  as	  you	  know,	  other	  
sort	   of	   major	   organisations	   kind	   of	   have	   taken	   over	   some	   of	   that	   field	   and	  
particularly	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Gates	  Foundation.	  	  
	  
So	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  feeling	  that	  WHO	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  it's	  a	  leader,	  at	  least	  in	  
some	   areas	   of	   global	   health.	   And	   I	   think	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ones	   that	   they've	  
chosen,	  that	  they	  …	  can	  be	  the	  world	  expert	  on	  it.	  
	  
Jonathan:	  	  You	  mean	  climate	  change	  in	  general?	  
	  
R19:	   	  Yes.	  I	  think	  so.	  And	  I	  think	  that	  partly	  comes	  from	  within	  WHO	  and	  that	  
partly	  comes	  from	  the	  sort	  of	  international	  process	  that	  I	  mentioned.	  
	  
The	  “international	  process”	  is	  the	  UN	  process.	  WHO’s	  role	  as	  a	  UN	  organisation	  
means	   that	  WHO	   is	   drawn	   into	  UN	  political	   agendas	   and	   processes,	   including	  
those	   surrounding	   climate	   change.	   	   These	   in	   turn	   can	   influence	   WHO	  
prioritisation,	   in	   some	   cases	   formally	   through	  World	  Health	  Assembly	   (WHA)	  
Resolutions	  which	  mandate	  the	  WHO	  work	  programme.13	  	  
	  
In	  1990,	  for	  example,	  WHO	  was	  asked	  to	  contribute	  some	  information	  on	  health	  
to	   the	   IPCC	  First	  Assessment	  Report	  (ARI),	  which	   it	  did	  so	  via	  a	  report	  (WHO,	  
1990).	   	   Although	   the	   findings	   from	   this	   report	   (which	   was	   not	   produced	   in	  
collaboration	  with	  the	  CCH	  community)	  did	  not	  ultimately	  end	  up	  being	  covered	  
                                                
13	  The	  World	  Health	  Assembly	  is	  “the	  decision-­‐making	  body	  of	  WHO.	  It	  is	  attended	  by	  
delegations	  from	  all	  WHO	  Member	  States	  and	  focuses	  on	  a	  specific	  health	  agenda	  prepared	  by	  
the	  Executive	  Board.	  The	  main	  functions	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Assembly	  are	  to	  determine	  the	  
policies	  of	  the	  Organization,	  appoint	  the	  Director-­‐General,	  supervise	  financial	  policies,	  and	  
review	  and	  approve	  the	  proposed	  programme	  budget.	  The	  Health	  Assembly	  is	  held	  annually	  in	  
Geneva,	  Switzerland”.	  From:	  
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/index.html,	  accessed	  October	  
31,	  2011.	  
 108 
in	  ARI,	  it	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  WHO	  engagement	  with	  CCH.	  Two	  years	  later,	  
WHO	   was	   asked	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   1992	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit,	   marking	   the	  
beginning	  of	  more	  serious	  WHO	  involvement	  in	  CCH	  research.	  The	  Rio	  Summit	  
would	  lead	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  three	  conventions,	   including	  the	  UN	  Framework	  
Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)14	  and	  would	  have	  two	  major	  impacts	  
on	  WHO	  and	  its	  attention	  to	  climate	  change.	  	  It	  provided	  an	  occasion	  for	  WHO	  to	  
consider	   the	   topic	   in	  detail,	  and	   its	  eventual	  wording	  would	  create	  yet	   further	  
impetus	  for	  WHO	  involvement:	  
	  
R2:	  The	  whole	  climate	  change	  debate,	  I	  mean	  as	  a	  subject	  itself,	  was	  put	  at	  the	  
first	  time	  in	  the	  internal	  WHO	  discussion	  before	  the	  Rio	  conference,	  actually….	  
	  
…So	   then	   it	   was	   taken	   up	   in	   Rio	   and	   of	   course	   in	   the	   convention	   on	   climate	  
change	   (UNFCCC)	   …	   as	   you	   can	   see	   Article	   2	   is	   actually	   referring	   to	   human	  
health	  and	  wellbeing.15	  	  	  
	  
The	   UNFCCC,	   focused	   on	   addressing	   anthropogenic	   climate	   change,	  mandates	  
signatories	  to	  develop	  policies	  and	  conduct	  impact	  assessments	  “with	  a	  view	  to	  
minimizing	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  economy,	  on	  public	  health	  and	  on	  the	  quality	  
of	   the	   environment	   (emphasis	   added)”.16	  	   This	   wording,	   referring	   to	   public	  
health	   as	   it	   does,	  may	  have	   contributed	   to	   the	   interest	   in	   health	   in	   other	  UN-­‐
related	   initiatives	   focused	   on	   climate	   change.	   	   As	  will	   be	   examined	   in	   greater	  
detail	   in	   5.3,	   by	   the	   time	   IPCC	   started	   the	   process	   for	   its	   Second	   Assessment	  
                                                
14	  The	  other	  two	  conventions	  were	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  and	  the	  Convention	  to	  
Combat	  Desertification.	  	  These	  conventions	  were	  adopted	  by	  192	  countries.	  	  
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2913.php,	  accessed	  August	  5,	  
2011.	  
15	  In	  fact,	  Article	  2	  does	  not	  explicitly	  mention	  public	  health,	  but	  Article	  4	  does.	  Article	  2,	  which	  
outlines	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  Convention,	  states:	  “The	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  this	  Convention	  and	  
any	  related	  legal	  instruments	  that	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  may	  adopt	  is	  to	  achieve,	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention,	  stabilization	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  
concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  at	  a	  level	  that	  would	  prevent	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  
interference	  with	  the	  climate	  system.	  Such	  a	  level	  should	  be	  achieved	  within	  a	  time	  frame	  
sufficient	  to	  allow	  ecosystems	  to	  adapt	  naturally	  to	  climate	  change,	  to	  ensure	  that	  food	  
production	  is	  not	  threatened	  and	  to	  enable	  economic	  development	  to	  proceed	  in	  a	  sustainable	  
manner”.	  See:	  
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php,,	  accessed	  
Aug.	  5,	  2011.	  
16	  http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php,	  
Commitment	  1f),	  accessed	  August	  5,	  2011.	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Review	   (SAR),	  which	  was	   eventually	   released	   in	   1995,	   health	  was	   allocated	   a	  
more	  prominent	  position:	  
	  
R20:	  Anyway,	  the	  second	  time	  around	  they	  …	  wanted	  a	  full	  chapter	  on	  human	  
health,	  which	  was	  a	  sign	  that	  there	  was	  an	  emerging	  awareness.	  	  It	  might	  have	  
reflected	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  you	  go	  back	  and	  look	  at	  the	  original	  wording	  of	  the	  UN	  
framework	  convention	  on	  climate	  change...	  because	  it	   talks	  about	  the	  need	  for	  
coordinated	  international	  action	  to	  avoid	  dangers	  interference	  with	  the	  climate	  
system	   and	   it	   offers	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   that,	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   economic	  
development,	  human	  health	  and	  the	  environment.	  
	  
Thus	   the	   global	   political	   discourse	   surrounding	   climate	   change,	   something	  
which	   the	  CCH	  community	  had	  extensively	  and	  explicitly	   incorporated	   into	   its	  
research	  programme,	   played	   a	   role	   in	   anchoring	  CCH	   research.	   Yet	   it	  was	   the	  
activities	  of	  the	  CCH	  community	  that	  created	  this	  opportunity	  and	  were	  by	  then	  
in	  the	  right	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  it.	  	  They	  had	  by	  then	  achieved	  enough	  
of	   a	   profile	   to	   be	   invited	   to	   produce	   a	   report	   for	   WHO	   and	   to	   present	   their	  
findings	   to	   IPCC.17	  After	   this	  presentation,	  Paul	  Epstein	  notes,	   “we	  managed	  to	  
persuade	  them	  (IPCC)	  that	  our	  findings	  should	  be	  included	  (Epstein	  and	  Ferber,	  
2011:	   66)”	   in	   the	   upcoming	   second	   assessment	   report.	   	   Indeed,	   a	   condensed	  
version	  of	   these	   findings	  would	   form	   the	  health	   chapter	   for	   IPCC	  SAR,	   and	  an	  
expanded	   version	  would	   later	   be	   published	   as	   a	   book	  by	  WHO.	   	   For	   the	   IPCC	  
report,	  Tony	  McMichael	  was	  the	  coordinating	  lead	  author	  of	  the	  health	  chapter;	  
among	   the	   principal	   lead	   authors	  were	   Paul	   Epstein,	   Jonathan	   Patz	   and	  Andy	  
Haines,	  and	  among	  the	  contributing	  lead	  authors	  were	  Alistair	  Woodward,	  Sari	  
Kovats	   and	   Pim	   Martens	   (see	   5.3,	   Table	   6).	   Having	   health	   issues	   clearly	  
documented	  in	  a	  high-­‐profile	  IPCC	  report	  would	  be	  something	  of	  a	  landmark	  for	  
the	   CCH	   community,	   gaining	   them	   further	   influence	   within	   the	   global	   health	  
arena:	  
	  
R20:	   I	   think	   once	  we	   got	   into	   the	   IPCC	  process	   and	   a	   group	   of	   us	  wrote	   that	  
chapter,	   and	   we	   then	   discussed	   with	   WHO	   the	   possibility	   of	   expanding	   and	  
                                                
17	  Paul	  Epstein	  suggests	  that	  his	  invitation	  came	  from	  the	  WHO	  after	  a	  representative	  had	  read	  a	  
series	  that	  the	  CCH	  had	  successfully	  pitched	  and	  published	  with	  Lancet	  in	  1993	  (Epstein	  and	  
Ferber,	  2010:	  65).	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bringing	  it	  out	  as	  a	  book,	  which	  we	  did	  in	  1996,	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  human	  
health	  -­‐	  we	  started	  to	  establish	  a	  bit	  of	  visibility.	  
	  
Around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  WHO	  published	  this	  book	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  
WHO,	   the	  World	  Meteorological	   Organisation	   (WMO),	   and	   the	  United	  Nations	  
Environment	   Programme	   (UNEP)	   began	   to	   collaborate.	   	   This	   collaboration	  
would	  eventually	  be	  endorsed	  by	  a	  UN	  Inter-­‐Agency	  Committee	  on	  the	  Climate	  
Agenda	   (IACCAA)	   for	   which	   the	   WMO	   acted	   as	   secretariat	   during	   the	   late	  
1990s18.	  	  These	  activities	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  first	  WHA	  Resolution	  on	  climate	  
change	   in	   1998,	   WHA51.29	   (Kovats	   et	   al.,	   2000). 19 	  	   Informing	   the	   WHA	  
discussion	   on	   WHA51.29	   was	   the	   work	   conducted	   by	   the	   CCH	   community,	  
which	   itself	   drew	   upon	   their	   own	   earlier	   work	   for	   IPCC.20	  	   WHO	   also	   began	  
coordinating	  CCH	  work	  more	   aggressively,	  more	   formally	   involving	  personnel	  
from	  a	  range	  of	  departments	  and	  other	  agencies.21	  
	  
The	   close	   working	   relationships	   between	   WHO	   and	   the	   CCH	   community	  
continued	   as	   well,	   leading	   to	   a	   virtuous	   circle	   in	   which	   the	   CCH	   community	  
would	  produce	  research	  and	  reports,	   in	  many	  instances	  funded	  by	  WHO.	   	  This	  
would	  then	  reinforce	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  CCH	  as	  well	  as	  consolidate	  the	  leadership	  
of	  the	  CCH	  community,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  help	  WHO	  to	  consolidate	  its	  leadership.	  	  	  
	  
                                                
18	  “WMO	  provided	  secretariat	  functions	  for	  IACCA.	  The	  Secretary	  General	  of	  WMO	  convened	  
three	  meetings	  of	  IACCA,	  the	  first	  was	  held	  in	  April	  1997,	  the	  second	  in	  April	  1998	  and	  the	  third	  
in	  March	  1999.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  endorsement	  of	  the	  sponsoring	  agencies,	  IACCA	  has	  not	  
met	  since	  1999”.	  See	  page	  29:	  
www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/cca/documents/climate_leadership.pdf,	  accessed	  Aug.	  5,	  2011.	  
19	  Annex	  1	  of	  this	  publication	  describes	  this	  series	  of	  events:	  “In	  1996,	  WHO,	  the	  World	  
Meteorological	  Organization	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  tentatively	  
established	  a	  collaborative	  network	  on	  climate	  and	  human	  health,	  which	  was	  endorsed	  in	  1997	  
by	  the	  Inter-­‐Agency	  Committee	  on	  the	  Climate	  Agenda,	  a	  joint	  programme	  of	  international	  
agencies	  concerned	  with	  climate	  issues.	  	  In	  May	  1998,	  the	  World	  Health	  Assembly	  approved	  
these	  initiatives	  and	  requested	  the	  Director-­‐General	  to	  formalize	  the	  agreements	  and	  begin	  
collaborative	  actions	  in	  support	  of	  Member	  States	  (resolution	  WHA	  51.29)”.	  
20	  R2:	  “Then,	  for	  that	  event	  for	  the	  discussion	  at	  the	  World	  Health	  Assembly	  a	  first	  report	  on	  
climate	  change	  and	  health	  was	  actually	  developed	  which	  was	  authored	  by	  Anthony	  McMichael	  
as	  a	  first	  author”.	  
21	  R2:	  “…	  we	  were	  altogether	  something	  like	  20	  of	  us	  involved	  into	  this	  cross	  cutting,	  you	  know	  
coordinating	  between	  each	  other	  the	  input.	  	  So	  that	  was	  a	  new	  dimension	  too	  because	  it	  was	  
more	  and	  more	  recognised	  …	  as	  a	  cross	  sectoral	  importance…”	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The	   CCH	   community	   would	   also	   continue	   to	   lead	   the	   health	   chapters	   of	  
subsequent	   IPCC	   assessments	   (5.3).	   	   IPCC	   reports,	   internationally	   renowned,	  
carry	   a	   significant	   weight	   in	   policy	   circles	   and	   are	   often	   cited	   in	   official	  
documents.	   	   For	   example,	   a	   Staff	  Working	   Document	   on	   Climate	   Change	   and	  
Health	  from	  DG	  SANCO	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  refers	  to	  the	  health	  chapter	  
of	  AR4.	  Similarly,	  the	  WHA	  resolution	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  from	  2008	  
(WHA61.19)	  specifically	  references	  the	  human	  health	  chapter	  from	  IPCC	  AR4	  in	  
urging	  its	  Member	  States	  to	  “take	  decisive	  action	  to	  address	  health	  impacts	  from	  
climate	  change”.22	  	  This	  was	  a	  major	  event	  for	  the	  CCH	  community:	  
	  
R6:	  It	  means	  that	  WHO	  will	  now	  take	  climate	  change	  forward	  as	  an	  issue	  to	  its	  
member	   states.	   	   It	  will	   take	   climate	   change	   forward	  as	   an	   issue	   to	   the	  United	  
Nations	   and	   will	   make	   sure	   that	   all	   the	   sister	   UN	   agencies	   understand	   that	  
climate	   change	   is	   a	   risk	   to	   health,	   it	   is	   something	   that	   it	   has	   to	   be	   addressed.	  	  
And	  so	   it	   raises	  a	  priority	  of	   the	   issue	  enormously	  within	   the	  health	  sector	   to	  
say	  that	  WHO	  has	  recognized,	  “This	  is	  indeed	  something	  that	  people	  should	  be	  
paying	   attention	   to”...	   and	   then	   funding	   streams	   become	   available:	   there's	  
expert	  meetings,	  there's	  expert	  reports,	  research	  gets	  done	  and	  so	  it	  really	  was	  
an	  enormous	  shift	  in	  the	  field	  of	  where	  we're	  going	  to	  be	  going	  and	  the	  amount	  
of	  visibility	  that	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  is	  going	  to	  have.	  	  	  
	  
R2:	   I	   mean	   the	   World	   Health	   Assembly	   Resolutions	   are	   the	   governing	  
documents	   of	   the	   World	   Health	   Organization…	   a	   resolution	   gives	   both	   the	  
Member	   State	   itself	   action	   points	   on	  what	   they	   could	   be	   considering	   to	   do	  …	  
[and]	   also	   gives	   the	   WHO	   a	   mandate	   to	   look	   more	   into	   that,	   into	   the	   whole	  
climate	  change	  and	  health	  issue	  and	  to	  develop	  much	  more	  technical	  support	  to	  
the	  Member	  States.	  
	  
Thus	   the	  WHA	   resolution	   created	   the	   impetus	   for	   additional	   CCH	   research	   at	  
national	  and	   international	   level	  and	  gave	   further	  prestige	   to	   the	   topic.	   	  By	   the	  
time	  of	  the	  Madrid	  Consultation	  in	  2008,	  CCH	  had	  emerged	  as	  a	  priority	  area	  for	  
public	   health,	   embraced	  by	   the	   IPCC	   and	  WHA	  and	   leading	   to	   a	   reinvigorated	  
WHO	   work	   programme.	   	   This	   increased	   visibility	   for	   CCH	   within	   the	   global	  
health	   and	   UN	   landscape	   can,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  
consequence	  of	  mutually	   beneficial	   relationships	  between	  WHO,	   IPCC	   and	   the	  
                                                
22	  WHA	  61.19.	  http://www.who.int/phe/news/wha/en/index.html,	  accessed	  August	  5,	  2011.	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CCH	   community.	   These	   relationships	   contributed	   to	   the	   overall	   growth	   of	   the	  
field	  and	  to	  a	  re-­‐ordering	  across	  the	  health	  and	  environment	  sectors.	  
 
3.3.5	  The	  stabilisation	  of	  CCH	  
Climate	   change	   and	   health	   became	   a	   topic	   for	   study	   through	   the	   efforts	   of	   a	  
community	  of	  epidemiologists	  who	  re-­‐reconsidered	   the	   risk	  of	   climate	  change	  
partially	   through	   the	   “EID	  worldview”.	   In	   the	   early	   1990s,	   there	  were	   only	   a	  
handful	   of	   people	  working	  on	   this,	   but	   the	   field	   gradually	   grew	   in	   size	   and	   in	  
profile	  through	  the	  gradual	  release	  of	  publications,	  official	  reports	  and,	  notably,	  
chapters	   addressing	   health	   in	   the	   IPCC	   second,	   third	   and	   fourth	   assessment	  
reviews	   published	   in	   1995,	   2001	   and	   2007,	   respectively.	   	   By	   2008,	   the	   CCH	  
community	  consisted	  not	  only	  of	  the	  initial	  group	  of	  epidemiologists	  interested	  
in	   more	   ecological	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	   population	   health,	   but	   also	  
officials	   from	   national	   and	   international	   public	   health	   and	   environment	  
agencies.	  	  Much	  more	  attention	  and	  visibility	  surrounded	  the	  field,	  mirroring	  its	  
growth	  in	  the	  scientific	  literature	  (Figure	  1).	  
	  
Perhaps	   ironically,	   it	   was	   the	   environment	   sector	   that	   was	   initially	   more	  
responsive	  to	  the	  CCH	  community’s	  work,	   likely	  because	  of	   its	   familiarity	  with	  
climate-­‐based	   modelling	   approaches	   but	   perhaps	   also	   because	   drawing	  
attention	  to	  the	  health	  aspects	  of	  climate	  change	  presented	  a	  further	  means	  of	  
stabilising	   “dominant”	   climate	   change	   science.	   	   Regardless,	   the	   emergence	   of	  
CCH	  bridged	  two	  traditionally	  separate	  sectors	  and	  re-­‐ordered	  each	  of	  them	  in	  
the	  process.	  As	   this	   took	  place,	  CCH	  gained	  credibility	  and,	  relatedly,	  access	   to	  




Figure	   1.	   Academic	   publications	   per	   year	   with	   the	   search	   terms	   “climate	   change”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
OR	  “global	  warming”	  AND	  “health”23	  
	  
There	   is	   certainly	   plenty	   of	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   health	   and	  
environmental	   sectors	   have	   accommodated	   CCH	   research.	   	   The	   IPCC	   is	   one	  
primary	  example;	  a	  WHO	  collaboration	  with	  WMO	  indicates	  a	  similar	  trend.	  By	  
the	   early	   2000s,	  WHO	   had	   re-­‐organised	   so	   as	   to	  more	   explicitly	   address	   CCH	  
and	  related	  issues.	  At	  the	  time,	  this	  was	  interpreted	  by	  McMichael	  as	  symbolic	  
of	  a	  changing	  awareness	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  eco-­‐epidemiology:	  
	  
The	  realization	  is	  gradually	  dawning	  on	  modern	  societies	  that	  the	  sustainability	  
of	   population	   health	   must	   be	   a	   central	   consideration	   in	   this	   sustainability	  
                                                
23 Data	  for	  Figure	  1	  was	  collected	  by	  searching	  “climate	  change”	  OR	  “global	  warming”	  AND	  
“health”	  in	  the	  PubMed	  search	  engine	  (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed).	  This	  includes	  
reviews,	  editorials,	  commentaries	  in	  addition	  to	  research	  papers.	  	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  
elsewhere	  that	  the	  CCH	  literature,	  as	  compared	  to	  that	  for	  more	  “traditional”	  epidemiological	  
topics,	  like	  tobacco	  or	  obesity,	  contains	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  citations	  that	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  
original	  research	  (Hosking	  &	  Campbell-­‐Lendrum,	  2012).	  	  Although	  an	  imperfect,	  and	  likely	  
delayed	  measure	  of	  growth	  in	  the	  field	  (owing	  to	  publication	  lag-­‐times),	  it	  is	  a	  suitable	  
representation	  of	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  field.	  It	  should	  nonetheless	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  number	  of	  
publications	  addressing	  climate	  change	  and	  health	  is	  likely	  much	  larger	  than	  what	  these	  search	  
terms	  retrieved.	  In	  addition,	  extending	  the	  search	  to	  other	  databases,	  including	  those	  more	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transition	   discourse.	   For	   that	   reason,	   the	   public,	   policymakers,	   and	   other	  
scientists	   show	   an	   increasing	   interest	   in	   hearing	   from	   epidemiologists	   about	  
these	  matters.	  Reflecting	  this	  changing	  agenda,	   the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  
now	   has	   a	   major	   section	   titled	   Healthy	   Environments	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development.	   We	   are	   edging	   toward	   a	   view	   of	   population	   health	   as	   an	  
ecological	  entity…	  (McMichael,	  2001a:	  1172-­‐3)	  
	  
Other	  government	  agencies	  have	  also	  responded	   to	  CCH.	  At	   the	  national	   level,	  
the	  US,	  for	  example,	  now	  has	  an	  Interagency	  Working	  Group	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
on	  Health,	   represented	  by	   several	   relevant	  US	   agencies,	   including	   the	  Centres	  
for	  Disease	  Control	   (CDC),	  National	   Institutes	   for	  Health	  (NIH),	  Environmental	  
Protection	   Agency	   (EPA)	   and	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Agriculture	   (USDA).24 	  In	  
Canada,	  Health	  Canada	  established	  a	  unit	  dedicated	  to	  CCH25,	  while	  in	  the	  UK	  its	  
Department	   of	  Health	   has	   held	   expert	  working	   groups	   on	   climate	   change	   and	  
health,	   releasing	   large	   reports	   in	   2001	   and	   2008	   (and	  with	   key	   contributions	  
from	   the	   CCH	   community).26	  	   At	   the	   EU	   level,	   as	   earlier	   discussed,	  DG	   SANCO	  
developed	   a	   Staff	   Working	   Document	   on	   the	   topic,	   mandating	   work	   to	   be	  
conducted	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  EU	  Agencies.	  	  A	  few	  staff	  dedicated	  to	  the	  topic	  at	  
the	  European	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  (ECDC),	  for	  example,	  as	  
does	  the	  European	  Environment	  Agency	  (EEA).	  	  As	  concerns	  the	  latter,	  this	  has	  
not	  always	  been	  the	  case:	  
	  
R5:	  I	  think	  that	  in	  the	  beginning,	  even	  though	  it's	  kind	  of	  a	  common	  sense	  that	  
one	  of	  the	  impacts	  [of	  climate	  change]	  would	  be	  on	  human	  health,	  I	  think	  it	  was	  
more	   isolated	   …	   a,	   let's	   say,	   separate	   trend	   of	   activities	   related	   to	   human	  
health…	  This	  perception	  is	  changing	  …	  
	  
Consequently,	  EEA	  has	  included	  health	  as	  one	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  impacts	  to	  
be	  incorporated	  into	  one	  of	  its	  key	  reports;	  the	  health	  section	  was	  developed	  in	  
collaboration	  with	  WHO	  and	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Joint	  Research	  Centre	  
in	   2008	   (EEA	   et	   al.,	   2008)	   and	   with	   WHO	   and	   ECDC	   in	   2012	   (EEA,	   2012).	  
                                                
24	  http://www.niehs.nih.gov/about/od/programs/climatechange/index.cfm,	  accessed	  
November	  1,	  2012	  
25	  http://www.hc-­‐sc.gc.ca/ewh-­‐semt/climat/index-­‐eng.php,	  accessed	  November	  1,	  2012	  
26	  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuida
nce/DH_4007935,	  accessed	  November	  1,	  2012	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Funding	  has,	  meanwhile,	  also	  opened	  up	  at	  the	  European	  level.	   In	  perhaps	  the	  
largest	   project,	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   DG	   Research	   funded	   a	   five	   year,	  
€11.5	   million	   project	   entitled	   Emerging	   Diseases	   in	   a	   Changing	   European	  
Environment	   (EDEN)	   which	   focused	   on	   environmental	   and	   ecological	   change	  
and	  its	  impact	  on	  disease	  pathogens.	  	  Many	  sub-­‐projects	  within	  EDEN	  deployed	  
predictive	  modelling	  approaches	  and	  a	  core	  objective	  was	  for	  the	  research	  to	  be	  
policy-­‐relevant.27	  	   The	   EDEN	   project	  was	   then	   succeeded	   by	  EDENext,	   a	   four-­‐
year	  projected	  funded	  by	  DG	  Research	  and	  conducted	  by	  a	  similar	  constellation	  
of	  researchers.28	  
	  
Such	  developments	  have	  contributed	  to	  an	  increased	  visibility	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  
the	  field,	  as	  well	  as	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  projects	  and	  researchers	  involved	  
in	  the	  topic,	  supported	  by	  policy	  documents,	  resolutions	  and	  money.	  	  It	  is	  nearly	  
easy	   to	   forget	   that	  CCH	  was	   initially	  a	  marginal	   topic	  within	  public	  health	  and	  
epidemiology.	  	  It	  was	  a	  topic	  for	  which	  the	  CCH	  pioneers	  took	  a	  risk:	  
	  
R6:…	  if...	  you	  jump	  out	  into	  insecurity	  with	  regard	  to	  funding,	  especially	  if	  it's	  a	  
question	   of	   trans-­‐disciplinary,	  multi-­‐disciplinary	   approaches…	   a	   lot	   of	   people	  
don't	  dare	  do	  that	  and	  didn’t	  in	  the	  1990's	  when	  this	  field	  was	  building	  up	  
	  
Today,	  with	  heightened	  awareness,	  the	  field	  has	  even	  become	  a	  bit	  trendy:	  	  
	  
R20:	   So	   this	   decade	   we	   have	   seen	   a	   shift.	   ...	   and	   ...to	   an	   extent	   it	   is	   even	  
becoming	  a	  sort	  of	  fashionable	  topic	  now	  …	  I	  think	  once	  an	  area	  like	  this	  gets	  bit	  
of	   a	  momentum	  and	   starts	   to	  attract	   a	  bit	  of	   research	   funding,	  others	   start	   to	  
take	   notice	   and	   suddenly	   find	   that	   the	   work	   that	   they	   are	   doing	   could	   be	  
                                                
27	  “EDEN	  (Emerging	  Diseases	  in	  a	  changing	  European	  eNvironment)	  is	  an	  Integrated	  Project	  of	  
the	  European	  Commission	  that	  aims	  to	  identify	  and	  catalogue	  those	  European	  ecosystems	  and	  
environmental	  conditions	  which	  can	  influence	  the	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  distribution	  and	  
dynamics	  of	  human	  pathogenic	  agents.	  The	  project	  develops	  and	  co-­‐coordinates	  a	  set	  of	  generic	  
methods,	  tools	  and	  skills	  such	  as	  predictive	  models,	  early	  warning	  and	  monitoring	  tools	  which	  
can	  be	  used	  by	  decision	  makers	  for	  risk	  assessment,	  decision	  support	  for	  intervention	  and	  
public	  health	  policies”.	  http://www.eden-­‐fp6project.net/,	  accessed	  August	  10,	  2011.	  
28	  http://www.edenext.eu/,	  accessed	  February	  22,	  2012.	  As	  the	  website	  for	  EDENnext	  notes:	  
“Due	  to	  environmental	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  changes,	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  …	  are	  becoming	  an	  
increasing	  challenge	  for	  human	  and	  veterinary	  public	  health	  not	  only	  in	  Europe,	  but	  across	  the	  
globe”.	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adjusted	  or	  adapted	   to	  explore	   some	  climate	   change	  and	  health	   relationships.	  	  
So	  it	  has	  now	  become	  a	  bit	  of	  an	  attracter.	  
	  
R6:	  [there]	  has	  been	  kind	  of	  an	  explosion	  within	  this	  climate	  change	  field	  since	  
2001.	   	   Especially	   during	   the	   latest	   years	   because	   there	   has	   been	  much	  more	  
funding	  coming	  in...	  
	  
Even	   a	   scientist	   who	   has	   thoroughly	   opposed	   CCH	   research	   agrees	   with	   this	  
assessment:	  
	  
R17:	  But	  my	  own	  opinion	   is	   that,	   it's	   the	  phenomenon	  one	  sees	   in	   science	  all	  
the	   time,	   here	   is	   a	   hook	   people	   are	   grabbing	   hold	   of,	   which	   legitimises	   their	  
work,	  is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  create	  new	  funding	  opportunities	  and	  to	  apply	  these	  
funding	   opportunities,	   you	   know…	   I	   think,	   in	   the	   climate	   change	   and	   health	  
debate,	   in	   the	   climate	   change	   debate	   altogether,	   it's	   a	   huge	   great	   area	   that	  
people	  can	  make	  a	  living	  out	  of.	  It's	  not	  bad,	  it's	  just	  natural,	  it's	  human	  nature…	  
	  
Thus	   climate	   change	   has	   been	   a	   convenient	   truth	   for	   the	   CCH	   community:	  
connecting	   to	   the	   broader	   global	   discourses	   surrounding	   climate	   change	  
facilitated	  its	  growing	  role	  within	  WHO	  and	  IPCC.	   	  Operating	  out	  of	  an	  initially	  
marginal	  position	  within	  epidemiology,	  the	  CCH	  community	  carved	  out	  a	  niche	  
for	  themselves:	  
	  
Now,	   as	   before,	   the	   leading	   instigators	   of…ecological	   approaches	   argue	   that	  
their	  views	  are	  marginal	  in	  biomedical	  research…	  But	  theoretical	  speculation	  of	  
this	  sort,	  once	  little	  more	  than	  a	  mark	  of	  intellectual	  distinction,	  a	  flashy	  bit	  of	  
plumage,	  would	  eventually	  become	  a	  major	  selection	  advantage	   in	   the	  rapidly	  
changing,	   and	   perplexing,	   natural	   and	   conceptual	   environments	   of	   the	   late	  
twentieth	  century	  (Anderson,	  2004:	  61).	  
	  
Once	   weakened	   by	   their	   move	   away	   from	   the	   mainstream,	   they	   ultimately	  
benefited	   from	   it.	   	   The	   subject,	   once	   “exotic”,	   has	   become	   somewhat	  
mainstream:	  “It’s	  like	  when	  you	  throw	  a	  stone	  into	  water,	  it	  causes	  rings…(R6)”.	  	  	  
	  
Throwing	  a	  rock	  into	  water,	  however,	  may	  also	  cause	  a	  splash	  and	  make	  a	  bit	  of	  
noise,	   and	   the	   CCH	   community	   has	   had	   to	   endure	   some	   very	   rough	   waters	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indeed,	   notably	   from	   a	   group	   of	   ecologists	   who	   took	   exception	   with	  
epidemiology’s	  ecologic	  turn,	  as	  the	  following	  Chapter	  will	  explore.	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Chapter	  4.	  A	  contested	  niche:	  ecology’s	  resistance	  to	  eco-­‐
epidemiology	  
	  




Although	  the	  emergence	  of	  CCH	  served	  to	  stabilise	  and	  even	  somewhat	  re-­‐order	  
the	   public	   health	   landscape,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   there	   was	   nothing	  
inevitable	   about	   its	   trajectory.	  As	  Chapter	  3	  observed,	  CCH	   research	  has	  been	  
influenced	  by	   the	  commitments	   shared	  by	   the	  CCH	  community	  and	  supported	  
by	  the	  “anchoring”	  of	  this	  research	  within	  the	  broader	  climate	  change	  domain,	  
which	   created	   an	   organisational	   impetus	   for	  WHO	   and	   later	   IPCC	   to	   address	  
CCH.	  
	  
This	   Chapter	   will	   delve	   into	   a	   longstanding	   dispute	   between	   the	   CCH	  
community	  and	  a	  group	  of	  ecologists	  who	  have	  staunchly	  opposed	  the	  relevance	  
of	   the	   links	  between	  climate	  change	  and	   infectious	  (particularly	  vector-­‐borne)	  
disease.	   	   An	   exploration	   of	   this	   controversy	   not	   only	   reveals	   the	   many	  
contingencies	  inherent	  to	  CCH	  research,	  but	  it	  also	  raises	  questions	  about	  how,	  
given	  that	  CCH	  research	  has	  been	  so	   intensely	  contested,	  official	  organisations	  
like	  the	  IPCC	  and	  WHO	  have	  accounted	  for	  this	  controversy.	   	  The	  latter	  will	  be	  
the	   focus	  of	  Chapter	  5.	   	   In	   this	  Chapter,	  after	   introducing	   the	  general	   terms	  of	  
the	   climate-­‐vector-­‐borne	   disease	   (VBD)	   debate	   (4.2),	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	  
controversy	  will	   be	   analysed	   in	   greater	   detail.	   	   A	   discussion	   on	   CCH	   research	  
surrounding	   malaria	   demonstrates	   how	   different	   methodological	   choices	   and	  
conclusions	  have	  aligned	  with	  professional	  commitments,	  and	  how	  CCH	  models	  
incorporate	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   assumptions,	   including	   normative	   ones,	   about	  
future	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   (4.3).	   	   In	   4.4,	   CCH	   research	   on	   “highland	  
malaria”	  demonstrates	  how	  possibility	  for	  endless	  technical	  debate	  exists	  when	  
one	   research	   community	   (i.e.	   climate	   impact	   researchers)	   is	   dependent	   upon	  
                                                
1	  Quotation	  by	  the	  economist	  William	  D.	  Nordhaus.	  The	  quote	  is	  taken	  from	  Nordhaus	  (1994:	  6),	  
cited	  in	  Timmerman	  (1996).	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another	   (i.e.	   climate	   modellers)	   for	   their	   underlying	   climate	   data.	   	   In	   4.5,	  
debates	  surrounding	  climate-­‐dengue	  linkages	  again	  demonstrate	  how	  different	  
commitments	   and	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   are	   embedded	   in	  models,	   in	   this	   case	  
even	  where	   the	  same	  methodologies	  are	  used.	   	   In	  4.6,	   research	  examining	   the	  
causes	  behind	  the	  increase	  in	  TBE	  incidence	  in	  Europe	  demonstrates	  how	  even	  
where	   opponents	   might	   seem	   to	   agree	   with	   each	   other,	   their	   entrenched	  
positions	   and	   concerns	   over	   how	   findings	   could	   be	   interpreted	   by	  
“downstream”	  users	  can	  continue	  to	  stir	  controversy.	   	  Section	  4.7	  summarises	  
the	  key	  insights	  arising	  from	  this	  Chapter.	  
 
4.2	  Doctors	  without	  borders:	  introducing	  the	  climate-­‐disease	  controversy	  
 
It	   is	   ironic	   that	   the	   CCH	   community	   pursued	   an	   ecological	   approach	   to	  
epidemiology	  but	  met	  their	  greatest	  resistance	  from	  a	  community	  of	  ecologists.	  	  
This	  resistance	  led	  to	  an	  intense	  and	  long-­‐standing	  controversy	  over	  the	  merits	  
and	  validity	  of	  CCH	  research,	  most	  specifically	  where	  it	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  links	  
between	  climate	  change	  and	  EIDs.	  	  A	  special	  issue	  of	  the	  journal	  Ecology	  reflects	  
a	   perspective	   on	   CCH	   research	   shared	   by	  many	   of	   its	   opponents.	   	   Suggesting	  
that	   “early	   reviews	   about	   climate	   change	   exaggerated	   claims	   that	   infectious	  
diseases	  will	   increase	  in	  the	  future	  (Lafferty,	  2009:	  932)”	  and	  observing	  that	  a	  
“common	  message	  is	  that	  an	  ecological	  approach	  is	  increasingly	  relevant	  to	  the	  
challenging	   topic	   of	   infectious	   disease	   (Ibid.:	   932)”,	   it	  was	   pointed	   out	   that	   if	  
ecological	   perspectives	   on	   health	   are	   what	   is	   required,	   then	   ecologists	   could	  
“contribute	  substantially	  (Ibid.:	  933)”.	  	  Although	  this	  is	  an	  eminently	  reasonable	  
position,	   ecologists’	   engagement	   with	   CCH	   research	   tended	   to	   lead	   to	  
controversy	  instead	  of	  collaboration.	  
	  
The	  controversy	  surrounding	  CCH	  research	  has,	  in	  many	  instances,	  been	  highly	  
polarised.	   	   It	   emerged	   more	   or	   less	   simultaneously	   with	   the	   first	   CCH	  
publications	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  As	  CCH	  researchers	  began	  to	  push	  beyond	  the	  
boundaries	   of	   “traditional”	   epidemiology,	   they	   inevitably	   encroached	   upon	  
other	  disciplinary	  boundaries,	  which	  lead	  to	  resentment:	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The	   debate,	   although	   phrased	   in	   the	   muted	   and	   technical	   language	   of	   the	  
scientific	   literature,	   turned	   into	   a	   slugfest.	   Much	   was	   at	   stake:	   professional	  
reputations,	   the	   scientific	   consensus,	   and	   –	  most	   critical	   –	   societal	   consensus	  
about	   the	   changes	   needed	   to	   deal	   with	   climate	   change	   (Epstein	   and	   Ferber,	  
2011:	  51).	  
	  
R20:	   There	  was	   sort	   of	   polarization,	  which	  was	   basically	   territorial	   I	   think	  …	  
But	  I	  think	  they	  [the	  ecologists]	  were	  also	  offended	  that	  amateurs	  were	  moving	  
into	  the	  area	  and	  trying	  to	  model	  the	  very	  simplistic	  models	  -­‐	  which	  of	  course	  
was	  inevitable.	  	  	  	  
	  
R1:	   ...	   I	  suspect	  …	  that	  people	   just	   feel	  very	  annoyed	  that	  you’ve	  got	  outsiders	  
who’ve	  come	  in	  and	  are,	  you	  know,	  taking	  the	  limelight.	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   scientists	   opposed	   to	   CCH	   research,	   principally	   ecologists,	  
have	  sought	  to	  discredit	  the	  CCH	  community:	  
	  
R4:	  …	  you	  will	  always	  in	  any	  field	  have	  your	  snake	  oil	  salesmen	  and	  the	  snake	  
oil	   salesmen	  are	  very	  concerned	   to	  promote	   themselves	   rather	   than	  science....	  
And	  that	  quite	  honestly	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  life…	  I	  can	  think	  of	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  people	  
who	  make	  their	  reputations	  on	  making	  predictions	  for	  health	  futures	  with	  very	  
little	  experience	  of	  health	  in	  the	  present	  or	  in	  the	  past…	  And	  yet	  they’ve	  got	  an	  
awful	   lot	  of	  publicity	  as	  a	  result	  of	   that.	   	   I	   think	  people	   like	   Jonathan	  Patz	  and	  
Paul	   Epstein	   are	   the	   key	   players	   here;	   Pim	  Martens	   of	   course	   in	   the	  malaria	  
field;	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  Tony	  McMichael	  in	  Australia.	  
	  
The	   mutual	   distrust	   and	   resentment	   between	   the	   CCH	   community	   and	   its	  
opponents	   is	   thus	   quite	   clear.	   	   The	   controversy	   has,	   periodically,	   received	  
coverage	   in	   the	   scientific	   and	   popular	   media	   (Allen,	   2011,	   Brower,	   2001,	  
Taubes,	   1997),	  which	  offers	   a	  useful	  way	  of	   introducing	   some	  of	   its	   recurring	  
themes.	   	   In	   1997,	   for	   example	   Science	   published	   a	   news	   story	   entitled	  
“Apocalypse	  Not”	  (Taubes,	  1997).	   	  This	  article	  pits	  the	  CCH	  community,	   in	  this	  
article	  referred	  to	  as	  “public	  health	  researchers”,	  against	  the	  ecologists	  and	  their	  
allies,	  referred	  to	  as	  “infectious	  disease	  specialists”	  (Ibid.:	  1004).	  	  The	  infectious	  
disease	  (ID)	  specialists	  react	  particularly	  strongly	  against	  the	  models	  produced	  
by	  the	  CCH	  community,	  branding	  them	  as	  “‘gloom	  and	  doom’	  speculations	  based	  
on	   ‘soft	   data’	   (1004)”.	   	   Duane	   Gubler,	   then	   director	   of	   the	   division	   of	   vector-­‐
borne	   diseases	   at	   the	  US	   CDC,	   refers	   to	   the	   standard	   CCH	  doctrine	   as	   “gospel	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(1004)”	  and	  argues	  that	  CCH	  models	  are	  “probably	  the	  most	  blatant	  disregard	  
(1005)”	  for	  other	  factors	  driving	  disease	  spread.	  	  	  
	  
The	   ID	   specialists	   cite	   a	   range	  of	   counter-­‐arguments	   to	  discredit	   CCH	  models,	  
including:	  the	   lack	  of	  conclusive	  evidence;	  the	  “simplistic	  (1005)”	  assumptions	  
embedded	  in	  models	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  various	  mosquito-­‐borne	  
diseases;	   the	   inherent	   complexity	   in	   the	   dynamics	   of	   vector-­‐borne	   disease	  
transmission;	   and	   the	   abundance	   of	   alternative	   (and	   more	   proximate!)	  
explanations	   for	   disease	   spread,	   such	   as	  microbial	   resistance	   to	   drugs,	   vector	  
resistance	   to	   pesticides,	   the	   collapse	   of	   public	   health	   infrastructure,	   and	  
demographics.	  	  As	  evidence	  of	  these	  factors,	  a	  natural	  experiment	  is	  put	  forward	  
by	  Gubler,	  along	  with	  Paul	  Reiter,	  then	  also	  of	  CDC	  and	  one	  of	  the	  most	  divisive	  
figures	  in	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  CCH	  research.2	  	  Gubler	  and	  Reiter	  note	  
that	   the	   incidence	  of	  dengue	  was	  much	  higher	   in	  Reynosa,	  Mexico	  than	  across	  
the	  Rio	  Grande	   in	   Texas,	   thereby	   demonstrating	   the	   influence	   of	   non-­‐climatic	  
factors	  on	  dengue	  outbreaks:	  as	  both	  areas	  share	  the	  same	  climate,	   it	  must	  be	  
their	  differing	  socio-­‐economic	  contexts	  that	  account	  for	  the	  different	  rates	  of	  the	  
disease.	  	  
	  
The	  Science	  article	  also	  describes	  how	  the	  CCH	  community	  defends	   the	  design	  
and	   purpose	   of	   their	   models.	   McMichael	   argues	   that	   the	   models	   are	   an	  
important	  part	  of	   awareness-­‐raising:	   they	   “serve	  notice…and	   there	   could	  be	   a	  
range	  of	   consequences	   for	  human	  health	   (1004)”.	   	   Epstein	   argues	   that	  Gubler	  
overlooks	  worrying	  trends,	  such	  as	  the	  spread	  of	  mosquitoes	  to	  higher	  latitudes	  
in	   concert	   with	   increasing	   temperatures,	   and	   McMichael	   argues	   that	   the	  
                                                
2 Paul	  Reiter	  has	  been	  perhaps	  the	  most	  vocal	  opponent	  of	  CCH	  research,	  and	  he	  has	  also	  been	  
vocal	  about	  his	  opposition	  to	  climate	  change	  science	  more	  generally.	  	  For	  example,	  	  in	  2006	  he	  
was	  a	  co-­‐signatory	  of	  an	  open	  letter	  to	  Canadian	  Prime	  Minister	  Stephen	  Harper	  urging	  him	  to	  
reconsider	  his	  country’s	  stance	  on	  climate	  change	  (	  see:	  
http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=3711460e-­‐bd5a-­‐475d-­‐
a6be-­‐4db87559d605,	  accessed	  November	  5,	  2012).	  	  He	  has	  also	  been	  accused	  of	  receiving	  
money	  from	  the	  anti-­‐climate	  change	  oil	  lobby,	  but	  such	  claims	  are	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  verify.	  It	  
does	  seem	  likely	  that	  he	  has	  spoken	  at	  conferences	  sponsored	  by	  the	  oil	  lobby,	  however.	  	  See,	  
for	  example:	  http://www.exxonsecrets.org/html/personfactsheet.php?id=421,	  accessed	  
October	  28,	  2012.	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opponents	  to	  CCH	  are	  “mixing	  up	  the	  present	  with	  the	  future	  (1006)”	  by	  citing	  
current	  or	  historical	  examples	  to	  contradict	  the	  models	  which	  are	  interested	  in	  
the	  future.	  
	  
The	  Science	  article	   finally	  notes	  the	  creation	  of	  various	  formal	  committees	  and	  
panels	  set	  up	  to	  resolve	  the	   issue.	   	  The	  US	  CDC	  and	  National	  Research	  Council	  
(NRC)	   established	   an	   expert	   panel	   to	   further	   examine	   the	   controversy,	   as	   did	  
the	  Pan-­‐American	  Health	  Organization	   (PAHO)	  and	  even	  NASA.3	  	  Despite	   such	  
interventions,	   the	   controversy	   persisted.	   	   A	   2001	   story	   appearing	   in	   EMBO	  
Reports	   offers	   further	  background	   (Brower,	   2001).	   	   This	   article	   cites	   an	   essay	  
published	   by	   Paul	   Epstein	   in	   Scientific	   American	   (Epstein,	   2000)	   in	   which	   he	  
discusses	   cases	   of	  malaria	   in	   the	   US,	   a	   resurgence	   of	  malaria	   in	   South	   Korea,	  
South	   Africa,	   Europe	   and	   even	   the	   former	   Soviet	   Union,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
resurgence	   of	   dengue	   in	   the	  Americas	   and	  Australia:	   “While	   he	   acknowledges	  
that	  these	  outbreaks	  could	  also	  be	  connected	  with	  a	  decline	  in	  mosquito	  control,	  
he	   sees	   global	   warming	   as	   the	   most	   likely	   source	   for	   the	   current	   spread	   of	  
vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  (Brower,	  2011:	  755)”.	  	  
	  
Similar	   to	   the	   Science	   article,	   the	   EMBO	   Reports	   article	   notes	   opposition	   to	  
Epstein’s	   ideas:	   “the	   proponents	   of	   climate	   change’s	   impact	   on	   these	   diseases	  
have	  not	  substantiated	  their	  claims	  with	  facts	  (Ibid.:	  755)”;	  their	  work	  “grossly	  
oversimplifies	   the	   issue	   (Ibid.:	   755)”.	   	   Paul	   Reiter	   suggests	   that	   there	   have	  
always	  been	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  in	  temperate	  areas,	  stating:	  “it	  is	  unfortunate	  
that	   public	   perception	   is	   distorted	   by	   people	   who	   know	   little	   about	   the	   field	  
(Ibid:	  756)”.	   	  Additionally,	  the	  point	  is	  made	  that	  even	  if	  climate	  change	  would	  
lend	   some	   areas	   more	   amenable	   for	   disease	   spread,	   “human	   behavioural	  
adaptations	   and	   public	   health	   interventions	   could	   mitigate	   many	   adverse	  
impacts	   (Ibid.:	   757)”.	   	   Along	   similar	   lines,	   CCH	   opponents	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
                                                
3	  Each	  of	  these	  panels	  offers	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  “institutional	  hybrids”	  discussed	  in	  3.3.3.	  	  
The	  final	  findings	  from	  the	  NRC	  committee	  were	  published	  a	  few	  years	  later	  in	  2001.	  	  The	  report	  
concludes	  that	  modelling	  studies	  must	  be	  interpreted	  cautiously	  and	  that	  the	  potential	  disease	  
impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  are	  uncertain,	  but	  it	  also	  calls	  for	  more	  (and	  ideally	  interdisciplinary)	  
research	  and	  enhanced	  surveillance	  incorporating	  climatic	  and	  non-­‐climatic	  factors	  (NRC,	  2001,	  
Epstein,	  2000).	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media	  coverage	  to	  be	  somewhat	  complacent	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  climate	  change.	  A	  
Washington	  Post	  story	  from	  2011	  cites	  Duane	  Gubler	  as	  saying:	  “I	  think	  it	  makes	  
more	  sense	  to	  use	  our	  money	  on	  research	  and	  public	  health	  than	  carbon	  trading	  
(Allen,	  2011)”.	  
	  
Thus	   some	   of	   the	   key	   battle-­‐lines	   have	   been	   drawn	   in	   the	   climate-­‐disease	  
controversy	  –	  a	  battle	  that	  has	  by	  now	  been	  fought	  in	  many	  theatres:	  the	  peer-­‐
review	   literature,	   conferences	   and	   workshops,	   the	   popular	   media,	   the	   IPCC.	  	  
Even	   a	   cursory	   examination	   of	   the	   highly	   quotable	   citations	   above	   reveals	  
instances	   of	   boundary	   work.	   	   This	   was	   further	   elaborated	   in	   an	   analysis	  
published	   in	   EcoHealth,	   a	   journal	   with	   close	   ties	   to	   the	   CCH	   community	  
(Brisbois	  and	  Ali,	  2010).4	  	  Brisbois	  and	  Harris	  Ali	   state	   that	   this	  article	  has	   its	  
roots	   in	   “a	  graduate	  student’s	  sense	  of	  unease	  with	   the	  extraordinarily	  heated	  
exchanges	   …	   and	   with	   the	   apparent	   absence	   of	   important	   political	  
considerations	   from	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate	   (Ibid.:	   2)”.	   	   In	   this	   study,	   the	  
authors	   identify	   four	   “proponents”	   of	   CCH	   research	   relating	   to	   vector-­‐borne	  
diseases.	   These	   are	   Tony	   McMichael	   and	   Andrew	   Haines	   of	   LSHTM;5	  Paul	  
Epstein	   from	   Harvard	   University;	   and	   Jonathan	   Patz	   from	   the	   University	   of	  
Wisconsin.	   	   They	   also	   identify	   four	   CCH	   “opponents”:	   	   David	   Rogers,	   Sarah	  
Randolph	  and	  Simon	  Hay,	  all	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Zoology	  at	  Oxford	  University,	  
and	  Paul	  Reiter,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	   formerly	  of	   the	  US	  CDC	  and	  currently	  at	  
the	  Pasteur	  Institute	  in	  Paris,	  France.	  	  	  
	  
Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   analyse	   the	   peer-­‐reviewed	   literature	   authored	   by	   the	  
proponents	  and	  opponents.	  	  The	  boundary	  work	  deployed	  by	  both	  “sides”	  of	  the	  
controversy	   is	   identified.	  The	   inter-­‐disciplinary	  nature	  of	  CCH	  research	  means	  
that	   it	   is	   best	   “described	   as	   a	   process	   of	   challenging	   existing	   disciplinary	  
frontiers	   (5;	   c.f.	   Frickel,	   2004)”.	   	   As	   the	  CCH	   community	   promotes	   their	  work	  
                                                
4	  EcoHealth	  was	  created	  as	  a	  merger	  of	  two	  former	  journals,	  Ecosystem	  Health,	  and	  Global	  
Change	  and	  Human	  Health.	  	  Currently,	  several	  members	  from	  the	  CCH	  community	  are	  involved	  
with	  the	  journal.	  Howard	  Frumkin	  and	  Tony	  McMichael	  are	  associate	  editors,	  Simon	  Hales	  is	  a	  
review	  editor,	  and	  Jan	  Semenza,	  Jonathan	  Patz	  and	  Pim	  Martens	  are	  Editorial	  Advisers.	  
http://www.ecohealth.net/whoweare_editorialboard.php,	  accessed	  August	  20,	  2011.	  
5 As	  noted	  earlier	  Tony	  McMichael	  eventually	  left	  LSHTM	  to	  return	  to	  Australia. 
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and	  the	  need	  for	   interdisciplinarity,	   their	  calls	   for	  pro-­‐active	  action	  to	  address	  
climate	   change	   establishes	   “the	   scientific	   consensus	   on	   climate	   science	   as	   a	  
frame	   within	   which	   VBD	   dynamics	   are	   interpreted	   as	   a	   symptom	   of	   climate	  
change	  (Brisbois	  and	  Ali,	  2010:	  5)”.	  	  On	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  controversy,	  the	  
authors	  note	  additional	  instances	  of	  CCH	  opponents	  describing	  CCH	  research	  as	  
“naive”	   and	   “simplistic”:	   “the	   language	   used	   by	   Reiter,	   Rogers,	   Randolph,	   and	  
Hay	  repeatedly	  downplays	  the	  scientific	  credibility	  of	  those	  proposing	  climate-­‐
VBD	  (vector-­‐borne	  disease)	  links	  (Ibid.:	  6)”.	  	  
	  
This	   boundary	  dispute,	   they	   suggest,	   validates	   the	   idea	   that	   climate	   change	   is	  
“serving	   as	   a	   collective	   action	   frame,	   within	   which	   VBDs	   are	   interpreted	   as	  
climate	   change	   impacts,	   and	   interdisciplinary	   research	   is	   highlighted	   as	   the	  
logical	   solution	   (Ibid.:	   8)”.	   Yet	   this,	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   speculate,	   is	   also	  
fuelling	   the	   controversy,	   for	   viewing	   VBDs	   as	   the	   products	   of	   climate	   change	  
creates	   a	   leadership	   role	   for	   the	   CCH	   community	   that	   its	   opponents	   resent.	  	  
Although	   this	   claim	   could	   have	   benefited	   from	   further	   substantiation,	   it	   is	  
certainly	  plausible	  that	  the	  “opponents”	  would	  not	  willingly	  yield	  leadership	  in	  
VBDs	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  research	  and	  public	  health	  action	  to	  the	  CCH	  community.	  	  	  
	  
Also	  at	  stake,	  according	  to	  Brisbois	  and	  Harris	  Ali,	   is	  the	  appropriate	  “scale”	  of	  
the	  issue.	  	  CCH	  proponents,	  they	  argue,	  tend	  to	  see	  the	  topic	  as	  a	  global	  problem,	  
whereas	  CCH	  opponents	  tend	  to	  see	  it	  as	  one	  with	  local	  solutions.	  	  Additionally,	  
consistent	  with	  the	  discussion	  from	  1.4,	  Brisbois	  and	  Harris	  Ali,	  note	  that	  GCMs	  
have	  led	  to	  the	  increasing	  global	  scaling	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  its	  impacts,	  and	  
suggest	   the	   climate	   impact	  modelling	   community,	   whether	   health,	   disease,	   or	  
otherwise,	  are	  “put	  into	  a	  lay	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  climate	  modelers…and	  a	  
scientific	  hierarchy	   is	  said	   to	  have	  emerged	  with	  climate	  modelers	  at	   top	  (8)”.	  
CCH	  opponents,	  notably	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph,	  are	  documented	  as	  critiquing	  the	  
validity	   and	   suitability	   of	   GCMs	   for	  modelling	   VBDs,	   and	   suggest	   instead	   that	  
good	   analyses	   should	   “’pass	   through’	   the	   R0	   equation	   from	   infectious	   disease	  
epidemiology	   (Ibid.:	   9)”.	   	   Yet,	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   fail	   to	   note	   that	   CCH	  
proponents	  also	  use	  the	  R0	  equation	  as	  a	  component	  in	  their	  models	  (4.3.1)	  or	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that	  they	  also	  view	  the	  solutions	  to	  CCH	  problems	  to	  be	  local	  (4.3).	  	  Identifying	  
GCMs	   as	   relevant	   for	   this	   controversy	   is	   nonetheless	   an	   interesting	   starting	  
point	   for	   further	   analysis	   as	   it	   begs	   the	   question:	  why	  would	   some	   scientists	  
studying	  VBDs	  be	  more	  happy	  to	  work	  with	  GCMs	  than	  others?	  	  	  
	  
The	   last	   part	   of	   their	   paper	   offers	   the	   vaguest	   of	   clues.	   	   In	   this	   section,	   it	   is	  
suggested	   that	   both	   opponents	   and	   proponents	   are	   naive	   with	   respect	   to	  
various	  aspects	  of	  globalisation.	  Paul	  Reiter,	  they	  suggest,	  is	  naive	  with	  regards	  
to	   the	   inequalities	   that	   globalisation	   creates	   and	   “implicitly	   accepts	   its	  
underlying	   ‘neoliberal’	   orthodoxy	   (Brisbois	  &	  Harris	   Ali,	   2010:	   10)”.	   Jonathan	  
Patz	   and	   some	   of	   his	   co-­‐authors,	  meanwhile,	   too	  willingly	   accept	   reductionist	  
climate	   models,	   which	   over-­‐emphasize	   climatic	   parameters	   and	   potentially	  
normalise	  “the	  ethically	  problematic	  economic	  world	  order	  (Ibid.:	  10)”.	  	  	  
	  
Essentially,	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   claim	   that	   both	   CCH	   proponents	   and	  
opponents	  are	  naive	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  power	  structures	   (with	   their	  roots	   in	  
colonialism,	   etc.)	   that	   influence	   global	   health.	   	   Unfortunately,	   this	   argument,	  
developed	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  ensuring	  that	  future	  iterations	  of	  this	  controversy	  
are	   “more	   self-­‐reflexive	   and	   politically	   aware	   (Ibid.:	   11)”,	   is	   neither	  
substantiated	  nor	  harnessed	  to	  further	  explain	  the	  controversy.	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  
a	   consequence	   of	   their	   decision	   to	   limit	   the	   analysis	   to	   the	   peer-­‐reviewed	  
literature,	   but	   it	   is	   more	   principally	   related	   to	   their	   source	   of	   theoretical	  
inspiration.	   	   Boundary	  work	   is	   useful	   for	   identifying	   and	   expressing	   the,	  well,	  
boundaries	  surrounding	  a	  given	  controversy,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  particularly	  insightful	  
with	  regards	  to	  its	  explanatory	  power.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  “collective	  action	  frames”	  
concept	  as	  described	  in	  this	  essay	  does	  not	  offer	  analytical	  insight.	  
	  
To	   summarise,	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   successfully	   identify	   some	   of	   the	   key	  
parameters	  driving	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  and	  they	  offer	  a	  starting	  point	  
for	   asking	   more	   in-­‐depth	   questions.	   	   How	   and	   why	   CCH	   research	   has	   been	  
conducted	   and	   contested?	   What	   are	   the	   related	   policy	   implications?	   What	  
deeper	   political	   commitments	   are	   embedded	   in	   adopting	   climate	   change	   as	   a	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“collective	  action	  frame”?	  However,	   in	  neglecting	  the	  broader	  contexts	  shaping	  
public	   health	   and	   ecologic	   research,	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   have	   themselves	  
developed	   an	   account	   demonstrating	   an	   “absence	   of	   important	   political	  
considerations	   (Ibid.:	   2)”.	   	  As	   they	   confess:	   “it	   is	   virtually	   certain	   that	   there	   is	  
more	  to	  the	  controversy	  than	  what	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  explain	  (Ibid.:	  10)”.	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   analyse	   with	   greater	   perspective	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	  
controversy	  has	  played	  out,	  	  it	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  detail	  as	  it	  specifically	  related	  
to	   three	   VBDs,	   malaria	   (4.3	   &	   4.4),	   dengue	   (4.5),	   and	   tick-­‐borne	   encephalitis	  
(TBE)	  (4.6).	  
 
4.3	  Debating	  climate-­‐malaria	  futures:	  biological	  vs.	  statistical	  approaches	  
 
Research	   focused	   on	   climate	   change	   and	   its	   current	   and	   potential	   impacts	   on	  
malaria	  transmission	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  key	  battle	  grounds	  of	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  
controversy.	  	  A	  detailed	  examination	  of	  this	  research	  is	  essential	  for	  analysing	  it.	  
In	  4.3.1,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  systems	  (or	  biological)	  modelling	  approach	  to	  
explore	  the	  relationships	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  malaria	  will	  be	  discussed.	  
In	  4.3.2,	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  statistical	  modelling,	  developed	  by	  some	  CCH	  
“opponents”,	   will	   be	   introduced	   while	   in	   4.3.3,	   the	   key	   points	   of	   contention	  
between	  these	  differing	  modelling	  approaches	  will	  be	  discussed.	  
 
4.3.1	  The	  Biological	  (systems)	  approach:	  The	  Martens	  malaria	  models	  
In	  1995,	  Pim	  Martens,	  Tony	  McMichael,	   and	  a	   few	  other	   co-­‐authors	  published	  
one	  of	  the	  early	  studies	  in	  the	  field,	  which	  presented	  a	  series	  of	  maps	  identifying	  
future	   global	   risk	   areas	   for	   Malaria	   based	   upon	   various	   climate	   change	  
scenarios	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1995b).	  	  The	  modelling	  work,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  
3,	  was	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  designed	  to	  influence	  public	  health	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
to	  draw	  attention	   to	   climate	   change	  as	   an	   issue	   relevant	   to	  public	  health.	  The	  
collaboration	  between	  McMichael	  and	  Martens	  was	  fuelled	  not	  only	  by	  a	  shared	  
set	  of	  commitments	  but	  also	  by	  opportunism:	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McMichael:	   I	   think	  he	   saw	   that	   I	  was	  an	  unusual	   sort	  of	   ally	  because	   I	  was	  a	  
senior	   figure	   in	   international	   epidemiology	   and	   somebody	   that	   …	   would	   be	  
interesting	  and	  useful	  to	  work	  with.	  	  From	  my	  part	  it	  was	  a	  nice	  opportunity	  to	  
actually	  find	  about	  scenario	  based	  modelling,	  which	  I	  had	  never	  done	  before.	  	  	  
	  
This	   type	   of	  modelling,	   the	   authors	   asserted,	   “seems	   to	   be	   the	   only	   approach	  
capable	   of	   adequately	   reflecting	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   interrelationships	  
between	   the	   climate	   system	   and	   mosquito	   and	   human	   population	   dynamics	  
(Martens	   et	   al.,	   1995:	   458)”.	   Using	   this	   approach,	   Martens	   and	   co-­‐authors	  
sought	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  “If	  other	  things	  were	  held	  constant	  in	  the	  world,	  
what	   would	   be	   the	   impact	   of	   climate	   change	   per	   se	   on	   the	   distribution	   and	  
incidence	  of	  malaria	  (Ibid.:	  458)?”	  The	  project	  was	  ambitious,	  as	  it	  attempted	  to	  
model	   the	  current	  and	   future	  global	   transmission	  of	   the	   two	  principal	  malaria	  
parasites,	  Plasmodium	  vivax	  and	  P.	  falciparum.	  	  
	  
The	   integrative	  modelling	  methodology	   is	  modular,	  with	  the	  outputs	   from	  one	  
module	  serving	  as	  the	  inputs	  for	  the	  next	  one.	  	  The	  modules	  included	  a	  climate	  
system,	   a	   malaria	   system	   (divided	   into	   a	   human	   subsystem	   and	   a	   mosquito	  
subsystem),	  and	  an	  impact	  system.	  	  Climatic	  variables,	  principally	  temperature	  
and	  precipitation,	  were	  said	  to	  impact	  the	  mosquito	  system.	  In	  turn,	  this	  system	  
interacted	   with	   the	   human	   system	   to	   determine	   transmission	   rates,	   and	   the	  
overall	   impact	  system	  calculates	  the	  public	  health	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  
malaria.	  	  	  
	  
The	  climate	  system	  
To	  model	  the	  climate	  system,	  the	  researchers	  employed	  a	  climatic	  dataset	  which	  
used	   the	   standardised	   temperature	   and	   precipitation	   outputs	   from	   a	   GCM	  
produced	  by	  the	  UK	  Meteorological	  Office.	  	  This	  GCM	  was	  based	  upon	  a	  climate	  
change	   scenario	   that	   projected	   a	   temperature	   increase	   beyond	   the	   IPCC	  
uncertainty	   range	   at	   the	   time	   (5.2°C	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   IPCC	   range	   1.5-­‐4.5°C).	  
The	  authors	  note	  that	  their	  “projected	  changes	  in	  malaria	  transmission	  will	  be	  
more	  pronounced	  (Ibid.:	  459)”	   than	   if	   the	  studies	  had	  used	  some	  other	  GCMs,	  
but	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  changes	  would	  not	  be	  overly	  significant.	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The	  malaria	  system:	  R0	  	  and	  “epidemic	  potential”	  
In	   the	   Martens	   model,	   the	   malaria	   system	   is	   based	   upon	   R0,	   the	   basic	  
reproduction	   rate,	   essential	   component	   to	   much	   epidemiologic	   modelling	   of	  
communicable	  diseases	  (e.g.	  Giesecke,	  2001).	  This	  rate	  measures	  the	  number	  of	  
secondary	   infections	   relating	   to	   one	   infection:	   “the	   average	   number	   of	  
secondary	  infections	  produced	  when	  one	  infected	  individual	  is	  introduced	  into	  
a	  host	  population	  where	  everyone	  is	  susceptible	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1995b:	  459)”.	  
Epidemiologic	   modelling	   theory	   suggests	   that	   where	   R0	   >1	   an	   infection	   will	  
continue	  to	  spread,	  but	  where	  R0	  <1	  it	  will	  die	  out.	  	  	  
	  
In	   this	   study,	   the	   authors	  were	  particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   climate-­‐sensitive	  
components	   driving	   R0	  and	   focused	   on	   vector	   density	   in	   particular.	   Although	  
they	  note	  that	  “it	  is	  impossible	  to	  estimate	  the	  change	  in	  vector	  abundance…as	  a	  
result	   of	   temperature,	   precipitation	   and	   humidity	   changes	   (Ibid.:	   459)”,	   the	  
authors	  suggest	  that	  R0	  	  allows	  for	  a	  calculation	  of	  the	  “critical	  density	  threshold	  
of	  hosts	  necessary	  to	  retain	  parasite	  transmission	  (Ibid.:	  459)”.	  They	  therefore	  
calculated	   malaria’s	   “epidemic	   potential”	   as	   a	   proxy	   variable	   for	   vector	  
abundance,	   which	   was	   defined	   as	   the	   reciprocal	   of	   the	   vector	   population’s	  
critical	   density.	   	   This	   was	   used	   to	   assess	   malaria	   risk	   under	   climate	   change	  
scenarios:	  	  
	  
A	  high	  epidemic	  potential	   indicates	   that	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  vectors	  or	  a	   less	  
potent	   vector	   population	   may	   maintain	   a	   state	   of	   endemicity	   or	   give	   rise	   to	  
occasional	  epidemics	  in	  a	  given	  area	  (Ibid.:	  460).	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   base	   modelling	   upon	   “epidemic	   potential”,	   biological	   thresholds	  
based	  upon	  temperature	  and	  precipitation	  were	  required	  as	  data	  inputs.6	  	  Based	  
upon	  a	  literature	  review,	  the	  former	  took	  the	  form	  of	  survival	  probabilities	  for	  
the	  mosquito	   vectors	   of	  malaria	   at	   different	   temperatures	   (9°,	   20°	   and	   40°C),	  
and	  the	  latter	  was	  a	  minimum	  rainfall	  threshold	  required	  for	  mosquito	  survival	  
                                                
6	  Martens	  et	  al.	  (1995:	  460)	  argue	  that	  “the	  distribution	  and	  population	  dynamics	  of	  malaria	  are	  
probably	  more	  governed	  by	  abiotic	  than	  biotic	  factors”,	  of	  which	  temperature	  and	  rainfall	  are	  
the	  most	  important.	  These	  were	  therefore	  the	  two	  variables	  for	  which	  thresholds	  were	  sought.	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and	  thus	  malaria	  transmission	  (an	  average	  of	  1.5mm	  per	  day),	  thereby	  enabling	  
the	   authors	   to	   exclude	   excessively	   dry	   regions	   from	   their	   model.	   	   Finally,	  
although	   they	   concede	   that	   heavy	   rainfalls	   can	   flush	   out	  mosquito	   larvae	   and	  
have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  malaria	  transmission,	  the	  authors	  do	  not	  incorporate	  
a	  maximum	  precipitation	  level	  into	  the	  model.	  	  	  
	  
The	  impact	  system	  
To	  model	  the	  human	  subsystem	  and	  overall	  impact	  system,	  the	  authors	  use	  UN	  
population	  projections	  to	  assess	  the	  current	  and	  future	  populations	   in	  malaria	  
risk-­‐zones,	  according	  to	  two	  age	  classes,	  0-­‐4	  years	  of	  age	  and	  5	  years	  and	  older.	  
This	  population	  was	   then	   further	  stratified	  according	   to	   three	  categories	   from	  
another	   classic	   epidemiological	   model:	   the	   susceptible-­‐infected-­‐immune	  
epidemic	   model.7	  Once	   infected,	   the	   authors	   assume	   that	   individuals	   run	   a	  
“standard	   (Martens	   et	   al.,	   1995b:	   461)”	   risk	   of	   contracting	   the	   disease,	   since	  
“the	   general	   level	   of	   prophylaxis	   is,	   and	   probably	   will	   remain,	   low	   in	   the	  
populations	   concerned	   (Ibid.:	   461;	   emphasis	   added)”.	   Finally,	   to	   consider	   the	  
differing	   levels	   of	   population	   immunity	   between	   endemic	   and	   non-­‐endemic	  
malaria	   regions,	   the	   authors	   also	   attempted	   to	   measure	   the	   overall	   health	  
impact	  according	  to	  the	  disability-­‐adjusted	  life	  years	  (DALY)	  metric.8	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  from	  the	  systems	  models	  
Thus	   having	   established	   the	   model	   and	   its	   data	   sources	   and	   parameters,	  
Martens	  et	  al.	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  maps	  for	  the	  baseline	  year	  1990	  and	  for	  the	  
year	  2100	  under	  two	  different	  climate	  change	  scenarios,	  the	  IPCC	  business-­‐as-­‐
                                                
7	  The	  similar	  SIR	  (susceptible-­‐infected-­‐recovered)	  model	  suggests	  that	  the	  transition	  of	  patients	  
between	  these	  three	  states	  ultimately	  influences	  and	  determines	  the	  course	  of	  an	  infectious	  
disease	  outbreak	  (e.g.	  Cooke,	  1979).	  
8	  DALY	  is	  a	  common	  measure	  used	  in	  health	  impact	  assessments	  or,	  more	  common	  in	  the	  public	  
health	  discourse,	  the	  burden	  of	  disease.	  The	  basic	  premise	  is	  that	  the	  more	  severe	  a	  disease	  and	  
the	  longer	  a	  patient	  suffers	  from	  it,	  the	  higher	  the	  DALY.	  However,	  aside	  from	  the	  many	  
assumptions	  surrounding	  various	  epidemiologic	  data	  that	  are	  required	  to	  calculate	  DALYs,	  the	  
usage	  of	  disability	  weights	  (0.6	  for	  malaria	  in	  this	  study)	  and	  age	  weights	  requires	  assumptions	  
about	  a	  “normal”	  population.	  Some	  controversy	  has	  surrounded	  this	  practice,	  such	  as	  that	  it	  has	  
been	  observed	  to	  be	  value-­‐laden.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Anand	  &	  Hanson	  (1997).	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usual	  (BaU)	  and	  advanced	  policies	  (AP)	  scenarios.9	  	  	  The	  models	  for	  2100	  assess	  
future	  risk	  by	  means	  of	  a	  ratio	  relating	  future	  “epidemic	  potential”	  to	  a	  baseline	  
“epidemic	   potential”	   calculated	   for	   1990.	   They	   argue	   that	   their	   1990	   models	  
generally	   agree	   with	   the	   global	   distribution	   of	   malaria	   as	   it	   was	   “before	   the	  
introduction	  of	   large-­‐scale	   antimalaria	   campaigns	   (Ibid.:	   461)”.	   	  That	   is	   to	   say	  
that	   the	   1990	  models	   for	  P.	  Vivax	   indicated	   potential	  malaria	   transmission	   in	  
much	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  southern	  Russia,	  central	  Europe	  and	  Japan:	  endemic	  
malaria	  was	  not	  present	   in	  these	  areas	   in	  1990,	  but	  their	  assessment	  suggests	  
that	  climatic	  factors	  were	  suitable	  for	  malaria	  transmission	  at	  that	  time.	  Thus,	  in	  
their	   models,	   the	   authors	   have	   not	   accounted	   for	   public	   health	   measures	   or	  
broader	  socio-­‐economic	  factors	  that	  mitigate	  malaria	  transmission.10	  	  
	  
The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  “an	  expansion	  of	  the	  geographic	  areas	  susceptible	  to	  
malaria	  transmission	  and	  a	  widespread	  increase	  of	  potential	  malaria	  risk	  are	  to	  
be	   expected	  as	   climate	   changes	   (Ibid.:	   462)”.	   	   Their	   analysis	   suggests	   that	   the	  
epidemic	   potential	   of	   the	   mosquito	   populations	   that	   carry	   malaria	   could	  
increase	   twofold	   in	   tropical	   regions	   and	   up	   to	   100-­‐fold	   in	   temperate	   regions.	  	  
Noting	   that	   “the	   highest	   risks	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   malaria	   remain	   in	   the	  
nonendemic	   regions	   bordering	   on	   malarial	   areas	   (Ibid.:	   462)”,	   the	   authors	  
highlight	   the	   high	   altitude	   areas	   such	   as	   East	   Africa	   or	   the	   Andes,	   where	  
temperature	   increases	  could	  help	  currently	  nonmalarial	   regions	  become	  areas	  
with	   seasonal	   epidemics.	   	   This	   conclusion,	   however,	   incorporates	   an	  
assumption	  about	  the	  future	  ability	  of	  these	  areas	  to	  cope	  with	  climate	  change:	  	  
	  
Given	   that	   resources	   are	   insufficient	   to	   deal	   adequately	   with	   malaria	   in	   the	  
most	   affected	   regions,	   increased	   risk	   of	   malaria	   due	   to	   climate	   change	   may	  
seriously	  affect	  human	  health	  in	  the	  next	  century	  (Ibid.:	  463).	  
	  
                                                
9	  The	  advanced	  policy	  scenario	  refers	  to	  greater	  government	  policies	  towards	  reducing	  
greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  than	  the	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  scenario.	  	  
10	  The	  authors	  do	  note	  that	  “the	  simulation	  of	  future	  risk	  areas	  must	  be	  interpreted	  to	  take	  
account	  of	  local	  conditions	  and	  developments	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1995b:	  461)”	  –	  but	  such	  
conditions	  were	  not	  incorporated	  into	  their	  models	  or	  conclusions.	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The	  authors	  also	   identify	   the	  temperate	  regions	  of	  Australia,	   the	  United	  States	  
and	  southern	  Europe,	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “real	  risk	  of	  reintroducing	  malaria	  
into	  nonmalarial	  areas	  (Ibid.:	  463)”.	  	  	  
	  
Refining	  the	  model	  methodologies	  and	  outputs	  
Martens	   and	   various	   constellations	   of	   co-­‐authors	   would	   continue	   to	   reiterate	  
and	   refine	   models	   presenting	   the	   relationships	   between	   malaria	   and	   climate	  
change	  through	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  1990s,	   including	  one	  highly	  visible	  study	  
published	   in	   1999	   (Martens	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   In	   this	   study,	   Martens	   and	   his	  
collaborators,	  again	   including	  Tony	  McMichael,	  employed	  a	  more	  recent	  set	  of	  
GCMs,	  the	  HadCM2	  and	  HadCM3	  models.11	  As	  with	  the	  previous	  Martens	  papers,	  
the	   uncertainties	   and	   underlying	   assumptions	   behind	   these	   GCMs	   are	   not	  
described;	   instead,	   readers	   are	   advised	   to	   seek	   the	   original	   publication	  
describing	  them,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  the	  same	  supplemental	  issue	  of	  Global	  
Environmental	  Change	  (Hulme	   et	   al.,	   1999).12	  	   Updated	   population	   projections	  
were	  also	  used	  by	  Martens	  et	  al.	  in	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  additional	  number	  of	  
people	  at	  risk	  from	  malaria	  caused	  by	  the	  two	  principle	  parasites,	  P.	  falciparum	  
and	  P.	  vivax.13	  	  
	  
The	  authors	  claim	  that	  the	  new	  findings	  were	  based	  upon	  an	  “improved	  model	  
(Martens	  et	  al.,	  1999:	  S90)”.	  	  As	  in	  their	  previous	  model,	  this	  model	  explicitly	  did	  
                                                
11	  These	  models	  were	  designed	  to	  enable	  climate	  change	  impact	  modelling	  at	  several	  different	  
time	  slices:	  a	  baseline	  period	  for	  1990	  (the	  mean	  1961-­‐1990	  climate),	  2020,	  2050	  and	  2080.	  	  
Martens	  et	  al.	  limit	  their	  description	  of	  the	  models	  to	  mentioning	  that	  four	  different	  simulations	  
of	  the	  HadCM2	  models	  were	  used,	  each	  “leading	  to	  four	  subtly	  different	  climate	  futures	  (S95)”.	  
The	  HadCM3	  is	  described	  as	  being	  more	  recent	  than	  HadCM2,	  “un-­‐flux-­‐corrected	  (S95)”	  and,	  
like	  HadCM2,	  a	  model	  that	  assumes	  “greenhouse-­‐gas-­‐only	  forcings	  (S95)”.	  Four	  different	  
HadCM2	  simulations	  are	  used,	  as:	  “the	  range	  of	  difference	  between	  the	  ensemble	  members	  gives	  
an	  estimate	  of	  the	  natural	  variability	  present	  within	  the	  forcing	  scenario”.	  
12	  The	  HadCM2	  and	  HadCM3	  models	  were	  based	  upon	  the	  assumption	  of	  1%	  per	  annum	  growth	  
in	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentration,	  and	  the	  IPCC	  range	  was	  0.5%	  -­‐	  1.1%.	  Hulme	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  
write:	  “if	  a	  forcing	  scenario	  of	  only	  0.5%	  per	  annum	  growth	  had	  been	  used	  to	  create	  our	  climate	  
scenarios,	  the	  global	  warming	  would	  have	  been	  between	  30	  and	  40%	  less	  than	  simulated	  for	  
our	  scenarios	  (S16)”.	  However,	  they	  also	  suggest	  that	  this	  would	  have	  been	  compensated	  by	  not	  
considering	  the	  effects	  of	  sulphate	  aerosols	  in	  the	  modelling.	  
13	  These	  population	  projections	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  projections	  that	  informed	  the	  HadCM2	  
and	  HadCM3	  climate	  models.	  The	  projections	  were	  for	  total	  global	  population	  of	  8.1	  billion	  in	  
2020,	  9.8	  billion	  in	  2050,	  and	  10.7	  billion	  in	  2080.	  These	  were	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  mid-­‐range	  
estimates	  of	  global	  population	  growth.	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not	  model	   the	   future	  distribution	  of	  malaria’s	  mosquito	  vectors	  under	  climate	  
change	   scenarios,	   but	   in	   this	   one	   they	   did	   incorporate	   contemporary	  
“continental-­‐scale	   (Ibid.:	   S90)”	   estimates	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  malaria’s	  main	  
vectors	  into	  the	  modelling.	  Other	  improvements	  that	  the	  authors	  point	  out	  are	  
“species-­‐specific	   relationships	   between	   temperature	   and	   transmission	  
dynamics	   (Ibid.:	   S90)”	   and	   a	   “more	   realistic	   approach	   regarding	   malaria	  
endemicity	   (Ibid.:	   S90)”	   for	   calculating	   future	   population	   risks	   of	   malaria.	  	  
Perhaps	   most	   noteworthy	   is	   the	   replacement	   of	   the	   concept	   “epidemic	  
potential”	  with	  “transmission	  potential”.	  As	  the	  authors	  explained:	  
	  
The	  transmission	  potential	  of	  malaria	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  reciprocal	  of	  the	  vector	  
density	  threshold.	  In	  previous	  assessments,	  TP	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  epidemic	  
potential	   (EP).	   However,	   this	   term	   (EP)	   did	   not	   correctly	   describe	   the	  
epidemiology	   of	   malaria	   because	   higher	   malaria	   transmission	   intensity	   does	  
not	  necessarily	  mean	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  epidemics	  (Ibid.:	  S92).	  
	  
As	  was	  also	  the	  case	  for	  epidemic	  potential,	  TP	  is	  calculated	  based	  a	  complicated	  
formula	   incorporating	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   parameters	   taken	   from	   the	   published	  
literature	   (from	   both	   field	   and	   laboratory	   experiments)	   such	   as	   the	   human	  
biting	  rate	  by	  mosquitoes,	  human	  susceptibility	  to	  infection	  via	  mosquito	  bites,	  
mosquito	   susceptibility	   to	   infection	   after	   biting	   an	   infectious	   person,	   daily	  
survival	  probability	  of	  mosquitoes,	  the	  incubation	  period	  of	  the	  parasite	  inside	  
the	  mosquito	  and	  the	  minimum	  and	  maximum	  temperature	  thresholds	  for	  such	  
parasite	  development	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1999:	  Table	  1).	  
	  
As	  in	  the	  1995	  models,	  the	  authors	  also	  attempted	  to	  assess	  the	  potential	  future	  
burden	  of	  malaria,	  based	  upon	  the	  relative	  change	  of	  TP	  from	  the	  baseline	  to	  the	  
future	  climate	  scenarios	  and,	  this	  time,	  by	  assessing	  the	  additional	  population	  at	  
risk	  of	  malaria	  under	  climate	  scenarios	  and	  according	   to	   the	   length	  of	  malaria	  
transmission.	  The	  population	  at-­‐risk	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  total	  population	  “living	  
in	  an	  area	  where	  conditions	  are	  suitable	  for	  malaria	  transmission	  (Ibid.:	  S99)”.	  	  
This	  was	  despite	  a	  caveat	   that	   “not	  everyone	  classified	  as	  at	   risk	   is	  actually	  at	  
risk	   (Ibid.:	   S99)”	   because	   the	   risk	   is	   ultimately	  modulated	   by	   socio-­‐economic	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circumstances	  and	  different	  for	  those	  living	  in	  cities	  or	  rural	  areas.	  	  Estimates	  of	  
the	   global	   distribution	   of	   malaria’s	   mosquito	   vectors	   were	   used	   as	   a	   limiting	  
factor	   for	   malaria	   transmission.14	  The	   authors	   calculated	   that	   roughly	   300	  
million	   people	   would	   be	   at	   risk	   of	   P.	   Falciparum	   malaria	   in	   2080	   under	   the	  
HadCM3	   model	   (between	   260	   –	   320	   million	   with	   HadCM2	   data),	   and	   150	  
million	   (between	  100-­‐200	  million	  with	  HadCM2)	   at	   risk	   of	  P.	  vivax	  malaria	   in	  
2080.15 	  The	   results	   were	   summarised	   in	   a	   series	   of	   maps	   identifying	   the	  
projected	  current	  and	  future	  global	  distribution	  limits	  of	  malaria	  (Figure	  2).	  
	  
 
Figure	  2.	  The	  Martens	  malaria	  models	  
The	  shading	  represents	  the	  number	  of	  months	  of	  malaria	  transmission,	  where	  a)	   is	   the	  time	  period	  
1961-­‐1990	  and	  b)	  is	  the	  2080s.16	  	  
                                                
14	  The	  authors	  note	  that	  previous	  estimates	  were	  higher	  where	  they	  did	  not	  limit	  the	  results	  by	  
vector	  distribution:	  “Obviously,	  the	  additional	  number	  of	  people	  at	  malaria	  risk	  is	  higher	  when	  
the	  absence	  of	  the	  vector	  is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  limitation	  for	  transmission	  (S102)”.	  
15	  These	  populations	  were	  then	  divided	  into	  three	  risk	  categories.	  	  Areas	  with	  low	  TP	  value	  for	  
three	  or	  less	  than	  three	  consecutive	  months	  per	  year	  were	  allotted	  to	  the	  “risk	  of	  epidemics”	  
group;	  the	  “seasonal	  transmission”	  group	  was	  assigned	  to	  those	  where	  TP>0	  for	  more	  than	  
three	  but	  less	  than	  seven	  consecutive	  months	  per	  year,;	  and	  the	  ”year-­‐round	  transmission”	  
group	  was	  assigned	  where	  TP>0	  for	  seven	  or	  more	  consecutive	  months	  per	  year.	  
16	  The	  figure	  is	  available	  from	  IPCC.	  	  The	  caption	  for	  the	  figure,	  as	  presented	  in	  IPCC	  TAR	  (to	  be	  
discussed	  in	  5.3.3)	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  “Potential	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  seasonal	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Despite	   all	   of	   the	   modifications	   to	   the	   model,	   the	   overall	   conclusions	   do	   not	  
dramatically	  differ	  from	  the	  earlier	  model:	  	  
	   	  
It	   is	   anticipated	   that	   climate	   change	  will	   affect	   the	   seasonal	   transmission	   and	  
geographical	   distribution	   of	  malaria.	   	   At	   the	   borders	   of	  malaria	   transmission,	  
the	   modelled	   changes	   in	   average	   length	   of	   the	   transmission	   season	   may	   be	  
important	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1999:	  S103).	  
	  
This	   conclusion,	   accompanied	   with	   the	   disclaimer	   that	   findings	   are	   not	  
“predictions	   of	   the	   future	   (Ibid.:	   S105)”	   but	   rather	   “trajectories	   of	   possible	  
changes	   in	  malaria	  risk	  (Ibid.:	  S105)”,	  once	  again	   identifies	   two	  principal	   “risk	  
zones”	   for	   future	   malaria	   transmission.	   One	   is	   temperate	   areas,	   including	  
Europe,	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  summer	  months,	  where	  they	  
note	  that	  the	  vector	  is	  present,	  the	  climatic	  conditions	  are	  permissive	  of	  malaria	  
transmission,	  and	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  malaria-­‐infected	  travellers	  visit	  or	  
return	  to	  these	  areas.	  Although	  they	  argue	  that	  these	  areas	  are	  unlikely	  to	  turn	  
endemic,	   they	   argue	   that	   climate	   change	   could	   increase	   the	   risk	   of	   sporadic	  
malaria	   transmission.	   They	   furthermore	   note	   that	   Azerbaijan,	   Tajikistan	   and	  
Turkey	   returned	   to	   a	   state	   of	  malaria	   endemicity	   coinciding	  with	   a	   decline	   in	  
public	   health	   infrastructures,	   which	   “illustrates	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   these	  
(temperate)	  regions	  (Ibid.:	  S105)”.	  
	  
High-­‐altitude	   areas,	   particularly	   in	   east	   Africa,	   again	   constitute	   the	   other	   key	  
risk	   area.	   Claiming	   that	   malaria	   had	   been	   a	   growing	   problem	   in	   the	   African	  
highlands	   in	   recent	   years,	   the	   authors	   note	   that	   this	   was	   “probably	   due	   to	   a	  
decline	   in	   the	   control	   and	   treatment	   of	   malaria	   (Ibid.:	   S104)”	   but	   provide	   a	  
central	  role	  for	  climate	  change	  in	  their	  account:	  
	  
                                                                                                                                     
transmission	  of	  falciparum	  malaria.	  Output	  from	  MIASMA	  v2.0	  malaria	  model	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  
1999)	  indicates	  the	  number	  of	  months	  per	  year	  when	  climate	  conditions	  are	  suitable	  for	  
falciparum	  transmission	  and	  where	  there	  is	  competent	  mosquito	  vector:	  (a)	  months	  of	  potential	  
transmission	  under	  current	  climate	  (1961-­‐1990);	  (b)	  months	  of	  potential	  transmission	  under	  a	  
GHG-­‐only	  climate	  scenario	  (HadCM2	  ensemble	  mean)	  in	  the	  2080s.	  Future	  changes	  in	  mosquito	  
distributions	  are	  not	  modelled.	  This	  model	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  control	  or	  eradication	  
activities	  that	  have	  significantly	  limited	  the	  distribution	  of	  malaria”.	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/,	  accessed	  February	  28,	  2012.	  
 135 
Whilst	   inadequate	   health	   care	  makes	   communities	   vulnerable	   to	  malaria,	   the	  
factors	  which	  precipitate	  epidemics	  are	  often	  climatic	  in	  origin,	  including	  sharp	  
increases	   in	  rainfall,	   temperature	  and	  humidity.	   	   It	   seems	   likely	   that	  epidemic	  
prone	   areas	   are	   those	   which	   experience	   marked	   differences	   in	   interannual	  
climate	   and	   where	   the	   thresholds	   required	   for	   malaria	   transmission	   are	  
exceeded	  every	  few	  years	  (Ibid.:	  S105).	  
	  
The	   authors	   concede	   that	   their	   models	   did	   not	   account	   for	   future	   adaptive	  
measures	   that	   risk	   areas	  might	   undertake,	  which	   could	   prevent	  malaria	   from	  
becoming	   a	   major	   problem,	   but	   as	   concerns	   eastern	   Africa	   particularly,	   they	  
argue	  that	  “many	  of	  the	  current	  technical,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  barriers	  
to	   successful	   prevention	   and	   control	  will	   also	   apply	   in	   the	   future	   (Ibid.:	   S105;	  
emphasis	  added)”.	  	  	  	  
	  
Summary:	  On	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  Martens	  malaria	  models	  
The	  production	  of	  the	  malaria	  models	  described	  above	  involves	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
complicated	  mathematical	   formulas	  and	  data	   inputs.	  An	   impressive	  number	  of	  
choices	   need	   to	   be	  made	   in	   producing	   these	  models,	   including:	  which	   climate	  
change	   models	   and	   scenarios	   to	   use;	   whether	   to	   model	   at	   the	   regional,	  
continental	   or	   global	   level;	   which	   population	   projections	   to	   use;	   whether	   to	  
model	   R0	   directly	   or	   to	   develop	   a	   formula	   for	   epidemic	   or	   transmission	  
potential;	  which	   biological	   parameters	   to	   use	   to	   inform	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	  
transmission	  or	  epidemic	  potential;	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  include	  projections	  of	  the	  
distribution	   of	   vectors	   as	   a	  model	   input;	   how	   to	   classify	   a	   population	   at-­‐risk;	  
whether	  to	  model	  future	  adaptive	  measures	  or	  public	  health	  capacities;	  and	  so	  
on.	  	  	  
	  
Many	  of	   these	  choices	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   inherent	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  
them.	  There	   are,	   additionally,	  many	   value-­‐laden	   judgments,	   notably	   about	   the	  
respective	   ability	   of	   nations	   to	   tackle	  malaria	   in	   the	   future,	   based	   upon	   their	  
socioeconomic	   circumstances	  and	   future	  public	  health	   capabilities,	   in	  addition	  
to	   the	  many	   socio-­‐economic	   assumptions	   already	   incorporated	   in	  GCMs	   (1.4).	  	  
Consequently,	  the	  malaria	  models	  described	  above	  are	  as	  much	  a	  product	  of	  the	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judgements	  and	  commitments	  of	  the	  scientists	  that	  created	  them	  as	  they	  are	  a	  
product	   of	   mathematical	   or	   biological	   reasoning.	   	   In	   their	   production	   and	  
uptake,	  climate-­‐malaria	  models	  stabilise	  and	  are	  stabilised	  by	  these	  underlying	  
judgements	  and	  commitments,	  producing	  one	  set	  of	  climate-­‐malaria	   futures	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  potentially	  different	  ones.	  	  	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	  Martens	  malaria	  models	   outputs	  were	   being	   incorporated	   into	   the	  
3rd	  IPCC	  Assessment	  Report	  in	  2001	  (to	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  5.3.3),	  thereby	  
gaining	   an	   even	   higher	   degree	   of	   visibility,	   a	   group	   of	   ecologists	   from	  Oxford	  
University	   had	   started	   to	  worry	   that	   the	  Martens	  models	  were	   fast	   becoming	  
not	   only	   the	   orthodox	   set	   of	   climate-­‐malaria	   futures	   but	   of	   climate-­‐health	  
futures	  more	  generally.	   	  They	  began	  to	  resent	  this	  attention	  and	  decided	  to	  do	  
their	  own	  set	  of	  models:	  
	  
Jonathan:	  Was	   this	   [the	   popularity	   of	   the	  Martens	  model]	   part	   of	   the	   reason	  
why	  you	  embarked	  on	  the	  projects…?	  
	  
R4:	   	   Absolutely…	   for	   about	   the	   five	   years	   before	   that	   we	   were	   getting	  
increasingly	   irritated	   about	   Pim	   Martens	   producing	   these	   models	   and	   quite	  
frankly	  reproducing	  them	  multiple	  times.	  So	  he	  got	  lots	  and	  lots	  of	  publications	  
all	  saying	  the	  same	  thing	  in	  multiple	  journals	  and	  the	  more	  these	  came	  out	  the	  
more	  frustrated	  we	  got.	  
	  
One	  of	   their	  main	  concerns	  was	   that	   the	  vision	  of	   the	   future	  embedded	   in	   the	  
Martens	  models	  would	  become	  dominant:	  
	  
R17:	  …	  the	  papers	  that	  were	  published	  [by	  Martens	  et	  al.]	  predicting	  the	  spread	  
of	  malaria,	  predicting	  those	  predicting	  maps	  that	  were	  based,	  we	  would	  argue,	  
on	  the	  wrong	  method...And	  they	  were	  very	  dramatic	  and	  they	  were	  repeated	  in	  
many,	  many	  publications	  …	  they	  have	  left	  a	  lasting	  legacy	  of	  a	  mindset…that	  is	  
hard	  to	  shake.	  	  
	  
Shaking	  this	  mindset,	  however,	  is	  exactly	  what	  they	  attempted	  to	  do.	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4.3.2	  Statistical	  approaches:	  The	  Rogers/Randolph	  models	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  visible	  and	  influential	  rebukes	  of	  CCH	  research	  was	  published	  
by	  David	  Rogers	  and	  Sarah	  Randolph	  of	  Oxford	  University	  in	  the	  journal	  Science	  
(Rogers	   and	   Randolph,	   2000).	   	   The	   Martens	   malaria	   maps,	   they	   argued,	  
produced	  “noticeable	  mismatches	  (Ibid.:	  1763)”	  to	  known	  malaria	  distribution,	  
including	   false-­‐positives	   in	   the	   United	   States	   as	   well	   as	   false	   predictions	   of	  
absence.	   They	   suggested	   this	  was	   because	   these	  models	   could	  not	   adequately	  
account	  for	  vector	  abundance:	  “The	  trouble…is	  the	  single	  biggest	  variable	  is	   in	  
fact	  vector	  abundance,	  and	  it's	  the	  one	  thing	  we	  have	  no	  model	  on	  (R17)”.	  Thus	  
malaria	  cannot	  be	  modelled	  “satisfactorily	  because	  crucial	  parameters	  and	  their	  
relations	  with	  environmental	  factors	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  quantified	  (Rogers	  and	  
Randolph,	  2000:	  1763)”.	  	  
	  
Another	   important	   critique	   focused	   on	   the	   use	   of	   R0	   in	   malaria	   modelling.	  
Rogers	  and	  Randolph	  (2000)	  argue	  that	  when	  predicting	  malaria	  transmission	  
based	  upon	  R0,	  “absolute,	  not	  relative,	  estimates	  of	  all	  quantities	  in	  the	  equation	  
are	  needed	  (Ibid.:	  1763)”.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  point	  that	  CCH	  opponents	  would	  raise	  often:	  
	  
R4:	  …	  R0	  has	  got	  to	  be	  above	  one	  which	  means	  that	  one	  case	  at	  the	  present	  time	  
gives	  rise	  to	  more	  than	  one	  case	  in	  the	  future.	  That	  is	  the	  condition	  for	  malaria	  
to	  exist	  anywhere	  in	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future...	  
	  
…	  all	  that	  Martens’	  models	  are	  saying	  is	  in	  a	  globally	  warm	  future	  each	  malaria	  
case	   will	   give	   rise	   to	   0.1	   cases	   in	   the	   future	   rather	   than	   0.01	   cases	   or	   0.001	  
cases.	  But	  …	  the	  R0	  of	  0.1	  …	  is	  still	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  1.	  So	  however	  much	  
the	  proportionate	   increase	   is	   it	  doesn’t	   increase	  above	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  1	  
and	  therefore	  there	  will	  be	  no	  malaria	  in	  arctic	  Russia	  until	  the	  absolute	  value	  is	  
above	   1	   ...	   And	  Martens	   completely	  missed	   this	   in	   his	   original	   papers	   –	   or	   he	  
chose	  to	  ignore	  it	  –	  and	  it	  generated	  a	  lot	  of	  publicity	  to	  say	  that	  so	  many	  tens	  of	  
millions	   of	   people	  would	   be	   at	   risk	   of	  malaria	   in	   the	   future	   that	   aren’t	   at	   the	  
moment,	  including	  many	  arctic	  Russians.	  And	  all	  that	  was	  complete	  nonsense.	  
	  
Following	  this	  logic,	  comparing	  present	  with	  future	  ratios	  of	  epidemic	  potential	  
or	   transmission	   potential	   to	   assess	   future	   malarial	   transmission	   is	   “an	  
inappropriate	   measure	   of	   changing	   risk	   because	   a	   high	   ratio	   may	   still	   leave	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R0	  <	  0	  (Ibid.:	  1763)”.	  In	  some	  areas	  where	  Martens	  had	  projected	  an	  increase	  in	  
risk,	  the	  Oxford	  researchers	  would	  have	  projected	  the	  opposite.	  
	  
The	  statistical	  modelling	  methodology	  
The	   models	   produced	   by	   Rogers	   and	   Randolph	   (2000)	   are	   based	   upon	   a	  
statistical	  modelling	  approach,	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	  biological/systems	  approach	  
followed	   by	   Martens	   and	   his	   collaborators.	   	   Statistical	   modelling	   involves	  
modelling	   the	   then	   present-­‐day	   global	   malaria	   distribution	   to	   assess	   the	  
“climatic	   constraints	   (Ibid.:	   1764)”	   influencing	   the	   global	   transmission	   of	  
malaria.	   The	   results	   were	   then	   used	   in	   combination	   with	   a	   few	   different	  
scenarios	   from	   the	   HadCM2	   GCMs	   (also	   used	   by	   the	   biological	   modellers)	   to	  
predict	  the	  future	  distribution	  of	  malaria.	  	  
	  
The	  Rogers-­‐Randolph	  malaria	  models	  were	  based	  upon	  the	  minimum,	  mean	  and	  
maximum	  values	   from	   three	   climate	   variables:	   temperature,	   precipitation	   and	  
humidity	  (vapour	  pressure).	  A	  complicated	  set	  of	  procedures	  modelled	  random	  
selections	  of	  1500	  data	  points	  inside	  (“presence”)	  and	  1500	  data	  points	  outside	  
(“absence”)	   of	   malaria’s	   recorded	   geographical	   distribution	   with	   Fourier-­‐
processed	  climate	  data.17	  	  The	  result	  is	  a	  series	  of	  data	  clusters	  for	  the	  presence	  
and	  absence	  points;	   the	  authors	   suggest	   that	   “clustering	  essentially	   allows	   for	  
nonlinear	   responses	   of	   biological	   systems	   to	   gradual	   changes	   in	   climatic	  
variables	   (Rogers	   &	   Randolph,	   2000:	   note	   16)”.	   The	   data	   clusters	   then	  
underwent	   discriminant	   analysis	   to	   identify	   the	   climatic	   conditions	   most	  
significant	   for	   determining	   malaria	   presence	   and	   absence.18	  These	   variables	  
were	  then	  used	  to	  map	  globally	  the	  predicted	  presence	  and	  absence	  of	  malaria	  
based	  on	  current	  and	  future	  climate.	  
	  
                                                
17	  Fourier	  processing	  of	  global	  climate	  data	  involves	  ”smoothing”	  the	  data	  from	  a	  long	  time-­‐
series	  so	  that	  specific	  variables,	  such	  as	  mean	  minimum	  or	  maximum	  temperature,	  can	  be	  
extracted	  and	  applied	  to	  statistical	  modelling.	  The	  method	  has	  been	  described	  in	  detail	  by	  
Rogers,	  Hay	  &	  Packer	  (1996).	  	  
18	  The	  approach	  adopted	  by	  David	  Rogers	  has	  evolved	  into	  non-­‐linear	  discriminant	  analysis.	  	  In	  
both	  approaches,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  variables	  consistently	  influence	  the	  presence	  of	  
absence	  of	  the	  outcome	  (e.g.	  of	  vectors,	  or	  of	  disease).	  	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  topic	  see	  Rogers	  
(2006).	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Modest	  returns:	  findings	  from	  the	  statistical	  models	  
Rogers	   and	   Randolph	   (2000:	   1765)	   report	   that	   “only	   a	   relatively	   small	  
extension”	   of	  malaria	  would	   occur	   in	   the	   future.	  Under	   the	  HadCM2	  medium-­‐
high	   scenario,	   23	   million	   additional	   people	   would	   be	   at-­‐risk,	   but	   under	   the	  
HadCM2	  high	  scenario,	  25	  million	  fewer	  people	  would	  be	  at-­‐risk	  globally.	  These	  
changes,	  they	  suggest,	  “are	  modest	  because	  covariates	  limit	  potential	  expansion	  
along	  certain	  dimensions	  of	  environmental	  space	  (Ibid.:	  1765)”.	  	  	  
	  
As	   concerns	   co-­‐variation,	   Rogers	   and	   Randolph	   (2000)	   argue	   that,	   from	   a	  
biological	   perspective,	   organisms	   can	   only	   cope	   with	   the	   extremes	   of	   some	  
climatic	   variables	   if	   the	   other	   variables	   influencing	   it	   are	   not	   extreme.	   They	  
provide	   a	   hypothetical	   example:	   models	   based	   upon	   only	   minimum	   mean	  
temperatures	  would	  predict	  a	  significant	  expansion	  of	  malaria	  northward	   into	  
the	  Sahara,	  as	  the	  cold	  desert	  nights	  would	  not	  be	  prohibitive	  of	  mosquito	  and	  
malaria	   development,	   but	   a	   multivariate	   model	   does	   not	   predict	   such	   an	  
expansion	   because	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   other	   key	   variables,	   rainfall	   and	  
humidity.	  Thus,	  their	  quantitative	  malaria	  model:	  	  
	  
highlights	   the	   use	   of	  multivariate	   rather	   than	   univariate	   constraints…and	   the	  
advantage	  of	   statistical	   rather	   than	  univariate	  approaches	   in	   situations	  where	  
biological	  knowledge	  is	  incomplete	  (Ibid.:	  1765).	  	  
	  
Thus	  differentiating	  the	  statistical	  modelling	  approach	  from	  the	  biological	  one,	  
Rogers	  and	  Randolph	  proceed	  to	  critique	  the	  practice	  of	  modelling	  using	  climate	  
change	  models.	   	   More	   generally,	   they	   argue	   that,	   regardless	   of	   the	  modelling	  
approach	   used,	   modelling	   with	   GCMs	   is	   problematic	   due	   to:	   low	   spatial	  
resolution;	   local	  variations;	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  represent	  “mean	  conditions	  
across	  large	  geographical	  areas	  that	  may	  not	  occur	  in	  many	  places	  within	  them	  
(Ibid.:	   1765)”;	   and	   the	   unknown	   accuracy	   of	   GCMs	   for	   predicting	   covariating	  
climate	  variables.	  
	  
One	   final	   item	  of	   interest	   in	   the	  Rogers/Randolph	  models	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  
they	   implicitly	   incorporate	   measures	   of	   “good”	   public	   health	   control.	   	   Their	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work	  was	   based	  upon	  present-­‐day	  maps	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  malaria,	  which	  
included	   climatic	   areas	   known	   to	   be	   climatically	   amenable	   to	   malaria	  
transmission	  but	   that	  no	   longer	  experience	  endemic	  malaria	   transmission	  due	  
to	  public	  health	  control	  measures.	   	  One	  example	  is	  the	  southern	  United	  States,	  
which	  is	  described	  as	  an	  “absence”	  point	  in	  the	  Rogers/Randolph	  models.	   	  The	  
significance	  of	   this	   is	   that	   factors	  beyond	   the	  climatic	  variables	  used	  as	  model	  
inputs	   play	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   “absence”	   (and	   therefore	   also	   “presence”),	  
thus	  influencing	  model	  outputs.	   	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph,	   intriguingly,	  argue	  that	  
climate	   continues	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   such	   regions:	   	   “In	   cooler	   regions,	   where	  
mosquito	   life-­‐spans	   barely	   exceed	   extrinsic	   incubation	   periods,	   transmission	  
cycles	   are	   inherently	   more	   fragile	   (Ibid.:	   1764)”.	   In	   other	   words,	   “along	   the	  
edges	   (Ibid.:	   1764)”	   of	   its	   distribution	   range,	   climate	   helps	   to	   determine	  
whether	   public	   health	   control	   measures	   are	   successful.	   	   Regardless	   of	   the	  
validity	   of	   this	   argument,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   is,	   effectively,	   the	  
inverse	   of	   the	   assumptions	   that	  Martens	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	  made	  when	   they	  
modelled	   “transmission	   potential”	   based	   on	   biologic	   parameters	   without	  
incorporating	  measures	   of	   public	   health	   capacity.	   	   It	   is	   likely	  no	   accident	   that	  
such	  modelling	  decisions	  have	  aligned	  with	  attempts	  to	  either	  prove	  or	  disprove	  
the	  role	  for	  climate	  change	  in	  malaria	  transmission.	  
	  
4.3.3	  A	  constant	  controversy	  
Both	   statistical	   and	   biologic/systems	   models	   are	   impossible	   to	   definitively	  
prove	   or	   falsify,	   given	   their	   future	   orientation.	   	   As	   such,	   the	   credibility	   stakes	  
have	  become	  quite	  high	  –	  actors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  controversy	  seem	  to	  realise	  
that	   scientific	   arguments	   alone	   will	   not	   settle	   it.	   	   Ever	   newer	   models	   are	  
presented,	   but	   as	   soon	   as	   they	   are	   published	   a	   new	   round	  of	   scrutiny	   begins.	  
Paul	  Epstein,	  Andy	  Haines	  and	  Paul	  Reiter	   can	  be	   seen	   thrashing	   it	   out	   in	   the	  
letters	   of	   Lancet	   (Epstein	   et	   al.,	   1998b),	   for	   example,	   while	   Pim	  Martens	   and	  
Paul	   Reiter	   have	   exchanged	   pleasantries	   in	   the	   letters	   of	   Emerging	   Infectious	  
Diseases	   (Martens,	   2000,	   Reiter,	   2000b).	   	   After	   an	   updated	   climate-­‐malaria	  
model	  was	  published	  in	  2003	  (Tanser	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  its	  scale	  (continental	  Africa),	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its	  use	  of	  a	   “parasite	  ratio”,	   the	  decision	  not	   to	  use	  population	  projections	  but	  
rather	   1990	   population	   levels	   to	   calculate	   future	   populations-­‐at-­‐risk,	   and,	  
unsurprisingly,	  its	  conclusions	  all	  came	  under	  attack	  (Reiter	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  	  
	  
Accusations	   and	   hostilities	   have	   also	   coloured	   this	   literature.	   	   Critics	   of	   the	  
Tanser	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  model	  stated	  that	  the	  study	  did	  not	  adhere	  to	  “the	  classical	  
components	  of	  science	  –	  unbiased	  observation	  and	  systematic	  experimentation	  
(Ibid.:	   323)”.	   	   The	   proponents,	   in	   reply,	   have	   defended	   their	   right	   to	   conduct	  
such	  research:	  “it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  be	  a	  malariologist	  (Hales	  and	  Woodward,	  
2005:	  258)”	  to	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  climate	  on	  malaria.	  	  When	  it	  comes	  
to	  climate	  change,	  society	  cannot	  afford	  “to	  postpone	  policy	  decisions	  until	  the	  
likely	   outcomes	   are	   clearer,	   since	   to	   do	   so	   risks	   serious	   and	   potentially	  
irreversible	   effects	   (Ibid.:	   258)”.	   The	   opponents,	   expectedly,	   disagree:	   the	  
simplicity	   and	   uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   future-­‐modelling	   are	   “precisely	   the	  
reason	  why	  we	  should	  be	  so	  cautious	  (Thomas	  and	  Hay,	  2005)”.	  
	  
Today,	   more	   than	   fifteen	   years	   after	   the	   publication	   of	   the	   early	   Martens	  
models,	  the	  controversy	  over	  climate-­‐malaria	  futures	  continues.	  	  New	  iterations	  
of	  biologic,	  statistical	  and	  other	  types	  of	  models	  are	  continually	  produced	  (e.g.	  
Beguin	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   and	   yet,	   despite	   this	   and	   despite	   attention	   to	   the	   others’	  
critiques,	  both	  CCH	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  continue	  to	  come	  to	  conclusions	  
strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  much	  earlier	  models	  (e.g.	  Gething	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  Parham	  
and	  Michael,	   2010).	   It	   has	  been,	   and	   is	   very	   likely	   to	   continue	   to	  be,	   a	  war	  of	  
attrition.	  
	  
To	   understand	   why,	   it	   is	   instructive	   to	   identify	   some	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  
deeper	   disciplinary	   and	   political	   commitments	   have	   driven	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	  
debate.	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4.3.4.	  Factors	  underpinning	  the	  climate-­‐malaria	  controversy	  
The	   biological	   and	   statistical	   modelling	   approaches	   discussed	   above	   (4.3.1,	  
4.3.2)	   are	   based	   upon	   different	   methodologies	   and	   lead	   to	   very	   different	  
conclusions	   as	   concerns	   both	   the	   current	   and	   future	   global	   transmission	   of	  
malaria.	   	   Each	   modelling	   approach	   tacitly	   endorses	   specific	   scientific-­‐politic	  
visions,	   whether	   ones	   embedded	   in	   GCMs,	   global	   population	   projections,	   or	  
future	  adaptive	  and	  public	  health	  capacities	   in	  both	  developing	  and	  developed	  
worlds.	  	  	  
	  
Socioeconomic	  visions	  of	  the	  future	  
Following	  the	  publication	  of	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph	  (2000),	  some	  members	  of	  the	  
CCH	   community	   responded	   via	   a	   letter	   to	   Science	   (Martens	   et	   al.,	   2000;	  
Appendix	   1).19	  	   Although	   it	   was	   ultimately	   not	   accepted	   for	   publication,	   it	   is	  
representative	  of	  arguments	   that	  have	  been	  used	  elsewhere.	  The	   letter,	  which	  
defends	   biological	   modelling	   as	   a	   “legitimate	   scientific	   exercise”,	   argues	   that	  
biological	  and	  statistical	  approaches	  cannot	  be	  compared	  as	  they	  are	  estimating	  
different	  parameters	  and	  asking	  different	  questions.	  The	  authors	  “question	  the	  
analytical	   approach”	   adopted	   by	   Rogers	   and	   Randolph	   and	   note	   that,	   “on	   a	  
global	   scale,	   all	   current	   biologically	   based	   models	   show	   net	   increases	   in	   the	  
transmission	   zone	   of	   malaria	   and	   changes	   in	   seasonal	   transmission”	   under	  
various	  climate	  change	  scenarios.	  	  	  
	  
The	   authors	   pick	   up	   on	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Rogers/Randolph	   statistical	  
models	   tacitly	   incorporate	   socioeconomic	   advances	   into	   their	   models.	   They	  
argue	  that	  the	  Rogers/Randolph	  model:	  
	  
…assumes	   that	   those	   contextual	   factors	   will	   apply	   in	   future	   in	   unchanged	  
fashion.	   This	   adds	   an	   important,	   though	   speculative,	   element	   of	   multivariate	  
realism	   to	   the	   modelling	   -­‐	   but	   the	   model	   thereby	   addresses	   a	   qualitatively	  
different	  question	  from	  the	  biological	  model.	  
	  
                                                
19	  The	  letter	  was	  provided	  through	  personal	  correspondence	  after	  following-­‐up	  on	  an	  interview.	  
The	  full	  letter	  is	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  1.	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By	   incorporating	   such	   factors,	   they	   continue,	   Rogers/Randolph	   forego	   “much	  
information	   on	   the	   malaria/climate	   relationship	   within	   the	   temperate-­‐zone	  
climatic	  range”,	  an	  area,	  it	  is	  suggested,	  that	  will	  be	  “considerably	  important”	  for	  
malaria	  transmission	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  particularly	  salient	  aspect	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  it	  deserves	  repetition:	  CCH	  
proponents	   and	   opponents	   alike	   embed	   judgements	   about	   future	   socio-­‐
economic	   development	   into	   their	   work,	   but	   to	   different	   ends.	   	   Rogers	   and	  
Randolph,	   for	   example,	   claim	   to	   be	  modelling	  malaria’s	   “climatic	   constraints”	  
even	   though,	   as	   they	   concede,	   socio-­‐economic	   factors	   are	   embedded	   in	   their	  
models.	   	   The	   hidden	   assumption	   is	   that	   temperate	   areas	   will	   have	   every	  
opportunity	  to	  thwart	  malaria	  in	  the	  future,	  not	  only	  because	  its	  transmission	  is	  
“fragile”,	   but	   also	   because	   they	   are	   currently	   wealthy.	   	   One	   consequence	   is	   a	  
likely	   bias	   in	   their	   definition	   of	   “presence”	   and	   “absence”	   points	   for	   malaria.	  
Because	  rich	   temperate	  areas	   like	  northern	  Australia	  or	   the	  southern	  USA	  are	  
currently	  free	  from	  malaria,	  all	  temperate	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  (currently,	  and	  in	  
future	  projections)	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  register	  as	  “absence”,	  regardless	  of	   their	  
socioeconomic	  context.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph	  prioritise	  the	  present	  
over	  the	  future	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  factors	  alongside	  climatic	  ones,	  even	  if	  they	  
claim	  to	  only	  be	  modelling	   the	   latter.	  The	  consequence	   is	  a	  more	  conservative	  
estimate	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  malaria	  transmission.	  	  	  
	  
Conversely,	   Martens	   and	   his	   co-­‐authors	   have	   as	   a	   central	   emphasis	   of	   their	  
model	   a	   formula	   for	   “transmission	   potential”	   that	   is	   based	   upon	   biological	  
variables	   that	   influence	  malaria	   transmission.	  As	  such,	   their	  model	  pays	  much	  
less	  attention	  to	  present-­‐day	  malaria	  than	  does	  the	  Rogers/Randolph	  model.	  	  In	  
this	   way,	   they	   prioritise	   the	   future	   over	   the	   present	   and	   climatic	   over	   socio-­‐
economic	   factors.	   	   They	   do,	   however,	   consider	   socio-­‐economic	   influences	   on	  
malaria	   transmission	   in	   the	   way	   they	   interpret	   results.	   When	   they	   discuss	  
malaria	  and	  the	  east	  African	  highlands,	  for	  example,	  they	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  
that	   socioeconomic	   factors	   impeding	   malaria	   control	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   a	  
problem	  in	  the	  future	  (4.3.1).	  	  As	  concerns	  rich,	  temperate	  countries,	  they	  argue	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that	   they	   should	   be	   vigilant	   to	   the	   increased	   malaria	   risk	   driven	   by	   climate	  
change:	   should	   socioeconomic	   conditions	   or	   malaria	   or	   vector	   control	  
programmes	   deteriorate,	   those	   countries	   could	   suffer	   from	  malaria	   just	   as	   it	  
returned	  to	  Tajikistan	  and	  Azerbaijan	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  CCH	  proponents,	  consistent	  with	  their	  community’s	  commitments	  and	  
context	  (Chapter	  3),	  argue	  that	  malaria,	  driven	  by	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  future,	  
will	   be	   an	   increasing	   problem.	   It	   may	   be	   somewhat	   modulated	   by	   socio-­‐
economic	  circumstances,	  but	  these	  can’t	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  better	   in	  the	  future	  
than	  they	  are	  today.	  	  Mirroring	  the	  CCH	  community’s	  more	  holistic	  approach	  to	  
public	   health,	   they	   tend	   to	   view	   globalisation	   and	   its	   uneven	   economic	  
consequences	  as	  an	  exacerbating	  factor:	  “Human	  development	  has	  many	  goals,	  
one	  of	  which	  is	  to	  protect	  human	  health…	  Unfortunately,	  we	  often	  fail	  to	  attain	  
this	  goal	  (Woodward	  et	  al.,	  2000:	  1148)”.	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  CCH	  opponents	  argue	  that	  malaria,	  somewhat	  modulated	  by	  climate	  
change,	  will	   not	  be	   that	  much	  more	  or	   less	  of	   an	   issue	   in	   the	   future	   than	   it	   is	  
today.	   	   Instead,	   socio-­‐economic	   circumstances	   will	   continue	   to	   substantially	  
modulate	  malaria	  transmission.	  	  As	  opponents	  like	  Paul	  Reiter	  have	  repeatedly	  
argued,	   rich	   temperate	   countries	   have	   historically	   suffered	   from	   malaria	   but	  
eradicated	   it	   through	   improved	   living	   standards:	   “unless	   living	   conditions	   are	  
drastically	  changed,	  global	  warming	  is	  unlikely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  major	  epidemics	  
of	   tropical	   mosquito-­‐borne	   disease	   in	   the	   USA	   (Reiter,	   1996)”	   (or	   in	   other	  
similar	  countries).	  
	  
Claims	  on	  expertise	  and	  climate	  science	  
The	  future-­‐orientated	  nature	  of	  climate-­‐disease	  modelling	  means	  not	  only	  that	  
socioeconomic	  and	  climatic	  visions	  of	  the	  future	  are	  incorporated	  (explicitly	  or	  
implicitly)	   into	   models,	   but	   also	   that	   model	   outputs	   cannot	   be	   definitively	  
proved	   or	   disproved.	   	   This	   serves	   to	   shift	   attention	   to	   the	   producers	   of	   the	  
models	   rather	   than	   the	   models	   themselves,	   perhaps	   explaining	   the	   tendency	  
towards	  hostility	  that	  this	  controversy	  displays.	  
 145 
	  
As	   one	   CCH	   opponent	   suggested	   –	   doubtless	   related	   to	   their	   prominent	  
recognition	  as	  an	  “infectious	  disease	  expert”	  –	  because	  future	  models	  cannot	  be	  
verified,	  the	  track	  record	  of	  the	  scientist	  producing	  the	  future	  models	  should	  be	  
heavily	  scrutinised:	  
	  
R4:	  …	  if	  you	  want	  to	  judge	  …	  the	  conflicting	  views	  of	  scientist	  X	  and	  scientist	  Y’s	  
predictions	  about	  the	  future	  you	  go	  back	  and	  look	  at	  their	  track	  record	  in	  other	  
areas	  of	  science…	  Let’s	  say	  scientist	  Y	  never	  actually	  worked	  on	  malaria	  at	  the	  
present	   time	  and	  has	  always	  predicted	  malaria	   in	   the	   future.	  When	   looking	  at	  
what	   scientist	   Y	   says	   about	   malaria	   in	   the	   future	   you	   can’t	   really	   judge	   how	  
good	  that	  is	  because	  he’s	  said	  nothing	  about	  malaria	  at	  the	  present	  time.	  And	  so	  
his	  predictions	  could	  be	  completely	  oddball	  and	  completely	  wrong	  and	  there’s	  
no	  yardstick	  for	  us	  or	  anybody	  else	  to	  judge	  the	  worthiness	  of	  his	  science…	  
	  
Assessing	   the	   previous	   track	   record	   of	   a	   scientist	   is,	   of	   course,	   contentious.	  
Clearly,	  the	  CCH	  opponents,	  for	  their	  part,	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  CCH	  community’s	  
science	  to	  be	  particularly	  “worthy”:	  
	  
R13:	  what	  shocked	  me	  really	  was	  that	  they	  talked,	  well	  they	  talk	  less	  and	  less	  
now,	   about	   climate	   change	   and	   vector	  borne	  disease	  with	   authority,	   although	  
they	  had	  never	  actually	  produced	  any	  research	  papers	  in	  that	  field….	  
	  
R17:	  …	  people	  who	  were	  producing	  them	  [systems	  models]	  were	  not	  actually	  
biologists.	   I	   know	  because	   I've	  had	   conversations	  with	  one	  or	   two	  of	   them	  at	  
meetings….they	  were	  not	   familiar	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	   the	  system,	  and	  how	  
things	  could	  go	  very	  wrong	   if	  you	   just	  apply	   formulae	  without	   thinking	  about	  
what	  would	  underpin	  those	  formulae.	  
	  
Consistent	  with	   this	   argument,	   Rogers	   and	  Randolph	   (2000:	   1763),	   state	   that	  
until	  malaria	  models	  “can	  give	  accurate	  descriptions	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  of	  
global	   malaria,	   they	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   give	   reliable	   predictions	   about	   the	  
future”.	  Thus	  models	  that	  predict	  present-­‐day	  malaria	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  US	  or	  
Australia	  should	  not	  be	   trusted	   to	  make	   future	  predictions.	   	  The	  right	   answer,	  
rooted	  in	  the	  right	  expertise	  and	  methodology,	  they	  suggest,	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  
statistical,	  rather	  than	  biological,	  approach	  which:	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gave	   a	   better	   description	   of	   the	   present	   global	   distribution	   of	   P.	   falciparum	  
malaria	   and	   predicted	   remarkably	   few	   future	   changes,	   even	   under	   the	   most	  
extreme	  scenarios	  of	  climate	  change	  (Rogers	  and	  Randolph,	  2000:	  1763-­‐4).	  	  
	  
It	   is,	   of	   course,	   not	   very	   surprising	   for	   the	  more	   established	   researchers	   in	   a	  
field	   to	   resent,	   and	   seek	   to	   police,	   the	   boundaries	   of	   their	   discipline.	   	   Their	  
efforts,	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  CCH	  proponents	  in	  attempting	  to	  assert	  their	  right	  
to	  work	  in	  the	  area,	  demonstrate	  the	  high	  stakes	  involved	  in	  being	  able	  to	  claim	  
to	  be	  the	  expert	  in	  a	  growing	  field.	  	  
	  
Thus	   CCH	   opponents	   sought	   to	   downplay	   the	   attention	   that	   models	   like	   the	  
Martens	  malaria	  models	   drew	  by	   attempting	   to	   redirect	   attention	  back	   to	   the	  
present:	  
	  
R4:	   And	   I	   think	   very	   few	   ...	   global	   warming	   people	   bother	   to	   think	   about	  
opportunity	  costs	  of	  what	  they're	  asking	  for.	  And	  I	  think	  we	  should	  do….	  
	  
…what	  we	  really	  are	  worried	  about	  is	  the	  fairly	  scarce	  resources	  that	  we've	  got	  
being	   thrown	   in	   all	   the	   wrong	   directions	   to	   meet	   threats	   that	   may	   never	  
actually	  arrive.	  
	  
Paul	  Reiter:	  Public	  concern	  should	  focus	  on	  ways	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  
malaria	  transmission,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  weather	  (Reiter,	  2000a:	  10)	  
	  
R13:	   it's	   very,	   very	   complicated,	   the	   whole	   thing	   …	   and	   of	   course,	   there	   are	  
different	  people	  within	  the	  system	  who	  have	  different	  biases	  or	  different	  goals	  
as	  well.	  	  We	  have	  among	  us	  a	  person	  that	  we	  all	  rather	  joke	  about,	  who	  is	  very	  
committed	  towards	  the	  sort	  of	  catastrophic	  side,	  and	  he	  is	  a	  modeller,	  so	  he	  can	  
produce	  catastrophic	  models	  as	  much	  as	  he	  wants.	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   CCH	   proponents	   have	   counter-­‐claimed	   that	   the	   CCH	  
opponents	  are	  simply	  climate	  change	  sceptics:	  
	  
R20…	  people	  like	  David	  Rogers	  and	  Sarah	  Randolph	  from	  Oxford	  were	  clearly	  
sceptical	  about	  the	  climate	  change	  process	  itself…	  Paul	  Reiter…has	  always	  been	  
very	  hostile	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  climate	  is	  related	  to	  these	  diseases	  ...	  I	  suspect	  that	  
he	  actually	  belongs	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  fringe	  sceptical	  or	  denier	  group.	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R19:	   …malaria	   for	   example	   is	   a	   highly	   climate	   sensitive	   disease.	   And	   I	   don't	  
think	  anyone	  would	  dispute	  that.	  It	   is	  climate	  sensitive.	   	  The	  astonishing	  thing	  
to	  me	  is	  that	  the	  Oxford	  Group	  have	  managed	  to	  produce	  paper	  after	  paper	  that	  
show	   that	  malaria	   is	   not	   affected	  by	   this,	   that	   or	   the	   other	   change	   in	   climate.	  
And	   I	   think	   they've	  had	   to	   stretch	   reality	  quite	  vigorously	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	  
that.	  
	  
Thus	   some	   of	   the	   key	   fault-­‐lines	   of	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   can	   be	   seen,	  
and	   they	  will	   re-­‐emerge	   in	   the	   specific	  debates	   surrounding	  dengue	   (4.5)	   and	  
tick-­‐borne	  encephalitis	  (4.6).	  	  Beforehand,	  however,	  a	  controversy	  surrounding	  
highland	  malaria	  (4.4)	  will	  examine	  how	  the	  tensions	   in	   the	  debate	  have	  been	  
further	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   reliance	   upon	   climate	   data	   for	   climate-­‐disease	  
modelling.	  	  
 
4.4	  Highland	  malaria:	  the	  case	  of	  changing	  climate	  data	  
 
In	   4.3.1	   it	   was	   noted	   that	   the	   biological	   modelling	   conducted	   by	   Martens,	  
McMichael	  and	  their	  collaborators	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  highland	  areas	  of	  east	  
Africa	   as	   one	   region	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   malaria,	   particularly	   under	  
climate	   change	   scenarios.	   	   In	   fact,	   in	   the	   late	   1990’s	  Martens	   and	   a	   co-­‐author	  
developed	   a	   climate	   change	   model	   for	   this	   region	   and	   concluded	   that	   their	  
projections	   “demonstrate	   that	   rises	   in	   temperature	   are	   likely	   to	   increase	   the	  
risk	   of	   epidemics	   in	   the	   highlands	   both	   on	   continental	   and	   national	   scales	  
(Lindsay	  and	  Martens,	  1998:	  42)”.	  
	  
Highland	  malaria	   would	   become	   a	   focus	   for	   CCH	   research	   aimed	   not	   only	   at	  
projecting	   future	   climate	   changes	   but	   also	   at	   demonstrating	   that	   the	   health	  
impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   had	   already	   been	   occurring	   (so-­‐called	   “fingerprint”	  
studies).	  	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  Paul	  Epstein	  has	  suggested,	  conducting	  research	  in	  
a	  mountainous	  region	  enables	  one	  to	  switch	  between	  different	  climatic	  regions	  
relatively	  easily;	  shifting	  only	   four	  meters	  on	  a	  mountain	  roughly	  corresponds	  
to	  the	  same	  temperature	  change	  as	  shifting	  2.4	  kilometres	   in	   latitude	  (Epstein	  
and	  Ferber,	  2010:	  48).	  Mountain	  regions	  are	   thus	  “perfect	  petri	  dishes	  (Ibid.)”	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for	  assessing	  a	  range	  of	  climate	  change	  impacts,	  including	  its	  impact	  on	  malaria	  
transmission.	  
	  
In	  the	  1990s,	  Andrew	  Githeko,	  a	  malaria	  researcher	  interested	  in	  the	  impacts	  of	  
climate	  change	  in	  Kenya,	  observed	  that	  malaria	  epidemics	  had	  spread	  from	  3	  to	  
13	   districts	   in	   western	   Kenya	   since	   1988,	   and	   that	   monthly	   maximum	  
temperatures	  in	  the	  region	  had	  increased	  by	  2	  °C	  during	  the	  same	  time	  period	  
(Githeko	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   	   At	   altitudes	   of	   2000m,	   the	  mean	  monthly	   temperature	  
was	   at	   the	   biologic	   threshold	   for	   P.	   Falciparum	   malaria	   transmission,	   leading	  
him	  to	  conclude	  that	  “further	  warming	  should	  affect	  areas	  above	  2000m	  in	  east	  
Africa	  (Ibid.:	  1138)”.	  This	  conclusion	  was	  consistent	  with	  other	  CCH	  community	  
research,	  such	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  paper	  by	  Lindsay	  and	  Martens	  (1998)	  as	  
well	  as	  one	  authored	  by	  Paul	  Epstein	  and	  Pim	  Martens	  (Epstein	  et	  al.,	  1998a).	  
	  
From	  the	  onset,	   their	  conclusions	  were	  strongly	  contested.	  Paul	  Reiter	  quickly	  
countered	  that	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  historical	  presence	  of	  malaria	  across	  much	  
of	  the	  Western	  world	  argues	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  living	  standards	  and	  hygiene,	  
instead	  of	  climate,	  on	  the	  transmission	  and	  eradication	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  disease	  
(Reiter,	   2001).	   	   A	   group	   from	   Oxford,	   led	   by	   Simon	   Hay	   and	   including	   David	  
Rogers	   and	   Sarah	  Randolph,	   published	   a	  model	  with	   their	   own	   findings.	   	   In	   a	  
paper	  published	  in	  Nature,	  they	  examined	  the	  long-­‐term	  meteorological	  data	  for	  
four	   high-­‐altitude	  East	  African	   locations	   (one	   each	   in	  Kenya,	  Uganda,	  Rwanda	  
and	  Burundi)	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  climate	  had	  not	  significantly	  changed	  over	  
the	   past	   century.	   Given	   this,	   factors	   other	   than	   climate	   must	   have	   been	  
responsible;20	  therefore	  there	   is	  “no	  need	  to	   invoke	  climate	  change	  (Hay	  et	  al.,	  
2002a:	   908)”.	   	   Hay	   and	   co-­‐authors	   followed	   this	   analysis	   up	  with	   a	   literature	  
review	  entitled	  “Hot	  topic	  or	  hot	  air?”	  which	  they	  produced	  with	  the	  objective	  to	  
“focus	   on	   the	   real	   and	   immediate	   causes	   of…malarial	   resurgences	   (Hay	   et	   al.,	  
2002b:	   533)”.	   	   They	   argue	   that	   although	   Rogers	   and	   Randolph	   (2000)	  
anticipated	   some	   future	   impact	   (albeit	   marginal)	   from	   climate	   change	   on	  
                                                
20	  As	  they	  had	  cited	  previously,	  examples	  of	  alternative	  explanations	  included	  the	  rise	  of	  
antimalarial	  drug	  resistance,	  breakdowns	  in	  public	  health	  and	  population	  migration.	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malaria	  spread,	  it	  is	  “quite	  another	  matter	  to	  attribute	  recent	  resurgences	  (Hay	  
et	   al.,	   2002b:	   530)”	   in	   highland	  malaria	   to	   climate	   change.	   They	   conclude	   by	  
noting	  that	  “reversing,	  or	  even	  delaying…global	  climate	  change	  will	  not	  address	  
the	  problems	  faced	  by	  Africa	  at	  risk	  from	  malaria	  today	  (Ibid.:	  533)”.	  
	  
This	   intervention	   from	  Oxford	   led	   to	  a	   “very,	  very	  unpleasant	   spat	   (R4)”	  with	  
the	  CCH	  community.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  4.3,	  the	  debate	  over	  future	  climate	  models	  
largely	   focused	   on	   the	   choice	   of	   methodology,	   and	   underlying	   assumptions	  
about	   the	   importance	  of	   socioeconomic	  development.	  Yet	   a	   striking	   feature	  of	  
the	  “highland	  malaria	  spat”	  is	  its	  strong	  focus	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  relevance	  of	  the	  
climatic	   data	   used	   in	   analyses.	   	   Several	   members	   of	   the	   CCH	   community,	  
including	   Jonathan	   Patz,	   Andrew	   Githeko	   and	   Tony	   McMichael,	   published	   a	  
reply	  in	  Nature	  in	  collaboration	  with	  Michael	  Hulme,	  who	  had	  been	  very	  active	  
in	  the	  boundaries	  between	  climate	  change	  model	  producers	  and	  users.21	  In	  this	  
letter,	   they	   focus	   most	   of	   their	   objection	   to	   the	   Oxford	   team’s	   findings	   by	  
arguing	   that	   the	  conclusions	  are	   likely	   “flawed	  by	   their	   inappropriate	  use	  of	  a	  
climate	   data	   set	   (Patz	   et	   al.,	   2002:	   628)”.	   The	   Oxford	   group	   had	   used	  
downscaled	   gridded	   climate	   data	   to	   interpolate	   climatic	   trends	   at	   the	   specific	  
study	  sites,	  but	  the	  CCH	  proponents	  argue	  that	  this	  data	  is	  only	  appropriate	  for	  
up-­‐scaling	  to	  African	  regions,	  not	  “down-­‐scaling	  to	  specific	  area	  locations	  (Ibid.:	  
627)”,	  because	  interpolations	  ignore	  the	  local	  elevations.	  The	  authors	  note	  that	  
the	  mean	  altitudes	  used	  by	  Hay	  et	  al.	  differed	  by	  an	  average	  of	  575m	  from	  the	  
input	  weather	   station	   sites,	   corresponding	   to	  a	   temperature	  deviation	  of	  3	   °C.	  	  
Thus,	   the	   CCH	   proponents	   conclude,	   climate	   and	   malaria	   data	   sets	   “must	   be	  
considered	  at	  comparable	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  scales	  (Ibid.:	  628)”.	  Where	  such	  
research	  has	  been	  appropriately	  conducted,	   the	  authors	  suggested,	   they	   found	  
“a	   close	   association	   (Ibid.:	   628)”	   between	   malaria	   transmission	   and	   monthly	  
temperature	  trends	  between	  1997	  and	  2000.	  	  Finally,	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  letter	  
also	   argue	   that	   even	   in	   the	   theoretical	   absence	   of	   a	   “historical	   climate	   signal	  
                                                
21	  Hulme	  was	  at	  the	  Hadley	  Centre,	  which	  produced	  the	  HadCM2	  and	  HadCM3	  datasets	  used	  in	  
the	  Martens	  models,	  see	  4.3.1.	  He	  has	  also	  worked	  extensively	  with	  climate	  change	  impacts	  
communities,	  and,	  more	  recently,	  ahas	  also	  explored	  the	  social	  and	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  
climate	  change	  in	  addition	  to	  scientific	  ones	  (see	  Hulme,	  2009).	  
 150 
(Ibid.:	   627)”,	   this	   does	   not	   negate	   the	   validity	   of	   forward-­‐looking	   predictions:	  
even	   “non-­‐significant”	   climate	   changes	   could	   influence	   malaria	   transmission	  
should	   they	   influence	   critical	   climatic	   thresholds	   governing	   malaria	  
transmission.	  
	  
In	  their	  reply	  to	  this	  letter,	  Hay	  and	  his	  co-­‐authors	  note	  that	  they	  did	  not	  focus	  
on	   the	   future	   situation	   of	  malaria	   transmission,	   shifting	   the	   attention	   back	   to	  
present-­‐day	  malaria.	   	   They	   furthermore	   claim	   that	   the	   climatic	   datasets	   they	  
used	  were	  indeed	  appropriate;	  the	  procedure	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  climate	  data	  
takes	  account	  of	  altitude,	  and	  that	  the	  dataset	  has	  been	  used	  to	  quantify	  climate	  
change	   across	   Africa:	   “it	   is	   inconsistent	   to	   assert	   that	   these	   same	   data	   are	  
insufficient	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   lack	   of	   climate	   change	   (Hay	   et	   al.,	   2002c:	   628)”.	  
They	   furthermore	   stress	   that	   “the	   purported	  warming	   trend	   is	   not	   significant	  
(Ibid.:	   628)”;	   as	   little	   is	   known	   about	   “non-­‐significant”	   climate	   change	   and	   its	  
impact	   on	   malaria,	   claims	   surrounding	   this	   cannot	   be	   substantiated.	   	   Thus:	  
“evidence	   against	   the	   epidemiological	   significance	   of	   climate	   change	   in	   the	  
recent	  malaria	  resurgences	  in	  Africa	  is	  mounting	  (Ibid.:	  628)”.	  
	  
A	  shifting	  debate:	  moving	  beyond	  “core”	  expertise	  
The	  debate	  over	  climate	  change	  and	  its	  links	  to	  malaria	  evolved	  so	  as	  to	  have	  a	  
much	   broader	   scope,	   by	   also	   considering	  whether	   or	   not	   climate	   change	  was	  
occurring	  and	  how	  and	  which	  climate	  datasets	  should	  be	  used	  in	  analyses.	  	  It	  is	  
a	  debate	  that	  would	  continue	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  for	  several	  years,	  with	  new	  
publications	   weighing	   in	   to	   support	   both	   perspectives	   (e.g.	   Hay	   et	   al.,	   2005,	  
Zhou	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   	   Similar	   to	   the	   debate	   over	   climate-­‐malaria	   futures	   (4.3),	  
there	  has	  been	  no	  resolution	  to	  this	  controversy:	  	  
	  
R4:	  Hay’s	  paper	  has	  been	  incredibly	  controversial…and	  it	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	   that	   they	  were	  using	  quite	  different	   climate	  data	   sets	   analysed	   in	   slightly	  
different	  ways	  and	  certainly	  over	  slightly	  different	  time	  periods.	  And	  we	  would	  




This	  respondent	  continued	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  controversy	  by	  focusing	  on	  
the	   implications	   of	  working	  with	   data	   produced	   by	   the	   global	   climate	   change	  
community,	  who	  “know	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  their	  models	  (R4)”.	  	  Yet	  these:	  
	  
R4:	  …	  tend	  to	  get	  ignored	  by	  the	  communities	  that	  adopt	  those	  predictions…	  so	  
the	   health	   community	   took	   global	   climate	   futures	   or	   global	   climate	  
interpolations	   as	   God-­‐given	   truths…	   and	   they	   used	   them	   to	   make	   future	  
predictions.	  	  
	  
CCH	   proponents,	   meanwhile,	   have	   made	   similar	   claims	   against	   the	   CCH	  
opponents.	  Andrew	  Githeko,	  for	  example,	  suggested	  that	  Hay	  and	  his	  colleagues’	  
analysis	   was	   based	   upon	   “statistical	   smoke	   and	  mirrors	   (Epstein	   and	   Ferber,	  
2010:	  52)”.	  	  	  
	  
Prediction	  and	  trust:	  the	  uncertainty	  cascade	  
The	   highland	   malaria	   spat	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   broader	   controversy	  
surrounding	   CCH	   research	   can	   end	   up	   focusing	   on	   climate	   change	   science.	  	  
There	   has	   been	  much	   debate	   about	   predictive	   value	   that	   CCH	   opponents	   and	  
proponents	   assign	   to	   their	   climate-­‐disease	   models.	   	   Are	   model	   outputs	  
predictions,	  warnings	  or	  false	  alarms?	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  CCH	  
proponents	  and	  their	  nearest	  policy	  communities	  do	  appear	  to	  treat	  the	  results	  
from	  climate-­‐malaria	  models	  as	  being	   face-­‐value	   in	   the	  policy	  world	   (see	  4.7).	  	  
Yet	   in	   the	  more	   technical	   spheres,	  where	  CCH	  opponents	  have	  cried	   foul,	  CCH	  
proponents	  have	  tended	  to	  modulate	  their	  claims:	  
	  
R1:	   …in	   our	   papers	   have	   been	   trying	   to	   say,	   “Hang	   on,	  we’re	   not	   claiming	   to	  
predict,	  we’re	  not	  claiming	  prediction”.	  That’s	  beyond	  our	  capacity	  or	  anyone’s.	  
What	   we’re	   saying	   is	   that	   if	   everything	   else	   remained	   constant,	   then	   the	  
changes	  in	  the	  climate	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  …	  greater	  potential	  for	  disease	  to	  spread	  …	  
in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  “true”	  predictive	  value	  that	  climate-­‐disease	  models	  have,	  the	  
debate	   over	   the	   underlying	   GCM	   data	   appears	   to	   support	   the	   idea	   of	   an	  	  
“uncertainty	   cascade”	   through	   which	   uncertainties	   get	   washed	   over	   as	   they	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move	  from	  producers	  to	  users	  of	  models.	  	  Just	  as	  policy	  worlds	  are	  reliant	  upon	  
trusting	   that	   CCH	   proponents’	   (or	   opponents’)	   results	   are	   valid,	   CCH	  
researchers	  themselves	  are	  reliant	  upon	  the	  producers	  of	  GCMs.	  In	  the	  highland	  
malaria	  controversy,	  it	  is	  noteworthy,	  for	  example,	  that	  there	  is	  only	  	  one	  “pure”	  
climate	  modeller	  involved,	  who	  joins	  sides	  with	  the	  CCH	  proponents	  to	  discredit	  
the	  opponents’	  assessment	  of	  climate	  data.	  	  This	  is	  unsurprising.	  	  Clearly,	  it	  is	  in	  
the	   self-­‐interest	   of	   the	   GCM	   modelling	   community	   to	   see	   their	   models	   gain	  
wider	  usage.	  As	  David	  Demeritt	  has	  noted:	  “the	  application	  of	  upstream	  outputs	  
from	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  GCM	  outputs	  by	   impact-­‐assessment	  experts	  enhances	  the	  
credibility	  of	  their	  own	  work	  (Demeritt,	  2001:	  320)”.	  	  The	  reproduction	  of	  GCMs	  
in	  “impacts”	  research,	  such	  as	  climate-­‐malaria	  modelling,	   further	  stabilises	  the	  
assumptions	   and	   worldviews	   embedded	   within	   GCMs,	   a	   point	   previously	  
discussed	  in	  1.4.	  	  	  
	  
The	  flip-­‐side	  to	  the	  issue	  is	  that	  as	  GCMs,	  themselves	  inherently	  uncertain,	  are	  
applied	   to	   model	   additional	   layers	   of	   complexity,	   it	   becomes	   easier	   for	   a	  
community	   of	   opponents	   –	   for	   whatever	   its	   reasons	   –	   to	   cast	   doubt	   on	   the	  
model	  outputs.	  	  As	  seen	  in	  4.3,	  objections	  can	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  methodologies	  
and	  assumptions	  related	  to	   impact	  modelling	   itself,	  or,	  as	  discussed	  here,	   they	  
can	  focus	  on	  the	  underpinning	  climate	  data.	  	  As	  there	  is	  no	  scientific	  method	  for	  
resolving	   these	   objections,	   the	   potential	   always	   exists	   that	   they	   end	   up	   in	   a	  
seemingly	   endless	   technical	   debate	   about	   climate	   or	   climate	   change	   itself,	   in	  
addition	   to	   (or	   rather	   than)	   a	   debate	   about	   the	   impact	  of	   climate	   or	   climate	  
change	  on	  their	  topic	  of	  interest.	  	  Where	  this	  happens,	  the	  debate	  moves	  further	  
afield	  from	  the	  “core”	  expertise	  of	  the	  impacts	  researchers,	  making	  both	  sides	  of	  
the	  debate	  even	  more	  dependent	  on	  those	  with	  GCM	  modelling	  expertise.	  
	  
Ultimately,	   researchers	   conducting	   climate	   impacts	   research	   need	   to	   choose	  
whether	  to	  trust	  GCMs	  enough	  to	  work	  with	  them.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  here,	  this	  
decision	   is	   heavily	   dependent	   upon	   how	   their	   disciplinary	   and/or	   political	  
interests	  align	  with	  the	  outputs	  from	  the	  final	  impacts	  models.	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4.5	  Modelling	  Dengue:	  “There’s	  no	  place	  like	  home”	  
 
Climate-­‐disease	  research	  has	  also	   focused	  on	  dengue,	  another	  mosquito-­‐borne	  
disease.	  	  Dengue	  can	  occur	  as	  dengue	  fever,	  or	  dengue	  haemorrhagic	  fever,	  with	  
the	   latter	   being	   common	   but	  more	   lethal.	   	   Dengue	   is	   primarily	   spread	   by	   the	  
mosquito	   species	   aedes	   aegypti,	   but	   a	   secondary	   mosquito	   vector,	   aedes	  
albopictus,	  is	  capable	  of	  transmitting	  the	  disease.	  	  Dengue	  incidence	  globally	  has	  
increased	   dramatically	   over	   the	   past	   fifty	   years	   and,	   simultaneously,	   aedes	  
albopictus	   has	   spread	   to	   new	   locations,	   including	   the	   United	   States	   and	  
Mediterranean	   Europe,	   sparking	   fears	   that	   dengue	   could	   now	   also	   be	  
transmitted	   in	   these	  areas.	   In	   this	   section,	  attempts	  by	   the	  CCH	  community	   to	  
model	  dengue	  using	  statistical	  approaches	  will	  be	  investigated.	  	  
	  
	  
The	  vapour-­‐pressure	  model	  
As	   the	   controversy	   surrounding	   climate	   change	   and	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases	  
progressed,	   it	   fuelled	  methodological	   refinements	   as	   both	   sides	   attempted	   to	  
definitively	   “win”	   the	   controversy.	   	   It	   was	   perhaps	   inevitable,	   then,	   that	  
methodological	   approaches	   (but	   not	   conclusions)	   managed	   to	   cross	   enemy	  
lines.	  	  With	  the	  objective	  of	  providing	  “vital	  information	  for	  policy	  makers	  who	  
want	   to	  understand	   the	  potential	   effects	  of	   climate	  change	   (Hales	  et	  al.,	  2002:	  
833)”,	   a	   team	   of	   CCH	   proponents	  modelled	   dengue	   based	   upon	   the	   statistical	  
approach:	  
	  
Hales:	   I	   guess	   the	   idea	   for	   it	   really	  came	   from	  the	  paper	   in	  Science	  by	  Rogers	  
and	  Randolph	  ...	  which	  was	  a	  spatial	  model	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  malaria.	  
	  
The	   paper,	   published	   in	   Lancet,	   attracted	   significant	   attention.	   	   Perhaps	  
anticipating	   resistance	   to	   their	   research,	   the	   authors	   present	   the	   project	  
rationale	   and	   allude	   to	   some	   of	   their	   underlying	   assumptions	   about	   future	  
public	  health	  capacity:	  
	  
Climate	  is	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  forces	  behind	  epidemics,	  and	  its	  effects	  
become	  evident	  if	  adaptive	  measures	  falter	  or	  cannot	  be	  extended	  to	  all	  
populations	  at	  risk	  (Ibid.:	  830).	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To	  produce	  the	  model,	  Hales	  et	  al.	  plotted	  the	  presence	  and	  absence	  of	  known	  
Dengue	   fever	   outbreaks	   globally	   between	   1975	   and	   1996	   alongside	   monthly	  
averages	   of	   various	   climatic	   factors:	   rainfall,	   vapour	   pressure,	   and	  minimum,	  
mean	   and	   maximum	   temperature.	   These	   variables	   were	   assessed	   for	   their	  
significance,	   both	   singly	   and	   in	   combination	   with	   each	   other,	   via	   logistic	  
regression	  to	  assess	  their	  relative	  importance	  in	  driving	  the	  risk	  of	  Dengue.	  The	  
authors	  concluded	  that	  vapour	  pressure	  (i.e.	  humidity)	  was	  the	  most	  important	  
predictor	   of	   dengue,	   and	   then	   produced	   a	   final	   “cautious	   (Ibid.:	   833)”	   model	  
using	  this	  as	  the	  only	  variable	   in	  the	  model;	   this	  was	  argued	  to	  be	  biologically	  
credible	   because	   humidity	   tends	   to	   be	   high	   only	   where	   rainfall	   and	  
temperatures	  are	  high.	  	  The	  model	  results	  were	  then	  combined	  with	  a	  series	  of	  
different	  GCMs	  to	  project	  the	  geographic	  areas	  that	  could	  be	  suitable	  for	  dengue	  
transmission	   in	   the	   future,	   and	   population	   projections	  were	   used	   to	   calculate	  
future	   populations	   at-­‐risk.	   Under	   climate	   change	   scenarios,	   the	   authors	  
estimated	   that	  4.1	  billion	  people	   could	  be	   living	   in	  dengue	  areas	  by	  2055	  and	  
between	  5.2	  –	  6	  billion	  people	  by	  2080.	  
	  
Although	   this	  dengue	  model	  was,	   like	   the	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph	   (2000)	  model	  
for	   malaria,	   based	   upon	   a	   statistical	   approach,	   the	   conclusions	   are	   very	  
different:	   	   the	   Hales	   dengue	   model	   projects	   a	   significant	   expansion	   of	   risk,	  
whereas	   the	   Rogers/Randolph	   malaria	   model	   does	   not.	   	   Clearly,	   dengue	   and	  
malaria	   are	   very	  different	  diseases	   (not	   least	   of	  which	  being	   that	  malaria	   is	   a	  
parasite	  and	  dengue	  is	  a	  virus)	  with	  very	  different	  transmission	  patterns.	  	  Yet	  as	  
they	  are	  both	  mosquito-­‐borne	  diseases,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  some	  of	   the	  reasons	  
behind	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   models	   relate	   to	   the	   assumptions	   embedded	  
within.	  	  	  
	  
In	   4.3.4,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   was	   implicitly	  
embedded	  in	  the	  Rogers/Randolph	  model	  was	  described.	  	  Intriguingly,	  Hales	  et	  
al.	  selected	  data	  differently,	  and	  such	  that	  “the	  effect	  of	  human	  interventions	  is	  
likely	   to	   be	   small	   (Hales	   et	   al.,	   2002:	   833)”.	   	   The	   difference	   lies	   in	   differing	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definitions	   of	   presence	   and	   absence	   points.	   	   Whereas	   the	   Rogers/Randolph	  
model	  for	  malaria	  presence	  and	  absence	  points	  was	  based	  upon	  only	  the	  most	  
recent	   malaria	   distribution	   data,	   the	   Hales	   model	   for	   dengue	   looked	   at	   the	  
presence	  of	  dengue	  over	  a	  substantially	  longer	  time-­‐frame	  (recorded	  outbreaks	  
between	   1961-­‐1990).	   By	   using	   data	   from	   a	   longer	   time	   period,	   public	   health	  
interventions	  such	  as	  vector	  control,	  which	  may	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  
but	  hard	  to	  “sustain	  over	  time	  (Ibid.:	  833)”,	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  excluded	  
from	  the	  analysis:	  
	  
Hales:	   ...	   given	   that	   there	   was	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time	   ...	   if	   any	   outbreak	   had	  
occurred	  in	  that	  period	  we	  assumed	  that	  the	  climate	  in	  that	  region	  was	  suitable	  
for	   an	   outbreak	   of	   dengue.	   We	   also	   assumed	   that	   if	   there	   hadn't	   been	   an	  
outbreak	  reported	  that	  the	  climate	  was	  not	  suitable,	  which	  is	  probably	  not	  quite	  
such	  a	  strong	  assumption	  to	  make,	  but	  in	  any	  case...	  
	  
Thus,	   for	   example,	   if	   one	   region	  had	   recorded	  a	  dengue	  outbreak	   in	  1973	  but	  
not	   since	   then,	   the	  Hales	   approach	  would	   record	   this	   as	   a	   “presence”,	   but	   the	  
Rogers/Randolph	   approach	   would	   record	   this	   as	   an	   “absence”.	   	   The	  
consequence	  is	  a	  looser	  definition	  of	  the	  environmental	  conditions	  suitable	  for	  
dengue	  –	  the	  “environmental	  envelope”	  –	  in	  the	  Hales	  approach.	  	  	  
	  
Another	   methodological	   factor	   that	   might	   influence	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	  
environmental	   envelope	   is	   the	   number	   of	   variables	   used	   in	   the	  modelling.	   As	  
mentioned,	  the	  dengue	  model	  eventually	  incorporated	  only	  humidity,	  although	  
the	   authors	   effectively	   assume	   that	   this	   climatic	   variable	   accounts	   for	   both	  
temperature	  and	  rainfall	  and	  they	  suggest	  that	  it	  did	  not	  affect	  model	  accuracy:	  	  
	  
Hales:	   ...	  actually	  for	  logistic	  reasons	  it	  was	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  work	  at	  that	  stage	  to	  
get	   the	  climate	  (variables)	   into	   the	  statistical	  model	   ...	   it	  was	  easier	   to	  make	  a	  
model	  with	  only	  one	  variable.	  And	  it	  was	  indistinguishable,	  as	  I	  recall,	  in	  terms	  
of	  how	  accurate	  it	  was.	  
	  
This	   interpretation	  was	   strongly	   contested.	   	   A	   CCH	   opponent	   has	   argued	   that	  
the	  more	  variables	  in	  the	  model,	  the	  narrower	  the	  environmental	  envelope:	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R4:	  The	  analogy	  is	  that	  there’s	  no	  place	  like	  home	  for	  dengue	  or	  for	  any	  other	  
disease.	   Now	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   single	   variable	   like	   temperature	   there	   are	   lots	   of	  
places	   like	   home,	   there	   are	   lots	   of	   places	   with	   the	   same	   temperature	   where	  
dengue	  exists	  at	   the	  moment	   that	  dengue	  doesn’t	   actually	  occur.	  But	   if	   you're	  
going	  to	  say,	   ‘Well	  actually	  dengue	  needs	  temperature	  and	  rainfall	  of	  a	  certain	  
specified	   amount’,	   there	   are	   few	   places	   in	   the	   world	   that	   have	   the	   specified	  
temperature	   and	   rainfall	   so	   your	   predictions	   of	   dengue’s	   global	   distribution	  
become	   more	   restricted.	   ...	   If	   you	   then	   try	   to	   predict	   ...	   dengue	   in	   a	  
unidimensional	  world	  or	  dengue	  in	  a	  million-­‐dimensional	  world,	  you	  can	  see	  in	  
the	  unidimensional	  world	  temperatures	  are	  going	  to	  change	  very	  dramatically	  
and	   therefore	   your	   predictions	   about	   dengue’s	   future	   will	   change	   very	  
dramatically.	   In	   a	   million-­‐dimensional	   world...	   there	   will	   be	   no	   place	   in	   the	  
future	  which	  is	  precisely	  like	  dengue’s	  home	  at	  the	  present	  time.	  	  
	  
The	  authors	  of	  the	  dengue	  model	  do	  in	  fact	  concede	  that	  their	  model	  accuracy	  
was	  not	  perfect	   as	   it	  predicted	   contemporary	  dengue	   transmission	   in	  parts	  of	  
Australia,	   for	   example,	   where	   vector-­‐borne	   disease	   specialists	   were	   quick	   to	  
point	   out	   their	   error	   (Hales	   interview).	   	   It	   would	   thus	   seem	   reasonable	   to	  
conclude	  that	  the	  time	  period	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  disease	  presence	  and	  absence	  
data,	   and	   the	   decision	   to	   model	   few	   or	   many	   variables	   can	   both	   affect	   the	  
construction	   of	   an	   environmental	   envelope	   governing	   the	   transmission	   of	   a	  
vector-­‐borne	  disease.	  	  	  
	  
Socioeconomic	  expectations	  revisited	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  scientific	  consensus	  on	  how	  to	  make	  such	  methodological	  
decisions	   it	   is,	   once	   again,	   instructive	   to	   assess	   the	   way	   in	   which	   broader	  
commitments	  have	  influenced	  research.	  	  One	  explanation	  relates	  to	  the	  different	  
notions	   of	   “progress”	   in	   socio-­‐economic	   circumstances	   held	   by	   the	   CCH	  
opponents	   and	   proponents.	   	   	   CCH	   opponents,	   as	   has	   been	   alluded	   to	   earlier,	  
tend	  to	  stress	  a	  more	  optimistic	  vision	  of	  the	  future,	  in	  which	  improvements	  in	  
public	  health	  can	  be	  expected.	  	  Using	  the	  most	  recent	  data	  alone	  is	  most	  relevant	  
for	   modelling	   precisely	   because	   it	   reflects,	   as	   accurately	   as	   possible,	   recent	  
“progress”	   in	   disease	   control.	   	   CCH	  proponents,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   are	   rather	  
more	  cautious	  (or	  pessimistic,	  depending	  on	  one’s	  vantage	  point).	  Future	  social	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trends,	  Hales	  and	  co-­‐authors	  note,	  “might	  move	  in	  a	  favourable	  direction	  (Hales	  
et	   al.,	   2002:	   833)”,	   but	   “there	   are	   other	   possible	   situations	   that	   might	   have	  
negative	  consequences	  (Ibid.:	  833)”.	   	  A	  concern	  with	  potential	   lapses	   in	  public	  
health	  capacities	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  vision	  of	  globalisation	  and	  its	   links	  to	  
both	   climate	   change	   and	   infectious	   diseases	   (and	   which	   are	   furthermore	  
consistent	  with	  the	  EID	  worldview):	  
	  
The	  resurgence	  of	  dengue	  fever	  and	  global	  climate	  change	  are	  driven	  by	  similar	  
issues,	   which	   include	   excessive	   resource	   consumption	   in	   rich	   countries,	   an	  
increase	  in	  social	  inequality,	  and	  population	  increases	  in	  poor	  countries	  (Ibid.:	  
833).	  	  
	  
For	  their	  part,	  CCH	  opponents	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  optimistic	  about	  the	  future	  but	  
less	  optimistic	  about	  human	  ability	  to	  assess	  it:	  
	  
R4:	  Very,	  very	   few	  models	  of	  health	   futures	  can	   take	  account	  of	   technological	  
advances,	   of	   evolution	   of	   diseases,	   of	   changes	   in	   human	   susceptibility	   to	  
disease,	  because	  we	  don’t	  know	  how	  much	  they	  will	  be	  and	  what	  their	  effects	  
will	   be…	   Things	   that	   have	   revolutionised	   human	   history	   have	   been	   entirely	  
unexpected.	  And	  50	  years	  down	  the	  line	  the	  future	  is	  very	  different	  from	  what	  it	  
was	  expected	  to	  be...	  
	  
This	   is	   consistent	   with	   their	   desire	   to	   re-­‐frame	   the	   debate	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
present,	  emphasizing	  the	  need	  to	  control	  the	  disease	  in	  the	  present	  (an	  activity	  
in	  which	  their	  expertise	   is	  rather	  more	  established).	  As	  Duane	  Gubler	  has	  said	  
about	  climate	  change	  and	  its	  role	  in	  dengue	  re-­‐emergence:	  “It’s	  all	  hype.	  	  A	  lot	  of	  
public	  health	  officials	  and	  a	   lot	  of	  policy	  makers	  use	  global	  warming	  as	  a	  cop-­‐








4.6	  Tick-­‐borne	  disease	  and	  climate	  change:	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  place	  
 
The	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   has	   not	   been	   restricted	   to	   mosquito-­‐borne	  
diseases,	  as	  an	  extensive	  debate	  over	  the	  linkages	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  
tick-­‐borne	  diseases	  demonstrates.	  	  In	  this	  particular	  dispute,	  the	  importance	  of	  
socio-­‐economic	   variables	   in	   climate-­‐disease	   modelling	   was	   brought	   to	   the	  
forefront.	  	  
	  
The	   dynamics	   of	   TBE	   transmission	   are	   complicated,	   leaving	   much	   room	   for	  
interpretation.	   Its	   full	   transmission	   cycle	   involves	   the	   lifecycle	   of	   ticks,	   the	  
climatic	   conditions	   that	   influence	   these	   lifecycles,	   the	   viral	   or	   bacterial	  
infections	  that	  infect	  ticks	  and	  lead	  to	  disease,	  the	  natural	  animal	  “reservoirs”	  of	  
ticks	   (such	   as	   deer	   populations),	   the	   land-­‐use	   and	   ecological	   trends	   of	   these	  
reservoir	  populations,	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  or	  mitigate	  human	  exposures	  
to	   ticks	   and	   risks	   of	  TBE.	   	  Amid	   this	  wealth	   of	   entry-­‐points	   for	   research,	   CCH	  
opponents	  and	  proponents	  focused	  on	  very	  different	  contexts	  and,	  predictably	  
enough,	  they	  came	  to	  very	  different	  conclusions.	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   1990s,	   there	   was	   an	   observed	   increase	   in	   the	   incidence	   of	   tick-­‐borne	  
encephalitis	   (TBE)	   in	  many	  parts	  of	  Europe,	  particularly	   central	   and	  northern	  
Europe.	   	   Researchers	   began	   to	   investigate	   the	   reasons	   behind	   this,	   and	   the	  
answers	  varied.	  Among	   the	  most	   common	   interpretations	  were	  detection	  bias	  
(health	   authorities	   only	   started	   to	   properly	   monitor	   these	   diseases	   from	   the	  
1990s,	   so	   the	   increased	   incidence	   was	   only	   a	   consequence	   of	   increased	  
awareness),	   social	   change	   following	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   and	  
climate	  change.	  
	  
In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Lancet	  in	  2001,	  two	  Swedish	  CCH	  researchers,	  Elisabet	  
Lindgren	   and	   Rolf	   Gustafson,	   examined	   the	   increased	   incidence	   of	   TBE	   in	  
relation	  to	  climate	  change	  (Lindgren	  and	  Gustafson,	  2001).	  	  A	  central	  aspect	  of	  
their	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  a	  “certain	  number	  of	  days	  per	  season	  (Ibid.:	  16)”	  with	  
a	  minimal	   temperature	  are	  required	   to	  sustain	  and	   increase	   the	  prevalence	  of	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tick	  populations.	  	  An	  important	  temperature	  threshold	  was	  5°C,	  as	  it	  is	  required	  
for	  tick	  activity	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  vegetation	  season.	   	  The	  authors	   looked	  at	  
historical	   records	  of	  TBE	   incidence	   in	   and	   around	  Stockholm	   county,	   Sweden,	  
where	  records	  on	  TBE	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  1950s.	   	  To	  conduct	  their	  analysis,	  the	  
researchers	  looked	  at	  the	  two	  years	  of	  temperature	  data	  before	  a	  given	  year	  of	  
TBE	  incidence	  (multiple	  years	  of	  weather	  are	  believed	  to	  impact	  tick	  prevalence	  
in	   any	   given	   year)	   with	   data	   obtained	   from	   the	   Swedish	   Meteorological	   and	  
Hydrological	  Institute.	  
	  
Based	   upon	   multiple	   regression	   analyses,	   the	   authors	   concluded	   that	   TBE	  
incidence	   was	   linked	   to	   a	   combination	   of	   climatic	   variables	   which,	   more	  
generally,	   tend	   to	   include	   milder	   winters	   and	   earlier	   onsets	   of	   vegetative	  
seasons.	   	  Noting	  that	  climate	  change	  had	  led	  to	  an	  earlier	  European	  vegetation	  
season	  by	  an	  average	  of	  12	  days	   from	  1960	  to	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  and	   that	  winter	  
temperatures	   had	   become	   milder,	   Lindgren	   and	   Gustafson	   conclude	   that	   a	  
milder	   climate	   in	   Sweden	   “has	   contributed	   not	   only	   to	   increases	   in	   TBE	  
incidences	   (Ibid.:	   18)”,	   but	   also	   to	   other	   tick-­‐borne	   diseases	   such	   as	   Lyme	  
borreliosis.	   	   It	   is	   noteworthy,	   however,	   that	   the	   authors	   also	   noted	   potential	  
confounding	  variables	   in	  their	  analysis.	  Warm	  weather	  conditions,	  particularly	  
in	   the	   spring	   and	  autumn,	   they	   suggest,	   also	   affects	   the	  human	   risk	  of	   getting	  
tick	  bites	  as	  more	  people	  spend	  more	  time	  pursuing	  outdoor	  activities,	  whether	  
mushroom	   picking,	   hiking,	   or	   picnicking.	   	   Additionally,	   a	   large	   number	   of	  
outdoor	   cottages	   around	   Stockholm	  were	   built	   during	   the	   study’s	   time-­‐frame,	  
thereby	   increasing	   the	   overall	   population	   at-­‐risk.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	  
noted,	  mitigating	   factors	   such	   as	   the	   availability	   of	   a	   vaccine	   against	  TBE	   and	  
increased	   overall	   awareness	   about	   tick-­‐borne	   diseases	   might	   have	   led	   to	   an	  
underestimation	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  association	  between	  TBE	  and	  climate	  change.	  
	  
The	  conclusions	  from	  this	  study	  were	  consistent	  with	  an	  earlier	  paper	  authored	  
by	  Lindgren	  and	  colleagues	   in	  which	  she	   tracked	  a	  northerly	  expansion	  of	   the	  
Ixodes	   ricinus	   tick	   species	   in	   Sweden	   and	   attributed	   it	   to	   climate	   change	  
(Lindgren	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   	   It	   also	   corroborated	   with	   studies	   from	   the	   Czech	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Republic,	  published	  shortly	  thereafter	  but	  already	  generally	  known	  at	  the	  time,	  
which	  linked	  climate	  change	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  I.	  ricinus	  ticks	  and	  TBE	  to	  higher	  
altitudes	   (Daniel	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   	   These	   studies	  would	   form	   the	   basis	   for	   claims	  
from	  the	  CCH	  community	  and	  beyond	  linking	  climate	  change	  to	  TBE,	  as	  a	  CCH	  
opponent	  noted:	  
	  
R17:	   …	   the	   data	   that	   has	   most	   likely	   been	   referenced	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  
linkages	  …	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  tick-­‐borne	  disease	  have	  been	  of	  course	  
the	  Lindgren	  work.	  
	  
In	   similar	   fashion	   to	   the	   debates	   over	   malaria	   or	   dengue,	   these	   studies	   met	  
immediate	  resistance.	  	  	  
	  
In	  a	  letter	  to	  Lancet,	  Sarah	  Randolph	  accuses	  Lindgren	  and	  Gustafson	  of	  giving	  a	  
“false	   impression	   of	   a	   simple	   causal	   relation	   (Randolph	   et	   al.,	   2001:	   1731)”	  
between	   TBE	   in	   Sweden	   and	   climate	   change,	   suggesting	   that	   although	  
temperatures	  could	  be	  a	   limiting	  factor	   in	  TBE	  epidemiology,	  “the	  relation	  has	  
not	   been	   satisfactorily	   shown	   (Ibid.:	   1731)”	   by	   their	   analysis.	   	   Randolph	   also	  
suggests	  that	  across	  Europe,	  the	  trends	  in	  TBE	  epidemiology	  were	  not	  uniform,	  
leading	  her	  to	  conclude	  that	  “climate	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  causal	  factor	  (Ibid.:	  1713)”.	  	  
Randolph	   concedes	   that	   climate	   change	   might	   be	   playing	   a	   role,	   but	   warns	  
against	   inferring	   any	   pattern	   in	   the	   links	   between	   climate	   change	   in	   TBE.	  	  
Vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  such	  as	  TBE	  depend	  upon:	  	  
	  
a	   complex	   integration	   of	   biological	   processes,	   each	   of	   which	   responds	  
differentially	  to	  changes	  in	  climate.	  Spatially	  variable	  climate	  change	  operating	  
on	  a	  spatially	  variable	  climate	  base	  will	  throw	  up	  spatially	  variable	  changes	  in	  
disease	  (Ibid.:	  1713).	  
	  
In	   other	   words,	   the	   variation	   is	   so	   substantial	   that	   it	   is	   not	   really	   worth	  
attributing	  or	  predicting	  TBE	  incidence	   in	  relation	  to	  climate	  change.	   	  The	  key	  
focus	   of	   Randolph’s	   objections,	   however,	   relate	   to	   factors	   other	   than	   climate.	  	  
TBE	   incidence	   rose	   dramatically	   in	   the	   1990s	   in	   many	   European	   countries,	  
including	  the	  Baltic	  States,	  Poland,	  Slovakia,	   the	  Czech	  Republic,	  and	  Germany,	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and	  Randolph	  suggests	  that	  “sociopolitical	  circumstances	  and	  resultant	  patterns	  
of	  agricultural	  and	   leisure	  activities	  (Ibid.:	  1731)”	  are	  the	  principal	  underlying	  
factors.	  	  This	  would	  become	  the	  theme	  of	  much	  of	  her	  research.	  Primarily	  based	  
upon	   studies	   of	   the	   Baltic	   States	   following	   the	   break-­‐up	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	  
Randolph	  and	  her	  colleagues	  argue	  that	  agricultural	  reforms,	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  
use	  of	  pesticides,	  and	  increased	  unemployment	  and	  poverty	  are	  correlated	  with	  
increased	   human	   exposures	   to	   ticks	   and	   to	   tick-­‐borne	   diseases	   (Sumilo	   et	   al.,	  
2007).	   	   In	   addition,	   a	  whole	   range	  of	   additional	   alternative	   explanations	  have	  
been	  put	  forward	  by	  CCH	  opponents:	  	  
	  
Randolph:	  …the	  increase	  in	  tick	  abundance	  in	  central	  and	  eastern	  Europe	  can	  
be	   related	   to	   the	   increase	   in	   deer	   abundance,	   which	   might	   be	   related	   to	   the	  
change	  in	  hunting	  practise	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  change.	  
	  
…But	   also,	   in	   the	   past,	   everything	   was	   blasted	   with	   insecticide	   and	   that	   no	  
longer	  happens…	  
	  
…In	   2006	   we	   had	   this	   wonderful	   natural	   experiment	   in	   the	   whole	   across	   of	  
Europe	  where	  there	  was	  a	  massive	  spike	  of	  TBE	  in	  some	  countries	  but	  not	  in	  all	  
countries.	  And	  we	  showed	  this	  was	  to	  do	  with	  the	  weather.	  And	  it	  was	  …	  very	  
good	   weather	   from	   June	   through	   to	   December	   2006,	   perfect	   for	   mushroom	  
growth	   and	   perfect	   for	   outdoor	   activities…	   And	   we	   showed	   that	   different	  
countries	   showed	   different	   spikes	   in	   accordance	   with	   how	   you'd	   expect	   the	  
local	  people	  to	  respond	  to	  good	  weather.	  
	  
Addressing	   Randolph’s	   letter	   to	   Lancet,	   Lindgren	   and	   Gustafson	   justify	   the	  
validity	   of	   the	   datasets	   they	   used	   for	   their	   analysis,	   hoping	   to	   prevent	   future	  
“misinterpretations	  of	  the	  results	  (Randolph	  et	  al.:	  1732)”.	  They	  claim	  that	  their	  
study	  did	  take	  into	  account,	  indirectly,	  other	  “climate-­‐dependent	  factors	  such	  as	  
host	   animal	   availability	   and	   human	   leisure	   activities	   (Ibid.:	   1732)”.	   The	   CCH	  
community	  has	  furthermore	  defended	  its	  methodological	  approach:	  
	  
R20:	  In	  central	  Europe,	  TBE	  shows	  a	  year	  to	  year	  relationship	  to	  temperatures	  
and	  so	  on	  and	  those	  issues	  will	  be	  a	  source	  of	  dispute	  because	  Sarah	  Randolph	  
says	   ‘well	  that	   is	   just	  empirical	  epidemiology,	  you	  need	  to	  know	  what	   is	  going	  
on	  with	  the	  three	  stages	  of	  the	  lifecycle	  of	  the	  tick	  or	  you	  don't	  know	  what	  you	  
are	   talking	  about’.	  Well	   I	   think	   she	   is	  wrong,	   I	  mean	  epidemiologists	  often	  do	  
operate	  empirically	  and	  for	  some	  questions	  that	  is	  entirely	  appropriate.	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An	   irony	   here	   is	   that	   the	   CCH	   community	   is	   drawing	   upon	   “traditional”	  
empirical	  epidemiological	  methodology	  to	  support	  this	  research,	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	   “ecological”	   perspectives,	   even	   though	   as	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3	   they	   have	  
argued	   that	   “traditional”	   epidemiology	   limits	   CCH	   research.	   	   Nonetheless,	  
Randolph	  and	  her	  colleagues	  are	  not	  epidemiologists	  and	  this	  is	  a	  point	  that	  the	  
CCH	   community	   has	   harnessed	   when	   on	   the	   offensive.	   	   Although	   Randolph	  
identifies	   correlations	   between	   socio-­‐economic	   factors	   and	   TBE	   in	   the	   Baltic	  
States,	  the	  CCH	  community	  retorts:	  
	  
R18:	  …	  ultimately	   they	   stop	   short	   of	   coming	   to	   any	   causal	   inference	   because	  
she	  ultimately	  only	  knows	  the	  associations.	  So,	  she's	  very	  much	  limited	  by	  her	  
methodological	  approach	  and	  she	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  transcend	  the…	  confined	  
area	  of	  ecology	  …	  if	  you	  do	  a	  proper	  epidemiologic	  study,	  you	  can	  control	  for	  all	  
of	   the	   things	   that	   she	   is	   looking	   at	   ...	   I	   think	   a	   lot	   of	   that	   controversy	   can	   be	  
resolved	  with	  a	  proper	  epidemiologic	  investigation.22	  
	  
From	   their	   perspective,	   only	   the	   CCH	   community	   is	   equipped	   to	   conduct	  
“proper”	   epidemiologic	   investigations,	   and	   where	   they	   have,	   they	   have	  
sufficiently	  demonstrated	  the	  links	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  TBE.	  
	  
On	  the	  importance	  of	  place	  
During	  an	   interview	   in	  which	   the	  climate-­‐TBE	  controversy	  was	  discussed,	  one	  
respondent	  discussed	  their	  opponent’s	  research:	  
	  
R17:	   This	   is	   a	   primary	   example	   of	   how	   long	   you	   didn't	   really	   listen	   at	   what	  
question	   you	   were	   asking,	   but	   you	   use	   the	   answer	   to	   apply	   to	   a	   different	  
question.	  
	  
Both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate	   can	   probably	   be	   accused	   of	   this.	   	   The	   climate-­‐TBE	  
controversy	  is	  in	  fact	  one	  about	  whether	  a	  given	  question	  is	  the	  right	  one	  to	  ask,	  
and	  about	  how	  far	  generalisations	  about	  the	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  can	  be	  
taken.	   Discounting	   for	   a	   moment	   the	   co-­‐produced	   nature	   of	   climate-­‐TBE	  
                                                
22	  This	  critique	  may	  have	  influenced	  Sarah	  Randolph.	  	  She	  is	  the	  senior	  author	  of	  a	  recent	  paper	  
in	  which	  case-­‐control	  study	  is	  used	  to	  examine	  socio-­‐economic	  status	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  TBE	  in	  
Poland	  (Stefanoff	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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research,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  take	  the	  findings	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  controversy	  at	  
face	   value,	   the	   question	   would	   arise:	   should	   evidence	   from	   Sweden,	   where	  
dramatic	  social	  upheavals	  have	  not	  generally	  happened,	  be	  offered	  as	  proof	  that	  
climate	  change	  affects	  TBE	  in	  principal	  –	  or	  only	  in	  these	  regions	  in	  the	  specific	  
time	   frames	   that	   the	   studies	   covered?	  Conversely,	   should	   evidence	   that	   social	  
upheaval	  in	  Latvia	  or	  Lithuania	  led	  to	  a	  steep	  rise	  in	  TBE	  incidence	  be	  offered	  as	  
evidence	  that	  social	  change,	  in	  principal,	  is	  the	  key	  determinant	  of	  TBE?	  	  	  
	  
Of	   course,	   it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   that	   both	   sides	   are	   right,	   or	   that	   the	   truth	   is	  
somewhere	   in	   between.	   But	   such	   has	   been	   the	   polarisation	   between	   CCH	  
proponents	   and	   opponents	   that	   this	   middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐road	   position	   has	   barely	  
been	   possible.	   	   Thus,	   the	   study	   sites	   adopted	   are	   ones	  most	   likely	   to	   confirm	  
each	  side’s	  original	  position.	  Actors	  appear	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  this:	  
	  
R18:	   I	  don't	   think	  anyone	  disagrees	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  climate	   is	  an	   important	  
determinant	   of	   tick-­‐borne	   encephalitis.	   The	   debate	   is	   over	   the	   degree.	   And	  
Sarah	  Randolph	  has	  focused	  her	  research…	  in	  an	  area	  where	  there's	  been	  a	  big	  
political	  upheaval	  that	  has	  precipitated	  a	  lot	  of	  social	  change,	  which	  is	  probably	  
responsible	  for	  …	  a	  surge	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  types	  of,	  of	  diseases,	  chronic	  and	  
infectious.	  And	  TBE	  might	  be	  one	  of	  them.	  
	  
R10:	   I	  will	   say	   that	   it	  depends	  on	  which	  part	  of	   the	  world	  you	  are	   looking	  or	  
which	  part	  of	  Europe.	  
	  
The	   definition	   of	   place	   thus	   becomes	   an	   integral,	   if	   slightly	   unspecified,	  
component	  of	  the	  debate.	  A	  CCH	  opponent	  discussed	  the	  research	  from	  Sweden	  
predicting	  a	  northerly	  expansion	  of	  TBE:	  	  
	  
R17:	   What	   proportion	   of	   the	   European	   land	   surface	   does	   that	   concern?	   And	  
that's	   rather	   small.	   And	   how	  many	   people	   live	   there	   or	   indeed	  walk	   through	  
there	   as	   visitors	   or	   as	   tourists?	   …	   Can	   that	   in	   any	   way	   explain	   the	   massive	  
increase	  in	  incidence	  in	  Europe?	  And	  the	  answer	  is:	  not	  possible.	  You	  might	  get	  
one	  or	  two	  cases,	  but	  hang	  on,	  we're	  talking	  about	  an	  extra	  2000	  cases,	  where	  




Importantly,	  this	  comment	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  possibility	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  
responsible	  for	  a	  northerly	  expansion	  of	  TBE	  in	  Europe.	  Indeed,	  CCH	  opponents	  
even	  concede	   this	  point!	  Sarah	  Randolph	  and	  David	  Rogers,	   for	  example,	  have	  
even	  published	  a	  model	  predicting	  an	  expansion	  of	  TBE	   in	  northwest	  Sweden	  
(and	   a	   contraction	   of	   TBE	   at	   the	   southern	   edges	   of	   its	   European	   distribution	  
range)	   (Randolph	   and	   Rogers,	   2000).	   	   Consider	   also	   that	   Lindgren	   and	  
Gustafson	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  demonstrating	  a	  climate-­‐TBE	  link	  for	  all	  of	  Europe	  
(their	   Lancet	   paper	   is	   even	   titled	   “Tick-­‐borne	   encephalitis	   in	   Sweden	   and	  
climate	  change”),	  but	  in	  the	  quote	  above	  Europe	  is	  used	  as	  evidence	  to	  weaken	  
the	   climate-­‐TBE	   link.	   	   The	   converse	   also	   happens,	   of	   course.	   Sweden	   and/or	  
Western	  Europe	   are	   used	   to	   disprove,	   or	   at	   least	   limit,	   the	   impact	   of	   findings	  
from	   the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union.	   	  What	   is	  behind	   this	  distortion	  of	   the	   terms	  of	  
debate?	   	  A	  plausible	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  stakes	  surrounding	  the	  climate-­‐TBE	  
controversy	   related	   to	   the	   generalisability	   and	   uptake	   of	   the	   findings:	   which	  
studies	   will	   be	   more	   widely	   cited	   among	   scientific	   and	   policy	   communities?	  
Actors	  on	  both	  sides	  fear	  the	  other’s	  studies	  will	  prove	  definitive.	   	   In	  this	  way,	  
conflicting	   professional	   interests	   have,	   once	   again,	   resulted	   in	   different	  
interpretations	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   climate	   change.	   For	  
CCH	  opponents	   it	   is	   insignificant	   in	   comparison	  with	  more	   proximate	   factors,	  
which,	  incidentally,	  are	  easier	  to	  address:	  
	  
R17:	  The	  thing	   is	  we	  are	   looking	  at	   the	  wrong	  target	  or	  we	  are	   looking	  at	   the	  
wrong	  cause.	  Even	   if	   climate	  change	   is	  playing	  a	  part,	   the	  evidence	   is	   that	   it's	  
playing	  a	  rather	  small	  part.	  And	  what	  could	  we	  do	  about	  it?	  We	  could	  go	  home,	  
beat	  our	  chests	  and	  turn	  off	  the	  light	  bulb...	  	  
	  
For	   CCH	   proponents,	   it	   is	   a	   call	   to	   arms:	   “We	   need	   to	   adapt,	   because	   …	   the	  
climate	   is	   going	   to	   continue	   to	   change	   regardless	  of	   the	  actions	  we	  are	   taking	  
from	  mitigation	  right	  now	  (R10)”.	  	  	  
	  
Thus	   divided,	   both	   sides	   continue	   to	   produce	   papers	   emphasizing	   or	   re-­‐
iterating	   their	   original	   stance,	   supported	   by	   new	   data,	   new	  models,	   and	   new	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collaborations	  (e.g.	  Jaenson	  and	  Lindgren,	  2011,	  Randolph,	  2010,	  Stefanoff	  et	  al.,	  
2012).	  
 
4.7	  Discussion:	  controversy	  and	  uncertainty	  
 
In	   this	   Chapter,	   a	   long-­‐standing	   and	  heated	   controversy	   over	  whether,	   and	   to	  
what	  extent,	  climate	  change	  can	  be	  said	  to	  influence	  the	  transmission	  of	  vector-­‐
borne	   diseases	   has	   been	   examined.	   	   The	   focus	   of	   this	   Chapter	   has	   been	   to	  
analyse	  CCH	  research	  in	  detail	  so	  as	  to	  unearth	  the	  deeper	  reasons	  behind	  the	  
climate-­‐VBD	   controversy.	   	   	   After	   introducing	   the	   general	   terms	   of	   the	   debate	  
(4.1),	   it	  was	  noted	  how	  the	  boundary	  work	  evident	  in	  the	  controversy	  offers	  a	  
useful,	  if	  ultimately	  incomplete,	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  (4.2).	  Four	  
case	   studies	   were	   subsequently	   presented	   in	   order	   to	   further	   explore	   the	  
controversy:	   malaria	   (4.3),	   “highland”	   malaria	   (4.4),	   dengue	   (4.5),	   and	   tick-­‐
borne	   diseases	   (4.6).	   	   In	   this	   section,	   some	   of	   the	   key	   themes	   emerging	   from	  
these	  case	  studies	  will	  be	  summarised.	  
	  
The	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   has	   been	   described	   as	   one	   between	   CCH	  
proponents	   and	   CCH	   opponents,	   the	   latter	   primarily	   consisting	   of	   a	  
constellation	   of	   ecologists	   and	   “infectious	   disease	   specialists”	   (4.2).	   	   This	   is	  
admittedly	  an	  over-­‐simplified	  way	  of	  classifying	  these	  actors.	  	  Despite	  that	  CCH	  
proponents	   and	   opponents	   share	   very	   similar	   worldviews	   and	   research	  
objectives,	   it	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  that	  these	  “sides”	  are	  so	  harmonious	  that	  
they	  agree	  with	  each	  other	  on	  every	  point.	   	  Even	  the	  tight-­‐knit	  constellation	  of	  
CCH	  proponents	  (Chapter	  3)	  has	  its	  internal	  rivalries	  and	  jealousies,	  and	  some	  
degree	  of	  boundary	  work	  can	  be	  seen	  among	  them.	  Paul	  Epstein,	   for	  example,	  
was	   denounced	   by	   one	   CCH	   community	   member	   as	   being	   “only”	   a	   medical	  
doctor	  and	  not	  an	  epidemiologist;	  his	  work	  was	  described	  as	  overly	  simple	  and	  
polemic	   (private	   correspondence).	   	   Similar	   rivalries	   exist	   amongst	   the	   CCH	  
opponents.	   	   Nonetheless,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   arguments	   that	   key	   CCH	  
opponents	   and	   proponents	   have	   consistently	   supported,	   such	   a	   classification	  
appears	  to	  be	  both	  fair	  and	  valid.	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The	  publication	  of	   the	  Martens	  malaria	  models	  was	  a	   landmark	  event	   for	  CCH	  
research.	   It	   was	   also	   the	   tipping	   point	   in	   the	   CCH	   controversy.	   Before	   the	  
publication	   of	   these	   models,	   a	   group	   of	   ecologists	   and	   infectious	   disease	  
“specialists”	  may	   have	   been	   annoyed	   by	   CCH	   community	   research,	   but	   it	  was	  
not	  perceived	  to	  be	  much	  of	  a	  threat	  –	  as	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  CCH	  research	  
was	  originally	  marginal	  even	  within	  the	  public	  health	  and	  epidemiologic	  worlds.	  	  
Everything	  changed	  with	  the	  attention	  that	  the	  Martens	  models	  received.	  “The	  
die	  was	  cast	  and	  persists	  today”,	  as	  Sarah	  Randolph	  (2010:	  93)	  describes	  it.	  	  The	  
media	   became	   interested,	   the	   IPCC	   republished	   the	   maps,	   and	   the	   ecologists	  
became	   so	   frustrated	   that	   they	  mounted	   a	   counter-­‐attack.	   	   The	   spats	   became	  
unpleasant	  and	  an	  arms	  race	  of	  high-­‐profile	  publications	  ensued.	  
	  
The	   controversy	   between	   CCH	  proponents	   and	   opponents	  was	   not,	   of	   course,	  
restricted	   to	   the	   peer-­‐reviewed	   literature.	   	   Shouting	   has	   broken	   out	   at	  
conferences.	   	   Disagreements	   have	   extended	   into	   “official”	   fora,	   such	   as	   IPCC	  
review	  panels	  (Chapter	  5).	  	  It	  has	  been	  covered	  by	  the	  print	  media,	  and	  aspects	  
of	  it	  have	  even	  appeared	  in	  films.	  Al	  Gore’s	  film	  An	  Inconvenient	  Truth	  discusses	  
Paul	   Epstein’s	   account	   of	   highland	  malaria,	  which	   drew	   the	   ire	   of	   Paul	   Reiter	  
and	   in	   turn	   motivated	   him	   to	   appear	   in	   the	   film	   The	   Great	   Global	   Warming	  
Swindle:	  
	  
Reiter:	  It’s	  nauseating.	  Gore	  shows	  a	  little	  animation	  of	  mosquitoes	  moving	  up	  
a	  mountain…There	  were	  actually	  six	  people	  given	  special	  credit	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  
film	  (An	  Inconvenient	  Truth),	  and	  one	  of	  them	  is	  Paul	  Epstein.23	  
	  
All	   of	   this	   to	   re-­‐iterate	   that	   CCH	   research	   outputs	   are	   visible	   and	   contested	  
beyond	  the	  scientific	  world:	  the	  stakes	  are	  higher	  than	  scientific	  prestige	  alone.	  	  
To	  understand	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  controversy,	   it	  has	  been	  instructive	  to	  examine	  
the	  co-­‐production	  of	  CCH	  research.	   	  The	  case	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  
                                                
23	  From	  the	  transcript	  of	  an	  interview	  with	  Paul	  Reiter,	  available	  at:	  
www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202007/GW_malaria.pdf	  (accessed	  October	  17,	  
2011).	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(4.3-­‐4.6)	  allude	  to	  a	  few	  formative	  ways	  in	  which	  differing	  disciplinary	  interests	  
have	  driven	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy.	  
 
4.7.1	  Modelled	  worldviews	  
Assessing	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   through	   a	   theoretical	   perspective	  
informed	   by	   the	   idiom	   of	   co-­‐production	   (Chapter	   2)	   offers	   a	   much	   greater	  
explanatory	   power	   than	   what	   has	   been	   achieved	   by	   other	   analyses	   of	   this	  
controversy,	   such	   as	   the	   “collective	   action	   frames”	   approach	   discussed	   in	   4.2.	  	  
By	  focusing	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  political	  and	  the	  scientific	  have	  
mutually	   informed	   this	   controversy,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   seemingly	   routine	  
methodological	  issues	  –	  such	  as	  whether	  to	  model	  future	  disease	  outcomes	  via	  a	  
systems	  or	   statistical	   approach	   (4.3),	  how	   to	  define	  disease	  presence/absence	  
points	  (4.5),	  or	  where	  to	  situate	  research	  (4.6)	  –	  are	  in	  fact	  as	  much	  the	  product	  
and	   consequence	   of	   subscription	   to	   particular	   worldviews	   and	   policy	  
preferences	  as	  they	  are	  a	  product	  of	  technical	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
	  
As	  Randolph	  and	  Rogers	  have	  recently	  noted:	  “The	  type	  of	  model,	  the	  variables	  
used,	   and	   the	   way	   they	   are	   selected	   are	   important	   determinants	   of	   the	   final	  
model	   fit	   (Randolph	   and	   Rogers,	   2010)”.	   	   Yet,	   as	   this	   Chapter	   has	   shown,	  
regardless	  of	  which	  disease	  research	   is	   focused	  upon,	  and	  regardless	  of	  which	  
modelling	  methodology	   is	   used,	   the	   single-­‐most	   important	  determinant	   of	   the	  
final	  model	  fit	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  person	  who	  undertook	  the	  research.	  
	  
Although	  it	  is	  fairly	  certain	  that	  both	  CCH	  opponents	  and	  proponents	  would	  like	  
for	  VBDs	  to	  become	  less	  of	  a	  public	  health	  burden,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  two	  sides	  
vehemently	  disagree	  about	  the	  best	  way	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  because	  the	  
future	   is	   unsettled	   and	   because	   no	   dominant	   disease	   control	   regime	   for	  
addressing	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases	   currently	   exists	   that	   the	   controversy	   is	   so	  
intense:	   “winning”	   the	  controversy	  would	  mean	  not	  only	  scientific	   recognition	  
but	   also	   the	   opportunity	   to	   influence	   the	   allocation	   and	   direction	   of	   limited	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global	  resources	  dedicated	  to	  disease	  control.	  	  This	  dynamic	  influences	  both	  the	  
content	  and	  the	  context	  of	  the	  controversy.	  
	  
Differing	  worldviews	  and	  policy	  preferences	  are,	   in	  turn,	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  
disciplinary	  context	  within	  which	  the	  CCH	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  operate,	  
as	   Chapter	   3	   demonstrated	   for	   the	   CCH	   community.	   	   Discipline,	   for	   example,	  
influences	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	   approach	   the	   research	   and	   interpret	   its	  
findings:	  
	  
R1:	   We’re	   relatively	   comfortable	   to	   try	   and	   make	   a	   judgement	   about	   what	  
would	  happen	  to	  that	  disease	  system	  if	  some	  of	  the	  major	  forcing	  factors	  were	  
changed.	  Epidemiologists	  are	  happy	  to	  do	  that.	  Whereas	  I	  think	  that	  makes	  the	  
entomologists	  and	  the	  outbreak	  investigators	  quite	  uncomfortable	  because	  they	  
feel	  it’s	  just	  so	  much	  that’s	  uncontrolled	  and	  uncertain	  that	  really	  you’ve	  got	  no	  
right	  to	  draw	  any	  conclusions	  at	  all	  because	  of	  all	  the	  factors	  that	  are	  involved.	  
	  
Similarly,	  disciplinary	  perspectives	  appear	  to	  be	  influencing	  whether	  the	  future	  
is	  viewed	  optimistically	  or	  pessimistically.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  shapes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
a	  researcher	  views	  the	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  of	  VBD	  spread:	  
	  
R1:	  I	  suspect	  that	  another	  dynamic	  underlying	  this	  difference	  of	  opinion	  is	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  you	  believe	  humans	  control	  nature	  and	  will	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  that	  
control	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
As	  the	  case	  studies	  surrounding	  malaria	  (4.3.3)	  and	  dengue	  (4.5)	  demonstrate,	  
CCH	   opponents	   and	   proponents	   hold	   very	   different	   perspectives	   on	   how	   the	  
future	  might	   play	   out,	   and	   these	   perspectives	   are	   implicitly	   incorporated	   into	  
their	  models.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  whether	  this	  is	  because	  a	  particular	  vision	  
of	  the	  future	  supports	  their	  preferred	  research	  and	  policy	  conclusions,	  or	  vice-­‐
versa,	  but	  most	  likely	  there	  is	  an	  iterative	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
 
4.7.2	  Assumptions	  and	  the	  evidential	  context:	  factors	  preventing	  “closure”	  
In	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy,	   for	   all	   the	   reasons	   specified	   above,	   the	  
“ecologists”	   or	   “infectious	   disease	   specialists”	   resist	   their	   potential	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marginalisation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  by	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  
a	   group	   of	   amateur	   interlopers.	   	   Accordingly	   they	   denounce	   the	   credibility	   of	  
these	  interlopers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  associations	  between	  VBDs	  and	  
climate	   change.	   The	  CCH	   community,	  meanwhile,	   attempts	   to	   do	   the	   opposite	  
with	   the	   aim	   to	   solidify	   an	   emerging	   field	   and	   gain	   influence	   with	   key	  
stakeholders.	  
	  
As	   this	   power	   struggle	   is	   so	   highly	   polarised,	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   the	   areas	   of	  
disagreement	   have	   been	   over-­‐emphasised	  while	   the	   areas	   of	   agreement	   have	  
been	   under-­‐emphasised.	   	   It	   is	   noteworthy,	   for	   example,	   that	   nobody	   disputes	  
claims	   such	   as	   that	   climatic	   factors	   influence	   the	   habitats	   and	   survivability	   of	  
ticks	  or	  mosquitoes.	   	  Additionally,	   in	  6.6	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  CCH	  opponents	  and	  
proponents	  even	  agree	  that	  TBE	  is	   likely	  to	  expand	  in	  northern	  Sweden	  under	  
climate	  change	  scenarios.	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  that	  a	  more	  substantial	  consensus	  
exists	  than	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  literature	  would	  suggest:	  
	  
R1:	   And	  what	   does	   lie	   behind	   it	   (the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy)?	   I	   think	   it’s	   a	  
different	   view	   of	   the	  world.	   I	  mean,	   I	   think	   if	   you	   look	   closely	   at	   the	   science,	  
there	  isn’t	  actually	  any	  disagreement	  about	  the	  essential	  points	   in	  the	  science.	  
It’s	  more	  a	  framing	  issue.	  
	  
It	   is	   certainly	   possible	   that	   at	   stake	   in	   this	   controversy	   is	   the	   uptake	   of	   CCH	  
research	  –	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  results	  might	   influence	  priority	  setting	   in	   the	  
public	  health	  world.	   	   	  This	  could	  help	   to	  explain	  why	  actors	  on	  both	  sides	  are	  
fighting	  not	  only	  over	   the	  “truth”	  of	  claims,	  but	  also	  over	   the	   implications	  and	  
the	  generalisability	  of	  these	  claims.	  	  One	  ramification	  of	  this	  could	  be	  that	  actors	  
on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   controversy	   have	   attempted	   to	   misrepresent	   the	   claims	  
made	  by	  their	  opponents.	  	  For	  example:	  
	  
R6:	   It's	  interesting	  -­‐	  that	  straw	  man	  that's	  going	  to	  put	  up.	  It's	  been	  put	  up	  by	  
folks	  who	  don't	  want	  us	  to	  talk	  about	  climate	  change.	  	  In	  fact	  if	  you	  go	  back	  and	  
look	   at	   the	   publications	   on	   climate	   change	   and	   health	   ...	   it	   doesn't	   reflect	   the	  
reality	  of	  where	  the	  research	  is	  and	  what	  the	  writings	  say.	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One	   way	   of	   viewing	   this	   is	   through	   the	   language	   of	   Pinch	   (1985):	   it	   is	   the	  
“externality”	  of	  the	  research	  claims	  that	  is	  contested	  here.	  	  Actors	  on	  both	  sides	  
hope	  to	  establish	  as	  broad	  an	  “externality”	  for	  their	  claims	  as	  possible	  while	  still	  
remaining	  credible.	  There	  is	  a	  delicate	  balance	  between	  the	  two:	  
	  
Reports	  of	  high	  externality	  will	  stand	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  making	  a	  contribution	  
to	  the	  wider	  corpus	  of	  knowledge	  in	  view	  of	  their	  high	  evidential	  specificity,	  but	  
such	   reports	  will	   also	  be	   risky	   ...	   because	   they	   involve	   so	  many	  aspects	  of	   the	  
observational	   situation,	   and	   thus	   give	   more	   grounds	   for	   possible	   criticisms	  
(Pinch,	  1985).	  	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  very	  interesting,	  but	  much	  safer,	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  rainfall	  can	  influence	  
malaria,	  or	  that	  one	  mild	  winter	  in	  Sweden	  was	  favourable	  for	  tick	  populations	  
and	   that	   this	   is	   part	   of	   the	   explanation	   for	   a	   higher	   TBE	   incidence.	   	   It	   is	  
something	  entirely	  different	   to	  argue	   that	  what	   the	   same	  data	  actually	   says	   is	  
that	   climate	   change	   caused	   the	  mild	   winter	   and	   is	   likely	   to	   cause	  more	  mild	  
winters	   and	  will	   likely	   drive	   the	   risk	   of	   TBE	   across	   not	   only	   Sweden	  but	   also	  
Europe	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Similarly,	  everyone	  can	  agree	  that	  in	  a	  million-­‐dimension	  
world,	  there	  is	  “no	  place	  like	  home”	  for	  dengue	  or	  any	  other	  disease	  (4.4).	  But	  to	  
say	  so	  would	  be	  hardly	  publishable,	  and	  even	   if	   it	  were	   it	  would	  certainly	  not	  
have	  any	  impact	  in	  scientific	  or	  public	  health	  circles.	  
	  
According	   to	   this	   reading,	   there	   are	   two	   dimensions	   of	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	  
controversy	  which	  make	  it	  particularly	  resistant	  to	  “closure”.	  	  One	  relates	  to	  the	  
breadth	  and	  newness	  of	  the	  topic	  –	  its	  “evidential	  context”	  is	  not	  well	  defined.	  A	  
second	  relates	  to	  the	  plurality	  of	  arenas	  in	  which	  claims	  to	  externality	  are	  made.	  	  
These	  points	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  below.	  
 
4.7.3	  Multiple	  assumptions	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  cascade	  
The	  production	  of	  and	  controversy	  surrounding	  research	  linking	  climate	  change	  
with	  malaria	  (4.3),	  “highland”	  malaria	  (4.4),	  dengue	  (4.5)	  and	  tick-­‐borne	  disease	  
(4.6),	  depends	  upon	  an	  unusually	  wide	  range	  of	  assumptions,	  some	  implicit	  and	  
some	   explicit.	   These,	   as	   has	   been	   documented,	   include	   assumptions	   about	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everything	   from	   the	   validity	   of	  methodology	   of	   specific	  modelling	   techniques,	  
the	   validity	   of	   climate	   data	   and	   of	   GCM	   outputs,	   the	   plausibility	   of	   socio-­‐
economic	   futures,	   the	   accuracy	   and	   relevance	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   biological	  
parameters,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  
	  
This	   predicament	   is	   quite	   unlike	   “normal”	   science,	   in	   which	   “background	  
assumptions	   are	   routinely	   accepted	   (Pinch,	   1985:	   14)”.	   	   Instead,	   all	   of	   the	  
research	  can	  be	  easily	   contested:	   “Because	   the	   results	  are	  only	  as	  good	  as	   the	  
assumptions	  used	   to	  get	   them,	   to	  doubt	   the	  assumptions	   is,	   in	  effect,	   to	  doubt	  
the	   results	   (Ibid.:	   14)”.	   With	   so	   many	   assumptions	   that	   can	   be	   called	   into	  
question	  in	  CCH	  research,	  there	  is	  much	  scope	  for	  controversy.	  	  
	  
This	   scope	   is	   further	   broadened	   by	   its	   reliance	   on	   key	   inputs	   from	   other	  
disciplines.	   	   The	   concept	   of	   a	   “cascade	   of	   uncertainty”	   or	   “uncertainty	  
explosion”,	   discussed	   in	   4.4,	   is	   well-­‐known	   within	   the	   climate	   change	  
community.	   As	   the	   IPCC	   describes	   it,	   it	   is	   “the	   process	   whereby	   uncertainty	  
accumulates	   throughout	   the	   process	   of	   climate	   change	   prediction	   and	   impact	  
assessment”24	  (see	  also	  Figure	   3).	  This	   range	  of	  uncertainties	   can	  cast	   a	  wide	  
range	  of	  doubts	  upon	  any	  findings	  from	  climate	  impact	  research.	  	  As	  the	  debate	  
over	   highland”	   malaria	   demonstrated	   (4.4),	   it	   can	   also	   lead	   to	   a	   controversy	  
over	   data	   inputs	   that	   are	   quite	   outside	   the	   core	   competency	   of	   the	   climate	  
impact	  researchers.	   	  This	  creates	  a	  dependency	  on	  “upstream”	  modellers,	  such	  
as	   those	   in	   the	   GCM	   modelling	   community.	   	   To	   work	   with	   climate	   data,	  
researchers	  must,	   to	   various	   degrees	   accept	   at	   face-­‐value	   the	   climate	  models	  
they	  receive	  from	  the	  GCM	  modelling	  community.	  	  In	  practice,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  
CCH	  modellers	   are	   aware	   of	   the	  many	   uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   GCMs,	   but	   to	  
push	   forward	   with	   their	   own	   research	   they	   must,	   to	   a	   considerable	   degree,	  
suppress	  whatever	  uncertainties	  they	  might	  have.25	  More	  generally,	  the	  practice	  
                                                
24	  http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=108#fig22,	  accessed	  October	  20,	  
2011.	  
25 This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Donald	  MacKenzie’s	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘certainty	  cascade’	  (MacKenzie,	  
1990),	  in	  which	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  users	  rather	  than	  producers	  of	  models	  tend	  to	  have	  higher	  
certainty	  about	  the	  models.	  	  What	  we	  observe	  here	  are	  “users”	  that	  are	  also	  “producers”	  (of	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of	   using	   model	   outputs	   as	   inputs	   to	   other	   models	   only	   serves	   to	   amplify	  
uncertainties,	   thereby	   creating	   the	   possibility	   for	   ever	  more	   technical	   debate.	  	  
Where	   this	  debate	   turns	   to	   the	  model	   inputs	   (GCMs	   in	   this	   case),	   it	   is	   further	  





Figure	  3.	  The	  uncertainty	  cascade	  
The	  range	  of	  major	  uncertainties	  typical	  in	  climate	  change	  impact	  assessments,	  showing	  an	  
"uncertainty	  explosion"	  as	  these	  ranges	  are	  multiplied	  to	  encompass	  a	  comprehensive	  range	  




It	  is	  only	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  a	  controversy	  over	  climate-­‐VBDs	  should	  eventually	  
focus	   upon	   the	   realities	   of	   climate	   change	   itself.	   Again,	   Pinch’s	   work	   on	  
externality	  offers	  an	  especially	  useful	  insight:	  
	  
                                                                                                                                     
climate-­‐disease	  models),	  who	  out	  of	  necessity	  have	  a	  fairly	  high	  certainty	  of	  the	  models	  that	  
they	  use	  as	  data	  inputs.	  	   
26	  Image	  and	  sub-­‐heading	  from	  IPCC.	  The	  term	  cascade	  of	  uncertainty	  comes	  from	  the	  late	  
Stephen	  Schneider,	  and	  the	  term	  uncertainty	  explosion	  comes	  from	  Henderson-­‐Sellers	  (1993).	  
Accessed	  from:	  http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=108#fig22,	  October	  
20,	  2011.	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In	  general,	  the	  lower	  the	  degree	  of	  the	  externality	  of	  the	  report	  challenged,	  the	  
more	   damage	   will	   be	   done	   to	   the	   experiment.	   	   This	   is	   because	   a	   successful	  
challenge,	  in	  effect,	  makes	  redundant	  all	  of	  the	  observational	  process...at	  higher	  
levels	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  inference	  (Pinch,	  1985:	  25).	  	  
	  
Any	  attack,	  properly	  sustained,	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  climate	  or	  climate	  change	  data	  
–	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  key	  inputs	  into	  climate-­‐VBD	  models	  –	  is	  a	  strong	  blow	  to	  
the	  overall	   conclusions	  of	   the	  model.	   	  This	  helps	   to	  explain	   the	  heated	  debate	  
about	   climate	   data	   in	   the	   example	   of	   highland	   malaria	   (4.4)	   or	   why	   Sarah	  
Randolph	   re-­‐assessed	   the	   climate	   data	   used	   in	   Lindgren	   and	   Gustafson’s	  
research	  on	  climate	  and	  tick-­‐borne	  diseases	  (4.6).	  	  	  
	  
4.7.4	  The	  future	  is	  not	  a	  testable	  hypothesis	  
A	   second	   factor	   contributing	   to	   the	   sustained	   nature	   of	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	  
controversy	  is	  its	  undefined	  evidential	  context.	  	  Even	  excluding	  the	  wide	  range	  
of	  assumptions	  involved	  in	  modelling	  the	  links	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  
spread	   of	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases,	   the	   “evidential	   context	   (Pinch	   1985,	   10)”	   of	  
this	   research	   is	   incredibly	   “loose”.	   It	   is	   a	   relatively	   new,	   largely	   future-­‐
orientated	  research	  area	  dependent	  on	  another	  highly	  uncertain	  and	  contested	  
field,	  climate	  change	  research,	  for	  some	  of	   its	  primary	  inputs.	  Additionally,	  the	  
research	   is	   focused	   on	   identifying	   the	   importance	   of	   one	   factor	   influencing	  
highly	   multi-­‐factorial	   systems	   –	   the	   transmission	   cycles	   of	   vector-­‐borne	  
diseases	   are	   the	   result	   of	   a	   complex	   interplay	   between	   pathogens,	   vectors,	  
reservoir	   hosts	   and	  dead-­‐end	  hosts,	   each	   of	  which	   in	   turn	   is	   dependent	   upon	  
and	   influenced	   by	   a	   huge	   range	   of	   environmental,	   biological,	   social,	   and	  
economic	   forces.	   	   Proving	   or	   disproving	   a	   link	   between	   climate	   change	   and	   a	  
VBD	  is,	  scientifically,	  nearly	  impossible:	  
	  
R18:	  The	  problem	  is	  if	  you	  then	  overlay	  these	  climatic	  models	  ...	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  
of...	  economic,	  developmental	   issues	   that	   feed	   into	   these	  models,	   like	   the	   IPCC	  
models,	   they	   all	   depend	   on	   different	   emissions	   scenarios.	   And	   the	   emissions	  
scenarios	  aren't	  predetermined	  because	  we	  don't	  know	  where	  we	  as	  a	  society	  
are	  going.	  Are	  we	  going	  to	  reduce	  our	  CO2...?	  And	  so,	  because	  of	  all	  the	  societal	  
unknowns,	   the	  models	   range	   quite	   a	   bit.	   And	   once	   you	   overlay	   this	   range	   of	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models	  over	  your	  current	  [disease]	  models	   ...	   then	  you	  will	   lose	  that	  signal.	  So	  
you	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  an	  association.	  
	  
In	  practice,	  of	  course,	  “proof”	  only	  exists	  if	  a	  group	  of	  scientists	  believes	  that	  it	  
does.	  	  Such	  acceptance	  necessarily	  depends	  upon	  some	  agreed-­‐upon	  standard	  of	  
proof.	  	  Yet,	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  through	  each	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  
there	  are	  no	  agreed-­‐upon	  standards	  of	  proof	  in	  CCH	  research.	  	  This	  problem	  is	  
even	  more	   acute	   where	   this	   research	   involves	   modelling	   the	   future	   (and	   the	  
extent	  to	  which	  this	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  scientific	  enterprise	  varies).	  	  This	  
quandary	   is	   an	   example,	   par	   excellence,	   of	   the	   experimenters’	   regress.	   	   In	   his	  
famous	   case	   study	   on	   the	   controversy	   surrounding	   the	   detection	   of	   gravity	  
waves,	  Harry	  Collins	  describes	  it	  thus:	  
	  
What	   the	   correct	   outcome	   is	   depends	   upon	  whether	   or	   not	   there	   are	   gravity	  
waves	  hitting	   the	  Earth	   in	   detectable	   fluxes.	   To	   find	   this	   out	  we	  must	   build	   a	  
good	  gravity	  wave	  detector	  and	  have	  a	  look.	  But	  we	  won’t	  know	  if	  we	  have	  built	  
a	  good	  detector	  until	  we	  have	  tried	  it	  and	  obtained	  the	  correct	  outcome!	  But	  we	  
don’t	   know	  what	   the	   correct	   outcome	   is	   until	   and	   so	   on	   ad	   infinitum	   (Collins	  
1985:	  84).	  
	  
Without	  time	  travel,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  test	  whether	  or	  not	  future	  climate-­‐VBD	  
models	  are	  good.	  	  There	  is	  no	  possible	  way	  for	  this	  circle	  to	  be	  broken.	  	  	  As	   such,	  
the	  experimenters’	  regress	  “can	  only	  be	  avoided	  by	  finding	  some	  other	  means	  of	  
defining	   the	   quality	   of	   an	   experiment;	   a	   criterion	   must	   be	   found	   which	   is	  
independent	  of	   the	  experiment	   itself	   (Ibid.:	  84)”.	   	   In	  some	  cases,	   this	  might	  be	  
the	  demonstration	  of	  some	  proxy	  measure	  of	  reality,	  but	  often	  the	  acceptance	  of	  
truth-­‐claims	  in	  these	  situations	  boils	  down	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  scientist	  and	  her	  
methodologies	  can	  be	  trusted	  or	  not.	   	  This	  explains	  the	  highly	  personal	  nature	  
of	  the	  boundary	  work	  involved	  in	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  and	  sheds	  light	  
on	  why	  some	  have	  said,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  judge	  a	  model	  of	  
the	   future	   is	   to	   judge	   the	   track-­‐record	  of	   the	  scientist	   in	  assessing	   the	  present	  
and	   the	   past.	   The	   credibility	   stakes	   in	   this	   controversy	   are	   so	   high	   precisely	  
because	  the	  evidential	  context	  is	  so	  loose.	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4.7.5	  Multiple	  venues	  for	  truth	  claims	  
In	   a	   highly	   polarised	   controversy	   that	   is	   particularly	   difficult	   to	   resolve,	  
scientists	  might	  resign	  themselves	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  “closure”	  might	  not	  be	  
reached	  anytime	  soon,	  perhaps	  not	  even	  during	  their	  career.	  Yet,	  if	  they	  work	  in	  
a	   research	   area	   (like	   CCH)	   that	   has	   practical	   policy	   and	   public	   health	  
implications,	  they	  might	  attempt	  to	  orchestrate	  closure	  in	  other	  venues,	  thereby	  
circumventing	  their	  main	  opponents.	  
	  
An	   important	   part	   of	   the	   context	   shaping	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   is	   that	  
there	  have	  been,	  throughout	  its	  history,	  calls	   from	  global	  stakeholders	  –	  WHO,	  
national	  governments,	  etc.	  –	  for	  answers.	  The	  highland	  areas	  of	  Africa,	  or	  indeed	  
dengue-­‐vulnerable	   regions	   of	   the	   Western	   world,	   cannot	   wait	   until	   a	  
longstanding	  controversy	   is	  resolved	  before	  acting.	  They	  want	   to	  know	  if	   they	  
face	   a	   risk	   and,	   if	   so,	   what	   they	   can	   do	   about	   it:	   public	   health	   is	   largely	  
predicated	  on	  pro-­‐active	  preparedness.	   	  The	  policy	   context	  has	   influenced	   the	  
climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   on	   at	   least	   three	   different	   levels!	   First,	   the	   policy	  
context	  has	  created	  an	  impetus	  for	  this	  research,	  and	  also	  provided	  funding	  for	  
it.	  	  Second,	  possible	  policy	  responses	  are	  incorporated	  into	  climate	  and	  climate-­‐
disease	  models.	  Third,	  the	  policy	  world	  has	  intervened	  to	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  the	  
issue.	   This	   has	   brought	   the	   controversy	   to	   new	   arenas,	   and	   notably	   to	   IPCC	  
where,	  through	  publishing	  Assessment	  Reports,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  strong	  attempt	  
to	  forge	  consensus	  in	  this	  highly	  polarised	  field.	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  has	  
happened,	  and	  the	  ramifications	  for	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
prioritisation	   of	   approaches	   for	   controlling	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases,	   will	   be	   the	  
focus	  of	  Chapter	  5.	  	  	  
 
4.7.6	  On	  controversies	  and	  opportunism	  
Controversies,	   such	   as	   the	   one	   described	   in	   this	   Chapter,	   are	   certainly	   great	  
study	  material:	   	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   extra-­‐scientific	   factors	   are	  mobilised	   in	  
order	   to	   support	   particular	   positions	   offers	   fascinating	   insights	   into	   the	   co-­‐
production	   of	   knowledge	   alongside	   political	   and	   policy	   spheres.	   	   Yet	   the	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implication	   is	  often	   that	   controversies	  ultimately	  end	  up	  having	   their	  winners	  
and	  their	  losers	  –	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  can	  ultimately	  prevail.	   	  This	  may	  
be	  true	  in	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	  things,	  but	  it	  could	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  actors	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  a	  controversy	  are	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  attention	  that	  controversies	  
generate	  can	  be	  beneficial	  to	  all	  involved.	  
	  
It	   is	  worth	   noting,	   for	   example,	   that	   the	   substantial	   volume	   of	   peer-­‐reviewed	  
outputs	  produced	  in	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  might	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  
if	   the	   controversy	  did	  not	   exist.	  High-­‐profile	   journals	  may	  not	   have	   found	   the	  
papers,	   letter	   and	   commentaries	   to	   be	   as	   interesting	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  
controversy,	  meaning	  that	  the	  visibility	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  profile	  –	  of	  the	  topic	  as	  a	  
whole,	   as	   well	   as	   of	   individual	   researchers,	   would	   be	   lesser.	   Given	   the	  
interrelationships	   between	   publishing	   and	   funding,	   this	   is	   no	   minor	   point.	  	  
Participants	  in	  the	  CCH	  controversy,	  from	  both	  sides,	  are	  quite	  aware	  of	  this:	  
	  
R18:	  A	   lot	  of	   the	  climate	  sceptic	  people,	   they	  have	  been	   funded	  under	  all	   this	  
climate	  research	  as	  well,	  and	  so	  they're	  quite	  happy	  to	  take	  the	  money	  despite	  
the	  fact	  that	  they	  don't	  subscribe	  to...	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  scientific	  fact	  or	  as	  a	  
phenomenon.	  
	  
R13:	  Obviously,	  the	  whole	  climate	  change	  debate	  has	  nurtured	  the	  tremendous	  
amount	   of	   grant	   giving,	   which	   is	   something	   that	   I	   feel	   comfortable	   about	  
because	  ...	  basic	  research	  ...	  is	  very	  important.	  
	  
The	  growth	  of	  funding	  for	  research	  exploring	  climatic	  and	  environmental	  links	  
to	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  has	  been	   fairly	   substantial,	  particularly	   in	  Europe,	  as	  
will	   be	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5.	   	   CCH	   proponents	   and	   opponents	   in	   some	  
instances	  even	  find	  themselves	   in	  the	  same	  EU-­‐funded	  projects,	  and	  they	  have	  
even	   been	   known	   to	   publish	   together.	   	   Aside	   from	   demonstrating	   a	   certain	  
degree	  of	  opportunism,	  this	  explanation	  demonstrates	  that	  funding	  is	  not	  one	  of	  
the	  key	  components	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy.	  Quite	  the	  opposite	  
–	  the	  controversy	  has	  stoked	  funding	  and	  this	  has	  benefited	  both	  sides.	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Ideologically,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  although	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  
has	  been	  rather	  heated	  and	  even	  deeply	  personal	   in	  some	  instances,	  actors	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  controversy	  ultimately	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  been	  good	  for	  science:	  
	  
R4:	  And	  because	  the	  models	  are	  formulated	  in	  quite	  different	  ways,	  they	  have	  
quite	  different	  assumptions,	  quite	  different	  variables,	   they're	   likely	  to	  come	  to	  
different	   conclusions.	   This	   is	   entirely	   healthy.	   This	   is	   how	   science	   makes	  
advances.	   This	   is	   the	   really	   important	   for	   founding	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  
way	  the	  world	  works.	  
	  
R19:	  Okay	   I	   think	   the	   issue	  of	   attribution…It's	   a	   very	  difficult	   theoretical	   and	  
methodological	   question	   and	  will	   remain	   so,	   okay?	   	   And	   there	  will	   be	   always	  
controversies	  and	  I	  think	  controversies	  are	  actually	  very	  healthy.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   striking	   that	   a	   longstanding	   controversy	   has	   not	   managed	   to	   shake	   the	  
contestants’	   convictions	   that	   their	   work	   is	   anything	   but	   “scientific”.	   	   It	   is	  
tempting	   to	   view	   such	   commentary	   as	  no	  more	   than	   another	   reminder	   of	   the	  
Janus-­‐faced	  nature	  of	   science,	  deeply	  political	   and	   controversial	   internally	  but	  
statesmanlike	   and	   objective	   externally	   (Latour,	   1987).	   	   Yet	   there	   is	   another	  
possible	   explanation:	   the	   scientists	   themselves	   are	   so	   deeply	   entrenched	   in	  




Chapter	  5.	  Science	  and	  Politics	  at	  the	  IPCC	  
 
“When	  the	  prices	  to	  pay	  are	  so	  large,	  the	  knowledge	  on	  which	  these	  kinds	  of	  decisions	  are	  
taken	  had	  better	  be	  right.	  	  The	  science	  must	  be	  irreproachable”.1	  
 
5.1	  Introduction:	  Climategate	  and	  the	  IPCC	  
 
The	   2007	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	   was	   famously	   shared	   between	   Al	   Gore	   and	   the	  
Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  for	  “their	  efforts	  to	  build	  up	  
and	  disseminate	  greater	  knowledge	  about	  man-­‐made	  climate	  change,	  and	  to	  lay	  
the	  foundations	  for	  the	  measures	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  counteract	  such	  change”.2	  	  
At	  that	  time,	  the	  IPCC	  was	  enjoying	  “a	  pristine	  reputation	  (Jasanoff,	  2010:	  695)”	  
and	   the	   public	   acceptance	   of	   climate	   change	   science	   may	   have	   never	   been	  
higher.	   	  Yet	   just	   two	  years	   later,	   towards	   the	  end	  of	  2009	  and	  coinciding	  with	  
UNFCCC	  COP15	  meeting	  in	  Copenhagen,	  the	  IPCC	  would	  find	  itself	  in	  the	  middle	  
of	  a	  highly	  visible	  and	  contentious	  scandal.	  
	  
“Climategate”,	  a	  “big	  embarrassment	  to	  the	  IPCC	  (R22)”,	  arose	  when	  thousands	  
of	  e-­‐mails	  and	  documents	  of	  prominent	  scientists	  at	  the	  Climate	  Research	  Unit	  
(CRU)	   of	   the	  University	   of	   East	  Anglia,	   one	   of	   the	   leading	   producers	   of	   global	  
climate	  datasets	  and	  models,	  were	  hacked	  and	  subsequently	  publicised	  on	  the	  
internet	  (Science	  and	  Technology	  Committee,	  2010).	  	  The	  hacked	  files	  offered	  a	  
rare	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  glimpse	  into	  the	  machinations	  of	  climate	  science.	  In	  one	  
highly	  publicised	  leaked	  email,	  Phil	  Jones,	  head	  of	  CRU,	  vowed	  to	  exclude	  a	  few	  
papers	  from	  the	  IPCC	  assessment	  report3:	  	  
	  
I	  can't	  see	  either	  of	  these	  papers	  being	  in	  the	  next	  IPCC	  report.	  Kevin	  and	  I	  will	  
keep	   them	   out	   somehow	   -­‐	   even	   if	  we	   have	   to	   redefine	  what	   the	   peer-­‐review	  
literature	  is!	  (Cited	  in	  Monbiot,	  2009)	  
	  
                                                
1	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Committee,	  House	  of	  Commons	  (UK)	  (2010).	  
2	  http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/,	  accessed	  November	  28,	  
2011.	  
3	  Both	  papers	  did	  in	  fact	  make	  it	  into	  the	  IPCC	  4th	  Assessment	  Review.	  See:	  Heffernan	  (2010).	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In	  another,	  scientists	  discuss	  the	  tricks-­‐of-­‐the-­‐trade	  in	  replacing	  tree-­‐ring	  proxy	  
temperatures	  with	   recorded	   temperatures	   for	   recent	  years	  when	  constructing	  
long	  time-­‐series	  temperature	  trends:	  	  	  
	  
I've	   just	   completed	   Mike's	   Nature	   trick	   of	   adding	   in	   the	   real	   temps	   to	   each	  
series	  for	  the	  last	  20	  years	  and	  from	  1961	  for	  Keith's	  to	  hide	  the	  decline	  (Cited	  
in	  Hickman	  and	  Randerson,	  2009).	  
	  
Unsurprisingly,	   these	   emails	   were	   widely	   cited	   by	   prominent	   climate	   change	  
sceptics	  as	  evidence	  of	  foul	  play	  in	  climate	  research.	  As	  Myron	  Ebell,	  director	  of	  
energy	  and	  global	  warming	  policy	  at	   the	  Competitive	  Enterprise	  Institute,	   told	  
the	  Washington	  Post:	  “Some	  of	  the	  e-­‐mails	  that	  I	  have	  read	  are	  blatant	  displays	  
of	  personal	  pettiness,	  unethical	   conniving,	  and	   twisting	   the	  science	   to	   support	  
their	  political	  position	   (Cited	   in	  Eilperin,	  2009)”.4	  	  The	   climate	   scientists	  went	  
on	  the	  defensive:	  “They	  are	  trying	  to	  pick	  out	  minor	  things	  in	  the	  data	  and	  blow	  
them	  out	  of	  all	  proportion	  (Heffernan,	  2010:	  26)”,	  as	  Phil	  Jones	  retorted.	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   Climategate,	   making	   matters	   worse	   for	   global	   climate	   change	  
science,	  reports	  surfaced	  in	  early	  2010	  about	  various	  errors	  found	  in	  the	  IPCC	  
Fourth	   Assessment	   Report	   (AR4).	   Most	   famous,	   dubbed	   by	   some	  
“Himalayagate”,	  was	   that	   IPCC	  misstated	   the	   total	   land	   covered	  by	  Himalayan	  
glaciers	  and	  misquoted	  a	  paper	  predicting	  the	  year	  by	  which	  the	  glaciers	  could	  
disappear,	  citing	  2035	  instead	  of	  2350	  (Pearce,	  2010).	  	  As	  the	  source	  of	  this	  data	  
turned	   out	   not	   to	   be	   from	   the	   peer-­‐reviewed	   literature,	   IPCC	   peer	   review	  
processes	   were	   criticised	   and	   its	   Chair,	   Rajendra	   Pachauri,	   faced	   pressure	   to	  
resign	  (Bagla,	  2010).	  
	  
Although	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  Climategate	  was	  timed	  to	  coincide	  with	  and	  disrupt	  
COP15,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  challenging	  indeed	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  
Climategate	   on	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   as	   narrowly	   defined.	   Among	   the	   most	  
immediate	  impacts	  was	  that	  as	  climate	  scientists	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  gathered	  in	  




Copenhagen	   for	   the	  UNFCCC	  COP15	  negotiations,	   they	  were	   forced	   to	  address	  
an	   onslaught	   of	   media	   questions	   about	   the	   hacked	   files,	   in	   some	   instances	  
distracting	  them	  from	  the	  negotiations.5	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord,	  
(which	   recognised	   the	  desire	   to	   limit	   global	   average	   temperature	   increases	   to	  
2°C	  and	  required	  nations	  to	  pledge	  emissions	  cuts6)	  was	  eventually	  agreed	  upon	  
by	   114	   State	   Parties	   at	   COP157 	  (although,	   as	   is	   nearly	   inevitable	   in	   the	  
negotiation	   of	   any	   international	   treaty,	   to	   varying	   levels	   of	   enthusiasm	  
(Bodansky,	   2010)).8	  Climategate	   may	   also	   have	   influenced	   public	   attitudes	  
towards	  climate	  change.	  As	  most	  State	  Parties	  involved	  in	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  
are	   democratically	   elected	   governments,	   public	   opinion	   plays	   an	   important,	   if	  
indirect,	   role	   in	   motivating	   governments	   to	   make	   binding	   commitments	   to	  
greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   reductions.	   	   Numerous	   polls	   demonstrated	   that	  
public	   belief	   in	   climate	   change	   had	   noticeably	   declined	   in	   the	   wake	   of	  
Climategate	   and,	   intriguingly,	   these	   findings	   have	   not	   been	   restricted	   to	   the	  
general	   public.	   One	   study	   suggested	   it	   even	   undermined	   belief	   in	   global	  
warming	  among	  American	  TV	  meteorologists	  (Maibach	  et	  al.,	  2011).9	  	  	  
	  
Collectively,	  Climategate	  and	  Himalayagate	  greatly	  challenged	  the	  credibility	  of	  
climate	  change	  scientists	  and	  science	  and,	  by	  association,	  some	  of	  the	  principal	  
institutions	  producing	  and	  vetting	  climate	  change	  knowledge,	  namely	  CRU	  and	  
IPCC	  (e.g.	  Jasanoff,	  2010;	  Monbiot,	  2009;	  Revkin,	  2009).	  	  IPCC	  in	  particular	  faced	  
                                                
5	  Numerous	  interviewees	  made	  this	  point.	  
6	  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf,	  accessed	  December	  1,	  2011.	  
7	  http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php,	  accessed	  November	  28,	  
2011.	  
8	  It	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  that	  despite	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord,	  “no	  agreements	  of	  any	  
consequence”	  had	  been	  reached	  at	  COP15	  (Prins	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
9 Public	  opinion	  polls	  of	  climate	  change	  have	  shown	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  public	  acceptance	  of	  
climate	  change	  post-­‐Climategate.	  For	  example,	  a	  poll	  conducted	  in	  February,	  2010,	  
demonstrated	  a	  30%	  drop	  in	  the	  number	  of	  British	  adults	  who	  believed	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  
“definitely”	  real	  (Jowit,	  2010).	  Similarly,	  a	  2011	  survey	  of	  25,000	  internet	  users	  from	  51	  
countries	  revealed	  that	  although	  more	  people	  were	  concerned	  about	  climate	  change	  in	  2011	  
than	  in	  2009,	  the	  total	  percentage	  (69%)	  was	  still	  lower	  than	  the	  2007	  percentage	  (72%)	  
(Chestney,	  2011).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  results	  from	  a	  US	  poll	  conducted	  in	  autumn,	  2011,	  
demonstrates	  both	  a	  decline	  in	  public	  belief	  in	  climate	  change	  following	  Climategate	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
modest	  rebound	  in	  this	  belief.	  The	  pollsters	  note	  that	  public	  belief	  is	  highly	  influenced	  by	  
personal	  weather	  observations.	  	  See:	  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/02_climate_change_rabe_borick/0
2_climate_change_rabe_borick.pdf,	  accessed	  March	  3,	  2012. 
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numerous	   criticisms	   related	   to	   its	   potential	   bias	   and	   flawed	   peer	   review	  
procedures,	   harming	   the	   perceived	   reliability	   of	   its	   assessments	   and	  
necessitating	   organisations	   such	   as	   the	   InterAcademy	  Council	   (IAC)	   to	   review	  
IPCC	   (IAC,	   2010,	   Berkhout,	   2010).	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	   UK	   House	   of	   Commons	  
Science	  and	  Technology	  Committee	  was	  mandated	  to	  investigate	  Climategate.	  	  It	  
ultimately	  exonerated	  Phil	  Jones	  from	  any	  wrongdoing	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  
actions	  were	   “common	  practice”	  within	   the	   scientific	   community	   (Science	  and	  
Technology	   Committee,	   2010)	   –	   	   even	   though	   these	   practices	   were	   less	   than	  
ideal	   and	   included	   “routine	   refusals	   to	   share	   raw	   data	   and	   computer	   codes	  
(Jasanoff,	  2010:	  695)”.	  As	  the	  Committee	  noted:	  
	  
Reputation	  does	  not	  …	   rest	   solely	  on	   the	  quality	  of	  work	  as	   it	   should.	   	   It	   also	  
depends	  on	  perception.	  	  It	  is	  self-­‐evident	  that	  the	  disclosure	  of	  CRU	  e-­‐mails	  has	  
damaged	   the	   reputation	   of	   UK	   climate	   science…	   If	   the	   practices	   of	   CRU	   are	  
found	   to	   be	   in	   line	  with	   the	   rest	   of	   climate	   science,	   the	   question	  would	   arise	  
whether	  climate	  science	  methods	  of	  operation	  need	  to	  change.	  	  In	  this	  event	  we	  
would	   recommend	   that	   the	   scientific	   community	   should	   consider	   changing	  
those	   practices	   to	   ensure	   greater	   transparency	   (Science	   and	   Technology	  
Committee,	  2010).	  
	  
This	   finding	   is	   both	   ironic	   and	   significant.	   It	   implies	   that	   rather	   than	  
illuminating	  anything	  particularly	  unusual	  about	  scientific	  practice	  to	  the	  world,	  
Climategate	  simply	  offered	  a	  rare	  insight	  into	  the	  type	  of	  work	  consistent	  with	  
everyday	  scientific	  practice	  –	  and	  that	  was	  enough	  to	  cause	  such	  furore.	  	  	  
	  
Jasanoff	   has	   recently	   argued	   that	   contemporary	   science	   needs	   to	  meet	   public	  
expectations	   “not	   only	   about	   its	   products	   but	   also	   about	   its	   processes	   and	  
purposes	  (Jasanoff,	  2010:	  696)”.	  	  The	  fallout	  from	  Climategate	  reveals	  just	  how	  
serious	   the	   implications	   can	   be	  when	   science	   fails	   to	  meet	   such	   expectations.	  	  
Although	  Climategate	   is	  certainly	  not	  the	  first	   instance	  in	  which	  the	  credibility	  
of	  IPCC	  has	  been	  challenged10,	  it	  does	  serve	  to	  demonstrate	  just	  how	  precarious	  
                                                
10	  In	  1996,	  to	  give	  one	  early	  example,	  the	  IPCC	  2nd	  Assessment	  Report	  and	  its	  peer	  review	  
processes	  came	  under	  intense	  scrutiny	  after	  an	  eminent	  physicist,	  Frederick	  Seitz,	  famously	  
published	  a	  letter	  in	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  claiming	  “I	  have	  never	  witnessed	  a	  more	  disturbing	  
corruption	  of	  the	  peer-­‐review	  process	  than	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  this	  IPCC	  Report”	  (Seitz,	  1996).	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and	   tenuous	   the	   credibility	   of	   climate	   science	   continues	   to	   be.	   There	  
consequently	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  need	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  processes	  through	  
which	  IPCC	  assesses	  and	  validates	  scientific	  knowledge:	  how	  it	   is	  “warranted”,	  
in	   the	   language	   of	   Shapin	   and	   Schaffer	   (1985).	   	   A	   role	   for	   interpretative	  
accounts	  of	  the	  IPCC	  has	  been	  previously	  identified	  by	  numerous	  authors	  (Beck,	  
2012,	   Hulme	   and	   Mahony,	   2010,	   Shackley	   and	   Skodvin,	   1995,	   Yearley,	   2009,	  
Hulme,	  2008),	  who	  have	  emphasised,	  among	  other	  topics:	   the	  need	  for	  critical	  
analyses	  of	  how	   IPCC	   is	  governed;	  analyses	  of	  how	   IPCC	  attempts	   to	  establish	  
credibility;	   critique	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   IPCC	   peer	   review	   process;	   and	  
insight	  into	  how	  knowledge	  claims	  (uncertain,	  controversial	  and	  situated)	  find	  
their	  way	  into	  IPCC	  reports.	  
	  
In	   Chapter	   3,	   the	   community	   involved	   in	   the	  production	  of	   CCH	   research	  was	  
described	   in	   detail.	   Their	   motivations	   were	   described,	   as	   were	   the	   ways	   in	  
which	   they	  managed	   to	  obtain	  key	  positions	  as	   lead	  authors	  and	   reviewers	   in	  
the	  IPCC	  assessment	  process.	   	   	   In	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  normative	  and	  
political	  preferences	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  contents	  of	  CCH	  research	  were	  
revealed	   through	  an	   analysis	   of	   the	   longstanding	   climate-­‐VBD	  controversy.	   	   It	  
was	  noted	  that	  the	  debate,	  highly	  polarised,	  is	  exemplary	  of	  the	  experimenters’	  
regress	  and	  is	  not	  one	  that	  can	  be	  resolved	  purely	  on	  scientific	  grounds	  alone.	  	  
Drawing	   upon	   both	   of	   these	   Chapters,	   this	   Chapter	   will	   seek	   to	   provide	   a	  
detailed	  case	  study	  of	   the	   “warranting”	  procedures	  of	   IPCC	  by	   focusing	  on	   the	  
IPCC	  treatment	  of	  CCH	  and,	   in	  particular,	   the	  transposition	  of	   the	  climate-­‐VBD	  
debate	  from	  the	  peer-­‐reviewed	  literature	  to	  the	  IPCC	  arena.	  
	  
This	   Chapter	   consists	   of	   four	   sections.	   	   In	   5.2,	   the	   history,	   organisation	   and	  
mandate	  of	  IPCC	  will	  be	  described,	  providing	  the	  necessary	  context	  about	  how	  
and	   why	   IPCC	   goes	   about	   assessing	   climate	   science.	   	   Thereafter,	   5.3	   will	  
examine	   how	   the	   health	   chapters	   have	   been	   produced,	   paying	   particular	  
attention	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   debate	   was	   interpreted	   and	  
communicated	  by	  the	  IPCC	  3rd	  and	  4th	  Assessment	  Reviews.	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5.2	  The	  IPCC:	  history,	  structure,	  processes	  
 
5.2.1	  A	  brief	  pre-­‐history	  of	  the	  IPCC	  
Following	  and	  building	  upon	  the	  discussion	  from	  1.4	  about	  the	  “global”	  framing	  
of	  climate	  change,	  this	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  key	  international	  events	  that	  led	  
to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  IPCC.	  	  A	  brief	  review	  of	  this	  period	  –	  which	  is	  much	  
more	  extensively	  assessed	  and	  recollected	  elsewhere	  (Agrawala,	  1998a,	  1998b,	  
1999,	   Boehmer-­‐Christiansen,	   1994a,	   1994b,	   1994c,	   Hecht	   and	   Tirpak,	   1995,	  
Bolin,	   2007)	   –	   demonstrates	   that	   IPCC	   is	   both	   an	   agent	   and	   result	   of	   co-­‐
production,	   as	   does	   a	   description	   of	   the	   IPCC	  mandate	   (5.2.2)	   and	   processes	  
(5.2.3).	   	   All	   of	   this	   is	   essential	   background	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   IPCC	   has	  
treated	  CCH	  science	  (5.3).	  	  	  
	  
The	  activities	  of	   the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization	  (WMO),	  established	   in	  
1950,	  have	  been	  particularly	  instrumental	  to	  the	  IPCC’s	  history.11	  One	  of	  its	  two	  
“parent”	   agencies,	   WMO	   actively	   forged	   international	   research	   networks	   and	  
standards	   in	   the	   field	   of	   meteorology	   and	   climatology,	   enabling	   global-­‐scale	  
understandings	   of	   atmospheric	   dynamics	   and	   playing	   a	   key	   role	   in	   laying	   the	  
foundations	   upon	   which	   climate	   change	   would	   eventually	   be	   understood	  
(Miller,	  2001,	  Edwards,	  2010).12	  	  
	  
Concurrently,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   wide-­‐ranging	   environmental	   concerns	   that	  
began	   to	   gain	   prominence	   during	   the	   1960s	   (e.g.	   Jasanoff,	   2001),	   the	   UN	  
organised	  the	  1972	  Stockholm	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  Environment,	  the	  first	  
UN	   meeting	   which	   specifically	   addressed	   humans	   and	   their	   impacts	   on	   the	  
environment.	  	  The	  Stockholm	  Conference	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  United	  
Nations	   Environment	   Programme	   (UNEP)	   and	   recommended	   that	   the	   World	  
Meteorological	   Organisation	   (WMO)	   should	   continue	   with	   its	   Global	  
                                                
11	  WMO	  originated	  from	  the	  International	  Meteorological	  Organization,	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  
1873.	  	  WMO	  became	  operational	  in	  1951.	  	  See:	  http://www.unctad.info/en/World-­‐Statistics-­‐
Day-­‐Geneva/Events/World-­‐Meteorologicla-­‐Organisation-­‐WMO/,	  accessed	  December	  29,	  2011.	  	  
12 The other parent agency of IPCC is the United Nations Environment Programme. 
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Atmospheric	   Research	   Programme	   (GARP)13	  and,	   if	   necessary,	   establish	   new	  
programmes	   to	   better	   understand	   climate	   change	   (Bolin,	   2007).	   	   The	  
subsequent	   Stockholm	  Declaration	   anticipated	   the	   need	   for	   organisations	   like	  
IPCC.14	  	  Principle	  20,	   for	  example,	  states:	   “the	   free	   flow	  of	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  scientific	  
information	   and	   transfer	   of	   experience	   must	   be	   supported	   and	   assisted,	   to	  
facilitate	  the	  solution	  of	  environmental	  problems”.15	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  years,	  awareness	  of	  the	  possible	  links	  between	  carbon	  dioxide	  
emissions	  and	  global	  warming	  would	  grow,	  in	  part	  through	  the	  profile	  given	  the	  
topic	  by	  a	  GARP	  conference	  focused	  on	  climate	  modelling.	  	  This	  meeting,	  which	  
took	   place	   in	   Stockholm	   in	   1974,	   was	   organised	   by	   the	   eminent	   Swedish	  
scientist	  Bert	  Bolin,	  who	  would	  later	  become	  the	  first	  Chairman	  of	  IPCC	  (Bolin,	  
2007).	   	  At	   this	  meeting,	   the	  results	   from	  general	  circulation	  models	  predicting	  
an	   average	   warming	   of	   3°C,	   given	   a	   doubling	   of	   CO2	   concentration	   in	   the	  
atmosphere	  were	   presented	   as	  were	   a	   range	   of	   other	   talks	   about	   the	   various	  
potential	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  (Ibid.).	  	  Agrawala	  notes	  that,	  in	  combination	  
with	   some	  of	  Bolin’s	  own	  research	  on	   the	   contribution	  of	   land	  degradation	   to	  
atmospheric	   CO2,	   the	   research	   discussed	   at	   the	   GARP	   conference	   “provoked	  
serious	   discussion	   as	   to	   whether	   human	   induced	   climate	   change	   was	   indeed	  
occurring	  and	  if	  it	  might	  seriously	  impact	  global	  society	  (Agrawala,	  1999:	  160)”.	  	  
	  
Much	   of	   this	   discussion	  would	   continue	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   	   The	   1975	  
WMO	   World	   Congress	   debated	   climate	   change	   and	   concluded	   that	   although	  
there	  was	  no	  imminent	  danger,	  there	  was	  enough	  reason	  to	  be	  concerned	  and	  to	  
                                                
13	  GARP	  was	  a	  collaboration	  between	  WMO,	  a	  UN	  agency,	  and	  the	  non-­‐governmental	  
International	  Council	  of	  Scientific	  Unions	  (ICSU).	  	  This	  collaboration	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  
speech	  to	  the	  UN	  by	  US	  President	  Kennedy	  in	  1961	  in	  which	  he	  called	  for	  peaceful	  uses	  of	  outer	  
space,	  notably	  global	  efforts	  at	  weather	  research	  and	  prediction.	  See	  Argawala	  (1999).	  
14	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  one	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  final	  report	  on	  the	  Stockholm	  Conference	  was	  
the	  microbiologist	  and	  promoter	  of	  ecological	  thinking	  in	  health,	  René	  Dubos	  (see	  3.2)	  (Ward	  &	  
Dubos,	  1983).	  
15 http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503,	  
accessed	  December	  27,	  2011.	  	  This	  sentiment	  was	  echoed	  in	  the	  report	  on	  the	  1972	  Conference	  
in	  which	   one	   section	  was	   dedicated	   to	   climate	   change	   and	   in	   this	   section	   the	   need	   for	   a	   new	  
capacity	  for	  global	  decision-­‐making	  is	  stressed.	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promote	   further	   research	   (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen,	   1994a).	   	   In	   1975,	   the	   UN	  
General	  Assembly	  requested	  WMO	  to	  study	  climate	  change,	  and	  it	  responded	  by	  
setting	  up	  an	  early	  climate	  change	  panel	  of	  experts	  (Ibid.).	   	  Meanwhile,	  climate	  
change	   broadened	   as	   an	   issue	   with	   the	   entry	   of	   geologists	   and	   ecologists	  
through	   the	   influential	   International	   Council	   of	   Scientific	   Unions’	   (ICSU)	  
Scientific	  Committee	  on	   	   	  Problems	  of	   the	  Environment	  (SCOPE).	   	   In	  1976	  this	  
committee	   reported	   that	   rapid	   increases	   of	   atmospheric	   CO2	  made	   ever-­‐more	  
urgent	   the	   need	   for	   additional	   research	   (Ibid.).	   	   In	   1978,	   GARP	   organised	   a	  
second	  climate	  conference,	  which	  planned	  further	  climate	  research	  but	  did	  not	  
specifically	  address	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  (Bolin,	  2007).	   	  Rather	  more	  
significant,	   however,	   was	   the	   first	   World	   Climate	   Conference,	   organised	   by	  
WMO	   and	   hosted	   in	   Geneva	   in	   1979, 16 	  which	   highlighted	   the	   scientific	  
uncertainties	  surrounding	  climate	  change,	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  World	  
Climate	   Programme	   (a	   WMO-­‐led	   long-­‐term	   research	   programme	   addressing	  
climate	   change17),	   and	   established	   a	   series	   of	   workshops	   that	   were	   run	   by	  
UNEP/ICSU/WMO	   and	   held	   in	   Villach,	   Austria	   in	   1980,	   1983	   and	   1985	  
(Boehmer-­‐Christiansen,	   1994a).	   	   The	   1985	   Villach	   meeting	   is	   particularly	  
noteworthy	  for	  being	  an	  early	  –	  if	  not	  the	  first	  –	  time	  that	  an	  international	  panel	  
of	   scientists	   came	   out	  with	   a	   consensus	   statement	   on	   climate	   change:	   “in	   the	  
first	   half	   of	   the	   next	   century	   a	   rise	   of	   global	   mean	   temperature	   could	   occur	  
which	  would	  be	  greater	  than	  any	  in	  man’s	  history	  (WMO,	  1985)”.	  	  
	  
Following	   the	  Villach	  1985	  statement,	  Agrawala	   suggests	   that	   “climate	  change	  
had	  truly	   ‘arrived’	  both	  in	  the	  news	  media	  and	  the	  international	  policy	  agenda	  
(Agrawala,	  1998a:	  608)”.	  The	  ascendancy	  was	  relatively	   fast;	  although	  climate	  
change	  had	  been	  promoted	  as	  a	  scientific	  issue	  throughout	  the	  1970s,	  the	  issue	  
claimed	  much	  greater	  attention	  from	  the	  policy	  and	  media	  spheres	  in	  the	  1980s	  
(Boehmer-­‐Christiansen,	   1994a).	   	   Although	   many	   factors	   affected	   the	   rise	   of	  




23+February+1979%2C+Geneva%2C+Switzerland%22#beg,	  accessed	  December	  29,	  2011.	  
17	  http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/,	  accessed	  December	  29,	  2011.	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climate	   change	   as	   a	   global	   issue,18	  which	   Agrawala	   (1998a)	   acknowledges,	  
Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	   (1994a:	  158)	   suggests	   that	   at	   least	   “part	   of	   the	   answer	  
comes	   from	   the	   skilful	   dissemination	   of	   the	   Villach	  message	   by	   the	   scientific	  
community	  itself”.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Villach	  conferences	  occurred	  under	  
the	   oversight	   of	   UN	   agencies,	   the	   statement	   was	   produced	   by	   individual	  
scientists	   and	   not	   by	   official	   representatives	   of	   countries	   (Jäger,	   1992).	  	  
Scientists	   may	   have	   been	   spear-­‐heading	   climate	   change	   within	   UN	   fora,	   but	  
there	   was	   not	   any	   formal	   means	   for	   either	   vetting	   their	   conclusions	   or	   for	  
assessing	   the	   policy	   implications	   of	   these	   conclusions	   at	   the	   international	  
level,19	  even	   if	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	   scientists	   were	   aware	   that	   the	   policy	  
dimensions	  of	  their	  work	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  important	  (e.g.	  Schneider,	  
2009).20	  	  	  
	  
This	  void	  was	  recognised	  by	  numerous	  actors	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  
not	  least	  the	  director	  of	  UNEP	  at	  the	  time,	  who	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  establishing	  
a	   precursor	   to	   the	   IPCC,	   the	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gasses	   (AGGG).21	  
The	  AGGG	  was	  a	  small	  group	  of	  scientists,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  
the	  Villach	  conferences,	  mandated	  to	  advise	  WMO,	  UNEP	  and	  ICSU	  on	  matters	  
pertaining	   to	   climate	   change	   (Agrawala,	   1999).	   	   The	   AGGG	   organised	   a	   key	  
workshop	  in	  Bellagio	  in	  1987,	  which	  successfully	  engaged	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  
actors	  and	  concluded	  that	  increases	  in	  air	  and	  sea	  temperatures	  would	  need	  to	  
be	  held	  within	  “tolerable”	  rates	  (Ibid.).	  	  The	  results	  from	  Bellagio	  fed	  into	  other	  
high-­‐profile	  climate	  change	  events	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s,	  most	  notably	  a	  1988	  NGO-­‐
                                                
18	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  “global”	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  is	  contingent	  and	  its	  framing	  as	  
such	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  worthy	  focus	  for	  analysis	  (e.g.	  Yearley,	  1996).	  The	  analysis	  of	  this	  chapter	  is,	  
however,	  as	  earlier	  mentioned,	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  politics	  and	  science	  more	  proximal	  to	  the	  
establishment	  of	  IPCC.	  
19	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  the	  USA	  was	  the	  key	  nation	  involved	  in	  climate	  change	  science,	  and	  by	  
the	  mid-­‐1980s	  one	  of	  the	  only	  countries	  to	  have	  conducted	  formal	  climate	  change	  assessments,	  
having	  done	  so	  from	  the	  early	  1970s	  onwards	  (e.g.	  Agrawala	  1998;	  Schneider	  2009).	  
20	  Schneider	  (2009)	  discusses	  rifts	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  concerning	  whether	  they	  
should	  also	  have	  been	  discussing	  the	  implications	  of	  climate	  change	  impacts;	  these	  began	  as	  
early	  as	  the	  1974	  GARP	  meeting	  in	  Stockholm	  (pp.	  55-­‐58).	  
21	  Aside	  from	  the	  activities	  described	  below,	  the	  AGGG	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  organising	  and	  
disseminating	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  Second	  World	  Climate	  Conference,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  
Geneva	  in	  1990	  (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994a),	  although	  by	  this	  time	  AGGG	  had	  largely	  been	  
superseded	  by	  IPCC.	  
 187 
organized	   conference	  held	   in	  Toronto	   (for	  which	   several	  AGGG	  members	   also	  
served	  on	   the	  steering	  committee).	   	  The	  conclusion	   from	  the	  Toronto	  meeting	  
was	   even	  more	   political	   than	   Bellagio:	   it	   stated	   that	   CO2	  emissions	   should	   be	  
reduced	   to	   20%	   of	   1988	   levels	   by	   2005.	   Bert	   Bolin,	   an	   AGGG	  member	   at	   the	  
time,	   later	   described	   this	   as	   an	   “unrealistic	   ad-­‐hoc	   recommendation	   (Bolin,	  
2007:	   48)”.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   Toronto	   statement	   attracted	   plenty	   of	   media	  
attention,	  perhaps	  partially	  aided	  by	  its	  timing,	  which	  coincided	  with	  a	  serious	  
drought	  in	  the	  US	  Midwest	  (Jäger,	  1992).22	  	  
	  
After	  only	  a	  few	  years	  in	  action	  the	  AGGG	  disbanded,	  in	  part	  because	  some	  of	  its	  
scientists	  were	  weary	  of	  the	  political	  aspect	  of	  their	  work,	  and	  in	  part	  because	  of	  
the	   emergence	   of	   IPCC	   which	   proved	   more	   suitable	   for	   dealing	   with	   the	  
emerging	  scientific	  and	  political	  climate	  change	  landscape	  (Agrawala,	  1999).	  In	  
fact,	  from	  nearly	  the	  beginning	  of	  AGGG’s	  tenure,	  discussions	  had	  been	  ongoing	  
between	   UNEP,	   WMO	   and	   a	   few	   countries,	   notably	   the	   USA,	   over	   the	   best	  
mechanism	  for	  assessing	  climate	  change.	  The	  USA,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  satisfied	  
with	   the	   key	   role	   played	   by	   scientists	   in	   the	   Villach	   statements	   (Hech	   and	  
Tirpak,	   1995)	   and	   the	   AGGG	   (Agrawala,	   1998a),23	  was	   particularly	   influential,	  
having	   the	   most	   expertise	   in	   climate	   change	   science	   but	   also	   much	   at	   stake	  
economically	   (Ibid.).	   	   The	   USA	   ultimately	   advocated	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
IPCC	  as	  a	  mechanism	   for	  producing	   international	   climate	  change	  assessments.	  	  
This	   was	   a	   compromise	   outcome	   of	   complicated	   domestic	   American	   politics,	  
where	  some	  agencies	  viewed	  the	  mechanism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  “buying	  time”	  while	  
others	   saw	   it	   as	   a	   necessary	   starting	   point	   for	   gaining	   scientific	   consensus	   in	  
advance	  of	  a	  global	  treaty	  (Hecht	  and	  Tirpak,	  1995).	  	  From	  the	  UN	  perspective,	  
                                                
22	  The	  role	  of	  adverse	  weather	  events	  in	  the	  history	  of	  climate	  change	  politics	  is	  a	  long	  one,	  
mirroring	  some	  of	  the	  evidence	  presented	  by	  interviewees	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  The	  account	  by	  Hecht	  
and	  Tirpak	  (1995)	  also	  identifies	  severe	  instances	  in	  which	  adverse	  weather	  influenced	  climate	  
change	  politics	  within	  the	  US.	  
23	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  (1994b:	  187)	  notes	  that	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  believed	  AGGG	  
represented	  no	  more	  than	  “free	  wheeling	  academics”.	  Moreover,	  others	  have	  suggested	  that	  
following	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Montreal	  Protocol	  for	  the	  reduction	  of	  Ozone	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  
in	  which	  a	  small	  group	  of	  scientists	  were	  able	  to	  dominate	  the	  proceedings,	  the	  US	  and	  WMO	  
were	  both	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  mechanism	  which	  would	  enable	  them	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  science	  
(e.g.	  Miller,	  2004).	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many	   seemed	   to	   have	   shared	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   was	   a	   need	   for	   a	   “more	  
trustworthy	  (Bolin,	  2007:	  49)”	  assessment	  mechanism	  than	  AGGG,	  which	  had	  a	  
very	   small	   membership	   and	   was	   formally	   quite	   far	   removed	   from	   policy	  
spheres.	   	   Furthermore,	   in	   anticipating	   a	   global	   climate	   treaty,	   many	   actors	  
perceived	  the	  need	  to	  foster	  international	  consensus	  on	  climate	  change	  science	  
through	  an	  intergovernmental	  mechanism:	  	  
	  
…the	  IPCC	  was	  the	  product	  of	  an	   intensely	  political	  process	  within	  the	  US	  and	  
the	   UN	   system.	   	   The	   specific	   purpose	   for	   setting	   it	   up	   was	   also	   political:	   to	  
engage	  governments	  worldwide	  in	  climate	  change	  decision-­‐making	  (Agrawala,	  
1998a:	  617,	  original	  emphasis).	  
	  
Similarly,	   Stephen	   Schneider	   (2009:	   125)	   recalled	   a	   conversation	   with	   Bert	  
Bolin	  just	  before	  he	  became	  the	  first	  chairman	  of	  IPCC,	  in	  which	  he	  asked:	  “Will	  
it	  be	  possible	  to	  have	  climate	  policy	  without	  having	  a	  scientific	  group	  in	  which	  
various	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  have	  some	  political	  ownership?”	  
	  
Based	  on	  its	  pre-­‐history	  as	  described	  here,	  the	  formation	  of	  IPCC	  can	  be	  viewed	  
as	   the	  product	  of	  mutually	   stabilising	   relationships	  between	   the	   scientific	   and	  
the	  political	  world.	  	  The	  political	  world	  set	  in	  motion,	  and	  made	  possible,	  much	  
of	  climate	  science;	  this	  in	  turn	  perpetuated	  the	  need	  for	  a	  global	  politics	  and	  set	  
of	   institutions	   to	   address	   the	   findings	   from	   climate	   science.	   	   Given	   the	  
prominent	   role	   that	   climate	   scientists	   played,	   it	   was	   not	   entirely	   without	  
foundation	  to	  suggest	  that	  
	  
..major	  well	  planned	   research	  programmes	  provided	   the	   scientific	   community	  
with	   the	   motivation	   to	   stimulate	   public	   concern	   and	   collaborate	   with	  
environmentalists	   to	   attract	   the	   attention	   of	   politics	   and	   policy	   (Boehmer-­‐
Christiansen,	  1994a:	  146).	  
	  
It	  would,	  however,	   be	   somewhat	  naive	   to	  believe	   that	   climate	   scientists	   could	  
have	   played	   such	   a	   strong	   role	   if	   the	   political	   world	   was	   not	   willing	   and	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interested	   in	   supporting	   this	   topic	   (e.g.	   van	   der	   Sluijs	   et	   al,	   1998). 24	  
Nevertheless,	   through	   the	   relationships	   described	   here,	   the	   impetus	   for	   an	  
intergovernmental	   climate	   change	  assessment	  mechanism	  gained	   considerable	  
momentum.	  Following	   further	  discussions	  over	   the	  exact	   form	  the	  mechanism	  
would	  take,	  WMO	  and	  UNEP	  invited	  WMO	  member	  governments	  to	  participate	  
in	   IPCC	   in	  March,	   1988.	   	   By	  November,	   1988,	   IPCC	   had	   held	   its	   first	  meeting	  
with	  the	  participation	  of	  28	  countries	  (Ibid.).	  	  	  
	  
5.2.2	  The	  IPCC	  mandate	  
The	   IPCC	   received	   its	   formal	  mandate	   from	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   Resolution	  
43/53	  of	  December	  6,	  1988.25	  	  In	  this	  Resolution,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly:	  
	  
Requests	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	   the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization	  and	  
the	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme,	  through	  
the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  immediately	  to	  initiate	  action	  
leading,	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  review	  and	  recommendations	  
with	  respect	  to:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  (a)	  	  The	  state	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  science	  of	  climate	  and	  climatic	  change;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  (b)	   	   Programmes	   and	   studies	   on	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   impact	   of	   climate	  
change,	  including	  global	  warming;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  (c)	   	   Possible	   response	   strategies	   to	   delay,	   limit	   or	   mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	  
adverse	  climate	  change;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  (d)	   	   The	   identification	   and	   possible	   strengthening	   of	   relevant	   existing	  
international	  legal	  instruments	  having	  a	  bearing	  on	  climate;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  (e)	   	   Elements	   for	   inclusion	   in	   a	   possible	   future	   international	   convention	   on	  
climate	  
	  
Resolution	   43/53	   legitimised	   and	   reinforced	   work	   that	   was	   in	   fact	   already	  
underway	   at	   IPCC.	   	   By	   the	   time	   the	   IPCC’s	   first	  meeting	   ended	   in	   November,	  
1988,	   IPCC	   had	   its	   formal	   intergovernmental	   status,	   a	   small	   bureau,	   a	  
secretariat	   organised	   by	   WMO,	   and	   a	   structure	   based	   around	   three	   working	  
groups	   (Agrawala,	   1998b).	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   working	   groups,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
chairs	  for	  each	  group,	  were	  negotiated	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  approved	  
                                                
24	  In	  her	  account,	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  (1994a,	  1994c)	  goes	  further	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  
research	  community	  pushed	  the	  climate	  change	  agenda	  within	  policy	  circles	  to	  secure	  further	  
research	  funding	  in	  this	  area.	  	  Others	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  Boehmer-­‐Christiansen’s	  assessment	  
of	  the	  role	  of	  scientists	  appears	  somewhat	  exaggerated	  (Shackley	  &	  Skovdin,	  1995).	  	  
25	  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm,	  accessed	  December	  30,	  2011.	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without	  much	  discussion	  (Bolin,	  2007).	  	  The	  three	  working	  groups,	  which	  have	  
similar	   foci	   today,	  were	  Working	   Group	   1	   (WGI),	  which	   assesses	   the	   physical	  
science	   aspects	   of	   climate	   change;	   WGII,	   which	   assesses	   impacts	   of	   climate	  
change	  on	   socio-­‐economic	  and	  natural	   systems,	   as	  well	   as	  options	   to	  adapt	   to	  
climate	   change;	   and	   WGIII,	   which	   assesses	   options	   for	   mitigating	   climate	  
change.	  The	  demarcation	  of	  the	  three	  working	  groups	  offers	  insight	  into	  one	  of	  
the	  aspects	  of	  IPCC	  that	  make	  it	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  organisation	  to	  study:	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  has	  attempted	  (and	  sometimes	  struggled)	  to	  cope	  with	  its	  
dual	  science-­‐political	  nature.	  	  As	  Miller	  (2004:	  60)	  commented,	  the	  demarcation	  
between	  WGs	  	  
	  
demonstrates	   early	   efforts	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   scientific	   and	   political	  
aspects	  of	  the	  panel…	  Over	  time,	  however,	  this	  separation	  proved	  inadequate	  in	  
pragmatic	   terms	   as	   the	   IPCC	   grappled	   with	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   problems	   of	  
formulating	  and	  carrying	  out	  its	  work	  plans.26	  	  	  
	  
Aside	   from	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   reinforced	   a	   particular	   division	   of	   labour	  
between	   the	   different	   Working	   Groups,	   the	   IPCC	   mandate	   is	   noteworthy	  
because	   it	   specifically	   asks	   IPCC	   to	   provide	   inputs	   into	   a	   future	   international	  
climate	  convention	  –	  which	  would	  eventually	  become	  the	  1992	  UN	  Framework	  
Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	   (UN	  FCCC)27	  –	   further	  demonstrating	   the	   close	  
coupling	   between	   science	   and	   policy	   that	   have	   existed	   at	   IPCC	   since	   its	  
inception.	  
 
5.2.3	  IPCC	  processes:	  seeking	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  
 
Sitting	   as	   it	   does	   at	   the	   interface	   of	   highly	   uncertain	   global	   climate	   change	  
science	  and	  highly	  contentious	  global	  climate	  change	  politics,	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  
IPCC	  mandate	  is	  challenging	  would	  be	  something	  of	  an	  understatement.	  	  By	  the	  
time	   IPCC	   received	   its	   formal	  mandate	   in	  1988,	  however,	   there	  were	  no	   clear	  
                                                
26	  Bolin	  (2007:	  50)	  similarly	  concedes	  that	  “The	  choice	  of	  chairmen	  of	  the	  IPCC	  and	  its	  working	  
groups	  reflected	  how	  both	  scientific	  competence	  and	  political	  considerations	  played	  a	  role”.	  
27	  http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2012.	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instructions	   on	   how	   to	   pursue	   it	   and	   the	   IPCC	   did	   not	   have	   much	   time	   for	  
contemplation:	  IPCC	  had	  been	  asked	  to	  complete	  its	  first	  assessment	  in	  time	  to	  
present	   it	   to	   the	   1990	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   and	   to	   gain	   momentum	   for	   a	  
climate	  convention,	  which	  would	  become	  the	  UN	  FCCC	  at	  the	  UN	  Conference	  on	  
the	   Environment	   and	   Development	   in	   Rio	   in	   1992.	   Thus	   IPCC	   started	   its	  
activities	  in	  a	  rather	  ad-­‐hoc	  manner.	  Bolin	  confesses:	  	  
	  
It	   was	   clear	   to	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   IPCC	   that	   we	   had	   to	   develop	   our	   own	  
procedure	  for	  how	  to	  achieve	  the	  task	  that	  had	  been	  given	  us.	  	  During	  the	  first	  
couple	  of	  years	  we	  formally	  followed	  the	  WMO	  procedures	  when	  in	  doubt.	  	  The	  
lack	  of	  more	  precise	  rules	  of	  procedure	   for	  a	   task	   that	  was	  going	   to	  be	  rather	  
different	   from	   ordinary	   WMO	   activities	   gave	   the	   IPCC	   great	   flexibility	   in	  
handling	  matters	   and	   could	   be	   exploited	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   assessment	  
process,	  but	  care	  had	  to	  be	  exercised.	   	  It	  gradually	  became	  apparent,	  however,	  
that	  we	  had	  to	  become	  more	  strict	  and	  professional	  in	  our	  work…	  (Bolin,	  2007:	  
50-­‐51)	  
	  
Becoming	  more	   strict	   and	   professional	   was,	   no	   doubt,	   necessary	   to	   shore-­‐up	  
IPCC’s	   scientific	   credibility	   and	   political	   legitimacy.	   One	  way	   of	   achieving	   this	  
has	   been	   through	   attempts	   to	   “de-­‐politicise”	   the	   IPCC.	   	   A	   rhetorical	   shift	   has	  
gradually	  placed	  more	  emphasis	  on	   the	   “scientific”	  nature	  of	   the	   IPCC.	   	   In	   the	  
run-­‐up	  to	  Rio,	   for	  example,	  developing	  countries	  were	  suspicious	  of	  the	  IPCC’s	  
role	  as	  a	  negotiating	  body	   for	   the	  FCCC,	  which	   led	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  
separate	   International	   Negotiating	   Committee	   (INC)	   (Agrawala,	   1999).	   The	  
tactical	  division	  between	  the	  “scientific”	  IPCC	  and	  “political”	  INC	  “had	  a	  number	  
of	  important	  stabilizing	  effects	  for	  the	  climate	  regime	  as	  a	  whole	  (Miller,	  2004)”,	  
of	  which	  the	  most	   immediate	  was	  a	  dampening	  of	  the	  criticism	  IPCC	  had	  been	  
receiving	   from	  developing	  countries.	   	  There	  were	  additional	   reasons	   to	   tweak	  
the	   IPCC’s	   rhetorical	   science/politics	   boundary.	   	   IPCC	   had	   encountered	   very	  
visible	   resistance	   to	   its	   assessments	   in	   advance	   of	   Rio	   (e.g.	   Singer,	   1992).	  	  
Moreover,	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  UN	  FCCC	  placed	  responsibility	  on	  IPCC	  to	  help	  define	  
“dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference”,	   meaning	   the	   IPCC	   work	   had	   the	  
possibility	  to	  become	  even	  more	  contentious	  given	  the	  “hybrid”	  nature	  of	  such	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an	   assignment	   (and	   one	   that	   very	   clearly	   involves	   value	   judgements	   (IPCC,	  
2001b,	  Schneider	  and	  Mastrandrea,	  2005)).	  	  	  
	  
Aligned	  with	  its	  desire	  to	  emphasise	  its	  “scientific”	  nature,	  the	  IPCC	  has	  pursued	  
an	   ever-­‐evolving	   series	   of	   tweaks	   and	   refinements	   to	   its	   structure	   and	  
processes,	   significantly	   via	   major	   revisions	   implemented	   in	   1993	   and	   1999.	  	  
Amendments	   to	   IPCC	   procedures	   have	   included	   additional	   guidance	   on	  
selecting	   authors	   and	   conducting	   peer-­‐review,	   an	   attempt	   to	   harmonise	   such	  
procedures	   across	   the	  Working	  Groups,	   a	  minor	   revision	  of	   the	   focus	  of	  WGII	  
and	  WGIII,	   the	   addition	   of	   review	   editors,	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   Technical	  
Support	  Units	  for	  each	  WG,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  acting	  as	  buffers	  between	  IPCC	  
“experts”	   and	   special	   interests	   who	   would	   want	   to	   influence	   the	   reports	  	  
(Agrawala,	  1998b,	  Bolin,	  2007,	  Hulme	  and	  Mahony,	  2010,	  Miller,	  2004,	  Skodvin,	  
2000).	   	   Behind	   each	   of	   these	   adjustments	   (in	   addition	   to	   countless	   other	  
innovations,	   such	   as	   the	   IPCC’s	   early	   establishment	   of	   the	   “Summary	   for	  
Policymakers”	   report	   which	   accompanies	   formal	   assessments)	   lie	   clear	  
objectives:	   to	   maintain	   scientific	   credibility,	   to	   maintain	   policy-­‐relevance	   and	  
foster	   ties	   with	   policy-­‐makers,	   and	   to	   ensure	   political	   legitimacy	   across	  
governments.	  
	  
Despite	  the	  many	  procedural	  changes	  IPCC	  has	  implemented,	  it	  has	  also	  sought	  
to	   retain	   some	   operational	   freedom.	   As	   Edwards	   and	   Schneider	   (2001:	   227)	  
observed:	  
	   	  
By	  the	  standards	  of	  many	  political	  organizations,	  its	  formal	  rules	  of	  governance	  
are	   not	   very	   extensive.	   	   They	   are	   also	   not	   very	   specific.	   	   The	   rules	   purposely	  
leave	   undefined	   the	   meaning	   of	   key	   terms	   such	   as	   “expert”	   and	   important	  
processes	  such	  as	  “taking	  into	  account”	  comments.	  
	  
Perhaps	  partially	  because	  of	  this	  flexibility,	  much	  of	  the	  IPCC	  process	  has	  come	  
under	   intense	   scrutiny	   from	   academics,	   lobbyists,	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   national	  
governments.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  critiques	  about	  the	  IPCC	  review	  process,	  the	  nature	  
of	  IPCC	  consensus	  and	  the	  manners	  in	  which	  uncertainty	  have	  been	  addressed	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have	  also	  received	  vast	  amounts	  of	  attention	  (e.g.	  Petersen,	  2011,	  Swart	  et	  al.,	  
2009,	   Shackley	   and	   Wynne,	   1996).	   	   A	   brief	   examination	   of	   the	   current	  
procedures	   for	   IPCC	   assessments	   (as	   currently	   outlined	   in	   Appendix	   A	   of	   the	  
IPCC	   document	   Principles	   Governing	   IPCC	   Work28)	   identifies	   the	   multiple	   and	  
overlapping	  influences	  that	  IPCC	  writing	  teams	  and	  national	  governments	  have	  
on	  the	  production	  of	  IPCC	  assessments	  (Figure	  4).29	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  sub-­‐section,	  the	  general	  aspects	  of	  this	  process	  will	  be	  
described,	  while	   in	   the	  next	   section,	   5.3,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   certain	  processes,	  
namely	   the	   selection	   of	   authors	   and	   peer	   review,	   have	   specifically	   influenced	  















                                                
28	  Principles	  Governing	  IPCC	  Work	  was	  adopted	  in	  1998	  and	  subsequently	  revised	  in	  2003	  and	  
2006,	  and	  must	  be	  reviewed	  (and	  amended	  if	  deemed	  necessary)	  at	  least	  every	  five	  years.	  	  As	  
the	  IPCC	  states:	  “Comprehensiveness,	  objectivity,	  openness	  and	  transparency:	  these	  are	  the	  
guiding	  principles	  governing	  IPCC	  work”.	  	  See:	  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-­‐principles/ipcc-­‐
principles.pdf,	  accessed	  January	  5,	  2012.	  
29	  After	  having	  been	  adopted	  in	  1999,	  the	  IPCC	  assessment	  process	  was	  amended	  twice	  in	  2003,	  
once	  in	  2008,	  and	  twice	  in	  2011.	  See:	  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-­‐principles/ipcc-­‐principles-­‐
appendix-­‐a-­‐final.pdf,	  accessed	  January	  5,	  2012.	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30 This	  Figure	  was	  kindly	  provided	  by	  the	  InterAcademy	  Council.	  It	  is	  Figure	  1.2	  in	  IAC	  (2010). 
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i) The	  scoping	  meeting	  	  
The	   very	   beginning	   of	   the	   IPCC	   assessment	   process	   consists	   of	   an	   invitation-­‐
only	  scoping	  meeting	  between	  IPCC	  and	  governmental	  focal	  points.	  	  During	  the	  
meeting,	  the	  objectives	  and	  outline	  of	  the	  upcoming	  Assessment	  are	  discussed;	  
thereafter	  a	  scoping	  document	  is	  prepared	  and	  submitted	  to	  governments,	  and	  
then	   a	   Plenary	   session	   of	   IPCC	   (consisting	   of	   government	   representatives)	  
needs	  to	  approve	  the	  scoping	  paper	  for	  each	  IPCC	  Working	  Group.31	  	  Given	  that	  
the	   outline	   of	   the	   entire	   IPCC	   assessment	  must	   be	   approved	   by	   governments,	  
the	   plenary	   sessions	   are	   particularly	   important	   in	   shaping	   IPCC	   Assessments	  
and	  also	  in	  ensuring	  that	  they	  remain	  policy-­‐relevant:	  	  
	  
the	   outline,	   the	   broad	   overview	   …	   it's	   actually	   driven	   by	   a	   demand	   of	  
policymakers	  (R2).	  
	  
there	   are	   governments	   that	   have	   very	   strong	   opinions	   about	  what	   should	   be	  
done	  and	  what	  should	  not	  be	  done…There	  were	  certainly	  lots	  of	  rumours,	  that	  I	  
personally	  can't	  confirm	  but	  I	  believe	  were	  true,	  that	  in	  the	  Fourth	  Assessment	  
Report,	  the	  US	  government	  tried	  to	  get	  one	  of	  the	  chapters	  pulled	  because	  they	  
didn't	   like	  what	   the	   chapter	  was	  doing	  …	   in	   the	  end	   they	  did	  not	   succeed	  but	  
there	   are	   these	   tensions	   because	   you	   do	   have	   to	   have	   approval	   by	   the	  
governments	  (R6).	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Thus	  any	  national	  government	  might	  lobby	  to	  have	  content	  added	  or	  removed,	  
potentially	   altering	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   Assessment,	   but	   as	   the	   one	   interviewee	  
suggested,	  countries	  rarely	  succeed	  in	  doing	  so	  if	  acting	  alone	  (R6).	  	  	  
	  
ii) Nomination	  and	  selection	  of	  experts	  
Once	   the	   outline	   of	   an	   Assessment	   is	   agreed	   upon,	   IPCC	   once	   again	   solicits	  
governments	   for	   a	   list	   of	   nominated	   candidates	   to	   be	   Coordinating	   Lead	  
Authors,	  Lead	  Authors,	  Contributing	  Authors,	  Review	  Editors	  and	  Government	  
Focal	   Points.	   	   The	   co-­‐chairs	   of	   IPCC	   Working	   Groups,	   the	   Technical	   Support	  
Units,	   and	   the	   chair	   and	   vice-­‐chairs	   for	   each	   WG	   select	   the	   Convening	   Lead	  
Authors	   (CLAs),	   Lead	   Authors	   and	   review	   editors,	   based	   upon	   the	   required	  
                                                
31	  For	  further	  details	  about	  how	  this	  took	  place	  for	  the	  currently	  underway	  IPCC	  AR5,	  see:	  
http://www.ipcc.ch/meeting_documentation/workshops-­‐experts-­‐meetings-­‐ar5-­‐scoping.shtml,	  
accessed	  January	  8,	  2012.	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expertise	  but	  also	  trying	  to	  ensure	  geographic	  and	  gender	  diversity	  among	  the	  
writing	  teams.	  All	  selected	  are	  unpaid	  by	  IPCC	  throughout	  the	  process.	  
	  
The	  selection	  of	  authors	  for	  IPCC	  assessments	  has	  some	  obvious	  problems.	  One	  
relates	  to	  their	  objectivity,	  which	  is	  potentially	  compromised	  for	  two	  reasons	  –	  
first	  because	  it	   is	  governments	  who	  nominate	  “experts”,	  and	  second	  because	  it	  
is	   highly	   doubtful	   that	   a	   scientist	   known	   to	   have	   ambivalent	   views	   towards	  
climate	   change	   would	   be	   selected	   by	   IPCC.	   	   As	   concerns	   the	   former,	   one	  
interviewee,	  well	  known	  to	  be	  hostile	  to	  CCH	  research,	  noted:	  
	  
R13:	   The	   intergovernmental	   [in	   the	   acronym	   IPCC]	   as	   I	   said	   is	  
intergovernmental	   …	   It's	   not	   saying	   the	   “scientific”,	   it	   is	   “governmental”.	  	  
Nobody	  hides	  that,	  and	  as	  I	  said	  it	  is	  governments	  who	  make	  the	  nominations,	  
so	   obviously,	   Mr.	   Blair's	   government	   would	   not	   have	   nominated	  me,	   but	   Mr.	  
Bush's	  government	  did	  -­‐	  to	  my	  embarrassment.	  	  So	  the	  government	  makes	  the	  
nominations	   and	   some	   sort	   of	   committee,	   which	   is	   not	   very	   clear,	   make	   the	  
selections	   and	   I'm	   not	   really	   sure	   of	   the	   details	   to	   be	   really	   honest	   …	   [but]	  
everybody	  knew	  that	  I	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  be	  a	  lead	  author.	  	  
	  
It	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  high	  level	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  
final	   selection	   of	   writing	   teams.	   	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   the	   IPCC	  
requirement	   for	   diversity	   in	   writing	   teams	   is	   driven	   by	   its	   desire	   to	   ensure	  
broad	   legitimacy	   and	   governmental	   buy-­‐in	   to	   its	   outputs:	   “there	   has	   to	   be	   a	  
balance	  from	  countries	  and	  genders	  ...	  [to	  avoid]	  too	  many	  white	  men	  (R8)”.	  	  As	  
another	  interviewee	  noted:	  
	  
R15:	   That	  was	   also	  of	   course	   the	  dilemma.	  How	  do	  you	  keep	   intact	   the	   same	  
scientific	   integrity	  and	  have	  enough	  diversity…	  in	  the	  team	  as	  well?	   	  That	  was	  
not	  always	  easy…	  
	  
…you	   are	   looking	   for	   authors	   also	   from	   African	   region,	   from	   South	   America,	  
from	   Asia	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   that	   is	   very	   fine,	   very	   easy.	   	   But	   if	   you	   look	   at	  
climate	  change	  science	  …	  it	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  US,	  by	  parts	  of	  Europe,	  maybe	  
Germany,	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   and,	   to	   some	   extent,	   Scandinavian	  
countries.	   	   So,	   there	   is	   not	   much	   very	   high	   standard	   climate	   change	   science,	  




Thus	   the	   final	   composition	   of	   writing	   teams	   is	   inevitably	   subject	   to	   criticism	  
about	   their	   level	   of	   expertise	   as	  well	   as	   political	   criticism	   about	   the	   scope	   of	  
representation.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  suggested	  above,	  the	  final	  composition	  of	  writing	  
teams	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  philosophically	  aligned	  with	  IPCC	  on	  the	  major	  substantive	  
issues:	  
	  
R6:	  The	  secretariat	   then	  has	   these	  huge	   long	   lists	  of	  possible	  people.	   	  The	  co-­‐
chairs	   for	   the	   working	   group	   and	   the	   technical	   service	   unit	   work	   with	   the	  
secretariat	  to	  identify	  the	  convening	  lead	  authors.	   	  They	  then	  turn	  around	  and	  
work...	  Once	  you've	  chosen	  your	  convening	  lead	  authors,	  you	  then	  have	  a	  very	  
long	   list	   of	   possible	   authors.	   	   And	   there	   is	   some	   fairly	   extensive	   process	   of	  
saying,	   "Who's	   your	   ideal	   team	   that	   you'd	   like	   to	   have?"	   	  We	   also,	   across	   the	  
working	   group,	   need	   geographic	   balance	   and,	   to	   the	   extent	   possible,	  we	  need	  
gender	  balance...	  and	  so	  then	  there	  is	  working	  with	  the	  convening	  lead	  authors,	  
the	   secretariat,	   the	  TSU,	   the	   co-­‐chairs,	   to	   say	   “what	   are	   these	  author	   teams	   is	  
going	   to	   look	   like?	   What	   are	   the	   constraints	   to	   the	   number	   of	   people?”	  
(emphasis	  added)	  
	  
Given	  such	  a	  selection	  procedure,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  indeed	  to	  satisfy	  all	  
governments	   that	   they	   have	   been	   adequately	   represented.	   	   As	   concerned	   the	  
WGII	  report	  for	  IPCC	  AR4,	  for	  example:	  	  
	  
R6:	  There	  were	  12	  US	  authors	  but	  if	  you	  count	  up	  how	  many	  European	  authors	  
…	  there's	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  12.	  	  So	  there's	  always	  this	  tension	  where	  people	  point	  
at	  the	  US	  and	  say	  you	  have	  more	  authors	  than	  any	  one	  country,	  but	  then	  Europe	  
must	  have	  had	  40	  authors	  …	  and	   the	  developing	   countries	  often	   feel	   they	  are	  
underrepresented.	  
	  
Of	  all	  selections,	  the	  CLA	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  one,	  as	  they	  will	  play	  a	  
role	   in	   guiding	   contributing	   authors	   and	  also	  play	   a	  key	   role	   in	  defending	   the	  
conclusions	  from	  their	  chapters	  in	  plenary	  sessions.	  	  As	  one	  interviewee	  stated	  
with	   regards	   to	   the	   review	   process	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   plenary	   sessions	  
(which	  negotiate	  the	  final	  text	  for	  the	  SPM):	  
	  
R6:	  …this	  is	  where	  it's	  critically	  important	  that	  you	  have	  very	  strong	  convening	  
lead	  authors,	  because	  when	  a	  country	  raises	  an	  objection	  the	  CLA	  has	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  come	  back.	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Once	  writing	   teams	  are	  assembled,	   they	  meet	  on	  a	   regular	  basis	  as	   they	  work	  
towards	   the	   preparation	   of	   drafts	   of	   the	   full	   report	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Synthesis	  
Report,	  which	  includes	  a	  Summary	  for	  Policymakers	  (SPM)	  and	  a	  longer,	  more	  
detailed	   report.	   	   Authors	   are	   instructed	   to	   draw	   upon	   the	   international	   peer-­‐
reviewed	  literature	  as	  extensively	  as	  possible	  as	  they	  prepare	  their	  reports,	  but	  
are	   allowed	   to	   draw	   upon	   grey	   and	   unpublished	   literature	   as	   well. 32	  
Importantly,	   writing	   teams	  must	   also	   address	   the	   comments	   from	   reviewers,	  
and	  they	  are	  instructed	  to	  identify	  areas	  in	  which	  consensus	  does	  not	  exist.	  As	  
the	   IPCC	   Principles	   state:	   “It	   is	   important	   that	   Reports	   describe	   different	  
(possibly	   controversial)	   scientific,	   technical,	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   views	   on	   a	  
subject,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  policy	  debate	  (IPCC,	  1999)”.	  	  
	  
iii) Peer	  review	  
The	   peer	   review	   process	   has	   been,	   and	   continues	   to	   be,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
discussed	   elements	   of	   the	   IPCC	   assessment	   process	   (e.g.	   Agrawala,	   1998b,	  
Edwards	   and	   Schneider,	   2001,	   Berkhout,	   2010,	   Hulme	   and	   Mahony,	   2010,	  
Yearley,	  2009).	  	  Insights	  on	  how	  this	  process	  has	  influenced	  the	  CCH	  content	  of	  
IPCC	  Assessments	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  5.3;	  here,	  the	  general	  process	  and	  
some	  of	  its	  major	  discussion	  points	  will	  be	  introduced.	  
	  
Peer	  review	  for	  IPCC	  Assessments	  begins	  after	  writing	  teams	  have	  finished	  their	  
1st	  order	  drafts.	  Once	  completed,	   the	  1st	  order	  draft	   is	   sent	   to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
experts,	   which	   include	   scientists	   with	   expertise	   in	   areas	   covered	   by	   the	  
Assessment,	  experts	  nominated	  by	  their	  national	  governments	  to	  contribute	  as	  
authors	  or	  expert	  reviewers,	  and	  experts	  nominated	  by	  other	  organisations.	  	  To	  
facilitate	   this	   process,	   IPCC	   introduced	   review	   editors	   in	   its	   1999	   revision	   of	  
procedures.	  	  Their	  role	  is	  to	  help	  identify	  reviewers,	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  comments	  
are	   considered,	   and	   to	   advise	   authors	   on	   how	   to	   handle	   controversial	   issues	  
                                                
32	  The	  1999	  revision	  to	  IPCC	  rules	  accounted	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  including	  non-­‐peer	  review	  
literature.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  Climategate,	  Hulme	  and	  Mahony	  (2010)	  remark	  that	  is	  was	  “prescient”	  
that	  Skovdin	  (2000)	  had	  anticipated	  that	  this	  could	  eventually	  cause	  credibility	  problems	  for	  
IPCC.	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(Edwards	  and	  Schneider,	  2001).	  	  After	  taking	  the	  expert	  review	  comments	  into	  
consideration,	   a	   2nd	   order	   draft	   is	   produced	   and	   subjected	   to	   a	   joint	   expert-­‐
governmental	  review.	  	  Once	  again	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  comments,	  a	  final	  draft	  
is	   produced,	   alongside	   the	   Synthesis	   Report.	   These	   drafts	   are	   then	   subject	   to	  
acceptance	  and	  approval	  at	  WG	  plenary	  sessions.	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  obvious	  problems	  for	  IPCC	  peer	  review	  has	  related	  to	  its	  scope	  
and	   its	   perceived	   impartiality.	   	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   peer	   reviewers	   in	   IPCC	  
include	   IPCC	   authors	   and	   government-­‐nominated	   “experts”.	   Given	   the	   vast	  
number	  of	  scientists	  involved	  in	  assessments,	  one	  consequence	  is	  that	  there	  are	  
“virtually	  no	  ‘peers’	  …	  not	  already	  within	  the	  IPCC	  (Yearley	  2009:	  396)”.	  Despite	  
this	   predicament,	   Edwards	   and	   Schneider	   (2001:	   225)	   maintain	   that	   peer-­‐
review	   is	   the	  principal	  mechanism	  of	   “independent	  self-­‐governance”	  at	   IPCC	  –	  
designed	  to	  establish	  credibility	  across	   its	  scientific	  and	  political	  stakeholders.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  volume	  of	  comments	  received	  places	  a	  large	  burden	  on	  writing	  
teams,	  who	  have	  to	  consider	  all	  of	  them.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   vast	   number	   of	   comments	   that	   IPCC	   receives	  
come	   not	   only	   from	   scientists	   and	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   governments,	   but	   also	  
special-­‐interest	   groups	   and	   lobbyists.	   	   Thus	   part	   of	   the	  work	   of	   IPCC	  writing	  
teams	  is	  boundary-­‐related	  work	  deciphering	  whether	  they	  consider	  comments	  
to	  be	  “scientific”	  or	  “political”:	  
	  
R2:	   I	   mean	   not	   all	   people	   commenting	   are	   really	   scientists	   …	   you	   have	   also	  
governmental	   comments.	   	   So	   you	  might	   also	   have	   statements	   like	   “but	   this	   is	  
nonsense”	   or	  …	   “you	   know	   this	   is	   not	   how	   I	  would	   say	   it”.	   	   Or	   you	   have	   one	  
government	  say	  “in	  our	  country	  it	  is	  like	  that	  and	  I	  want	  you	  to	  state	  it	  like	  that”	  	  
	  
R6:	   …	   	   We	   had	   more	   than	   800	   perhaps	   a	   thousand	   comments...	   and	   the	  
comments	  come	  from	  other	  scientists,	  so	  they	  are	  true	  peer	  review,	  they	  come	  
from	  any	  interested	  member	  of	  the	  public,	  they	  come	  from	  policy	  makers,	  they	  
come	  from	  people	  with	  particular	  perspectives,	  and	  you	  have	  to	  write	  a	  written	  
response	  to	  each	  and	  every	  comment	  ...	  It's	  much	  more	  strenuous	  than	  getting	  




Given	   this,	   one	  of	   the	  major	   issues	   in	   the	   IPCC	  peer	   review	  process	   relates	   to	  
what	   and	   how	   the	   writing	   teams	   determine	   which	   comments	   necessitate	   the	  
greatest	  consideration.	  Significantly,	  writing	  teams	  have	  flexibility,	  as	  Edwards	  
and	  Schneider	  have	  noted:	  
	  
Chapter	  authors	  are	  required	  to	  “take	  into	  account”	  all	  comments,	  although	  the	  
meaning	   of	   this	   phrase	   is	   deliberately	   left	   vague.	   	   Given	   the	   volume	   of	  
commentary	   and	   the	   many	   duplicate	   and	   irrelevant	   comments	   received,	  
responses	   may	   be	   no	   more	   than	   a	   couple	   of	   words.	   	   Yet	   in	   aggregate,	   this	  
extremely	   extensive	   peer	   review	   process	   typically	   leads	   to	   hundreds	   or	   even	  
thousands	   of	   changes,	   since	   each	   document	   typically	   goes	   through	   several	  
drafts	  (Edwards	  and	  Schneider,	  2001:	  235;	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
Edwards	   and	   Schneider	   are	   correct	   to	   state	   that	   this	   style	   of	   peer	   review	   is	  
extremely	  extensive	  and	   that	   it	   consults	   to	   far	  broader	  range	  of	  actors	   than	   is	  
normally	   the	   case	   for	   a	   scientific	   publication.	   	   It	   may	   also	   be	   true,	   from	   the	  
perspective	   of	   IPCC	   and	   prominent	   climate	   scientists	   like	   the	   late	   Stephen	  
Schneider,	   that	   this	   process	   has	   “created	   a	   fairer,	   more	   thorough,	   and	   hence	  
more	  powerful	  method	   for	  reaching	  consensus	  on	   the	  knowledge	  required	   for	  
good	   public	   policy	   (2001:	   245)”.	   	   Yet,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   events	  
surrounding	  Climategate	   (5.1),	   their	   account	   spends	   too	  much	   time	  defending	  
the	   IPCC	   peer	   review	   process	   instead	   of	   also	   considering	   how	   structural	   and	  
subjective	  factors	  influence	  the	  way	  that	  peer	  review	  comments	  are	  determined	  
to	  be	  relevant	  or	  irrelevant.	   	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  5.3	  and	  5.4.	  	  
For	   the	   time	   being,	   it	   suffices	   to	   reiterate	   that	   the	   IPCC’s	   main	   institutional	  
response	  to	  address	  this	  has	  been	  the	  introduction	  of	  review	  editors,	  whose	  role	  
is	   to	   support	   and	  guide	   IPCC	  authors	   to	   follow	   IPCC	  procedures	   (IPCC,	  1999).	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  problem	  of	  subjectivity	  remains:	  
	  
If	   these	   writing	   teams	   are	   dominated	   by	   opinionated	   experts	   holding	   one	  
particular	  viewpoint,	  then,	  conceivably,	  they	  could	  get	  away	  with	  ignoring	  some	  
or	  a	  majority	  of	  all	  critical	  review	  comments	  (Agrawala	  1998b:	  626).	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Given	   the	   intense	   scrutiny	   that	   each	   IPCC	   Assessment	   faces,	   the	   desire	   to	  
mitigate	   bias	   is	   obvious	   –	   but	   it	   is	   not	   obvious	   that	   any	   peer	   review	   process	  
would	  be	  capable	  of	  eliminating	  subjectivity.	  
	  
iv) Approval,	  acceptance	  and	  adoption	  of	  IPCC	  reports	  
The	   terms	   “acceptance”,	   “adoption”	   and	   “approval”	   have	   somewhat	   different	  
meanings	  at	  IPCC	  (IPCC,	  1999).	   	  “Acceptance”	  by	  a	  WG	  plenary	  suggests	  that	  a	  
report	   is	   balanced	   and	   comprehensive,	   but	   has	   not	   been	   subject	   to	   in-­‐depth	  
discussion.	   	   This	   applies	   to	   the	   full-­‐length	   assessment	   chapters.	   “Adoption”	  
implies	   “section-­‐by-­‐section”	   endorsement,	   and	   applies	   to	   the	   longer	   report	   of	  
the	  IPCC	  Synthesis	  Report.	   	  “Approval”	  means	  that	  the	  text	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  
line-­‐by-­‐line	  discussion,	  and	  this	  applies	  to	  the	  Summary	  for	  Policymakers	  (SPM)	  
component	  of	  the	  Synthesis	  Report	  (Alfsen	  and	  Skodvin,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  
Plenary	  sessions	  focus	  on	  the	  Synthesis	  Reports,	  typically	  requiring	  5-­‐7	  days	  of	  
negotiation	   to	   produce	   the	   final	   version.	   The	   first	   focus	   of	   the	   WG	   plenary	  
involves	   line-­‐by-­‐line	   negotiation	   over	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   SPM.	   After	   the	  
provisional	   approval	   of	   the	   SPM,	   the	   plenary	   session	   will	   review	   the	   longer	  
report	  of	  the	  Synthesis	  Report	  section-­‐by-­‐section,	  ensuring	  that	  it	  is	  consistent	  
with	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  SPM.	   	  Once	  there	  is	  agreement	  on	  this,	  the	  SPM	  is	  
approved	   and	   the	   longer	   report	   is	   adopted.	   Approval	   of	   the	   SPM	   implies	  
acceptance	   of	   the	   full	   report.33 	  	   The	   accepted	   and	   approved	   reports	   then	  
proceed	  to	  the	  full	  panel	  plenary,	  where	  the	  contents	  of	  reports	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  
changed,	  and	  where	  reports	  receive	  final	  acceptance	  (IPCC,	  1999).	  
	  
The	  plenary	  sessions	  are	  the	  first	  and	  most	  important	  step	  towards	  the	  political	  
acceptance	  of	   IPCC	  Assessments	  (Alfsen	  and	  Skodvin,	  2010)	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  
highly	  contested.	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  plenary	  negotiations	  resemble	  
“a	   fox-­‐trot	   performed	   by	   a	   drunken	   couple:	   one	   lurch	   forward,	   followed	   by	   a	  
                                                
33	  As	  IPCC	  states:	  “Approval	  of	  the	  Summary	  for	  Policymakers	  at	  the	  Session	  of	  the	  Working	  
Group	  signifies	  that	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  factual	  material	  contained	  in	  the	  full	  scientific,	  
technical	  and	  socioeconomic	  assessment	  or	  Special	  Report	  accepted	  by	  the	  Working	  Group	  
(IPCC,	  1999)”.	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sideways	  stagger,	  then	  a	  stumble	  backwards	  (Agrawala,	  1998b:	  627)”.	  	  In	  these	  
sessions,	  IPCC	  writing	  teams	  and	  national	  governments	  negotiate	  over	  the	  final	  
content	  of	  the	  SPM:	  
	  
R6:	   So	   it's	   the	   summary	   for	  policymakers	  and	   the	   synthesis	   report	  where	   the	  
governments	  try	  to	  make	  changes	  to	  reflect	  their	  political	  realities.	  	  Sometimes	  
they're	  successful,	  sometimes	  they're	  not.	   	  The	  chapters	  themselves	  they	  don't	  
touch.	  
	  
Although	   there	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   government	   officials	   than	   scientists	   at	   WG	  
plenaries,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  “scientists	  still	  have	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  
control	   over	   the	   documents	   (Alfsen	   and	   Skovdin,	   2010:	   6)”.	   	   One	   interviewee	  
substantiated	  this:	  “And	  so	  the	  plenary	  is	  quite	  contentious	  because	  the	  authors	  
don't	   want	   to	   have	   anything	   changed	   …	   and	   by	   and	   large	   the	   authors	   have	  
prevailed	  (R6)”.	  	  	  
	  
5.2.4	  Summary	  
The	  IPCC	   is	  easily	   the	  most	  visible	  organisation	   involved	   in	  conducting	  policy-­‐
relevant	  assessments	  of	  climate	  change	  science.	  	  The	  co-­‐product	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  
of	  political	  and	  scientific	  forces,	  IPCC	  has	  a	  unique	  mandate	  and	  set	  of	  processes	  
that	   have	   been	   designed	   to	   balance	   scientific	   credibility	   with	   political	  
legitimacy.	   As	   has	   been	   described	   here,	   political	   and	   scientific	   forces	   jointly	  
shape	   the	   production	   of	   IPCC	   assessments,	   but	   there	   remain	   many	  
opportunities	  for	  the	  IPCC	  secretariat	  and	  its	  selected	  writing	  teams	  to	  influence	  
the	   final	  reports.	   	  The	  next	  section	  will	  analyse	  how	  the	   IPCC	  has	   treated	  CCH	  







5.3	  CCH	  through	  the	  IPCC	  
 
Currently	   working	   on	   its	   Fifth	   Assessment	   Report,	   IPCC	   has	   released	   four	  
previous	  Assessment	  Reports	  (Table	  5)	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  series	  of	  supplemental	  
reports	   published	   in	   1992	   for	   the	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit	   and	   a	   range	   of	   Special	  
Reports.34	  	   In	   the	  First	  Assessment	  Report	   (FAR),	   there	  was	  very	   little	  content	  
focused	  on	  the	  health	   impacts	  of	  climate	  change.	   	  This	  may	  be	   in	  part	  because	  
the	  impacts	  community	  was	  not	  nearly	  as	  cohesive	  or	  prominent	  as	  the	  climate	  
change	   science	   or	   policy	   communities	   by	   the	   time	   IPCC	  was	   established	   (e.g.	  
Agrawala,	   1998a,	   Bolin,	   2007).	   	   	   As	   described	   earlier	   (3.3.4),	   the	   CCH	  
community	   took	   advantage	   of	   this	   void,	  working	   alongside	  WHO	   to	   build	   the	  
case	  for	  more	  expanded	  roles	  of	  CCH	  in	  subsequent	  IPCC	  Assessments.	  	  Indeed,	  
many	   familiar	  members	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   have	   held	   prominent	   roles	   in	  
these	   assessments	   (Table	   6).	   	   In	   the	   following	   subsections,	   the	   principal	   CCH	  
findings,	   focused	   on	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases	   as	   presented	   in	   the	   separate	  
assessment	  reports,	  will	  be	  discussed.	  
	  
Table	  5.	  The	  IPCC	  Assessment	  Reports	  
	   Abbreviation	   Year	  Published	  
First	  Assessment	  Report	   FAR	   1990	  
Second	  Assessment	  Report	   SAR	   1995	  
Third	  Assessment	  Report	   TAR	   2001	  
Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	   AR4	   2007	  









                                                
34	  http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml,	  accessed	  
January	  12,	  2012.	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Table	  6.	  Composition	  of	  IPCC	  Human	  Health	  Chapter	  Writing	  Teams	  	  (*indicates	  that	  the	  
author	  was	  interviewed	  in	  this	  research)	  
 









SAR	   -­‐Tony	  McMichael*	  
(Australia)	  
-­‐Paul	  Epstein	  (USA)	  
-­‐Andrew	  Haines	  (UK)	  
-­‐Jonathan	  Patz	  (USA)	  
-­‐Roy	  Anderson	  
(UK)	  











-­‐Duane	  Gubler*	  (USA)	  
-­‐Andrew	  Haines	  (UK)	  
-­‐Sari	  Kovats*	  (UK)	  
-­‐Pim	  Martens*	  
(Netherlands)	  
-­‐Jonathan	  Patz	  (USA)	  
	  
















Office	  for	  Europe	  /	  
Germany)	  
-­‐Kris	  Ebi*	  (USA)	  













AR5	   -­‐Alistair	  
Woodward*	  (New	  
Zealand)	  
-­‐	  Kirk	  R.	  Smith	  
(USA)	  







	  	   -­‐Andrew	  
Haines	  (UK)	  
	  
5.3.1	  The	  First	  Assessment	  Report	  (FAR)	  
As	   noted	   above,	   the	   IPCC	   FAR	   contains	   very	   little	   content	   on	   health.	   It	   forms	  
only	  a	  small	  component	  of	  a	  broader	  chapter	  addressing	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  
change	   on	   human	   settlement	   and	   migration;	   the	   energy,	   transportation	   and	  
industrial	  sectors;	  air	  quality;	  and	  changes	  in	  ultraviolet	  radiation.	  	  None	  of	  the	  
authors	  were	  core	  members	  of	  the	  CCH	  community.	  
	  
FAR	  does	  however	  note	  that	  should	  global	  warming	  lead	  to	  changes	  in	  rainfall	  
and	   temperature,	   then	   “the	   seasonal	   and	   geographical	   abundance”	   of	   vector	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species,	   such	   as	   mosquitoes,	   could	   change;	   this	   could	   mean	   a	   northerly	  
expansion	   in	   the	   Northern	   Hemisphere	   and	   a	   southerly	   expansion	   in	   the	  
Southern	   Hemisphere	   (Rouviere	   et	   al.,	   1990:	   6.2.6).	   	   For	   tropical	   regions,	  
precipitation	  increases	  could	  drive	  the	  incidence	  of	  malaria,	  schistosomiasis	  and	  
dengue,	   all	   of	   which,	   the	   report	   notes,	   “have	   the	   potential	   for	   increase	   and	  
reintroduction	  in	  many	  countries	  (Ibid.)”.	  
	  
Intriguingly,	  the	  accompanying	  SPM	  document	  offers	  a	  somewhat	  more	  alarmist	  
take	  on	  the	  issue:	  
	  
Changes	   in	  precipitation	  and	   temperature	  could	  radically	   alter	   the	  patterns	  of	  
vector-­‐borne	   and	   viral	   diseases	   by	   shifting	   them	   to	   higher	   latitudes,	   thus	  
putting	  large	  populations	  at	  risk	  (Tegart	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
This	   text	   would	   set	   the	   tone	   for	   future	   IPCC	   Assessments,	   which	   would	   be	  
conducted	  under	  much	  more	  scrutiny	  and	  controversy.	  
 
5.3.2	  The	  Second	  Assessment	  Report	  (SAR)	  
The	  IPCC	  Second	  Assessment	  Report	  (SAR)	  is	  the	  first	  report	  published	  after	  the	  
establishment	  of	  UN	  FCCC	   in	  1992.	   	  As	  discussed	   in	  3.3.4,	   the	  SAR	  would	  also	  
mark	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   CCH	   community,	   who	   had	  
gradually	   gained	   prominence	   with	   WHO	   and	   had	   used	   this	   opportunity	   to	  
directly	  appeal	  to	  IPCC	  to	  include	  a	  chapter	  on	  human	  health.	  	  	  
	  
With	  Tony	  McMichael	  as	  the	  Coordinating	  Lead	  Author	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  CCH	  
proponents	   involved	  as	  authors	   (Table	  6),	   the	  health	  chapter	   in	  SAR	  offered	  a	  
much	  more	   comprehensive	   analysis	   than	   did	   FAR.	   	   It	   was	   no	   less	   bold	   in	   its	  
pronouncements,	   claiming	   in	   the	   SPM	   document:	   “Climate	   change	   is	   likely	   to	  
have	   wide-­‐ranging	   and	   mostly	   adverse	   impacts	   on	   human	   health,	   with	  
significant	   loss	   of	   life	   (IPCC,	   1996:	   11)”.	   	   The	  health	  writing	   team	  divided	   the	  
possible	  health	  impacts	  from	  climate	  change	  into	  those	  with	  direct	  effects	  (e.g.	  	  
mortality	  due	  to	  heat	  waves)	  and	  indirect	  effects,	  which	  focused	  particularly	  on	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vector-­‐borne	  diseases.	  	  Malaria,	  dengue,	  yellow	  fever	  and	  a	  few	  food-­‐	  and	  water-­‐
borne	  diseases	  are	  all	  highlighted,	  but	   the	   focus	   is	   clearly	  on	  malaria.35	  As	   the	  
SPM	  would	  further	  state:	  
	  
Projections	   by	   models…indicate	   the	   geographical	   zone	   of	   potential	   malaria	  
transmission	   in	  response	   to	  world	   temperature	   increases	  at	   the	  upper	  part	  of	  
the	   IPCC-­‐projected	   range	   …	   would	   increase	   from	   approximately	   45%	   of	   the	  
world	  population	  to	  60%	  of	  the	  world	  population	  by	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  next	  
century.	   	   This	   could	   lead	   to	   potential	   increases	   in	   malaria	   incidence	   (on	   the	  
order	   of	   50-­‐80	  million	   additional	   annual	   cases,	   relative	   to	   an	   assumed	   global	  
background	   total	  of	  500	  million	  cases),	  primarily	   in	   tropical,	   sub-­‐tropical,	  and	  
less	  well-­‐protected	  temperate-­‐zone	  populations	  (Ibid.:	  12).	  
	  
Further	  details	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  full	  health	  chapter	  where	  the	  discussion	  on	  
malaria	   is	   more	   nuanced.	   	   The	   chapter	   notes	   the	   historical	   contraction	   of	  
malaria	   in	   the	   developed	   world	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   existing	   public	   health	  
resources	   in	  these	  countries	  makes	  “reemergent	  malaria	  unlikely	  (Ibid.:	  572)”.	  	  
It	  does	  however	  argue	  that	  malaria	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  extend	  its	  spread	  in	  tropical	  
countries,	   “particularly	   in	   populations	   currently	   at	   the	   fringe	   of	   established	  
endemic	   areas	   (Ibid.)”.	   	   One	   of	   the	   possibilities	   identified	   here	   is	   highland	  
malaria:	  
	  
...it	  is	  a	  reasonable	  prediction	  that,	  in	  eastern	  Africa,	  a	  relative	  small	  increase	  in	  
winter	   temperature	   could	   extend	   the	   mosquito	   habitat	   and	   thus	   enable	  
falciparum	  malaria	  to	  reach	  beyond	  the	  usual	  altitude	  limit	  of	  around	  2,500m	  to	  
the	  large,	  malaria-­‐free,	  urban	  highland	  populations…	  (Ibid.:	  574).	  
	  
It	  is	  significant	  that	  these	  conclusions	  on	  malaria,	  which	  underpin	  the	  SPM,	  are	  
primarily	  based	  upon	  early	  research	  produced	  by	  the	  same	  authors	  involved	  in	  
the	   IPCC	  writing	   team.	   	  The	  statement	  about	  highland	  malaria,	   for	  example,	   is	  
supported	  by	  only	  one	  citation,	  which	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  an	  essay	  in	  Lancet	  penned	  
by	   Haines,	   Epstein	   and	  McMichael	   on	   behalf	   of	   an	   international	   expert	   panel	  
organised	   by	  WHO	   to	   discuss	   possible	  ways	   to	  monitor	   the	   health	   impacts	   of	  
                                                
35	  In	  the	  full	  chapter,	  Malaria	  is	  the	  only	  disease	  deemed	  to	  be	  “highly	  likely”	  to	  have	  its	  
distribution	  ranges	  altered	  by	  climate	  change,	  while	  Dengue,	  Yellow	  Fever,	  Schistosomiasis	  and	  
Onchocerciasis	  (River	  Blindness)	  all	  deemed	  “very	  likely”	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  1996).	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climate	  change	  (Haines	  et	  al.,	  1993).36	  	  This	  essay	  identifies	  highland	  malaria	  as	  
one	  issue	  worth	  monitoring	  for	  the	  early	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change,	  but	  it	  does	  
not	   present	   any	   research	   findings	   about	   the	   topic.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   malaria	  
projections	  are	  based	  upon	  the	  research	  produced	  by	  Martens	  and	  co-­‐authors,	  
including	  Tony	  McMichael,	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	  4.3.1	   (Martens	   et	   al.,	   1995a,	  
Martens	  et	  al.,	  1995c).	  	  
	  
To	  be	  fair,	  the	  chapter	  also	  provides	  a	  text-­‐box	  discussion	  of	  the	  ins	  and	  outs	  of	  
biological	  models	  for	  assessing	  the	  links	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  malaria.	  	  It	  
is	   fairly	   nuanced,	   providing	   many	   caveats:	   “As	   a	   highly	   aggregated	   model,	   it	  
does	  not	  take	  account	  of	  local	  environmental-­‐ecological	  factors,	  and	  it	  therefore	  
cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  source	  of	  precise	  projections	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  1996:	  
573)”.	   	  Nonetheless,	  despite	  highlighting	  the	  model	  limitations	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
“validate”	  the	  models,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  “such	  models…	  provide	  indication	  about	  
the	   likely	   impact	   of	   climate	   change	   on	   the	   potential	   transmission	   of	   vector-­‐
borne	  diseases	  (Ibid.:	  574)”.	  
	  
It	  must	  also	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  when	  SAR	  was	  under	  preparation,	   there	  were	  
relatively	   few	   climate	   change-­‐VBD	   publications,	   and	   most	   of	   these	   were	   not	  
based	  upon	  models.	  	  This	  may	  partially	  excuse	  the	  inconvenient	  truth	  that	  much	  
of	  the	  literature	  cited	  on	  this	  topic	  was	  self-­‐referential.	  	  The	  IPCC	  authors	  were,	  
for	  the	  most	  part,	  citing	  their	  own	  research	  –	  and	  as	  discussed	  above,	   in	  some	  
cases	  they	  were	  merely	  citing	  their	  earlier	  speculations.	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   strong	   representation	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   in	   the	  
writing	   team	   prevented	   them	   from	   seriously	   considering	   alternative	  
perspectives:	  	  
	  
R15:	  …we	  had	  not	   that	  much	  discussion	   in	   the	  whole	  process	  because	  again	   I	  
think	  the	  climate	  change	  community	  already	  knew	  it	  [the	  science].	  	  	  
	  
                                                
36	  Recall	  3.3.4	  for	  further	  discussion	  on	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  CCH	  community	  in	  early	  WHO	  
activities	  addressing	  CCH.	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Even	  if	  the	  community	  already	  knew	  and	  agreed	  upon	  all	  of	  the	  literature,	  this	  
did	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   no	   alternative	   interpretations	   were	   available.	  	  
Although	   instructed	   to	   represent	   differences	   of	   opinion,	   the	   authors	   did	   not	  
represent	   the	   views	   from	   one	   of	   the	   few	   prominent	   papers	   that	   had	   been	  
published	  about	  climate	  change	  and	  epidemiological	  modelling	  before	  1995.	  	  It	  
would	   have	   been	   quite	   reasonable	   to	   at	   least	   refer	   to	   an	   argument	   carefully	  
articulated	  by	  David	  Rogers	  and	  Michael	  Packer	  in	  a	  1993	  Lancet	  article	  entitled	  
“Vector-­‐borne	  diseases,	  models,	  and	  global	  change”:	  	  
	  
It	   is	  probably	  correct	   to	  assume	  that	  a	  vector	  now	  confined	  to	  the	  tropics	  will	  
spread	  into	  more	  temperate	  regions	  if	  global	  warming	  occurs	  …	  but	  it	  is	  much	  
less	   certain	   that	   the	  diseases	   they	  carry	  will	   eventually	  be	  as	  prevalent	   in	   the	  
newly	  invaded	  areas	  as	  elsewhere	  (Rogers	  and	  Packer,	  1993:	  1283).	  
	  
That	   this	   is	   not	   even	   referred	   to	   is	   even	  more	   striking	   when	   noting	   that	   the	  
Rogers	  and	  Packer	  paper	  is	  in	  fact	  cited	  in	  IPCC	  SAR,	  but	  only	  to	  support	  a	  claim	  
that	  the	  distribution	  of	  tsetse	  flies,	  the	  main	  vector	  of	  African	  trypanosomiasis,	  
could	  be	   significantly	   altered	  by	   small	   temperature	   changes	   (McMichael	   et	   al.,	  
1996:	  574).	  	  This	  was,	  moreover,	  a	  curious	  use	  of	  the	  citation,	  given	  that	  Rogers	  
and	  Packer	  themselves	  self-­‐deprecatingly	  suggest	  of	  their	  model:	  
	  
Such	   predictions	   should	   not	   be	   used	   to	   frighten	   public	   health	   planners	   into	  
precipitate	  action	  over	   the	  possible	   impact	  of	  global	  warming-­‐-­‐on	   the	   scale	  of	  
“lies,	  damned	  lies	  and	  statistics”	  the	  prediction	  illustrated	  is	  slightly	  to	  the	  right	  
of	   “statistics”-­‐-­‐but	   they	   can	   be	   used	   to	   encourage	  more	   careful	   study	   of	   how	  
important	  predictors	  operate	   in	   the	  biological	   systems	  on	   the	  ground	  (Rogers	  
and	  Packer,	  1993:	  1284).	  
	  
Thus	   IPCC	   SAR,	   although	   somewhat	   transparent	   about	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	  
malaria	   models	   and	   need	   for	   model	   validation,	   did	   not	   carefully	   discuss	   the	  
possibility	   that	   more	   fundamental	   differences	   of	   perspective	   existed	   in	   the	  
scientific	  world.	  	  The	  composition	  of	  the	  writing	  team,	  with	  a	  strong	  personality	  
in	  Tony	  McMichael	  as	  the	  CLA	  and	  with	  several	  other	  CCH	  proponents	  involved,	  
appears	   to	  have	  had	  a	   significant	   influence	  over	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   science	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was	  perceived.	  It	  was	  also	  likely	  influential	  in	  negotiating	  the	  stronger	  message	  
found	  in	  the	  SPM.	  
 
5.3.3	  The	  Third	  Assessment	  Report	  (TAR)	  
A	   familiar	   cast	   of	   characters	   was	   involved	   in	   TAR.	   The	   Coordinating	   Lead	  
Authors	  (CLAs)	  were	  Tony	  McMichael	  and	  Andrew	  Githeko,	  who	  was	  a	  central	  
actor	  in	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  climate	  change	  and	  highland	  malaria	  (4.4).	  	  
Among	  the	  Lead	  Authors	  were	  CCH	  researchers	  Pim	  Martens,	  Sari	  Kovats,	  and	  
Jonathan	  Patz.	  	  Yet	  this	  time	  around,	  two	  prominent	  CCH	  opponents	  would	  find	  
their	  way	  into	  the	  IPCC	  process.	  Duane	  Gubler,	  then	  of	  the	  US	  CDC,	  would	  be	  a	  
Lead	  Author	  and	  Paul	  Reiter,	  then	  also	  of	  CDC,	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  review	  
process.	  	  Further	  complicating	  the	  matter	  for	  the	  CCH	  proponents	  would	  be	  that	  
many	   of	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversies	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4	   were	   well	  
underway,	  meaning	  that	  the	  writing	  teams	  would	  need	  to	  consider	  a	  literature	  
vastly	  larger	  and	  more	  contentious	  than	  in	  previous	  assessments.	  
	  
Noting	  that	  the	  science	  has	  progressed	  since	  the	  SAR,	  the	  SPM	  document	  states	  
that	   many	   infectious	   diseases	   are	   climate	   sensitive.	   	   As	   concerns	   infectious	  
diseases:	  
	  
From	   the	   result	   of	   most	   predictive	   model	   studies,	   there	   is	   medium	   to	   high	  
confidence	  that,	  under	  climate	  change	  scenarios,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  net	  increase	  
in	  the	  geographic	  range	  of	  potential	  transmission	  of	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  –	  two	  
vector-­‐borne	   infections	   each	   of	   which	   currently	   impinge	   on	   40-­‐50%	   of	   the	  
world	   population	   (original	   emphasis)	   ...	   In	   all	   cases,	   however,	   disease	  
occurrence	   is	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   local	   environmental	   conditions,	  
socioeconomic	   circumstances,	   and	   public	   health	   infrastructure	   (IPCC,	   2001a:	  
12).37	  
	  
The	   above	   statement	   is	   accompanied	   by	   a	   footnote	  which	   briefly	   summarises	  
the	  evidence	  base	  supporting	  such	  a	  claim:	  
	  
                                                
37	  By	  medium	  confidence,	  IPCC	  means	  a	  33-­‐67%	  degree	  of	  confidence,	  and	  by	  high	  confidence,	  
IPCC	  means	  67-­‐95%.	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Eight	  studies	  have	  modeled	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  these	  diseases,	  five	  
on	  malaria	   and	   three	   on	   dengue.	   	   Seven	   use	   the	   biological,	   or	   process-­‐based	  
approach,	  and	  one	  uses	  an	  empirical,	  statistical	  approach	  (Ibid.).	  
	  
It	   is	   instructive	   to	   assess	   the	   IPCC	   treatment	   of	   these	   eight	   studies	   and	   to	  
contrast	  it	  to	  the	  statement	  that	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  SPM.	  	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  
two	   IPCC	   assessments,	   the	   discussion	   in	   the	   full	   report	   is	   somewhat	   more	  
nuanced	  than	  the	  SPM	  statements.	  	  The	  section	  on	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  starts	  
with	  a	  discussion	  which	  notes	  that	  many	  infectious	  diseases	  are	  transmitted	  by	  
climate-­‐sensitive	  organisms	  but	  also	  carefully	  alludes	  to	  the	  “many	  complex	  and	  
interacting	   factors	   (McMichael	   et	   al.,	   2001:	   462)”	   that	   influence	   infectious	  
disease	   transmission.	   	   The	   authors	   also	   state	   that	   “to	   date,	   there	   is	   little	  
evidence	   that	   climate	   change	   has	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   recent	  
resurgence	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  (Ibid.:	  463)”.	  Perhaps	  for	  this	  reason,	  much	  of	  
the	  remaining	  discussion	  focuses	  on	  predictive	  modelling	  studies.	  	  	  
	  
i)	  Climate	  change	  and	  malaria	  in	  TAR	  
Considering	   that	   the	   climate-­‐malaria	   controversy	   was	   in	   full-­‐swing	   by	   2001	  
(recall	   4.3	   and	   4.4)	   and	   that	   IPCC	   writing	   teams	   are	   requested	   to	   reflect	  
controversies	   in	   their	   chapters,	   the	   text	   contained	   in	  TAR	   is	   surprisingly	  one-­‐
sided.	  
	  
Noting	  that	  the	  then	  current	  resurgence	  of	  Malaria	  was	  occurring	  due	  to	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   factors,	   including	   policy	   changes,	   population	   growth,	   drug	   resistance	  
and	   deteriorating	   public	   health	   infrastructures,	   the	   discussion	   considers	   the	  
possible	   impact	   of	   climate	   changes	   on	   malaria	   transmission	   in	   light	   of	  
socioeconomic	   circumstances:	   “in	   many	   malaria-­‐free	   countries	   with	   a	  
developed	   public	   health	   infrastructure,	   the	   risk	   of	   sustained	   malaria	  
transmission	   after	   reintroduction	   is	   low	   in	   the	   near	   term	   (Ibid.:	   465)”.	  	  
However,	  this	  time	  mirroring	  the	  CCH	  community	  tendency	  to	  have	  somewhat	  
pessimistic	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   (4.3.3,	   4.5),	   the	   chapter	   also	   states:	   “Malaria	  
could	  become	  established	  again	  under	  the	  prolonged	  pressures	  of	  climatic	  and	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other	   environmental-­‐demographic	   changes	   if	   a	   strong	   public	   health	  
infrastructure	  is	  not	  maintained	  (Ibid.:	  465)”.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  
biological	   and	   statistical	   modelling	   approaches.	   The	   former	   are	   principally	  
represented	  by	  various	  iterations	  of	  the	  Martens	  models	  (Martens	  et	  al.,	  1999,	  
Martens	   et	   al.,	   1995a),	   for	  which	   they	   suggest	   there	   has	   been	   a	   “considerable	  
evolution	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  2001:	  466)”.	  	  Similar	  to	  SAR,	  the	  chapter	  does	  admit	  
some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  models,	  such	  as	  that	  they	  had	  not	  been	  validated,	  that	  
they	   placed	   undue	   emphasis	   upon	   temperature	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   other	  
ecological	   variables,	   and	   that	   more	   smaller-­‐scale	   models	   were	   needed.	   The	  
discussion,	   furthermore,	   concedes	   that	   the	   Martens	   projections	   based	   upon	  
environmental	   variables	   do	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   increased	   malaria	  
transmission	   will	   occur.	   In	   reference	   to	   the	   projection	   that	   260-­‐320	   million	  
additional	   people	   could	   live	   in	  malaria	   transmission	   zones	   by	   2080,	   the	   IPCC	  
states:	  
	  
This	  projection,	  by	  design,	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  of	  this	  
additional	   population	   at	   risk	   is	   in	   middle-­‐	   or	   high-­‐income	   countries	   where	  
human-­‐imposed	   constraints	   on	   malaria	   are	   greatest	   and	   where	   potential	  
transmission	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  actual	  transmission	  (Ibid.:	  466).	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  section	  on	  malaria	  modelling	  concludes	  that	  “on	  a	  global	  scale,	  
all	   biological	  models	   show	  net	   increases	   in	   the	  potential	   transmission	   zone	  of	  
malaria…	  (Ibid.)”.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  only	  figure	  reproduced	  in	  the	  health	  chapter	  
is	  the	  Martens	  malaria	  model	  (Figure	  2,	  4.3.1),	  thereby	  allotting	  this	  research	  a	  
prominent	  position	  in	  the	  health	  chapter.	  
	  
Whereas	   the	   biological	  models	   get	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   treatment	   in	   the	   IPCC	   text,	  
one	   paragraph	   is	   allotted	   to	   the	   statistical	   approach,	   which	   focuses	   upon	   the	  
Science	  paper	  published	  by	  David	  Rogers	  and	  Sarah	  Randolph	  discussed	  in	  4.3	  	  
(Rogers	  and	  Randolph,	  2000).	  	  The	  treatment	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  subtly	  different	  in	  
tone.	  To	  begin	  with,	  as	  concerns	  the	  principal	  differences	  between	  the	  biological	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and	  statistical	  modelling	  approaches,	  the	  chapter	  states:	  “the	  outcome	  variable	  
in	  this	  model	  is	  the	  number	  of	  people	  living	  in	  an	  actual	   transmission	  zone,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  potential	  zone	  (as	  estimated	  by	  biological	  models)	  (McMichael	  et	  
al.,	   2001:	   466,	   original	   emphasis)”.	   	   The	   findings	   –	   that	   Rogers	   and	  Randolph	  
estimated	  no	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  global	  population	  that	  
would	   live	   in	   malaria	   transmission	   zones	   by	   2080	   –	   are	   presented	   but	   their	  
significance	  is	  downplayed:	  
	  
This	   study	   made	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   actual	   geographic	   distribution	   of	  
malaria	   in	   today’s	   world	   is	   a	   satisfactory	   approximation	   of	   its	   historical	  
distribution	   prior	   to	  modern	   public	   health	   interventions.	   	   This	   assumption	   is	  
likely	  to	  have	  biased	  the	  estimation	  of	   the	  underlying	  multivariate	  relationship	  
between	   climatic	   variables	   and	   malaria	   occurrence	   because	   the	   sensitive	  
climate-­‐malaria	   relationship	   in	   the	   lower	   temperature	   range	   in	   temperate	  
zones	   (especially	   Europe	   and	   the	   southern	   United	   States)	   would	   have	   been	  
excluded	  from	  the	  empirically	  derived	  equation.	  (Ibid.:	  emphasis	  added).	  
	  
The	   usage	   of	   the	   word	   “biased”	   is	   particularly	   striking,	   not	   because	   this	  
statement	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  fundamentally	  inaccurate,	  but	  because	  biological	  
models	   are	   biased	   in	   the	   other	   direction.	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   this	   is	   a	   point	  
conceded	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  TAR	  health	  chapter.	  	  	  
	  
Following	   a	   brief	   description	   of	   some	  models	   that	   focused	   only	   on	  mosquito	  
species,	   the	   section	   on	  malaria	   and	   climate-­‐malaria	  modelling	   concludes	  with	  
the	  following	  statement:	  
	  
…it	  remains	  a	  legitimate	  and	  important	  question	  to	  estimate,	  under	  scenarios	  of	  
climate	  change,	  change	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  natural	  world	  …	  would	  allow	  
transmission	  of	  malaria	   if	   there	  were	  no	  other	  human-­‐imposed	  constraints	  on	  
transmission	  (Ibid.).	  
	  
Without	  also	  arguing	  for	  more	  climate-­‐malaria	  modelling	  in	  general,	  this	  ending	  
quote	  privileges	  modelling	  work	  conducted	  by	   the	  CCH	  community.	   	  That	   this	  
should	  be	  the	  case	  (just	  as	  that	  the	  SPM	  should	  have	  stated	  that	  with	  medium	  to	  
high	   confidence	   there	   will	   be	   a	   net	   increase	   in	   areas	   potentially	   suitable	   for	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malaria	  transmission)	  is	  not	  completely	  surprising,	  given	  that	  the	  author	  team	  
was	  dominated	  by	  CCH	  proponents.	   	  Yet	  at	  least	  one	  CCH	  opponent	  was	  in	  the	  
team,	   adding	   some	   internal	   friction	   to	   the	   process.	   	   As	   one	   external	   observer	  
tells	   the	   story,	   the	   climate-­‐malaria	   controversies	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4	  
certainly	  found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  IPCC	  writing	  process,	  as	  did	  the	  hard	  feelings	  
between	  CCH	  proponents	  and	  opponents:	  
	  
	  R4:	  Now	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  went	  on	  in	  this	  committee	  was	  that	  it	  was	  
incredibly	   controversial	   and	   Pim	   Martens	   was	   pushing	   his	   line	   and	   Duane	  
Gubler	   wanted	   to	   be	   slightly	  more	   circumspect.	   And	   Paul	   Reiter	   had	   already	  
had	  a	  run-­‐in	  with	  Paul	  Epstein	  and	  really	  didn’t	  want	  [IPCC]	  to	  push	  the	  global	  
warming	  bandwagon	  too	  far.	  He	  felt	  they	  [CCH	  proponents]	  were	  pushing	  it	  too	  
far.	  And	  I	  got	  wind	  of	  all	   this,	   I	  can’t	  quite	  remember	  how.	  So	   I	  sent	  a	  draft	  of	  
our	  Science	  paper...	  to	  Duane	  Gubler	  on	  the	  committee.	  And	  he	  circulated	  it.	  
	  
This	  paper,	   contesting	  as	   it	  did	   the	  CCH	  proponents’	   “orthodox”	  position,	  may	  
have	  been	  welcome	  ammunition	  for	  Duane	  Gubler:	  
	  
R4:	   You	   see	   before	  we	   sent	   him	   the	   paper	   the	   draft	   of	   the	   IPCC3	   [TAR]	  was	  
saying	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  evidence	  is	  that	  malaria	   is	  going	  to	  extend	  its	  range	  
fantastically	   in	   the	   future.	   Duane	   was	   unhappy	   with	   this	   conclusion	   based	  
entirely	   on	   Martens’	   work	   but	   Duane	   himself	   wasn’t	   able	   to	   nail	   why	   it	   was	  
wrong	  or	  to	  produce	  an	  alternative.	  So	  when	  we	  sent	  Duane	  our	  Science	  paper	  
he	  now	  had	  something	  that	  at	  least	  was	  a	  counter	  argument	  to	  Pim	  Martens.	  	  
	  
Formally,	  the	  IPCC	  may	  not	  have	  been	  obliged	  to	  consider	  this	  paper,	  because	  
there	  are	  cut-­‐off	  dates	  for	  the	  peer-­‐reviewed	  literature:	  
	  
R4:	  …	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  actually	  tried	  to	  throw	  out	  our	  Science	  paper	  
from	  consideration	  because	  there	  was	  a	  cut-­‐off	  date	  beyond	  which	  IPCC3	  [TAR]	  
wasn’t	  supposed	  to	  take	  any	  notice.	  It	  reviews	  the	  literature	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  date	  
and	  not	  beyond.	  
	  
To	   their	   credit,	   then,	   the	   IPCC	   writing	   team	   ultimately	   did	   incorporate	   the	  
Science	  paper	   into	   the	   Health	   Chapter.	   	   Nonetheless,	   as	   described	   above,	   the	  
treatment	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   somewhat	   different	   than	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	  
biological	  models.	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It	  was	  earlier	  mentioned	  that	   in	  the	  SPM	  there	  was	  a	   footnote	  referring	  to	  the	  
body	   of	   evidence	   as	   seven	   biological	   models	   and	   one	   statistical	   model.	   This	  
statement	   is,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   statistical	   modellers,	   not	   sufficient	  
justification	  for	  privileging	  biological	  models:	  
	   	  
R17:	  …	   I'm	  not	   quite	   sure	   how	   they	   finessed	   around	   that	   problem	  but	   if	   you	  
read	   the	   IPCC3	   [TAR]...	   they	   still	   state	   that	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   malaria	   will	  
expand	  its	  range	  globally	  in	  the	  future...	  	  
	  
...and	  the	  footnote	  says:	  ‘The	  balance	  of	  evidence	  is	  eight	  publications	  in	  favour	  
of	  a	  great	  increase	  in	  malaria	  versus	  one	  against.’	  It	  was	  a	  ratio	  of	  eight	  to	  one.	  
So	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  say,	  ‘Look	  there’s	  a	  balance	  but	  in	  general	  the	  evidence	  is	  
in	  favour	  there’s	  going	  to	  be	  a	  huge	  increase.’	   ...But	  our	  immediate	  response	  to	  
that	  was	   to	   say,	   ‘Well	   actually	   look	   at	   those	   eight	   papers’.	   They're	   all	   by	   Pim	  
Martens.	   They	   all	   say	   the	   same	   thing	   in	   eight	   different	   journals.	   It’s	   not	   eight	  
different	  views,	  it’s	  one	  view	  repeated	  eight	  times.38	  
	  
Indeed,	   the	   TAR	   discussion	   on	  malaria	   references	   numerous	   different	   papers	  
authored	  or	   co-­‐authored	  by	  Martens.	   	   As	   in	   SAR,	   this	   offers	   evidence	   that	   the	  
IPCC	  writing	   team	  felt	  most	  comfortable	  citing	   its	  own	  research.	  Furthermore,	  
although	   impossible	   to	   verify,	   it	   would	   appear	   that	   the	   internal	   controversy	  
over	   how	   to	   represent	   the	   climate-­‐malaria	   played	   out	   in	   favour	   of	   CCH	  
proponents,	  given	  their	  majority	  representation	  in	  the	  writing	  team.	   	  Although	  
the	   text	   in	   the	   technical	   chapter	   is	   more	   nuanced	   than	   the	   SPM,	   it	   does	   not	  
appear	  to	  fairly	  represent	  the	  full	  scope	  of	  the	  climate-­‐malaria	  controversy.	  	  	  	  
	  
ii)	  Climate	  change	  and	  highland	  malaria	  in	  TAR	  
Andrew	  Githeko	  was	  one	  of	  the	  two	  CLAs	  for	  the	  health	  chapter	  in	  TAR,	  and	  as	  
discussed	   in	   4.4,	   he	   has	   also	   been	   one	   of	   the	  main	   actors	   in	   the	   controversy	  
surrounding	  highland	  malaria.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  particularly	  alarming	  that	  TAR	  
addresses	   this	   topic,	   although	   it	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   highland	   malaria	   is	   not	  
                                                
38	  The	  interviewee	  had	  the	  numbers	  mixed	  up.	  	  As	  cited	  earlier,	  the	  footnote	  says	  there	  are	  
seven	  biological	  models	  and	  one	  statistical	  model	  for	  malaria	  and	  dengue	  combined.	  	  The	  IPCC	  
footnote	  also	  does	  not	  specify	  that	  the	  biological	  models	  are	  “for”	  and	  the	  statistical	  model	  
“against”,	  but	  the	  interviewee’s	  comments	  here	  nonetheless	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  somewhat	  
disingenuous	  to	  list	  the	  number	  of	  models	  because	  different	  research	  papers	  published	  by	  the	  
same	  constellation	  of	  authors	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  similar	  conclusions.	  
 215 
referred	   to	   in	   the	  SPM.	  However,	   the	   text	   in	   the	  more	  detailed	  health	   chapter	  
states:	   “Future	   climate	   change	   may	   increase	   transmission	   in	   some	   highland	  
regions,	  such	  as	  East	  Africa	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  2001:	  464)”.	  	  This	  is	  accompanied	  
by	  a	   text-­‐box	  entitled	   “Have	  recent	   increases	   in	  highland	  malaria	  been	  caused	  
by	   global	  warming?”	   	   However,	   the	   text	  within	   this	   box	   is	   in	   fact	  much	  more	  
balanced	   than	   the	   aforementioned	   statement,	   suggesting	   the	   various	   possible	  
and	  contradictory	  explanations	  that	  had	  been	  suggested	  to	  explain	  the	  increase	  
in	   highland	   malaria,	   and	   noting	   that	   further	   research	   would	   be	   required	   to	  
decipher	   the	   role	   of	   climate	   change	   in	   the	   rise	   of	   highland	   malaria.	   Further	  
aspects	  of	  the	  climate-­‐highland	  malaria	  controversy	  (4.4)	  are	  not	  alluded	  to	   in	  
this	   text	   box,	   but	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   publications	  
surrounding	  this	  controversy	  were	  published	  after	  2001.	  
	  
iii)	  Climate	  change	  and	  dengue	  in	  TAR	  
In	   comparison	   to	   the	   section	   on	   malaria,	   the	   discussion	   on	   dengue	   is	   rather	  
limited	   in	  TAR.	   	   As	   earlier	  mentioned,	   the	   SPM	   suggests	   that	  with	  medium	   to	  
high	   confidence,	   there	   would	   be	   a	   net	   increase	   in	   the	   geographic	   range	   with	  
potential	   dengue	   transmission	   under	   climate	   change	   scenarios.	   	   Yet	   when	  
reading	  the	  full	  chapter,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  very	  few	  modelling	  studies	  had	  been	  
conducted	   for	   dengue	   at	   the	   time.	   Unlike	   malaria,	   the	   concluding	   statement,	  
rather	  than	  advocating	  the	  biological	  modelling	  approach	  for	  examining	  future	  
dengue	  spread,	  stresses	  mitigating	  factors	  for	  dengue	  transmission:	  
	  
Transmission	   intensity	   in	   tropical	   endemic	   countries	   is	   limited	   primarily	   by	  
herd	   immunity,	   not	   temperature;	   therefore,	   projected	   temperature	   increases	  
are	   not	   likely	   to	   affect	   transmission	   significantly.	   	   Moreover,	   in	   subtropical	  
developed	  areas,	  where	  transmission	  is	   limited	  primarily	  by	  demographic	  and	  
societal	  factors,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  anticipated	  temperature	  rise	  would	  affect	  
endemicity	  (McMichael	  et	  al.,	  2001:	  464.).	  	  	  
	  
This	  message	  is	  philosophically	  very	  different	  to	  the	  message	  from	  the	  section	  
on	  malaria,	  which	  essentially	  prioritised	  the	  opposite	  –	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  
role	   of	   temperature	   and	   other	   climate	   variables	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   mitigating	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variables.	  	  That	  this	  was	  the	  case	  for	  dengue	  could	  be	  due	  to	  two	  factors.	  	  First,	  
as	  mentioned	  above,	  there	  were	  relatively	  few	  papers	  published	  on	  dengue	  by	  
2001,	  and	  the	  climate-­‐dengue	  controversy	  (4.5)	  hadn’t	  really	  heated	  up	  by	  then.	  	  
Second,	  Duane	  Gubler	  is	  among	  the	  world’s	  most	  prominent	  dengue	  specialists,	  
and	  he	   can	  be	   generally	   classified	   as	   a	   CCH	  opponent.	   	  His	   voice	  would	   likely	  
have	  held	  significant	  sway	  over	  this	  section	  of	  the	  TAR	  text.	  
	  
iv)	  On	  the	  influence	  of	  writing	  teams	  
This	   analysis	   of	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversy	   as	   represented	   by	   IPCC	   TAR	  
reveals	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   statements	   made	   in	   the	   SPM	   and	   the	  
treatment	   of	   the	   underlying	   science	   as	   presented	   in	   the	   full	   health	   chapter.	  	  
Whereas	   the	   SPM	   signals	   a	   fairly	   strong	   and	   positive	   association	   between	  
climate	  change	  and	  malaria	  and	  dengue,	  the	  text	  is	  rather	  more	  nuanced.	  	  That	  
is	  not	  to	  say,	  at	  least	  for	  malaria,	  that	  the	  text	  is	  neutral,	  and	  from	  the	  discussion	  
above	   it	   would	   seem	   clear	   that	   although	   the	   strengths	   and	   weakness	   of	   the	  
biological	   and	   statistical	   modelling	   approaches	   are	   explained,	   preference	   is	  
given	  to	  the	  biological	  models.	   	  Conversely,	  the	  text	  on	  dengue,	   limited	  as	  it	   is,	  
appears	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  factors	  other	  than	  climate	  are	  most	  
important	  for	  dengue	  transmission.	  
	  
In	   both	   instances,	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   particular	   interests	   of	   the	   various	   co-­‐
authors	  appears	  to	  have	  weighed	  in.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  intense	  and	  then	  emerging	  
controversy	  over	  climate-­‐VBD	  interactions	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  text	  in	  its	  full	  
glory	   –	   it	   is	   filtered	   through	   the	   perspective	   of	   CCH	   proponents.	   	   The	   CCH	  
opponents	   involved	   in	   the	   process,	   either	   as	   authors	   or	   reviewers,	   certainly	  
expressed	  their	  frustration	  in	  it:	  
	  
R21:	  Tony	  McMichael	  was	  the	  principal	  author	  on	  that	  chapter	  and	  there	  were	  
several	   lead	   authors	   and	  we	   all	   contributed,	   but	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	   it	  was	  
Tony	  McMichael	  that	  decided	  on	  the	  tone...	  
	  
…	  I	  think	  it	  was	  1999	  or	  2000	  and	  with	  the	  first	  meeting	  with	  all	  of	  the	  authors	  
of	   that	   IPCC	   report	   and	   there	   was	   something	   like	   two	   thousand	   of	   us	   in	   the	  
room,	  but	  I	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  population	  growth,	  population	  density	  and	  how	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that	  influences	  transmission	  dynamics.	  And	  that	  was	  off	  the	  table.	  It	  was	  simply	  
not	  discussed	  because	  it	  was	  a	  politically	  charged	  topic.	  So	  they	  ignored	  a	  lot	  of	  
the	   demographic	   factors	   that	   were	   driving	   this	   and	   I	   think	   the	   reason	   they	  
wanted	  to	  ignore	  it	  is	  because	  it	  was	  a	  counter-­‐argument.	  
	  
...	  But	  in	  general	  when	  people	  like	  [us]	  went	  to	  these	  meetings	  we	  were	  the	  odd	  
men	  out,	  we	  were	  very	  much	  a	  minority	  group.	  
	  
R13:	  But	  anyway,	  the	  first	  draft	  was	  among	  the	  scientists,	  and	  we	  were	  writing	  
things	  down,	  and	  [we]	  both	  said,	  “Well	  this	  is	  not	  true,	  you’ve	  got	  no	  evidence	  
for	  this,”	  …	  but	  then	  it	  appeared	  in	  the	  draft.	  
	  
R17:	   I	   have	   to	   tell	   you,	   it	   was	   deeply	   frustrating	   because	   they	   basically,	   the	  
authors	  and	  people	  who	  I	  was	  reporting	  to,	  were	  very,	  very	  reluctant	  to	  accept	  
any	  statement	  that	  was	  contrary	  to	  what	  they	  already	  believed...	  My	  very	  strong	  
impression	  was	  that	  the	  tide	  of	  opinion	  was	  so	  much	  in	  favour	  of	  saying	  that	  ...	  
climate	  change	  would	  cause	  all	  sorts	  of	  bad	  effects.	  
	  
Clearly,	  the	  influence	  of	  personal	  interests	  and	  commitments	  will	  play	  a	  strong	  
role	   in	   any	   assessment.	   	   The	   IPCC	   process	   however	   has	   been	   designed	   to	  
mitigate	   this	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   but	   by	   2001	   still	   left	   plenty	   of	   room	   for	  
judgement.	   This	   perhaps	   cannot	   be	   avoided.	   Even	   CCH	   proponents	   have	  
acknowledged	  this:	  
	  
R15:	  That	  is	  actually	  also	  one	  of	  the	  ones	  that	  you	  see	  ...	  people	  sometimes	  have	  
a	   lot	   of	   experience	   but	   you	   feel	   a	   kind	   of	   certain	   idealistic	   motivation	  
underneath	  which	  is	  very	  fine.	  	  I	  think	  we	  all	  have	  that	  but	  in	  this	  complex	  issue	  
sometimes	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	  make	  distinctions	  between	  what	   you	   think	   is	   real	  
and	  what	  you	  actually	  have	  scientific	  evidence	  for.	  
	  
With	  more	  CCH	  proponents	  than	  opponents	  involved	  in	  the	  process,	   it	   is	  more	  
likely	   that	   the	   assessment	   would	   be	   skewed	   towards	   their	   perspective.	   The	  
review	   process	   involves	   authors	   addressing	   those	   topics	   that	   are	   their	  
particular	  areas	  of	  expertise.	  As	  one	  co-­‐author	  noted:	  
	  
R10:	   ...	   when	   the	   head	   author	   of	   the	   chapter,	   it	   was	   Tony	  McMichael	   at	   that	  
time,	  when	  he	  got	  the	  comments	  from	  the	  reviewers,	   if	   there	  was	  anything	  he	  
wanted	  to	  ask	  you	  know	  the	  other	  authors,	  he	  asked	  us	  and	  said	  ‘okay	  we	  have	  
got	  these	  comments	  and	  are	  there	  anything	  you	  want	  to	  add?’	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Thus,	   the	  drafting	  of	   text	  and	   the	  reviewing	  of	  comments	  are	  both	  affected	  by	  
the	   composition	   of	   IPCC	   writing	   teams,	   which	   are	   almost	   certain	   to	   include	  
more	  proponents	  than	  opponents	  of	  climate	  change	  or	  climate	  change	  impacts	  
research.	  	  	  
 
5.3.4	  The	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	  (AR4)	  
The	  writing	  team	  for	  the	  AR4	  health	  chapter	  is	  notable	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  Tony	  
McMichael	   and	   Pim	   Martens	   as	   well	   as	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   notable	   CCH	  
opponents	  like	  Duane	  Gubler.	  	  There	  were,	  nonetheless,	  many	  contributors	  from	  
the	  CCH	  core	  group,	   including	  the	  CLA	  Bettina	  Menne	   from	  the	  WHO	  Regional	  
Office	  for	  Euro,	  Kris	  Ebi,	  Sari	  Kovats,	  Alistair	  Woodward	  and	  Simon	  Hales.	  
	  
i)	  The	  SPM	  
The	  language	  in	  the	  SPM	  is	  rather	  more	  nuanced	  in	  comparison	  with	  previous	  
assessments.	  Among	  the	  “projected	  climate	  change-­‐related	  exposures...likely	  to	  
affect	   the	   health	   status	   of	   millions	   of	   people”,	   IPCC	   includes	   the	   increased	  
burden	   of	   diarrhoeal	   disease	   and	   the	   altered	   spatial	   distribution	   of	   some	  
infectious	   disease	   vectors.	   	   The	   text	   about	   malaria	   is	   more	   cautious	   than	   in	  
previous	  assessments:	  “Climate	  change	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  some	  mixed	  effects,	  
such	  as	  a	  decrease	  or	  increase	  in	  the	  range	  of	  transmission	  potential	  of	  malaria	  
in	  Africa	  (IPCC,	  2007)”.	  	  The	  SPM	  for	  health	  concludes	  with	  a	  sort	  of	  disclaimer,	  
noting	  that	  health	  impacts	  (whether	  positive	  or	  negative)	  from	  climate	  change	  
would	   vary	   from	   one	   location	   to	   another,	   and	   that	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	  
population	   health	   –	   	   including	   education,	   economic	   development,	   health	   care	  
and	  public	  health	  initiatives	  and	  infrastructures	  –	  would	  be	  critically	  important	  
as	  well.	  
	  
ii)	  The	  full	  chapter:	  current	  climate	  impacts	  and	  vulnerabilities	  
The	  message	  from	  the	  full	  chapter	  is,	   like	  the	  SPM,	  somewhat	  more	  restrained	  
than	   previous	   IPCC	   assessments	   –	   the	   literature	   cites	  more	  widely	   from	   both	  
sides	   of	   the	   CCH	   controversy.	   	   The	   chapter	   is	   loosely	   divided	   into	   a	   section	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discussing	   current	   sensitivities	   and	   vulnerabilities	   and	   a	   section	   addressing	  
future	   health	   impacts.	   	   As	   concerns	   the	   former,	   the	   text	   generally	   discusses	  
observed	   associations	   between	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases	   and	   climate	   change	  
without	   making	   any	   strong,	   causal	   statements.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   although	  
northern	  or	  altitudinal	  shifts	   in	  tick	  distribution	  had	  been	  observed	  in	  Europe,	  
as	  well	  as	  increases	  in	  TBE	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe,	  “climate	  change	  alone	  
is	   unlikely	   to	   explain	   recent	   increases	   (Confalonieri	   et	   al.,	   2007:	   403)”,	   citing	  
Sarah	  Randolph’s	  work	  as	  one	  of	   the	  alternative	  explanations	   for	   this	  upsurge	  
(recall	  4.6).	  	  	  
	  
As	  for	  dengue,	  although	  several	  studies	  identified	  associations	  between	  climatic	  
variables	  and	  dengue,	   “these	  reported	  associations	  are	  not	  entirely	  consistent,	  
possibly	   reflecting	   the	   complexity	   of	   climatic	   effects	   on	   transmission	   (Ibid.:	  
403)”.	  	  	  
	  
The	  longest	  discussion	  is	  focused	  on	  malaria,	  and	  the	  text	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  
longstanding	   controversy	   over	  whether	   climate	   change	   had	   already	   impacted	  
highland	  malaria:	   “The	  effects	  of	  observed	  climate	  change	  on	  the	  geographical	  
distribution	   of	   malaria	   and	   its	   transmission	   intensity	   in	   highland	   regions	  
remains	  controversial	  (Ibid.:	  404)”.	  	  The	  bulk	  of	  this	  text,	  however,	  favours	  the	  
conclusion	   that	   climate	   and	   climate	   change	   have	   played	   an	   important	   role.	  
Although	   the	   research	   of	   Simon	   Hay	   is	   presented	   in	   which	   he	   suggests	   that	  
increases	   in	   malaria	   incidence	   occurred	   “in	   the	   apparent	   absence	   of	   climate	  
trends	   (Ibid.:	   404)”,	   substantial	   doubt	   is	   subsequently	   cast	   upon	   it	   through	  
citing	  research	  led	  by	  Jonathan	  Patz:	  “…the	  validity	  of	  this	  conclusion	  has	  been	  
questioned	  because	  it	  may	  have	  resulted	  from	  inappropriate	  use	  of	  the	  climatic	  
data	   (Ibid.)”.	   	   A	   range	   of	   studies	   are	   then	   cited	   demonstrating	   associations	  
between	   climate	   and	   highland	   malaria	   in	   Madagascar,	   Kenya,	   and	   Ethiopia	  
before	  concluding	  by	  noting	  another	  study	  by	  Hay	  critiquing	  such	  findings.	  
	  
It	  was	  suggested	  in	  4.7	  that	  a	  successful	  challenge	  on	  the	  climate	  data	  used	  in	  a	  
model	   would	   necessarily	   compromise	   the	   perceived	   validity	   of	   the	   model’s	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outputs.	   It	  seems	  as	  though,	   in	  AR4,	   levels	  of	  “externality”	  have	  been	  removed	  
from	  the	  debate	  on	  highland	  malaria.	  	  Given	  that	  this	  is	  an	  IPCC	  assessment,	  it	  is	  
not	   entirely	   surprising:	   for	   all	   the	   reasons	   related	   to	   how	   writing	   teams	   are	  
selected	  (5.2.3),	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  IPCC	  authors	  accept	  
the	  premise	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  occurring	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  
critical	   of	   climate	   change	   data	   itself	   (which	   is,	   in	   any	   case,	   the	   focus	   of	   other	  
Working	  Groups).	  	  
	  
iii)	  Future	  impacts	  
The	   discussion	   on	   future	   impacts	   and	   vulnerabilities	   is,	   consistent	   with	   the	  
aforementioned	  section	  and	   the	  SPM,	  also	  much	  more	  muted	   than	   in	  previous	  
IPCC	   assessments.	   	   The	   subsection	   devoted	   to	   malaria,	   dengue	   and	   other	  
infectious	   diseases	   includes,	   in	   the	   very	   first	   paragraph,	   the	   following	  
statement:	  
	  
The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  projected	  effect	  may	  be	  smaller	  than	  reported	  in	  the	  TAR,	  
partly	  because	  of	  advances	  in	  categorising	  risk.	   	  There	  is	  greater	  confidence	  in	  
projected	   changes	   in	   the	   geographical	   range	   of	   vectors	   than	   in	   changes	   in	  
disease	   incidence	   because	   of	   uncertainties	   about	   trends	   in	   factors	   other	   than	  
climate	   that	   influence	   human	   cases	   and	   deaths,	   including	   the	   status	   of	   public	  
health	  infrastructure	  (Ibid.:	  408).	  
	  
Very	   few	   concrete	   statements	   can	   be	   found	   about	   the	   possible	   impacts	   of	  
climate	   change	   on	   malaria	   or	   dengue.	   	   The	   chapter	   lists	   a	   lengthy	   table	  
summarising	  key	  studies	  and	  notes	  many	  caveats	  about	  modelling.	  For	  example:	  
	  
Models	  with	   incomplete	   parameterisation	   of	   biological	   relationships	   between	  
temperature,	  vector	  and	  parasite	  often	  over-­‐emphasise	  relative	  changes	  in	  risk,	  
even	  when	  the	  absolute	  risk	  is	  small	  (Ibid.:	  408).	  
	  
Malaria	   is	   a	   complex	   disease	   to	  model	   and	   all	   published	  models	   have	   limited	  
parameterisation	   of	   some	   of	   the	   key	   factors	   that	   influence	   the	   geographical	  
range	  and	  intensity	  of	  malaria	  transmission	  (Ibid.).	  
	  
Read	   together,	   this	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   very	   technical	   admission	   that	  
biological	  climate-­‐malaria	  models	  are	  not	  as	  accurate	  as	  previously	  advertised.	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Accordingly,	  the	  final	  claims	  from	  AR4	  are	  quite	  modest.	  	  For	  malaria	  in	  Africa,	  
the	   boldest	   statement	   is	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   malaria	   transmission	   season	  
could	  have	  “important	   implications	  for	  vector	  control	  (Ibid.)”,	  but	  this,	  citing	  a	  
publication	  by	  Paul	  Reiter,	  would	  not	  necessarily	   translate	   into	  an	   increase	   in	  
the	   burden	   of	   disease	   due	   to	   malaria.	   	   The	   remainder	   of	   the	   discussion	   on	  
malaria	  addresses	  the	  risks	  in	  Europe,	  Australia,	  Asia	  and	  Central	  America	  and	  
is	   also	   generally	   balanced,	   pointing	   out,	   for	   example,	   that	   although	   climate	  
change	   might	   enable	   a	   southward	   expansion	   of	   the	   climatic	   suitability	   for	  
vectors	  in	  Australia,	  “the	  future	  risk	  of	  endemicity	  would	  remain	  low	  due	  to	  the	  
capacity	  to	  respond	  (Ibid.:	  408)”.	   	  This	  is	  in	  clear	  contrast	  to	  TAR,	  where	  more	  
pessimistic	   socioeconomic	   expectations	   were	   emphasised	   when	   it	   noted	   that	  
malaria	   could	   become	   established	   in	   certain	   countries	   should	   public	   health	  
capacities	  not	  be	  maintained	  (5.3.3).	  
	  
Dengue,	   meanwhile,	   is	   given	   fairly	   little	   treatment.	   	   Unlike	   the	   coverage	   of	  
malaria	  in	  AR4	  and	  dengue	  in	  TAR,	  the	  literature	  is	  not	  evenly	  represented.	  	  The	  
Hales	   vapour	   pressure	   model	   (4.5)	   is	   the	   main	   study	   cited,	   and	   it	   is	   simply	  
accompanied	  by	  the	  statement:	  “It	  was	  estimated	  that,	  in	  the	  2080s,	  5-­‐6	  billion	  
people	  would	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  dengue	  as	  a	  result	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  population	  
increase,	   compared	  with	  3.5	  billion	  people	   if	   the	   climate	   remained	  unchanged	  
(Ibid.:	  408)”.	  
	  
The	   health	   chapter	   in	   AR4	   does	   not	   discuss	   other	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases;	   it	  
refers	   to	  chapters	  on	  Europe	  and	  North	  America	   for	  discussions	  on	  tick-­‐borne	  
encephalitis	   and	   Lyme	   disease.	   	   These	   chapters	   only	   briefly	   touch	   upon	  
infectious	  diseases.	  	  The	  North	  American	  chapter,	  of	  which	  Jonathan	  Patz	  was	  a	  
Lead	   Author,	   suggests	   that	   the	   Lyme	   disease	   distribution	   range	   could	   shift	  
north,	   whereas	   the	   European	   chapter	   contains	   a	   fairly	   balanced	   but	   concise	  
discussion	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  Lindgren	  and	  Randolph	  (section	  4.6)	  over	  the	  




iv)	  	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  AR4	  writing	  team	  
A	   general	   consensus,	   at	   least	   among	   CCH	   opponents,	   is	   that	   AR4	   achieved	   a	  
balance	  hitherto	  absent	  in	  prior	  IPCC	  assessments:	  
	  
R4:	  IPCC4,	  the	  more	  recent	  one,	  achieves	  a	  more	  balanced	  view	  than	  IPCC3.	  	  
	  
Jonathan:	  	  So	  you	  feel	  comfortable	  with	  the	  conclusions	  from	  the	  2007	  
assessment?	  	  
	  
R13:	  	   More	  or	  less,	  yes.	  I	  can’t	  remember,	  I	  read	  it	  very	  briefly,	  I	  was	  so	  sick	  of	  
the	  whole	  business.	  But	  put	   it	   this	  way,	  we	  went	   through	   two	  drafts,	   and	   the	  
first	  one	  I	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  suggestions	  in,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  them	  were	  accepted,	  and	  then	  
the	  second	  one	  I	  went	  over	  some	  of	  the	  first	  one,	  to	  put	  them	  back	  in	  again	  with	  
additional	  sort	  of	  discussion,	  and	  I	  think	  they	  accepted	  some	  of	  those.	  
	  
The	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   would	   appear	   to	   slightly	   confirm	   these	  
statements,	   as	   AR4	   at	   least	   alluded	   to	   the	   the	   potential	   positive	   as	   well	   as	  
negative	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   on	   health,	   evidenced	   by	   the	   depiction	   of	  
malaria	   in	   a	   heavily	   cited	   summary	   figure	   produced	   by	   IPCC	   (Figure	   5).	   	   The	  
assessment	  nevertheless	  appears	   to	  be	  skewed	  towards	  the	  potential	  negative	  
health	  impacts	  from	  climate	  change,	  a	  trend	  more	  generally	  identified	  for	  IPCC	  
assessments	  (e.g.	  PBL,	  2010).	   	  One	  example	  is	  dengue,	  for	  which	  we	  have	  seen	  
earlier	  in	  this	  section	  that	  the	  research	  claims	  were	  fairly	  one-­‐sided	  towards	  the	  
negative,	  even	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  claims	  from	  TAR.	   	  Another	  (albeit	  more	  
general)	   example	   comes	   from	   the	   chapter	   on	  Europe,	  where	   the	   statement	   in	  
the	  executive	  summary	  that	  “on	  balance	  health	  risks	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  increase”	  
is	  not	  adequately	  substantiated	  by	  the	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  in	  the	  main	  text	  








Figure	  5.	  Direction	  and	  magnitude	  of	  change	  of	  selected	  health	  impacts	  of	  climate	  
change,	  as	  presented	  in	  AR4	  39	  
 
	  
Overall,	   however,	   as	   concerns	   infectious	   diseases	   the	   message	   from	   AR4	   is	  
toned	  down	   in	   comparison	  with	  earlier	   IPCC	  assessments,	   even	   if	   the	   reasons	  
behind	  this	  AR4	  are	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  	  There	  are	  many	  possible	  explanations	  –	  
some	  unrelated	  to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  peer	  review	  literature,	  which	  we	  have	  already	  
seen	  has	  been	  treated	   inconsistently	  across	   the	  assessments.	   	  One	  explanation	  
could	  be	   that	  amendments	   to	   the	   IPCC	  assessment	  process	  had	  had	  an	   impact	  
(5.2.3),	  but	  then	  again	  many	  of	  these	  were	  made	  prior	  to	  TAR.	  	  	  
	  
Another	   explanation	   could	   be	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   CLA	   with	   a	   very	   strong	  
personality	   such	   as	   Tony	   McMichael;	   it	   has	   already	   been	   noted	   just	   how	  
significant	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Coordinating	   Lead	   Author	   (CLA)	   can	   be	   in	  
influencing	  the	  peer	  review	  and	  in	  negotiating	  the	  final	  text	  for	  the	  SPM	  (5.2.3,	  
5.3.3).	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  one	  Lead	  Author	  from	  AR4	  stated	  the	  
following	  about	  the	  AR4	  CLAs:	  
                                                
39 Available	  at:	  
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_figures_and_tables.shtml#.T
0dgz3mCVGQ,	  accessed	  February	  22,	  2012. 
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R6:	   I	  was	   a	   lead	   author	   but	   to	   be	   blunt	   two	   of	   us	  wrote	   85%	   of	   the	   chapter	  
because	  of	  the	  CLAs,	  one	  was	  not	  interested	  and	  one	  was	  not	  capable.	  
	  
Yet	  another	  explanation	  for	  AR4	  could	  be	  that	  CCH	  opponents,	   frustrated	  with	  
the	   outcome	   of	   prior	   assessments,	   were	   more	   substantially	   involved	   in	   the	  
review	  process:	  
	  
R2:	   And	   so	   the	   controversies	   got	   into	   it…	   And	   everybody	   could	   who	   was	  
involved	  into	  the	  review	  process	  and	  the	  major	  institutions	  were	  involved	  into	  
this	  had	   to	  make	   their	  points	  on	  where	   there	  was	   incorrect	   representation	  of	  
the	  science.	  
	  
So	  definitely	  what	  you	  would	  call	  the	  climate	  skeptics	  I	  mean	  the	  Oxford	  Group	  
or	  Paul	  Reiter,	  I	  mean	  just	  to	  mention	  a	  few,	  had	  ample	  space	  and	  opportunity	  
to	  comment…	  	  
	  
It	  is	  at	  least	  clear	  that	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  comments	  that	  the	  writing	  team	  had	  to	  
address	  through	  the	  peer	  review	  process	  was	  enormous	  and	  it	   is	   important	  to	  
reiterate	  that	  any	  interested	  parties	  could	  respond:	  
	  
R6:	  We	  had	  more	  than	  800	  perhaps	  a	  thousand	  comments...	  and	  the	  comments	  
come	   from	   other	   scientists	   ...	   they	   come	   from	   any	   interested	   member	   of	   the	  
public,	   they	   come	   from	  policy	  makers,	   they	   come	   from	  people	  with	  particular	  
perspectives,	   and	   you	   have	   to	   write	   a	   written	   response	   to	   each	   and	   every	  
comment.	  40	  
	  
The	  need	  to	  address	  so	  many	  comments	  introduces,	  as	  earlier	  mentioned,	  a	  high	  
degree	   of	   subjectivity	   as	  writing	   teams	   deem	   some	   comments	   significant	   and	  
others	  not.	  	  The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  comments,	  however,	  could	  also	  contribute	  to	  a	  
more	  diluted	  message,	  if	  the	  writing	  teams	  decided	  to	  be	  cautious	  by	  addressing	  
as	  many	  comments	  as	  possible.	   	  Here,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   the	  climate-­‐
VBD	  message	  from	  this	  assessment	  could	  have	  been	  even	  weaker,	  had	  the	  final	  
version	  not	  benefitted	  from	  the	  deletion	  of	  a	  few	  choice	  sentences.	  	  In	  the	  First-­‐
                                                
40	  All	  comments	  received	  and	  addressed	  by	  IPCC	  for	  AR4	  are	  in	  fact	  available.	  For	  the	  chapter	  on	  
Human	  Health,	  there	  were	  1102	  comments	  on	  the	  first-­‐order	  draft.	  	  There	  were	  593	  expert	  
comments	  and	  100	  government	  comments	  on	  the	  second-­‐order	  draft.	  See:	  http://www.ipcc-­‐
wg2.gov/publications/AR4/ar4review.html,	  accessed	  March	  3,	  2012.	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Order	  Draft,	   the	  paragraph	  on	  dengue	  ends	  with	  a	  disclaiming	  sentence	  about	  
the	  Hales	  model	  projections:	  
	  
This	   analysis	   is	   based	   on	   one	   model;	   additional	   models	   are	   needed	   before	  
confidence	  can	  be	  placed	  on	  how	  climate	  change	  could	  affect	  the	  incidence	  and	  
range	  of	  dengue.41	  
	  
This	   statement	   is	   shortened	   in	   the	   Second-­‐Order	   Draft,	   reading:	   “additional	  
models	  are	  needed	   to	   increase	  confidence	   in	   these	  projections”.42	  	  By	   the	   final	  
report,	   this	   sentence	   had	   been	   deleted	   entirely.	   	   Similarly,	   a	   statement	   about	  
tick-­‐borne	  encephalitis	  appears	  in	  both	  the	  First-­‐	  and	  Second-­‐Order	  Drafts	  but	  
not	  the	  final	  report:	  
	  
The	  only	  other	   vector	  borne	  disease	   to	  be	  mapped	  and	  quantified	   for	   climate	  
change	   impacts	   is	   tick-­‐borne	   encephalitis	   in	   Europe	   (Randolph	   and	   Rogers,	  
2000).	   Increased	   temperatures	   are	   projected	   to	   reduce	   the	   endemic	   range	   of	  
this	  disease	  in	  Europe.43	  
	  
If	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  these	  statements	  appeared	  in	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Order	  
Drafts	   at	   all,	   it	   is	   equally	   surprising	   that	   they	   were	   subsequently	   removed.	  	  
There	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  expert	  comments	  for	  the	  First-­‐	  or	  Second-­‐Order	  Draft	  or	  
the	  governmental	  comments	  for	  the	  Second-­‐Order	  draft	  to	  suggest	  that	  anyone	  
had	  recommended	  that	  these	  statements	  be	  removed.44	  45	  	  Thus	  the	  content	  of	  
the	   final	   version	   of	   the	   chapter	   appears	   to	   offer	   yet	   additional	   evidence	   that	  
                                                
41	  This	  statement	  appears	  on	  page	  25	  of	  the	  First	  Order	  Draft,	  available	  at:	  http://www.ipcc-­‐
wg2.gov/publications/AR4/ar4review.html,	  accessed	  March	  3,	  2012.	  
42	  This	  statement	  appears	  on	  page	  28	  of	  the	  Second	  Order	  Draft,	  available	  at:	  http://www.ipcc-­‐
wg2.gov/publications/AR4/ar4review.html,	  accessed	  March	  3,	  2012.	  
43	  This	  statement	  appears	  on	  page	  25	  of	  the	  First	  Order	  Draft	  and	  page	  28	  of	  the	  Second	  Order	  
Draft,	  available	  at:	  http://www.ipcc-­‐wg2.gov/publications/AR4/ar4review.html,	  accessed	  
March	  3,	  2012.	  
44	  Searching	  all	  expert	  and	  government	  review	  comments	  for	  the	  words	  “dengue”	  and	  “tick”	  and	  
“TBE”	  reveals	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  comments	  about	  dengue	  were	  in	  fact	  submitted	  by	  Paul	  Reiter	  
and	  were	  critical	  of	  any	  stated	  role	  for	  climate	  in	  dengue	  transmission.	  	  All	  review	  documents	  
are	  available	  at:	  http://www.ipcc-­‐wg2.gov/publications/AR4/ar4review.html,	  accessed	  March	  
3,	  2012.	  	  
45	  Paul	  Reiter,	  it	  should	  be	  clarified,	  has	  been	  openly	  critical	  of	  IPCC	  and	  its	  processes,	  even	  
testifying	  to	  the	  UK	  House	  of	  Lords	  about	  this	  topic.	  See:	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeconaf/12/12we21.htm,	  
accessed	  March	  3,	  2012.	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IPCC	  writing	  teams	  and	  review	  editors	  (one	  of	  which	  was	  Tony	  McMichael)	  can	  
influence	   the	   determination	   of	   which	   comments	   (and	   snippets	   of	   text)	   are	  
relevant	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  	  
	  
v)	  Issue	  fatigue	  and	  message	  dilution	  
It	  is	  an	  ironic	  but	  not	  unnoticed	  phenomenon	  that	  additional	  research	  may	  lead	  
to	  greater	  rather	  than	  reduced	  uncertainty.	  	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  a	  marked	  
growth	  in	  the	  CCH	  literature	  from	  SAR	  to	  TAR	  to	  AR4	  (recall	  also	  Table	  1),	  this	  
has	  been	  accompanied,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  by	  a	  weakening	  of	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  
these	  assessments.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  further	  irony	  of	  the	  IPCC	  peer	  review	  process	  as	  currently	  conceived.	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  this	  process	  is	  incredibly	  extensive	  and	  that	  the	  final	  outcome	  can	  
rightly	   be	   said	   to	   have	   undergone	   a	   rigorous	   peer	   review.	   	   As	   such,	   any	  
concluding	  statements	  can	  easily	  be	  viewed	  as	  “facts”	  –	  how	  could	  they	  not	  be	  if	  
they	  have	  withstood	  so	  many	  opportunities	  for	  rebuttal?	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
because	   writing	   teams	   have	   addressed	   each	   and	   every	   review	   comment,	   the	  
strength	  of	   claims	   that	   can	  be	   attributed	   to	   these	   “facts”	   is	   often	  diluted.	   	   For	  
this	  reason,	  others	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  messages	  from	  such	  assessments	  tend	  
towards	  the	  banal:	  
	  
R19:	   I	   think	   there	   was	   probably	   a	   sense	   that	   IPCC	   is	   pretty	   cautious	   and	  
conservative…and	   that	   it	   tends	   to	   be	   a	   lowest	   common	   denominator	  
approach…they	  only	  publish	  things	  that	  practically	  everybody	  will	  have	  agreed	  
to.	  
	  
This	  might	  be	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  claims	  made	  with	  “very	  high	  confidence”:	  
stating	  that	  malaria	  will	  both	  expand	  and	  contract	  (albeit	  to	  somewhat	  different	  
extents	  and	  depending	  on	  location)	  is	  but	  one	  example.	  	  For	  future	  assessments,	  
given	   the	   intense	   scrutiny	   that	   IPCC	   assessments	   face	   (e.g.	   Climategate,	  
Himalayagate),	  could	  it	  be	  that	  writing	  teams	  will	  increasingly	  choose	  to	  err	  on	  
the	   side	   of	   caution?	   As	   one	   interviewee	   stated	   when	   reflecting	   upon	   the	  
increased	   attention	   that	   subsequent	   IPCC	   Assessments	   have	   received,	   “…in	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subtle	   ways,	   and	   not	   perhaps	   self-­‐aware,	   the	   authors	   began	   to	   write	   in	   a	  
defensive	  mode	  (R22)”.	  
	  
One	   additional	   issue	   related	   to	   the	   above	   is	   that	   parties	  with	   strong	   interests	  
might	  put	  more	  energy	   into	   the	   IPCC	   review	  process	   than	  parties	  with	   less	  at	  
stake.	   	  One	  Lead	  Author	   from	  AR4	  certainly	   felt	   that	   the	  peer	   review	  process,	  
and	  thus	  the	  final	  conclusions,	  was	  sub-­‐optimal:	  	  
	  
R8:	  And	  I	  think	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  climate	  change	  chapters	  is	  that	  it	  did	  fail	  
at	   the	  peer	   review	   -­‐	  and	  don't	  attribute	   this	   to	  me,	  okay,	  but	  despite	  our	  best	  
efforts,	  the	  health	  scientists	  wouldn't	  take	  the	  time	  to	  review	  it.	  	  We	  sent	  it	  to	  -­‐	  
and	  this	  was	  crucial	  -­‐	  we	  sent	  it	  to	  all	  the	  malaria	  people,	  the	  water	  people,	  but	  
they	  didn't	  review	  it,	  and	  if	  they	  didn't	  review	  it,	  what	  could	  we	  do?	  	  	  
	  
	  
That	  this	  occurred	  may	  partially	  represent	  the	   longstanding	  challenge	  that	  the	  
CCH	  community	  has	  faced	  (3.2	  –	  3.4),	  namely	  their	  tenuous	  position	  within	  the	  
broader	   public	   health	   landscape.	   	   Meanwhile,	   over	   1,000	   comments	   were	  
received	  from	  other	  sources,	  and	  active	  opponents	   like	  Paul	  Reiter	  have	  taken	  
the	  time	  to	  submit	  numerous	  comments.	  	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  Lead	  Authors	  may	  have	  started	  to	  become	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  review	  
process,	  so	  too	  have	  several	  of	  the	  more	  credible	  opponents	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
more	  blatantly	  obvious	  special	  interest	  or	  lobby	  groups):	  
	  
R17:	   But	   I	   didn't	   think	   that	   the	   IPCC	  was	   necessarily	   the	   best	  way	   to	   get	  my	  
views	   across.	   I	   mean	   that	   genuinely.	   I	   know	   the	   people	   who	   are	   writing	   the	  
chapters	  …	  and	  they'd	  interviewed	  me	  on	  certain	  chapters	  and...	  not	  really	  had	  
any	   impact.	   People	   are	   quite	   determined	   to	   carry	   on	   with	   what	   they	   feel	  
comfortable	  with.	  
	  
R4:	  And	  I	  saw	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  IPCC	  health	  report	  …	  I	  was	  sent	  it	  to	  review	  
by	   IPCC4.	   And	   I	   read	   it	   through	   quickly	   and	   quite	   frankly	   it	   was	   so	   badly	  
written.	  It’s	  difficult	  for	  somebody	  whose	  natural	  language	  isn’t	  English	  to	  write	  
but	  it	  was	  so	  badly	  written.	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I	  said,	  “Look,	  it	  would	  take	  me	  forever	  to	  edit	  this	  damn	  thing	  let	  alone	  to	  look	  
at	  the	  science.	  I	  just	  can’t.	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  time”.	  And	  I	  turned	  it	  down.	  
	  
	  
A	   legitimate	  question	  for	  AR5	  and	  beyond	  thus	  relates	  to	  the	  problem	  of	   issue	  
fatigue	   among	   leading	   scientists.	   	   Weighing	   the	   relative	   merits	   of	   comments,	  
always	  open	  to	   interpretative	   flexibility	   from	  the	  writing	  teams,	  could	  become	  
much	  more	  problematic	  should	  both	  writing	  teams	  and	  peer	  reviewers	  become	  
increasingly	   devoid	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   scientists	   in	   the	   field	   and/or	  
increasingly	  populated	  by	  special	  interests	  groups.46	  
 
5.3.5	  Summary:	  CCH	  at	  the	  IPCC	  
Throughout	   5.3,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   IPCC	   assessments	   of	   the	   links	   between	  
climate	  change	  and	  vector-­‐borne	  diseases	  have	  mirrored,	  or	  masked,	  the	  wider	  
controversies	   in	   the	   field	   has	   been	   examined.	   	   There	   are	   a	   few	   particularly	  
important	   findings.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   personality	   and	  
composition	   of	   the	   IPCC	  writing	   teams,	  which	   for	   health	   have	   had	   prominent	  
participation	   by	   members	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   (Chapter	   3),	   have	   heavily	  
influenced	   the	   final	   statements	   appearing	   in	   the	   SPMs	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   full	  
technical	  chapters.	  	  Final	  IPCC	  statements	  on	  the	  links	  between	  climate	  change	  
and	   vector-­‐borne	   diseases	   have	   been,	   by	   and	   large,	   filtered	   through	   their	  
perspective.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  have	  had	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  production	  of	  the	  texts	  –	  
CCH	  opponents	  have	  been	  moderately	  successful	  in	  engaging	  IPCC	  processes	  to	  
bring	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	   debate	   into	   the	   assessments	   –	   but	   it	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	  
assessments	  would	  likely	  be	  very	  different	  in	  tone	  if	  it	  were	  the	  CCH	  opponents	  
leading	   the	   work.	   	   The	   representation	   of	   the	   very	   complex	   climate-­‐VBD	  
controversies	  described	  in	  Chapter	  4	  favours	  the	  CCH	  proponents.	  	  As	  argued	  in	  
                                                
46	  This	  is	  not	  to	  denounce	  an	  idea	  dominant	  through	  much	  of	  this	  thesis,	  which	  is	  that	  CCH	  
proponents	  and	  opponents	  themselves	  are	  driven,	  at	  least	  partially,	  by	  interests.	  However,	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  interests	  at	  play	  in	  climate	  change	  assessments,	  
including	  oil	  industry	  lobbyists,	  who	  may	  act	  with	  levels	  of	  integrity	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  lower	  
than	  the	  scientists	  described	  in	  this	  thesis	  (e.g.	  Oreskes	  &	  Conway,	  2010).	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5.3.4	  concerning	  highland	  malaria,	  given	  that	  the	  venue	  is	  the	  IPCC,	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	   controversy	   are	   also	   somewhat	   narrowed:	   a	   lengthy	   debate	   about	   the	  
relative	   merits	   or	   use	   of	   certain	   climatic	   datasets	   for	   disease	   modelling	   is	  
generally	   absent.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   foundation	   upon	  which	   this	   research	   is	  
based	  is	  much	  more	  solid	  in	  the	  safe	  confines	  of	  the	  IPCC	  than	  out	  in	  the	  peer-­‐
reviewed	  literature.	  The	  CCH	  community,	   it	  might	  be	  said,	  has	  benefitted	  from	  
home-­‐field	  advantage.	  
	  
Despite	  this,	  as	  discussed	  in	  5.3.4,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  clear	  dilution	  of	  the	  message	  
coming	  out	  of	  the	  successive	  health	  chapters,	  and	  this	  could	  be	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
reasons.	  Champions	  of	  the	  IPCC	  might	  suggest	  that	  this	   is	  evidence	  of	  an	  ever-­‐
improving	  review	  process;	  cynics	  might	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  prior	  
controversies	   –	   IPCC	   has	   become	  more	   cautious	   and	   conservative.	   	  Whatever	  
the	   reason,	   and	   despite	   the	   trend	   towards	  more	   nuance	   in	   discussions	   about	  
climate-­‐VBD	   links,	   it	   must	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   there	   are	   inconsistencies	  
throughout	  the	  assessments.	  In	  TAR,	  dengue	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  strongly	  linked	  to	  
climate	   as	   is	   malaria;	   in	   AR4	   it	   is	   the	   opposite.	   	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   this,	  
discussed	   at	   length	   in	   4.3.3	   and	   4.7.2,	   relates	   to	   varying	   visions	   of	   the	   future.	  	  
IPCC	  would	  do	  well	  to	  make	  this	  more	  explicit	  in	  future	  assessments,	  given	  the	  
significance	   that	  such	  visions	  have	  on	  how	  climate-­‐VBD	  models	  are	  ultimately	  
perceived.	  As	  one	  IPCC	  contributor	  noted:	  
	  
R1:	  The	  IPCC	  takes	  a	  far	  more	  cautious	  approach	  [than	  CCH	  opponents].	  And	  it	  
says	   if	   current	   social	   conditions	   are	   sustained,	   then	   it’s	   most	   unlikely	   that	  
malaria	   will	   return	   to	   Europe,	   even	   if	   the	   climate	   has	   changed.	   But	   it	   is	   not	  
taking	  that	  for	  granted.	  And	  of	  course	  the	  answer	  is	  the	  different	  scenarios	  that	  
we	  used	  as	  part	   of	   the	  modelling	   for	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   assessment	   reports	  
included	  a	   sort	  of	  variety	  of	   futures,	  which	  didn’t	  necessarily	  assume	   that	   the	  
advances	  that	  have	  held	  in	  the	  past,	  that	  have	  applied	  in	  the	  past,	  will	  have	  hold	  
in	  the	  future.	  
	  
This	   point	   cannot	   be	   emphasised	   enough.	   Aside	   from	   all	   of	   the	   other	   choices	  
that	  modellers	  might	  make	  that	  can	  influence	  model	  outcomes	  –	  many	  involving	  
judgments	  not	  particularly	  “scientific”	  –	  the	  choice	  of	  socioeconomic	  model	  and	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future	  assumptions	  are	  highly	  important.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  is	  generally	  well-­‐known,	  
the	   IPCC	   SRES	   (Special	   Report	   on	   Emissions	   Scenarios)	   underpinned	   climate	  
change	  projections	  for	  TAR	  and	  AR4.47	  	  It	  is	  here	  important	  to	  reiterate	  that	  this,	  
like	  many	  other	  aspects	  of	  IPCC	  work,	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  hybrid	  scientific	  and	  
political	  process:	  
	  
R6:	  The	  SRES	  was	  a	  process	   led	  by	   the	   IPCC,	   so	   the	  governments	  did	  need	   to	  
approve	   the	   SPM	   and	   then	   accept	   the	   underlying	   chapters.	   	  The	   governments	  
did	  not	  directly	  approve	  the	  economic	   forecasts,	  but	   they	  did	  approve	  the	  key	  
messages	   that	   came	   from	   those	   forecasts.	   	  Which	   could	   have	   had	   an	   indirect	  
affect	  on	  the	  scenarios.	  
	  
Particular	  socioeconomic	  visions	  of	  the	  future,	  vetted	  by	  governments,	  are	  used	  
to	   underpin	   climate	   data	  models.	  When	  used	   in	   impacts	   research,	   such	   as	   for	  
modelling	   climate-­‐VBD	   futures,	   these	   visions	   become	   further	   embedded,	  
meaning	   that	   some	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   are	   privileged	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
alternative	  visions.48	  49	  
	  
This	   is	   but	   one	   example	  of	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   IPCC	   is,	   as	  Miller	   (2004)	  has	  
suggested,	  both	  a	  consequence	  and	  an	  agent	  of	  co-­‐production.	  	  As	  argued	  earlier	  
in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  author	  nomination	  processes	  and	  the	  peer	  review	  processes	  
are	   designed	   to	   balance	   political	   and	   scientific	   credibility,	   but	   as	   shown	   by	  
following	   CCH	   through	   the	   four	   IPCC	   assessments,	   these	   processes	   are	   also	  
much	   more	   likely	   to	   reinforce	   the	   dominant	   narratives	   surrounding	   climate	  
change:	   namely,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   health,	   that	   climate	   change	  will	   lead	   to	   health	  
outcomes,	  most	  of	  them	  adverse.	  	  Yet	  both	  of	  these	  claims,	  as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  
                                                
47	  See:	  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-­‐reports/spm/sres-­‐en.pdf,	  accessed	  March	  5,	  2012.	  
48	  It	  is	  important	  to	  ask	  whether	  IPCC	  scenarios	  in	  general	  tend	  towards	  the	  optimistic	  or	  the	  
pessimistic.	  	  Most	  interviewees	  who	  commented	  on	  this	  suggested	  that	  IPCC	  is	  more	  cautious	  
about	  the	  future,	  as	  the	  quote	  above	  indicates,	  which	  is	  probably	  true	  for	  impacts	  modeling,	  but	  
there	  is	  at	  least	  some	  reason	  to	  doubt	  this	  as	  concerns	  overall	  climate	  change	  projections.	  As	  
one	  interviewee	  noted:	  “no	  government	  would	  approve	  something	  that	  suggests	  that	  there	  
wouldn’t	  be	  dramatic	  economic	  growth	  in	  their	  country	  (R19)”.	  	  
49	  Recall	  the	  discussion	  from	  1.4	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  risk	  tolerance	  and	  subjective	  
assumptions	  are	  embedded	  in	  GCMs.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  use	  of	  both	  climate	  models	  and	  
SRES	  scenarios	  have	  been	  noted	  to	  limit	  the	  full	  range	  of	  extremes	  that	  could	  be	  potentially	  
considered	  (e.g.	  Oppenheimer	  et	  al,	  2007;	  van	  der	  Sluijs	  et	  al,	  1998).	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4,	  were	   the	   subject	  of	   intense	   controversy.	   	  Accepting	   them,	   it	  was	   suggested,	  
has	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  subscription	   to	  a	  particular	  worldview	  as	   it	  does	  with	  
the	   validity	   of	   the	   science.	   Thus,	   IPCC	   assessment	   reports	   have	   enforced	   and	  
been	  reinforced	  by	  particular	  worldviews.	  	  	  
	  
One	  final	  point	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  about	  the	  trajectory	  of	  climate-­‐VBD	  knowledge	  
claims	   through	   the	   four	   IPCC	   assessments.	   	   Although	   they	   have	   gradually	  
become	  more	  nuanced,	  it	  was	  also	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  3	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  IPCC	  
assessments	  has	  been	  quite	  significant:	  
	  
R18:	  …it’s	  a	  great	  document	  to	  cite,	  because	  it	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  weight…because	  it’s	  
international	  and	  balanced.	  
	  
As	  IPCC	  has	  been	  cited	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  governmental	  policy	  documents,	  the	  
impetus	  for	  action	  addressing	  the	  possible	  health	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  has	  
grown.	   For	   example,	   a	   World	   Health	   Assembly	   Resolution	   and	   a	   European	  
Commission	  Communication	  have	  specifically	   cited	  AR4.50	  	   Such	  citations	   tend	  
to	  be	  used	   to	  support	   the	  claim	   that	  public	  health	  action	  needs	   to	  be	   taken	   to	  
address	   climate	   change.	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	   more	   complicated	   and	   nuanced	  
discussion	  embedded	  in	  the	  IPCC	  full	  chapters	  tend	  to	  be	  glossed	  over.	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  further	  and	  final	  means	  through	  which	  IPCC	  stabilises	  CCH	  research	  
and	   vice-­‐versa:	   simply	   by	   assessing	   it.	   	   The	   medium	   is	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	  
message.	  	  If	  IPCC	  has	  studied	  possible	  health	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change,	  then	  the	  
topic	  must	  be	  important	  and	  something	  must	  be	  done	  by	  public	  health	  agencies.	  	  
Conversely,	  if	  these	  agencies,	  like	  WHO,	  have	  started	  to	  work	  on	  climate	  change,	  
then	  the	  health	   impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  must	  be	  serious,	  adding	  yet	  another	  
reason	  to	  more	  aggressively	  curb	  carbon	  emissions.	  
                                                
50	  WHA	  61.19	  (http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R19-­‐en.pdf,	  accessed	  August	  
22,	  2012).	  The	  DG	  SANCO	  produced	  a	  Commission	  Staff	  Working	  Document	  accompanying	  a	  
White	  Paper	  on	  adaptation	  to	  climate	  change.	  At:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_threats/climate/docs/com_2009-­‐147_en.pdf,	  accessed	  




In	  the	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  since	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  IPCC,	  although	  numerous	  
high-­‐profile	   expert	   assessments	   of	   climate	   science	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   both	  
international	   and	  national	   arenas,	   there	   remains	   the	  potential	   for	   controversy	  
every	  time	  a	  new	  assessment	  is	  released.	   	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  science	  alone,	  
excluding	   broader	   political	   considerations,	   would	   be	   enough	   to	   cause	   this.	  	  
Assessing	   the	   veracity	   of	   models	   (as	   well	   as	   their	   input	   data)	   necessitates	  
considering	   many	   and	   vast	   uncertainties.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   challenge	   of	  
attribution	  in	  the	  present-­‐day	  is	  notoriously	  difficult:	  even	  if	  one	  were	  to	  accept	  
that	   climate	   change	   is	   “real”,	   how	   could	   one	   know	   when	   such	   changes	   will	  
actually	   start	   to	   occur?	   Is	   an	   abnormally	   mild	   winter,	   hot	   summer	   or	   heavy	  
rainfall	   evidence	   of	   climate	   change,	   or	   simply	   year-­‐to-­‐year	   variation	   of	   the	  
weather?	  	  	  
	  
Recently,	   climate	   scientists	   have	   argued	   that	   some	   of	   the	   extreme	   weather	  
events	  of	  past	  years	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  attributed	  to	  climate	  change.	  	  The	  prominent	  
NASA	   scientist	   James	   Hansen,	   for	   example,	   recently	   published	   a	   paper	   in	  
Proceedings	   of	   the	   National	   Academies	   of	   Science	   in	   which	   he	   claims	   that	  
extreme	  events,	  such	  as	  a	  heatwave	  in	  Russia	   in	  2010	  and	  intense	  droughts	   in	  
Texas	  and	  Oklahoma	  in	  2011,	  “would	  not	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  global	  
warming	  (Hansen	  et	  al.,	  2012)”.	  	  Similar	  claims	  have	  been	  published	  in	  Nature	  in	  
relation	   to	   the	  risk	  of	   flooding	  and	  heavy	  precipitation	  events	   in	   the	  Northern	  
Hemisphere	  (Pall	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  Min	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  Such	  research	  can	  be	  expected	  
to	   be	   highlighted	   by	   the	   upcoming	   IPCC	   5th	   Assessment	   Report,	   which	   the	  
former	  UN	  head	  of	  climate	  negotiations,	  Yvo	  de	  Boer,	  has	  claimed	  will	  “scare	  the	  
wits	   out	   of	   everyone	   (quoted	   in	   Hannam,	   2012)”.	   It	   can	   also	   be	   reasonably	  
expected	   that	   such	   claims	  will,	   once	   again,	   be	   both	   highly	   visible	   and	   heavily	  
challenged,	   leaving	   policy-­‐makers	   to	   decide:	   can	   IPCC	   scientists,	   with	   clear	  
vested	  interests	  in	  climate	  change	  science,	  be	  trusted?	  Should	  societies	  start	  to	  
act	   more	   aggressively	   to	   curb	   GHG	   emissions	   and	   begin	   to	   implement	  
(potentially	  very	  expensive)	  adaptations	  to	  existing	  infrastructures?	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Co-­‐production	  and	  epistemic	  communities	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  central	  question	  is	  as	  relevant	  to	  atmospheric	  science	  as	  it	  is	  
to	  public	  health:	  what	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  credibility	  of	  climate	  change	  science	  
by	   assessing	   how	   it	   is	  made	   to	   be	   credible?	   	   Following	   Jasanoff	   (2004a,b,c),	   I	  
have	  suggested	  that	  examining	  this	  question	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  explored	  through	  
a	   theoretical	   perspective	   inspired	   by	   co-­‐production	   (2.4),	   because	   examining	  
how	   science	   and	   its	   “internal”	   controversies	   relate	   to	   broader	   political	  
structures	   reveals	   substantial	   insights	   into	   the	  myriad	   and	  often	  hidden	  ways	  
that	   science	   and	   politics	   interact.	   	   Recall,	   for	   example,	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	  
controversy	   as	   presented	   by	   Brisbois	   and	   Harris	   Ali	   (2010),	   in	   which	   they	  
identified	  some	  of	  the	  key	  actors	  and	  points	  of	  contention	  of	  the	  climate-­‐vector-­‐
borne	   disease	   controversy,	   but	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   any	   particularly	   profound	  
insights	  (4.2).	  	  As	  I	  argued,	  they	  did	  not	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  broader	  contexts	  
in	   which	   CCH	   research	   is	   both	   conducted	   and	   understood,	   and	   they	   also	  
neglected	   to	   observe	   the	   controversy	   in	   other	   domains	   –	   crucially,	   as	   it	  
manifested	  at	  the	  IPCC	  –	  leaving	  them	  to	  make	  the	  unfortunate	  admission	  that	  
“there	   is	   more	   to	   the	   controversy	   than	   what	   we	   have	   been	   able	   to	   explain	  
(Brisbois	  &	  Ali,	  2010:	  10)”.	  	  In	  contrast,	  meanwhile,	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  
scientific	  knowledge	  in	  governance	  –	  notably	  epistemic	  communities	  –	  usefully	  
draws	  attention	  to	  the	  prominent	  role	  of	  experts	  within	  governance	  systems	  but	  
tends	  to	  view	  expert	  knowledge	  as	  “objective”	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  interesting	  site	  
for	  analysis	  (2.2).	  	  	  
	  
Consistent	   in	   both	   approaches	   is	   that	   they	   neglect	   to	   consider	   that	   socio-­‐
political	   contexts	   and	   science	   are	   mutually	   constitutive.	   	   Analytically,	   this	   is	  
overcome	   by	   explicitly	   considering	   co-­‐production,	   which	   enables	   such	  
connections	  by	   identifying	  specific	   thematic	  areas	  of	  attention	   (specifically	   for	  
this	   thesis	   emergence	   and	   stabilization,	   controversy,	   and	   intelligibility	   and	  
portability	  (2.4.4))	  and	  by	  posing	  questions	  that	  these	  literatures	  tend	  to	  ignore.	  	  
Thus	   analytical	   attention	   was	   drawn	   to	   the	   climate	   change	   and	   health	  
community	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  By	  acknowledging	  the	  types	  of	  ambiguities	  lacking	  in	  
“traditional”	   epistemic	   communities	   theory	   (2.2),	   the	   co-­‐production	   of	   CCH	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science	  and	  politics	  was	  examined	  at	  many	  different	  levels.	  	  In	  no	  sense	  could	  it	  
be	  argued	  that	  the	  growth	  in	  credibility	  of	  CCH	  as	  a	   field	  of	   interest	  happened	  
solely	   because	   of	   the	   “science”.	   	   The	   trajectory	   of	   this	   research	   is	   the	  
consequence	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  factors:	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  dominant	  framings	  of	  
“global”	   climate	   change	   (1.3)	   and	   the	   EID	   worldview	   (1.4);	   pre-­‐existing	  
paradigmatic	  tensions	  within	  the	  field	  of	  epidemiology	  (3.2.1);	  the	  political	  and	  
philosophical	   commitments	   of	   early	   CCH	   researchers	   (3.2.2,	   3.3.1);	   the	  
boundary	   work	   and	   awareness	   raising	   efforts	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   (3.3.2);	  
fractures	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  global	  health	  landscape	  (2.3,	  3.3.3);	  and	  policies	  
and	  processes	  at	  both	   international	  and	  national	   levels	   (3.3.4).	   	  Meanwhile,	  as	  
CCH	  emerged	  and	  became	  stabilised,	  it	  influenced	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  institutes,	  
units,	  and	  collaborations;	  new	  funding	  streams,	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  priorities	  
for	  public	  health	  (3.3.5);	  and	  new	  topics	  to	  be	  considered	  and	  negotiated	  by	  the	  
climate	  change	  community	  (3.3.5,	  Chapter	  5).	  
	  
Despite	   this	   relatively	   smooth	   trajectory	   for	   CCH,	   its	   academic	   and	   policy	  
contexts	  are	  highly	  competitive,	  and	  it	  would	  have	  been	  surprising	  indeed	  if	  this	  
research	   niche	   would	   not	   have	   been	   contested.	   	   Thus	   the	   longstanding	  
controversy	  between	  CCH	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  (Chapter	  4),	  which	  serves	  
to	   further	   demonstrate	   just	   how	   important	   the	   extra-­‐curricular	   activities	  
pursued	  by	  the	  CCH	  community	  were	  in	  ensuring	  their	  discipline’s	  stabilisation:	  
this	  science	  was	  (and	  is)	  so	  heavily	  contested	  that	  one	  would	  have	  to	  be	  rather	  
credulous	   to	   think	   that	   the	  emergence	  and	  stabilisation	  of	  CCH	  was	  related	   to	  
purely	  “scientific”	  factors	  alone.	  	  	  
	  
That	  CCH	  knowledge	  could	  be	  so	   intensely	  contested	  throws	  into	  question	  not	  
only	  whether	  or	  not	  “consensus”	  surrounding	  CCH	  could	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  (to	  be	  
discussed	  below)	  but	  also	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  epistemic	  CCH	  community	  could	  be	  
said	   to	   exist.	   	   The	   analysis	   from	   Chapters	   3,	   4	   &	   5	   demonstrates	   that	   in	   a	  
scientific	  controversy,	  driven	  by	  contested	  norms	  and	  worldviews,	  actors	  may	  
seek	  to	  control	  the	  message	  and	  membership	  of	  a	  given	  community.	   	   It	   is	  thus	  
instructive	  to	  problematise	  the	  notion	  of	  “community”	  and	  “shared	  values”:	  who	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gets	   invited	   to	   meetings	   like	   the	   WHO’s	   Madrid	   Consultation,	   and	   why?	  	  
Although	  I	  have	  referred	  to	  a	  CCH	  community	  in	  this	  thesis,	  dominated	  to	  a	  fair	  
degree	  by	  CCH	  “proponents”,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  group	  of	  CCH	  “opponents”	  mobilised	  
to	  contest	  the	  mainstream	  CCH	  “gospel”	  suggests	  that	  the	  homogeneity	  implied	  
by	   the	   notion	   “epistemic	   community”	   may	   be	   somewhat	   illusory.	   	   This	   is	  
demonstrated	   by	   the	   boundary	   work	   that	   took	   place	   to	   demarcate	   CCH	  
“insiders”	  from	  “outsiders”.	  
	  
Models	  and	  controversy	  
To	  further	  emphasise	  this	  point,	  and	  to	  further	  probe	  the	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  
judgements	   and	  values	   are	   incorporated	   into	   the	  production	  of	   CCH	   research,	  
Chapter	   4	   examined	   specific	   climate-­‐disease	   controversies	   at	   length.	   	   	   Thus	   it	  
was	  noted	  how	  a	  group	  of	  disease	  ecologists	  and	   infectious	  disease	  specialists	  
clearly	   resented	   the	   encroachment	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   into	   their	   areas	   of	  
expertise,	  getting	  “increasingly	  irritated	  (4.3.1)”	  with	  the	  prominence	  of	  some	  of	  
the	  early	  climate-­‐malaria	  models	  and	  how	  they	  eventually	  embarked	  upon	  their	  
own	  research	  seeking	  to	  debunk	  the	  work	  of	  the	  mainstream	  CCH	  proponents.	  	  
In	   the	   intense	   and	   often	   hostile	   debates	   that	   ensued,	   there	   are	   numerous	  
instances	  of	   “accounting	   for	  error”	   (2.6.4),	  with	  explanations	  ranging	   from	  the	  
wrong	  choice	  of	  method	  (e.g.	  biological	  as	  opposed	  to	  statistical	  models	  or	  vice-­‐
versa)	   (4.3.2),	   lacking	   of	   the	   appropriate	   scientific	   expertise	   (e.g.	   an	  
epidemiologist	  instead	  of	  a	  biologist	  or	  ecologist)	  (4.3.4),	  choosing	  to	  work	  with	  
the	   “wrong”	   climate	   input	  data	   (4.4),	   or	   the	   “wrong”	  number	  of	   variables	   in	   a	  
model	  (4.5).	  	  	  
	  
In	   all	   facets	   of	   the	   controversy,	   there	   were	   even	   deeper	   factors	   at	   play:	   the	  
single-­‐most	  important	  determinant	  of	  “model	  fit”	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  preferences	  
of	   the	   person	   who	   conducted	   the	   work.	   	   Factors	   persistently	   driving	  
controversy	   in	   climate-­‐VBD	   research	   include	   subscription	   to	   different	  
disciplines,	  each	  with	  strong	  interests	  in	  protecting	  their	  “niches”,	  but	  also	  with	  
different	   standards	   of	   proof,	   methodological	   approaches,	   and	   norms	   of	  
interpretation	   (e.g.	   4.7.1).	   	   More	   profoundly,	   discipline	   also	   appears	   to	   have	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influenced	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  researchers	  have	  accepted	  (or	  not)	  the	  credibility	  
of	   data	   inputs	   from	  GCMs	   (e.g.	   4.4),	   as	  well	   as	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   researchers	  
view	   the	   future.	   	   Assumptions	   about	   socioeconomic	   “progress”	   and	   future	  
societal	   resilience	   have	   been	   implicitly	   incorporated	   into	   climate	   change-­‐
disease	   models,	   to	   varying	   effects.	   	   In	   the	   climate-­‐malaria	   controversy,	   for	  
example,	   CCH	   opponents	   have	   tended	   to	   assume	   that	   socioeconomic	  
circumstances	  would	  develop	  so	  as	  to	  mitigate	  any	  potential	  increase	  in	  malaria	  
transmission	   in	   the	   future	   due	   to	   climate	   change,	   whereas	   CCH	   proponents	  
assumed	   the	   opposite	   (4.3.4).	   	   Such	   assumptions	   are	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	   explicitly	  
mentioned	   in	   the	  scientific	   literature;	   instead,	   they	  are	   implicitly	   incorporated	  
into	   the	   technical	   design	   of	   models,	   such	   as	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	  
“presence”	  or	  “absence”	  points	  are	  defined	  (4.3.4,	  4.5).	  
	  
This	  hidden	  component	  of	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  is	  deeply	  significant.	  	  As	  
I	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  as	  a	  researcher	  with	  multiple	  identities,	  one	  objective	  
I	   have	   had	   for	   this	   research	   is	   to	   employ	   STS	   to	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   a	  
controversy	  that	  has	  baffled	  many	  in	  the	  field	  for	  many	  years.	  	  Identifying	  how	  
hidden	   socioeconomic	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   can	   affect	   climate-­‐disease	   model	  
outputs	  is	  an	  important	  contribution	  of	  this	  research	  because	  it	  introduces	  the	  
question:	  which	  future	  are	  we	  talking	  about?	  Are	  two	  competing	  models	  based	  
on	  the	  same	  climate	  scenarios	  and	  the	  same	  assumptions	  about	  socioeconomic	  
development?	   	   This,	   in	   turn,	   begins	   to	   open-­‐up	   these	   future-­‐orientated	  
assumptions	   to	   further	   deliberation	   rather	   than	   allowing	   a	   highly	   technical	  
debate	   about	   the	   possible	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   on	   disease	   spread	   to	  
obfuscate	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  assumptions	  exist.	  	  In	  varying	  public	  health	  contexts	  
(e.g.	  international,	  national,	  sub-­‐national),	  public	  health	  practitioners	  may	  then	  
also	   contemplate	  whether	   or	   not	   disease	  modellers	   are	   the	   best	   people	   to	   be	  
making	  inferences	  about	  how	  the	  future	  could	  evolve	  within	  their	  jurisdictions,	  
and	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   might	   want	   alternative	   forms	   of	   expertise	   to	   be	  
included	  in	  model-­‐making	  activities.	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Intriguingly,	   the	   possibility	   exists	   that	   multiple	   and	   potentially	   non-­‐
complementary	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   could	   be	   incorporated	   into	   the	   same	  
climate-­‐disease	  model,	  because	  GCM	  outputs	  are	  predicated	  on	  very	  particular	  
socioeconomic	  assumptions	  embedded	  in	  emissions	  scenarios	  (1.4),	  which	  may	  
well	  be	  at	  odds	  with	   the	  sorts	  of	  assumptions	   that	   some	  CCH	  modellers	  make	  
when	   they	   decide	   to	   emphasise	   or	   de-­‐emphasise	   future	   adaptive	   capacities	  
(4.7).	  	  For	  example,	  a	  climate-­‐disease	  model	  might	  based	  upon	  a	  SRES	  scenario	  
anticipating	  positive	  economic	  growth,	  even	  where	  other	  assumptions	  built	  into	  
the	  model	  contradict	  what	  one	  would	  generally	  expect	  to	  coincide	  with	  positive	  
economic	   growth	   (such	   as	   a	   diminished	   public	   health	   infrastructure).	   	   	   More	  
recent	   climate-­‐disease	   modelling	   projects	   tend	   to	   compare	   outcomes	   across	  
different	  SRES	  scenarios	  (e.g.	  Fischer	  et	  al,	  2011,	  van	  Lieshout	  et	  al,	  2004)	  and	  
some	  have	  argued	  about	   the	  need	   to	  better	   consider	  uncertainties	  and	  even	  a	  
broader	   range	   of	   SRES	   storylines	   when	   conducting	   climate	   change	   impacts	  
research	   (Arnell,	  2004,	  van	  Lieshout	  et	   al,	  2004),	  but	   they	  nonetheless	  do	  not	  
tend	   to	   assess	  whether	  different	   types	  of	   assumptions	   incorporated	   into	   their	  
models	  are	  contradictory.	   	  Examining	  this	  matter	  in	  greater	  detail	  was	  beyond	  
the	   scope	  of	   this	   thesis	  but	   could	  prove	   to	  be	  a	  productive	  avenue	   for	   further	  
research.	  	  	  
	  
At	  a	  broader	  level,	  there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  scope	  for	  much	  more	  STS	  research	  
examining	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   socioeconomic	   visions	   of	   the	   future	   are	  
incorporated	  in	  the	  production	  of	  climate	  change	  emissions	  scenarios.	  	  As	  noted	  
in	  1.3,	  the	  development	  of	  emissions	  scenarios	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  
“natural”	  scientists.	   	  Where	  studies	  have	  focused	  upon	  the	  limitations	  inherent	  
in	   climate	   change	   scenarios,	   even	   highlighting	   the	   need	   for	   considering	   a	  
broader	  range	  of	  potential	  socio-­‐economic	  futures,	  such	  arguments	  do	  not	  tend	  
to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   calls	   to	   incorporate	   complementary	   expertise,	   such	   as	  
demographers,	  social	  scientists,	  or	  economists,	   into	  the	  research	  (e.g.	  Arnell	  et	  
al,	   2004).	   This	   appears	   to	   remain	   the	   case	   for	   a	   new	   process	   aimed	   at	  
developing	  “the	  next	  generation”	  of	  climate	  change	  scenarios	  (Moss	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  
for	  which	   it	   is	  noteworthy	   that	   IPCC	  –	  perhaps	   to	   avoid	   controversy	  and	   thus	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any	   further	   loss	   of	   credibility	   –	   has	   decided	   to	   not	   formally	   lead	   the	   current	  
ongoing	  process	  aimed	  at	  producing	  a	  next	  generation	  of	  emissions	  scenarios.	  	  
This	  process	  is	  nonetheless	  being	  driven,	  once	  again,	  by	  natural	  scientists	  (e.g.	  
R6).	  	  	  As	  the	  outputs	  from	  this	  process	  will	  inform	  a	  whole	  generation	  of	  climate	  
change	   impact	  models	   as	  well	   as	   IPCC	   assessments,	   climate	   change	   scenarios	  
can	  be	  expected	  to	  remain	  a	  key	  site	  of	  co-­‐production	  in	  climate	  change	  science	  
and	   politics.	   	   They	   therefore	   remain	   a	   particularly	   interesting	   area	   for	   STS	  
intervention,	  with	  many	  pertinent	  questions	  to	  pursue:	  what	  is	  the	  relationship	  
between	   the	  mainstream	   political	   order	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   content	   of	  
these	   scenarios?	   	   How	   are	   certain	   worldviews	   –	   held	   by	   key	   actors	   in	   the	  
scenario	   development	   process	   –	   embedded	   in	   and	   further	   constituted	   by	  
“downstream”	  climate	  change	  impacts	  research?	  	  Which	  visions	  of	  the	  future	  do	  
these	  models	  include	  and	  exclude	  and	  with	  which	  consequences?	  
	  
Controversial	  contexts	  
Climate	   change	   impacts	   models,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   through	   the	   climate-­‐VBD	  
controversies	  depicted	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  were	  not	  simply	  amenable	  to	  controversy	  
because	  of	  personal	  animosities	  between	  groups	  of	   researchers	   from	  different	  
disciplines.	   	   The	   contexts	   within	   which	   such	   models	   are	   produced	   and	  
warranted	  have	  also	  fostered	  and	  even	  helped	  to	  sustain	  controversy	  (and	  they	  
have	  clearly	  also	  played	  a	  role	   in	  constituting	  the	   interests	  of	   these	  competing	  
groups).	   	   I	   am	   specifically	   referring	   to	   both	   the	   evidential	   and	   the	   political	  
contexts	  within	  which	  CCH	  research	  takes	  place.	   	  The	  evidential	  context,	  as	  we	  
have	  seen	  (4.7.2),	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  future-­‐orientated	  science	  using	  data	  
outputs	  as	  inputs	  is	  quite	  far	  along	  on	  the	  “uncertainty	  cascade”.	  	  Should	  parties	  
disagree,	   there	   are	   many	   potential	   battlegrounds	   for	   a	   scientific	   controversy.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  such	  a	  problematic	  evidential	  context	  exists	  
is	  because	  the	  “political”	  context	  of	  CCH	  research	  necessitates	  future-­‐modelling	  
in	  the	  first	  place	  (e.g.	  1.4).	  	  The	  political	  context	  also	  serves	  to	  raise	  the	  stakes	  of	  
the	   controversy,	   because	   controlling	   the	   “scientific”	   argument	   means	   having	  
greater	   sway	   in	   the	   “political”	   decisions	   that	   are	   made	   and	   implemented,	  
including	   the	   allocation	   of	   limited	   resources	   for	   infectious	   disease	   control	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(4.7.1).	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  an	  organisation	  like	  
IPCC	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   that	   a	   controversy	   will	   be	   amplified,	   for	   IPCC	  
offers	  a	  government-­‐vetted	  and	  high-­‐profile	  arena	  for	  turning	  certain	  scientific	  
claims	   into	  “truth”	  (4.7.5,	  5.2).	   	  Actors	   in	  a	  controversy	  clearly	  understand	  the	  
value	  in	  “owning”	  an	  IPCC	  assessment	  process,	  for	  working	  as	  a	  CLA	  or	  LA	  has	  
an	   important	   impact	   upon	   how	   a	   scientific	   issue	  will	   be	   presented	   –	   often	   as	  
“consensus”	  –	  by	  IPCC	  (5.2,	  5.3).	   	   In	  turn,	   the	  reach	  of	   IPCC	  reports	   is	  perhaps	  
increasingly	   broad,	   influencing	   scientific	   disciplines	   as	  well	   as	   policy	   contexts	  
(Vasileiadou	  et	  al,	  2011).	  
	  
I	   will	   return	   to	   the	   role	   of	   consensus	   in	   IPCC	   assessments	   below,	   but	   before	  
doing	  so	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  climate-­‐VBD	  controversy	  described	  in	  
this	   thesis	   has	   been	   largely	   played	   out	   by	   “reputable”	   scientists;	   this	   is	   not	   a	  
controversy	   driven	   by	   full-­‐time	   special	   interests	   groups.	   	   David	   Rogers	   and	  
Sarah	   Randolph	  were	   both	   professors	   at	   Oxford	   (they	   have	   recently	   retired),	  
and	   even	   if	   some	   CCH	   proponents	   have	   accused	   the	  most	   radical	   of	   the	   CCH	  
opponents,	   Paul	   Reiter,	   of	   having	   received	   money	   from	   the	   oil	   lobby1,	   he	  
nonetheless	  has	  a	  PhD	  in	  entomology	  and	  has	  held	  posts	  at	  the	  US	  CDC	  and	  the	  
Pasteur	  Institute	  in	  Paris.	  	  The	  larger	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  Chapters	  
4	  &	  5	  offers	  an	   important	  counter-­‐point	  to	  the	  “Merchants	  of	  Doubt”	  thesis,	   in	  
which	   it	   has	   been	   convincingly	   demonstrated	   that	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   advocacy	  
groups	   have	   systematically	   deployed	   strategies	   designed	   to	   delegitimise	   the	  
science	   underpinning	   climate	   change,	   often	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   protecting	   their	  
(economic)	   interests	   and	   disrupting	   policy	   processes	   that	   might	   have	   led	   to	  
binding	   limits	   of	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   (Oreskes	   and	   Conway,	   2010).	  	  
Jasanoff	   has	   recently	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   “bandwagon	   effect”	   around	   this	  
thesis	   in	  climate	  change	  and	  even	  social	  science	  communities	  (Jasanoff,	  2012).	  	  
If	   this	   is	   true,	   then	   the	  Merchants	  of	  Doubt	   thesis	  may	  have	   already	  become	  a	  
convenient	  truth	  for	  supporters	  of	  climate	  change,	  for	  it	  enables	  them	  to	  assert	  
that	   consensus	   about	   climate	   change	   would	   have	   existed	   were	   it	   not	   for	   the	  
                                                
1	  Refer	  to	  note	  85	  in	  section	  4.2.	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special	   interests	   groups.	   	   This	   could	   have	   the	   unfortunate	   consequence	   of	  
preventing	  more	  critical	  (and	  self-­‐critical)	  and	  nuanced	  analyses	  of	  why	  there	  is	  
disagreement	  about	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (e.g.	  Hulme,	  2009).	  	  	  
	  
I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  challenge	  the	  central	  premise	  of	  Merchants	  of	  Doubt,	  but	  simply	  
to	  stress	  that	  it	  offers	  only	  one	  of	  many	  sides	  of	  the	  story.	  	  The	  side	  of	  the	  story	  
presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  “real”	  scientists	  might	  also	  disagree	  
with	   each	   other,	   for	   very	   understandable	   reasons,	   not	   only	   about	  whether	   or	  
not	  climate	  change	  exists	  but	  also	  –	  perhaps	  even	  more	  importantly	  given	  that	  
most	   scientists	   do	   accept	   that	   climate	   change	   is	   “real”	   and	   occurring	   –	   about	  
whether	   or	   not	   some	   of	   the	   potential	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   are	   worth	  
bothering	   about.	   	   These	   sorts	   of	   disagreements	   offer	   a	   productive	   avenue	   for	  
additional	  STS	  research,	  as	  does	  further	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  exploration	  of	  
the	   implications	  of	  how	  (and	  by	  whom)	   the	   reputability	  of	  various	  actors	   in	  a	  
given	  climate	  change	  controversy	  is	  co-­‐constructed.	  	  Differentiating	  “reputable”	  
from	   “disreputable”,	   and	   by	   extension	   “insider”	   or	   “outsider”,	   will	   doubtless	  
continue	   to	   be	   a	   key	   area	   of	   activity	   for	   those	   institutions,	   like	   IPCC,	   that	   are	  
working	  to	  police	  the	  boundaries	  and	  contents	  of	  climate	  science.	  
	  
Fixing	  and	  formalising	  the	  IPCC	  
As	  it	  patrols	  the	  immensely	  complex	  and	  rapidly	  evolving	  climate	  change	  world,	  
IPCC	  needs	   to	  be	   careful	   that	   its	  work	  does	  not	   come	   to	  be	   seen	  as	  partial	   or	  
inaccurate.	  	  One	  of	  the	  principal	  objectives	  for	  this	  thesis	  (2.5.3)	  was	  to	  use	  the	  
insights	   from	   a	   study	   of	   the	   CCH	   community	   and	   the	   controversies	   that	   they	  
were	   involved	   in	   to	  reflect	  upon	  what	   this	  means	   for	   the	  credibility	  of	  climate	  
change	  science	  and	  politics	  more	  generally	  –	  a	  topic	  much	  in	  discussion	  in	  the	  
wake	  of	  Climategate	  (5.1)	  (e.g.	  Prins	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  IAC,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  
Recall	   that	   IPCC,	   as	   it	   was	   noted	   earlier,	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   long	   history	   of	  
climate	   change	   politics	   and	   diplomacy	   and	   its	   principles	   and	   assessment	  
processes	   have	   been	   established	   to	   “straddle	   the	   demands	   for	   scientific	  
credibility	   and	   international	   political	   legitimacy	   (Agrawala,	   1999:	   158)”.	   	   The	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IPCC	  “performs	  a	  mix	  of	  functions,	  part	  scientific	  assessment,	  part	  policy	  advice,	  
and	  part	  diplomacy	  –	   that	  demand	  external,	   as	  well	  as	   internal,	  accountability	  
(Jasanoff,	  2010:	  696)”.	   	   In	   its	  own	  rhetoric,	   IPCC	  strives	   to	  be	   “policy-­‐relevant	  
and	  yet	  policy-­‐neutral,	  never	  policy-­‐prescriptive”.2	  
	  
As	   should	   be	   clear	   by	   now,	   it	   is	   no	   easy	   feat	   to	   maintain	   an	   untarnished	  
reputation	   as	   an	   honest	   broker	   for	   a	   highly	   uncertain	   and	   politicised	   science,	  
especially	   when	   so	   many	   prominent	   stakeholders	   are	   openly	   antagonistic	  
towards	   it.	   	   Unfortunately	   for	   IPCC,	   its	   complicated	   history,	   organisation	   and	  
processes	  (5.2)	  –	  and	  the	  complicated	  science	  that	  it	  is	  assessing	  (5.3)	  –	  create	  
many	  possibilities	  for	  critique.	  	  Foremost	  among	  them	  has	  been	  the	  selection	  of	  
writing	  teams	  and	  experts	  and	  the	  peer	  review	  process	  (IAC,	  2010),	  all	  of	  which	  
exert	  a	  strong	   influence	  on	  the	  production	  of	   the	  content	  of	   IPCC	  Assessments	  
(5.2,	   5.3).	   	   As	   John	   R.	   Christy,	   a	   former	   IPCC	   Lead	   Author	   for	   TAR,	   recently	  
argued	  in	  an	  opinion	  piece	  in	  Nature	  entitled	  “IPCC:	  cherish	  it,	  tweak	  it	  or	  scrap	  
it?”:	  
	  
Selected	  lead	  authors	  have	  the	  last	  word	  in	  the	  review	  cycle	  and	  so	  control	  the	  
message,	   often	   ignoring	   or	   marginalizing	   dissenting	   comments.	   	   ‘Consensus’	  
and	  manufactured-­‐confidence	  ensued	  (Hulme	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  732).	  
	  
The	   manner	   in	   which	   climate-­‐VBD	   controversies	   were	   represented	   by	   IPCC	  
assessments,	   notably	   TAR	   and	   AR4,	   confirms	   that	   the	   composition	   of	   writing	  
teams	  significantly	   impacts	   the	  tone	  and	  content	  of	   the	   final	   text	  (5.3.3,	  5.3.4).	  	  
This	   raises	   some	   issues	   that	   require	   further	  discussion.	   	   The	   first	   is	   that	   if	   its	  
assessments	  were	  truly	  “scientific”,	  as	   IPCC	  would	   like	  to	  claim	  (e.g.	   “IPCC	  is	  a	  
scientific	   body”3),	   then	   the	  perspective	   of	   selected	   lead	   authors	   should	  hardly	  
matter	  at	  all:	  
	  
The	   conviction	   that	   science	   speaks	  objectively	   and	  disinterestedly	  means	   that	  
one	  need	  have	  no	  qualms	  about	  excluding	  other	  people	   from	  decision-­‐making	  
                                                
2	  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml,	  accessed	  March	  5,	  2012.	  
3	  http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml,	  accessed	  March	  5,	  2012.	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since	  they	  would,	  in	  any	  event,	  have	  arrived	  at	  the	  same	  conclusions	  as	  oneself	  
(emphasis	  removed)	  (Yearley,	  1996a:	  118).	  
	  	  
Clearly,	   however,	   climate	   science	   is	   neither	   objective	   nor	   disinterested,	   and	  
neither	   are	   IPCC	   assessments.	   	   One	   of	   the	   frequently	   cited	   challenges	  
surrounding	   IPCC	   assessments	   has	   been	   that	   it	   can	   be	   hard	   to	   meet	   the	  
requirements	  for	  gender	  and	  nationality	  balance	  among	  writing	  teams	  and	  still	  
maintain	  a	  high	  scientific	  standard.	  	  In	  recent	  discussions	  about	  fixing	  the	  IPCC,	  
suggestions	   for	   overcoming	   this	   problem	   tend	   to	   include	   improving	   the	  
transparency	  with	  which	  writing	  teams	  are	  selected	  (IAC,	  2010).	  	  This	  is	  at	  least	  
sensible	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  IPCC,	  for	  it	  would	  help	  allay	  concerns	  that	  IPCC	  
dream-­‐teams	   are	   being	   concocted	   by	   the	   IPCC	   secretariat.	   	   Somewhat	   more	  
radical	  are	  the	  periodic	  calls	  to	  abolish	  these	  criteria	  altogether	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
better	   science.	   	   As	   Jeff	   Price,	   a	   lead	   author	   in	   TAR	   and	   AR4	   and	   director	   of	  
climate	   change	   adaptation	   at	   the	   World	   Wildlife	   Fund,	   wrote	   in	   the	   same	  
aforementioned	  Nature	  opinion	  article:	  
	  
Given	   the	   importance	  placed	  on	   these	   assessments,	   the	  most	   senior	  positions	  
should	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  nominees	  most	  expert	  in	  the	  field,	  regardless	  of	  balance	  
(Hulme	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  732).	  
	  
This,	  I	  would	  argue,	  would	  do	  little	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  “scientific”	  credibility	  of	  
an	   IPCC	   assessment	   but	  much	   to	   damage	   its	   “political”	   legitimacy,	   for	   such	   a	  
stance	   is	   ahistorical	   –	   it	   neglects	   the	   many	   previous	   times	   that	   “southern”	  
countries	   have	   felt	   misrepresented	   by	   “northern”	   technocratic	  
conceptualisations	  of	   climate	   change	   (e.g.	  Agrawal	  and	  Narain,	  1991).	   	  Under-­‐
represented	   nations	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   be	  much	   less	   likely	   to	   buy-­‐in	   to	   IPCC	  
conclusions	   and,	   potentially,	   UN	   climate	   change	   processes	   more	   generally.	  	  
Recall	   that	   one	   of	   the	   very	   reasons	   for	   establishing	   IPCC	   was	   to	   engage	   UN	  
Member	  States	  in	  climate	  change	  decision-­‐making	  (5.2).	   	  Should	  the	  IPCC	  wish	  
to	  alter	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  selects	  authors,	  it	  might	  instead	  consider	  broadening	  
selection	   criteria	   to	   ensure	   that	   different	   disciplines	   and	   perspectives	   are	  
considered	  alongside	  nationality	   and	  gender.	   	   Such	   a	   solution	  would	   certainly	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not	  ease	   the	  assessment	  process,	  but	   it	   could	  help	   to	  make	   it	   somewhat	  more	  
robust.	  	  Thus	  far,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  (e.g.	  5.3),	  the	  IPCC	  has	  tended	  to	  run	  with	  its	  
stronger	  allies,	  which	  makes	  it	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  claims	  that	  is	  not	  impartial.	  	  
	  
It	   should,	   however,	   be	   questioned	   whether	   implementing	   stricter	   authorship	  
selection	  criteria	  or,	  more	  broadly,	  establishing	  stricter	  assessment	  processes,	  is	  
a	   useful	   approach	   for	   shoring-­‐up	   the	   credibility	   of	   IPCC.	   	   That	   the	   debate	   has	  
been	  restricted	  to	  such	  matters	  seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  continued	  belief	  that	  if	  only	  
the	  IPCC	  were	  to	  act	  (and	  be	  perceived)	  more	  scientifically,	   then	   its	  credibility	  
issues	   will	   disappear.	   	   It	   is	   telling,	   for	   example,	   that	   the	   IAC	   Committee	   that	  
reviewed	   IPCC	   consisted	   of	   10	   scientists	   and	   2	   economists	   (Appendix	   E,	   IAC,	  
2010)	  who	  were	  given	  the	  mandate	  of	  reviewing	  the	  “processes	  and	  procedures	  
of	  IPCC”.	  	  Thus	  IAC	  advice	  to	  IPCC	  consists	  of	  items	  like:	  appointing	  an	  Executive	  
Committee	   and	   Executive	   Director;	   ensuring	   that	   Review	   Editors	   are	   more	  
forceful	   during	   the	   review	   process	   (which	   itself	   should	   be	   tightened	   up);	  
developing	   a	   comprehensive	   communications	   strategy	   that	   would	   emphasise	  
transparency	  and	  provide	  guidelines	  for	  determining,	  among	  other	  things,	  who	  
can	  speak	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  IPCC	  (IAC,	  2010).	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   not	   difficult	   to	   see	   that	   these	   are	   pragmatic	   suggestions,	   because	   in	  
following	   them	   IPCC	   assessments	  would	   at	   least	   appear	   to	   be	  more	   thorough	  
and	  formal.	  	  Yet	  one	  is	  left	  wondering	  why	  IAC	  appears	  to	  have	  not	  more	  deeply	  
contemplated	   the	  much	  messier	   contexts	   within	   which	   IPCC	   assessments	   are	  
conducted.	  	  Recall	  from	  5.2	  that	  IPCC	  has	  tweaked	  its	  procedures	  throughout	  its	  
history	   but,	   despite	   this,	   subsequent	   IPCC	   assessments	   have,	   if	   anything,	  
become	   more	   heavily	   contested.	   	   As	   demonstrated	   in	   5.3,	   regardless	   of	   how	  
assessment	   procedures	   are	   drawn	   up,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   in	   which	   they	   can	  
eliminate	  the	  human	  component	  that	  is	  so	  central	  to	  assessment-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making.	  	  
Nobody	  can	  determine	  who	  the	  best	  expert	   in	  a	  field	  is	  without	  enrolling	  their	  
own	  perspectives	  and	  interests;	  there	  will	  always	  be	  the	  possible	  criticism	  that	  
the	  selection	  of	  a	  writing	  team	  has	  been	  impartial.	  	  How,	  for	  example,	  would	  one	  
select	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  expert	  from	  a	  highly	  polarised	  field,	  such	  as	  climate-­‐VBD	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research?	   	   Similarly,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  a	  Review	  Editor	  might	  determine	  what	  
counts	  as	  “the	  most	  significant	  review	  issues	  (IAC,	  2010:	  19)”	  is	  also	  dependent	  
upon	   contingent	   human	   judgements.	   	   As	   such,	   parallel	   to	   the	   perils	   that	  
surround	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  the	  Merchants	  of	  Doubt	  thesis,	  undue	  attention	  to	  
processes	   and	   procedures	   might	   have	   the	   unintended	   consequence	   of	  
preventing	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   credibility	   of	   climate	   change	   science	   is	  
neither	   fully	   dependent	   upon,	   nor	   can	   be	   fully	   reduced	   to,	   the	   types	   of	  
organisations	  and	  procedures	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  assess	  it.	  
	  
Consensus	  and	  the	  “assessment	  paradox”	  
To	  elaborate	  upon	  why	  this	  is	  problematic,	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  consider	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  IPCC	  presents	  “its	  reports	  to	  the	  world	  as	  the	   ‘consensus’	  view	  of	  the	  
leading	  climate	  change	  experts	  of	  the	  world	  (Hulme,	  2008:	  9)”.	  	  Although	  some	  
have	   accused	   IPCC	   of	   delivering	   conservative	   versions	   of	   “consensus”,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   IPCC	   itself	   does	   not	   necessitate	   this.	   	   Recall	  
from	   5.2	   that	   the	   IPCC	  Principles	   state:	   “It	   is	   important	   that	   Reports	   describe	  
different	  (possibly	  controversial)	  scientific,	  technical,	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  views	  
on	  a	  subject,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  policy	  debate	  (IPCC,	  1999)”.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   lost	   on	   IPCC	   authors.	   	   As	   one	   interviewee,	   a	   Coordinating	   Lead	  
Author	  for	  the	  upcoming	  AR5,	  noted:	  
	  
R1:	   As	   I	   understand	   the	   IPCC,	   its	   purpose	   is	   to	   provide	   some	   assistance	   to	  
policy	  makers	   by	   assessing	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	   science.	   So	   if	   the	   current	  
state	  of	  the	  science	  is	  polarised	  or	  if	  there’s	  serious	  disagreement	  then	  I	  would	  
have	  thought	  the	  IPCC	  would	  be	  doing	  its	  job	  to	  represent	  that.	  
	  
It	   is	   thus	   somewhat	   strange	   that	   so	   much	   importance	   in	   climate	   change	  
discourse	   continues	   to	   be	   attached	   to	   “consensus”	   (e.g.	   Oreskes,	   2004).	  	  
Certainly,	  of	  course,	  consensus	  is	  an	  eminently	  useful	  tool,	  perfectly	  amenable	  to	  
the	  wide	   range	   of	   settings,	   variably	   “scientific”	   or	   “political”,	   in	  which	   climate	  
science	   and	   IPCC	   assessments	   are	   mobilised.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   “consensus”	   on	  
climate	   change	   has	   often	   been	   praised	   for	   facilitating	   a	   global	   agreement,	  
however	  weak,	   about	   stabilising	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	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idea	   of	   consensus	   needs	   to	   be	   problematised.	   	   As	   Gilbert	   and	   Mulkay	  
convincingly	  observed	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  ago:	  
	   	  
...participants’	   consensus	   accounts	   are	   highly	   variable	   and	   ...	   their	  meaning	   is	  
linked	   to	   the	   interpretative	  situation	   in	  which	   they	  occur...	   it	  appears	   that,	   for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  sociological	  analysis,	  a	  given	  field	  at	  a	  particular	  point	   in	  time	  
cannot	  be	  said	  to	  exhibit	  a	  specifiable	  degree	  of	  consensus.	  	  Rather,	  the	  field	  must	  
be	  said	  to	  exhibit	  varying	  degrees	  of	  consensus,	  depending	  on	  the	  discourse	  of	  
those	  involved	  (original	  emphasis)	  (Gilbert	  and	  Mulkay,	  1984:	  140)	  
	  
This	  observation	  appears	  to	  be	  particularly	  well-­‐suited	  for	  analyses	  of	  science-­‐
policy	   interactions	   in	   climate	   change	   arenas.	   	   In	   their	   study	   of	   the	   surprising	  
stability	   throughout	   time	   of	   the	   consensus-­‐estimate	   range	   for	   climate	   change	  
(1.5	  °C	  to	  4.5	  °C),	  van	  der	  Sluijs,	  van	  Eijndhoven,	  Shackley	  and	  Wynne	  noted	  of	  
IPCC:	  
	  
It	  has	  become	  an	  elaborate	   international	  means	   for	  securing	  consensus	   in	   the	  
case	  for	  climate	  policy,	  although	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘consensus’	  commonly	  employed	  
is	  not	  straightforward.	  	  For	  instance,	  precisely	  what	  ‘knowledge’	  is	  the	  object	  of	  
that	  widely	  proclaimed	  consensus	  is	  open	  to	  debate	  (van	  der	  Sluijs	  et	  al,	  1998:	  
293).	  
	  
For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	   thesis,	   the	  most	   significant	   aspect	   of	   their	   analysis	   is	  
that	  the	  consensus-­‐estimate	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  tacit	  agreement	  among	  a	  wide	  
constellation	  of	  scientists	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  which	  enabled	  local	  interpretative	  
flexibility	  but	  also	  constrained	  the	  possible	  discourse.	  	  This	  restraining	  function	  
still	   appears	   to	   exist.	   For	   example,	   multiple	   interviewees	   reflected	   upon	   the	  
problem	  that	  although	  many	  climate	  scientists	  now	  believe	   that	   the	   trajectory	  
for	   climate	   change	   is	   well	   beyond	   the	   climate	   sensitivity	   range,	   this	   is	   not	  
something	  that	  is	  acceptable	  for	  discussion	  in	  the	  negotiating	  realm,	  such	  as	  at	  
the	  COP	  meetings	  (e.g.	  R6,	  R22).	  	  
	  
	  If	  it	  is	  indeed	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  the	  (perhaps	  increasing)	  tendency	  to	  err	  on	  
the	   side	   of	   caution	   and	   avoid	   “reaching	   conclusions	   which	   are	   at	   all	  
controversial	  (Van	  der	  Sluijs	  et	  al.,	  1998:	  314)”	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  “lowest	  common	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denominator”	  approach	  –	  then	  there	  is	  the	  real	  risk	  that	  IPCC	  assessments	  will	  
lose	  their	  policy	  relevance.	  	  This	  might	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  assessment	  paradox.	  	  
Assessments	   are	   conducted	   to	  provide	  policy-­‐makers	  with	   the	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  
in	   a	   given	   discipline,	   and	   yet	   owing	   to	   the	   perceived	   demands	   of	   the	   policy	  
world	   for	   certainty,	   they	   can	   easily	   tend	   towards	   banal,	   generally	   agreeable	  
statements	   that	   can	   be	   made	   with	   high	   confidence.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  
information	   most	   needed	   may	   well	   be	   the	   opposite:	   radical	   statements	   with	  
lower	  degrees	  of	  confidence.	  Recent	  pieces	  in	  Science	  and	  Climatic	  Change	  have	  
alluded	  to	  this	  (even	  if	  they	  have	  been	  written	  by	  scientists	  who	  firmly	  believe	  
in	  the	  concept	  of	  “consensus”):	  
	  
With	   the	   general	   credibility	   of	   the	   science	   of	   climate	   change	   established,	   it	   is	  
now	   equally	   important	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   understand	   the	   more	   extreme	  
possibilities	  that	  consensus	  may	  exclude	  or	  downplay...	  
	  
...	  increased	  transparency,	  including	  a	  thorough	  narrative	  report	  on	  the	  range	  of	  
views	   expressed	   by	   panel	   members,	   emphasizing	   areas	   of	   disagreement	   that	  
arose	  during	   the	   assessment,	  would	  provide	   a	  more	   robust	   evaluation	   of	   risk	  
(Oppenheimer	  et	  al.,	  2007:	  1506).	  
	  
In	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  IPCC’s	  emphasis	  on	  consensus	  was	  necessary,	  and	  
has	  served	  to	  help	  shift	  public	  opinion.	  	  Going	  forward,	  governments	  now	  need	  
careful	   assessments	   of	   the	   relative	   risks	   and	   impacts	   of	   costs.	   	   Treatment	   of	  
uncertainty	  will	  become	  more	   important	   than	  consensus	   if	   the	   IPCC	   is	   to	  stay	  
relevant	  to	  the	  decisions	  that	  face	  us	  (Webster,	  2009).	  
	  
The	   IAC	   (2010)	   review	   of	   IPCC	   specifically	   addressed	   the	   articulation	   of	  
uncertainty	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   examination	   of	   the	   activities	   of	  WGII	   in	   AR4.	   	   It	  
highlighted	   some	   instances	   in	   which	   statements	   were	   made	   with	   “high	  
confidence”	   even	   where	   limited	   evidence	   appeared	   to	   be	   available.	   	   The	  
recommendation	   was	   to	   improve	   transparency	   and	   make	   use	   of	   a	   “level-­‐of-­‐
understanding”	  scale,	  which	  states	  the	  degree	  of	  agreement	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  
evidence	   (e.g.	   high	   agreement	   and	   much	   evidence;	   low	   agreement	   and	   much	  
evidence;	  high	  agreement	  and	  limited	  evidence;	  etc.).	  	  Leaving	  aside	  the	  obvious	  
subjectivity	   related	   to	   the	   use	   of	   such	   a	   scale,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   full	  
transparency	  and	  the	  full	  representation	  of	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  uncertainties	  and	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viewpoints	   is	   unlikely	   to	   occur	   unless	   IPCC	   becomes	   more	   open	   about	   its	  
intrinsically	   “hybrid”	   nature.	   	   I	   do	   not	   simply	   mean	   that	   IPCC	   would	   more	  
readily	  admit	  that	  its	  activities	  are	  both	  scientific	  and	  political,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  
would	  take	  seriously	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  research	  it	  is	  assessing	  is	  also	  inherently	  
scientific	   and	   political.	   	   Here	   the	   discussion	   about	   the	   incorporation	   of	  
alternative	   socio-­‐economic	   visions	   into	   climate-­‐VBD	   models	   is	   once	   again	  
particularly	   instructive	   (4.7,	   5.3.3,	   5.3.4).	   	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   controversy	  
over	  the	  possible	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  on	  dengue	  or	  malaria	  transmission	  
is	  particularly	  intractable,	  but	  also	  that	  one	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  controversy	  
is	   that	   competing	   models	   can	   have	   very	   different	   assumptions	   about	   future	  
socioeconomic	   circumstances	   and	   thus,	   by	   association,	   disease	   control	  
competencies.	  	  Rather	  than	  present	  somewhat	  muted	  and	  distorted	  versions	  of	  
the	  controversy	   in	   the	  health	  chapter,	   IPCC	  might	  be	  better	  off	   simply	  coming	  
clean	  on	  why	  the	  different	  models	  differ.	   	   Ironically,	   this	  might	  have	  made	   the	  
entire	  content	  more	  palatable	  to	  CCH	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  alike,	  since	  it	  
could	   create	   space	   for	   both	   viewpoints.	   	   Presenting	   “consensus”,	   meanwhile,	  
particularly	  where	  the	  underlying	  science	  is	  heavily	  contested,	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	   triply	   undermine	   the	   IPCC.	   	   First,	   because	   consensus	   often	   does	   not	   exist.	  
Second,	   because	   it	   is	   debatable	   that	   consensus	   statements	   are	  of	  much	  use	   to	  
policy-­‐makers:	   a	   statement	   of	   consensus	   conceals	   differences	   of	   opinion	   and	  
provides	  no	  information	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  minority	  opinions	  have	  been	  
considered.	  	  As	  Beatty	  &	  Moore	  (2010:	  211)	  have	  commented:	  
	  
The	  very	  transparency	  that	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  scientific	  authority	  –	  by	  
revealing	  a	  lack	  of	  unanimity	  –	  is	  actually	  a	  requirement	  for	  authority.	  	  It	  is	  the	  
unanimity	   requirement	   that	   is	   the	   problem.	   	   What	   we	   want	   to	   know	   is	   that	  
there	  was	  indeed	  disagreement,	  even	  to	  the	  end,	  but	  that	  by	  its	  own	  account	  the	  
minority	  was	  heard.	  
	  
It	   is	  perfectly	   reasonable	   for	   “experts”	   to	   review	   the	   same	  body	  of	  knowledge	  
and,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  science,	  come	  to	  different	  conclusions.	  	  Presenting	  a	  greater	  
range	   of	   scientific	   findings	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   assumptions	   upon	   which	   they	   are	  
based)	   might	   force	   organisations	   like	   IPCC	   to	   uncomfortably	   embrace	   their	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“hybridity”,	  but	  this	  would	  also	  enable	  them	  to	  achieve	  a	  degree	  of	  “purification”	  
(Latour,	   1993)	   –	   and	   thus	   credibility	   –	   otherwise	   not	   possible.	   	   It	  would	   also	  
leave	  more	   choice	   for	   a	   would-­‐be	   policy-­‐maker,	   thereby	  making	   assessments	  
somewhat	  more	   policy-­‐relevant	   and	   somewhat	  more	   policy-­‐neutral.	   	   It	   is	   the	  
opposite	   tactic	   –	   the	   “boundary	   protection”	   approach	   –	   which	   is	   more	  
problematic.	   	   David	   Guston	   (2000)	   famously	   coined	   the	   term	   “boundary	  
organization”,	   but	   it	   has	   been	   quite	   rightly	   pointed	   out	   that	   this	  
conceptualisation	   tends	   to	   reinforce	   rather	   than	  disintegrate	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  
worlds	   of	   science	   and	   politics	   are	   separate	   (Miller,	   2004).	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	  
concept	   is	   influential	   and	   indeed	   it	   is	   not	   hard	   to	   imagine	   that	   IPCC	   has	  
embraced	   it,	   perceiving	   as	   one	   of	   its	   key	   roles	   a	   certain	   policing	   of	   the	  
boundaries	  between	  science	  and	  the	  political	  contexts	  that	  influence	  how	  and	  in	  
which	  ways	  science	  is	  understood.	  	  Indefinitely	  maintaining	  such	  boundaries	  is	  
however	  a	  task	  bound	  for	  failure:	  for	  a	  topic	  as	  influential,	  uncertain,	  and	  high-­‐
profile	   as	   climate	   change,	   there	   are	   simply	   too	   many	   opportunities	   for	  
“impurities”	  to	  surface.	  	  
	  
It	  is,	  of	  course,	  somewhat	  simpler	  to	  continue	  to	  assert	  that	  science	  and	  politics	  
are	   separate,	   and	   to	   blame	   their	   intermingling	   for	   any	   controversies	   (or	  
absences	   of	   unanimity)	   that	   arise:	   “When	   politics	   gets	   into	   science	   the	   truth	  
tends	   to	   go	   out	   the	   window	   (R4)”.	   In	   an	   Ecologist	   article	   entitled	   “Beyond	  
Climategate:	   can	   we	   keep	   the	   politics	   and	   science	   of	   climate	   forecasting	  
separate?”,	   Vicky	   Pope,	   head	   of	   climate	   science	   advice	   at	   the	   UK	   Met	   Office,	  
asserts	  the	  role	  for	  climate	  science:	  	  
	  
Our	  role	  is	  simply	  to	  supply	  objective	  evidence	  and	  to	  represent	  the	  uncertainty	  
inherent	   in	   the	  scientific	  process.	   It	   isn’t	  a	  question	  of	  right	  and	  wrong,	  but	  of	  
trying	  to	  give	  a	  balanced	  assessment	  of	  what	  is	  certain	  and	  uncertain	  (quoted	  in	  
Rees,	  2011).	  
	  
Should	  this	  type	  of	  idealistic	  thinking	  continue	  to	  be	  prevalent	  in	  climate	  change	  
and	  climate	  change	  impacts	  communities,	  then	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  suspect	  
that	   climate	   change	   will	   continue	   to	   face	   a	   crisis	   of	   credibility.	   	   The	   deeply	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political,	   controversial	   and	   uncertain	   nature	   of	   climate	   change	   research	   has	  
meant	   that	   time	   and	   time	   again,	   the	   rhetorically	   neat	   and	   tidy	   distinction	  
between	  climate	  change	  science	  and	  politics	  has	  been	  exposed	  for	  the	  falsehood	  
that	   it	   is.	   	   The	   IPCC	  and	   the	   current	  paradigm	  of	   “warranting”	   climate	   change	  
science	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   this	   dynamic,	   for	   its	   high	   visibility	   and	  
complicated	  procedures	  act	  as	  a	  magnifying	  glass	  through	  which	  any	  interested	  
party	   can	   identify	   the	   contradictions	   between	   an	   official	   statement	   and	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  it	  was	  produced.	   	  As	  one	  interviewee	  reflected,	  the	  IPCC	  was	  
established	   “to	   take	   the	   science	   out	   of	   the	   negotiations,	   so	   that	   you	   can	   craft	  
some	  agreements	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  science	  (R22)”.	  	  Instead,	  inevitably,	  IPCC	  
assessments	   have	   exposed	   to	   the	  world	   the	   insight	   that	   scientific	   agreements	  
conform	  to	  politics	  just	  as	  political	  agreements	  conform	  to	  science.	  	  Pretending	  
otherwise	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   causal	   than	   a	   mitigating	   factor	   of	   the	   next	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Appendix	  1.	  Unpublished	  letter	  submitted	  to	  Science	  in	  2000	  
in	  response	  to	  “The	  Global	  Spread	  of	  Malaria	  in	  a	  Future,	  
Warmer	  World”	  (Martens	  et	  al,	  2000).	  
 
In	  their	  report	  “The	  Global	  Spread	  of	  Malaria	  in	  a	  Future,	  Warmer	  World”	  (1),	  Rogers	  
and	  Randolph	  (2000)	  favour	  a	  statistical	  modelling	  approach	  to	  estimate	  future	  
changes	  in	  malaria	  risk	  above	  a	  biological	  approach.	  Their	  statistical-­‐empirical	  
approach,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  biological	  or	  process-­‐based	  models,	  estimated	  changes	  not	  
in	  the	  potential	  risk	  of	  transmission,	  but	  based	  on	  a	  climate-­‐malaria	  equation	  derived	  
from	  the	  actual	  contemporary	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  malaria.	  	  However,	  comparing	  
biological	  and	  statistical	  is	  comparing	  apples	  with	  oranges.	  The	  biological	  and	  
statistical	  models	  are	  thus	  estimating	  different	  parameters,	  and	  their	  results	  cannot	  be	  
directly	  compared.	  We	  also	  question	  their	  analytical	  approach.	  
	  
On	  a	  global	  scale,	  all	  current	  biologically	  based	  models	  show	  net	  increases	  in	  the	  
transmission	  zone	  of	  malaria	  and	  changes	  in	  seasonal	  transmission	  under	  various	  
climate	  change	  scenarios	  (2).	  Some	  local	  decreases	  in	  malaria	  transmission	  are	  also	  
estimated	  to	  occur	  where	  declines	  in	  rainfall	  would	  limit	  mosquito	  survival	  and	  
reproduction.	  This	  modelling	  of	  potential	  malaria	  transmission	  is	  a	  legitimate	  scientific	  
exercise,	  seeking,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  information	  about	  how	  the	  intrinsic	  
transmission-­‐supporting	  properties	  of	  the	  world	  would	  vary	  under	  climate	  change.	  
	  
The	  statistical	  modelling	  of	  actual	  transmission	  by	  Rogers	  and	  Randolph	  focused	  on	  the	  
present	  day	  distribution	  of	  malaria	  and	  does	  not	  consider	  its	  historical	  distribution	  at	  
extreme	  latitudes,	  for	  example	  in	  Europe	  or	  North	  America.	  	  Thus	  we	  wonder	  whether	  
the	  model	  has	  satisfactorily	  captured	  the	  climate	  space	  needed	  to	  support	  malaria?	  
Secondly,	  the	  climate	  in	  areas	  without	  malaria	  was	  described	  in	  a	  10o	  band	  
surrounding	  the	  malaria	  presence	  zones.	  These	  negative	  areas	  include	  major	  
geographical	  barriers	  with	  extreme	  climates,	  such	  as	  the	  Sahara,	  Kalahari	  and	  
Australian	  deserts,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Andes	  and	  Himalayan	  mountains,	  all	  areas	  that	  are	  
not	  representative	  of	  where	  most	  people	  live.	  Thus	  the	  climate	  model	  is	  probably	  
defining	  those	  warm	  and	  wet	  conditions	  found	  in	  the	  tropics,	  the	  region	  where	  climate	  




Statistical	  modelling	  offers	  a	  different	  approach	  because	  it	  incorporates	  information	  
about	  the	  current	  social,	  economic,	  technological	  modulation	  of	  malaria	  transmission.	  It	  
assumes	  that	  those	  contextual	  factors	  will	  apply	  in	  future	  in	  unchanged	  fashion.	  This	  
adds	  an	  important,	  though	  speculative,	  element	  of	  multivariate	  realism	  to	  the	  
modelling	  -­‐	  but	  the	  model	  thereby	  addresses	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  question	  from	  the	  
biological	  model.	  
	  
Both	  types	  of	  models	  have	  limitations	  and	  defects.	  The	  biological	  model	  assumes	  that	  
there	  are	  known	  and	  generalisable	  biologically-­‐mediated	  relationships.	  	  Also,	  in	  its	  
current	  developmental	  state,	  such	  modelling	  has	  not	  yet	  attempted	  the	  horizontal	  
integration	  of	  social,	  economic	  and	  technical	  change.	  The	  statistical	  model	  is	  based	  on	  
socioeconomically	  censored	  data.	  It	  derives	  its	  basic	  equation	  from	  the	  existing	  
(constrained)	  distribution	  of	  malaria	  in	  today's	  world	  and	  climatic	  conditions,	  and	  
foregoes	  much	  information	  on	  the	  malaria/climate	  relationship	  within	  the	  temperate-­‐
zone	  climatic	  range.	  Yet	  this	  range	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  considerably	  important	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  marginal	  spread	  of	  malaria	  under	  future	  climate	  change.	  
	  
The	  important	  task	  is	  to	  compare,	  and	  understand,	  the	  differing	  results	  in	  these	  two	  
types	  of	  models.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  concepts	  and	  methods	  of	  estimating	  future	  climate	  
impacts	  will	  evolve.	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
